How likely is it that Russia will allow India to copy Russia’s best submarine? How likely is it that the first submarine India builds will be as good as Russia’s best? This claim about the Indian ATV being a derivative of the Russian Severodvinsk-class (Yasen) SSGN is just a wet dream.

The ATV is probably an attempt to clone the old Soviet Charlie II submarine. India has been struggling to build the ATV for decades.

Rupak, India is trying to pay for 5 different fighter programs. Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000-5, LCA, MCA and helping to fund the Russian PAK-FA. Where is the money going to come from? India is not a big economy. The economy of France is 3 times bigger than India’s.

The Russian Su-30MKI is a 4th generation heavy fighter and will be India’s best fighter for a long time to come. The Indian air force wants 126 French Mirage 2000-5s as its 4th generation light fighter. And India is going to help fund the Russian PAK-FA because the PAK-FA is India’s only hope of getting a 5th generation fighter.

Paying for these 3 fighter programs is going to use up a lot of India’s money. Where does that leave the LCA and MCA? The LCA has a long way to go. The MCA is a twin engined strike version of the LCA and is even further away. If the LCA fails the MCA also fails because the MCA depends on the LCA.

How much money is the Indian air force budgetting for the Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000-5 and PAK-FA? How much money is the Indian air force budgetting for the LCA and MCA?

The Indian air force is eager to buy 126 Mirage 2000-5s from France. India is asking France to transfer technology to enable India to build the Mirage 2000-5 under license. This deal will cost many billions of dollars.

The Indian air force is obviously desperate for a modern light fighter like the Mirage 2000-5. But the fact that the Indian air force prefers to spend India’s scarce funds on 126 Mirage 2000-5s clearly shows that the Indian air force has no confidence in the LCA.

http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IEH20030919143518&Title=Top+Stories&rLink=0

CHENNAI: The Centre has given the clearance to start negotiations for acquiring 12 used Mirage-2000-5 aircraft from Qatar, Vice Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal M Mc Mahon said here on Thursday.

Speaking to this website’s newspaper, Air Marshal Mc Mahon said the Indian Air Force (IAF) was keen on the Mirages since the infrastructure and the facilities for service and maintenance were already in place.

The Mirage 2000-5 is capable of carrying nuclear weapons and is a generation ahead of the Mirage 2000s which are currently with the IAF. Qatar, which bought the Mirages from France in 1998, has now decided to sell them.

Air Marshal Mahon also confirmed that the IAF had plans to acquire as many as 126 Mirage 2000-5s from France. “The Government has given the go-ahead to begin talks with France on the issue,” he said.

According to him, the air force was going in for such a large number of the same type of aircraft to reduce the `types’ of aircraft in its inventory since `this would make it simpler in terms of providing maintenance and support, in addition to being cost effective’. “The Mirage fits this role. It is an aircraft which can be continuously upgraded. We can use it for a considerable future,” he said.

Is the LCA really indigenous? The following is from Indian Admiral J G Nadkarni (retd).

Admiral J G Nadkarni (retd)

The sad tale of the LCA

Last month, Indian defence authorities quietly announced that India’s prestigious Light Combat Aircraft, originally to have become operational in 1995, will not achieve that status before 2015. The euphoria over the first flight of the prototype a few days later, however, helped to push that stark news off the front pages.

The LCA programme was initiated in 1983 by the Defence Research and Development Organisation, with three widely publicised assertions. One, that it would be an indigenous project catapulting India into the rarefied ranks of global aviation powers. Two, the aircraft would enter frontline squadron service by 1995. And three, the project would only cost Rs 700 crores (Rs 7 billion).

What actually happened between 1983 and 2000? First, let us take the promise of indigenous development. In 1986 an agreement was quietly signed with the United States that permitted DRDO to work with four US Air force laboratories. The to-be-indigenously-developed engine for the LCA — Kaveri — was forgotten and the US made General Electric F-404 engine was substituted. Radar was sourced from Erricson Ferranti, carbon-fibre composite panels for wings from Alenia and fly-by-wire controls from Lockheed Martin. Design help was sought from British Aerospace, Avion Marcel Dassault and Deutsche Aerospace. Wind tunnel testing was done in the US, Russia and France. As for armaments — missiles, guns, rockets and bombs — every last item was to be imported.

As for operational induction, anyone who knew anything about fighter aircraft development or the capabilities of the DRDO would have known that the envisaged 12-year time frame (1983-1995) was /pure make-believe.

Yet, as late as 1990, DRDO asserted that the 1995 target would be met. It was only when 1995 drew closer that the talk shifted from operational induction to test flights. In 1998, the defence minister stated that the first test flight would take place in 1999. The first flight finally took place a few days ago, 17 years after the project started.

As for the project cost, the original budget was Rs 700 crores. It was later revised to Rs 3,000 crores (Rs 30 billion). It would easily go past Rs 10,000 crores (Rs 100 billion) before the aircraft is inducted into operational service. And that is with DRDO incurring only about a quarter of the overall development costs. Not included are the cost of the huge amounts of foreign equipment being fitted; engine, radar, electronic warfare and communication equipment, high-stress body panels, cockpit displays and the entire range of armament.

Initially it was stated that the per copy price of an LCA would be Rs 10 crores (Rs 100 million). It would be a miracle if the LCA can ever be produced at less than Rs 150 crores (Rs 1.5 billion) a copy. And if the LCA is eventually inducted in 2015, what will the Indian Air Force get? It will get an aircraft at best comparable to first generation F-16s.

One of the DRDO’s favourite phrases is ‘state of the art,’ and according to them everything of the LCA is state of the art. In the fighter aircraft field, to be state of the art, at least from 1990, an aircraft must be designed for ‘stealth’, that is having virtually no radar or thermal signature. Not even DRDO has so far claimed that the LCA is a stealth aircraft, or that it is capable of being made into one. Forget stealth, the LCA is incapable of any significant upgrading at all during its lifetime. It is a very small, single-engined aircraft tightly packed with equipment. It cannot be fitted with a bigger engine or expanded avionics.

What prompted the DRDO to conceive the LCA when Israel, technologically far more advanced than India, had abandoned its Lavi fighter project after spending more than $ 2 billion on it? Aircraft development costs had mounted so much by then that far richer-countries compared to India such as Britain, France and Germany had realised that unless they formed multinational consortia it would not be possible for them to develop sophisticated, modern aircraft. That is why beginning the late 1970s we have had Eurofighters and Eurocopters, where three or four countries share costs and buying commitments.

It can be said with certainty that the LCA will never become a frontline fighter with the Indian Air Force. The Mirage 2000s and the Mig-29s that the air force has been flying from the 1980s have superior capabilities to any LCA that might be inducted in 2015, 2020 or 2025. So the most prudent thing for the government would be to immediately terminate the LCA project. National and individual egos have been satisfied after the first flight.

The Rs 3,000 crores or so that have spent so far could be put down as the price of a valuable learning experience. We would have undoubtedly gained valuable knowledge in many areas of aircraft design and engineering. But of much greater value, we would have gained the understanding that defence R&D is not a make-believe game to be played by exploiting the fascination for techno-nationalism.

The LCA ranks alongside DRDO’s other monumental failures such as the Arjun tank, the Trishul and the Akash missiles, and the Kaveri engine. The time and cost overruns on these projects have been enormous. The story of the Arjun is well known.

With the induction of the T-90, there is no way the Arjun is going to spearhead India’s armoured divisions. In fact there are many who believe that the T-72 inducted two decades ago is a better tank than the Arjun. The reality of Arjun seems to be finally sinking in, and it would appear that it might end up not as a battle tank, but as a platform for a 155mm howitzer.

The short-range, surface-to-air-missile Trishul was to be fitted on three Indian Navy frigates in 1992. A decade later, the missile is still carrying out “successful” tests, long after the frigates have been completed. The same story goes for the medium-range, surface-to-air missile Akash and the anti-tank missile Nag.

During the last 20 years, DRDO has fine-tuned the art of selling projects. To start with, don’t be timid and aim low. In true Parkinsonian style, the more ambitious the project, greater the chance of it being sanctioned. When the presentation is made to the minister, be generous with phrases such as “state-of-the art”. Also mention that we will be the third country in the world to produce the equipment. (It is always the “third” as even the minister knows that the USA and Russia already produce the same).

If a service chief demurs, make snide remarks about how the services want to import everything. And keep the estimated cost of the project absurdly low. Once the project is sanctioned, feed the media with a steady stream of unverifiable tidbits. Bring out a mock-up model and show it round at the Republic Day parade and defence exhibitions.

In recent times DRDO and India’s defence services have evolved a modus vivendi. No longer does DRDO oppose imports, provided they are allowed to continue with their projects. Thus, import Su-30s and develop the LCA. Import T-90 tanks and produce Arjun. Import Israeli UAV and continue with a similar indigenous project. The only victim in this you-scratch-my-back-I-scratch-yours game is the Indian taxpayer, who unfortunately does not seem to care.

http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jan/13nad.htm