On the topic of the Kfir, I have always had my doubts about the listed empty weight, considering the heavier engine, extensive heat shielding needed in the rear fuselage, canards, and the strengthened undercarriage with longer stroke oleos.
The J-79 required larger intakes due to its greater mass flow over the ATAR 09C, and it’s higher operating temperature, apart from the heat shielding mentioned above, required the recognisable extra air cooling scoops and trunking.

None of that would reduce weight when compared to the Mirage 5 or Dagger/Nesher.
It is also noticeable that the Nesher is quoted as being half a ton empty than the Mirage 5 regarding empty weight…;)

The J79 was superior at higher altitude than the Atar. None of the Mirage users used them at 50,000 feet, but we know the J79 could handle it. The Atar was a hotrodded motor, ran hotter than the metals and corresponding lubrication systems were able to handle, especially at high altitudes. So the J79 wasn’t some hot mess or anything. It’s use on Kfir was because it was available.

I realize wiki and other sources list Mirage III ceiling being anywhere from 52,000 to 56,000 feet. The problem is you don’t last long above 40,000 feet without a positive pressure suit. Once you get that high in one it blossoms as air pressure in the cockpit drops. Everything becomes more difficult to function in the tight cockpit of the Mirage III. The second more critical issue is engine cooling. The Atar wasn’t meant to run that high except for single runs on a head-on target. The J79 was designed with high altitude in mind.

It’s difficult to know where to begin with this.
Suffice to say, the Mirage IV spent a decade, before changing flight profiles due to SAM improvements, showing much of this to be incorrect.

where did you get all this info? It seems to me that the Kfir has had quite a few satisfied customers around the world, and certainly the use of the J79 motor instead of the ATAR should have improved performance somewhat.

Books.. My best bet is Squadron/Signal, I don’t remember it all, anymore…
The performance was better, right, but balance and handling were terrible. Compared to ATAR, the J79 was short, heavy and positioned way too aft..

Everything I’ve seen indicates the J-79 mated to the Mirage III airframe wasn’t a match made in heaven.
Apart from what MSphere states about the different weight, shape and positioning, the J-79 also required extensive heat shielding and additional cooling scoops and trunking.

The J-79 certainly provided more thrust over the ATAR 09C that the Israelis used on their Mirage IIIC, but the ATAR 9K50 as used by the Cheetah (and Mirage F1 incidentally) was a far superior mating. The Israelis never used the more powerful ATAR 09K50, which was only slightly less powerful than the J-79 as compared to the original ATARs.
The roughly 5 to 10% increase of thrust the J-79 over the 09K50 must be balanced with the J-79’s heavier weight and draggier installation in the Mirage III airframe.
For example, take a look at the airframe of the Kfir C10 and Cheetah C from aft of the cockpit. The Cheetah has a far cleaner airframe, from the refuelling proble, cable bulges on the Kfir C10 wing roots, and generally large and messy air cooling scoops found on the Kfir C10 mid and rear fuselage.
Probably the primary driver of the J-79 on the Mirage III airframe was the fact that Israel already used it by the hundreds on the F4 Phantom, and could avail of US military aid. Israel after all was the largest foreign user of the Phantom.

a few operators who had the F.1 chose to continue using the clone of the earlier Mirage, over the F.1. such as south africa.

Context is very important here.

The original aim in South Africa was to develop the New Generation Fighter Aircraft System, also known as Project Carver. Once this project was underway, it would have replaced a whole host of aircraft.
A few years into the programme, it was realised that the Carver would only have come into service in appreciable numbers around the year 2000.

This led to an interim multirole fighter project called Project Tunny, which resulted in the Cheetah C, with service entry in 1993.
The earlier Cheetah E programme, an upgrade of existing Mirage III airframes in the SA inventory, was also an interim project to enhance the capabilities of existing airframes, and was nowhere near as capable as the Cheetah C. These Cheetah E airframes were retired in 1992, after being introduced in 1986.

The Mirage F1 was not replaced by the Cheetah C. The Mirage F1 was the premier combat aircraft in the South African inventory.
The decision was thus taken, as the premier combat jet, to keep the F1 in service, and when enough Cheetah C’s were in service, the Mirage F-1 AZ and CZ would then in turn be taken into hand for modification to a common standard.
The intention was to keep the Cheetah C and the “Super” Mirage F1 in service together, with similar systems, until Carver then replaced both.

On another forum, an engineer who worked on the Cheetah C project stated that the F1 would have received a new nose with radar that was basically the same as the Cheetah C. His development brief on his side of the project was ensuring the digital “glass displays” in the Cheetah C (positioning etc) remain compatible with the intended Mirage F1 upgrade cockpit. Among other modifications to the F1, apart from the new radar and nose, was an air-to-air refuelling pipe, and a bulged redesigned base of the vertical fin similar to that found on the F16. Both Mirage F1 and Cheetah C airframes were fitted with and flew with a turbofan engine.

The end of the Cold War ended the Mirage F1 upgrade programme, just as it ended the Carver programme.
The SAAF were impressed with the Mirage F1 aerodynamic performance, and were willing to upgrade the internal systems/avionics to Cheetah C level. It was simply a matter of the timing of external events, leading to massive defence reductions, that stopped that from happening.

I would posit that the timing of the end of the Cold War probably came at exactly the time when the Mirage F1 was ready for a serious upgrade…but then, as in South Africa, defence budgets were slashed.

I’m surprised that you see maintaining an Assad Baath-party dictatorship enforced by force as a realistic position here. Putting their habit of bombarding their own cities and civilians into submission aside, they don’t seem to have a capability of regaining control over the country militarily as they would have probably lost the war already had it not been for vast Iranian-provided financial support and cannon fodder, plus the later Russian air support.

This right here is breathtakingly and fundamentally dishonest.
I’ve no doubt you are “surprised”.

For some reason you seem to be ignoring the fact that there is external funding, arming, and training for the “moderate” head chopping fundamentalists. That there are foreign jihadis by the thousands in Syria, armed and funded by external countries who have stated from the very beginning what they are doing, and that their aim is to topple the Syrian government.

Why would you apply a select criteria to one side, but not the other?

Well, the level in this thread has sunk to never before explored low levels, I am afraid..

There is a report button for a reason. That drivel certainly warrants it.

Syria is a really complex matter, but from my perspective there’s no gain for either SAAF or RuAF in attacking a UN convoy. In addition, the timing is just too convenient for me to believe that it was actually attacked by the loyalist forces. I mean Assad and Putin may not deserve the peace nobel price, but attacking UN convoy is just plain silly, none of the two looks like a fool to me.
It looks like an attack intended at diverting attention from the bombing on SAA positions in Deir Ez Zor, in fact it served that purpouse by shifting the center of concerns at the UN summit. But it would have been silly by the USAAF to strike from the air, I believe some proxies on the ground did the actual job.

Good post. Many have commented on the EXTREMELY convenient timing of the incident. The loud, howling protest that followed has indeed obscured and obfuscated the incident where those Syrian soldiers were killed in that bombing in their own country, by an entity with zero international legal mandate to even be there.