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Marcellogo

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  • in reply to: Russia moving tac air troops to Syria #2168671
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    This T-129 tell enough about rest of Turkish capabilities. It has been over 10 years in this project and how many in active combat with round the clock sorties. compared to more than 300 Russian made transport and attack choppers operating in Syria-Irak theatres.

    It is not just MIG29K that got tested but Syrian MIG29s also.

    And you consider T-129 a Turkish project?:confused:

    in reply to: US CAS rethinking going on #2172298
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    Interestingly the comments in your post above, since it would have been possible to observe these differences in the operations from A-10 in the Gulf War in 1991 as well as in the current campaigns both in Iraq and Afghanistan after 2003.

    like in 1991 during the Gulf War the A-10 had been operated mostly at altitudes above 10000ft(3050m) on CAS and BAI missions because of the threat from MANPADS and AAA . In this campaign the most effective weapon of the A 10 has been the AGM 65 Maverik, once 90% from all AGM 65 were launched by A 10 during the Golf War, while the Gatling 6x30mm GAU-8 cannon were less used because of the restrictions to stay above 10000ft(3050m) the altitude.

    In the campaigns post-invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Afghanistan the most effective weapon of the A 10 has been the GAU-8 cannon, although the threat of the MANPADS and AAA has been smaller than 1991 but the same still present , therefore the explanation for this change could have been associated with the characteristics of the targets has been found out in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    In 1991 those targets had been identified from 10,000ft altitude on the deserts of Iraq and Kuwait, such as: MBT, APC, IFV, MLRS, SS 1 SCUD TEL , artillery pieces among others. While in Iraq and Afghanistan after 2003 the targets of the A-10 has been found out among civilian buildings and vehicles used by insurgents, so there were not scattered and visible in the deserts like in 1991 but in urban areas among the civilian population.

    Another detail that may explain the fact that the GAU-8 cannon has been became the most effective weapon in the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns shall be the improved version A-10C, which among other systems has been introduced the SNIPER and LITENING pod with FLIR and Laser Designation .

    In 1991 the A-10A had been only equipped with the Pave Penny sensor that are simple located laser from marked targets by others aircraft or ground troops equipped with laser designation.

    Then with the introduction of SNIPER and LITENING pods the A-10C has been equipping with laser range to increase the accuracy of GAU-8 as well as FLIR for searching more difficult targets in urban environment.

    However, what has been making the A-10 highly effective with the GAU 8 are its impressive capabilities to withstand damage from MANPADS or AAA while has been flying at low altitude and speed, since the low speed and altitude will increases accuracy from GAU-8 and enables A-10C to identify difficult targets for the GAU-8 and other weapons.

    In the 1998 Kosovo campaign your A-10 and our AMX operated together as one had the heavy payload while the other had a better and above all “just on time” sensor package.
    + they worked very well together having, the more, the less, the same flight pattern and the low level loiter ability.
    Our own operative experience in Afghanistan confirm what said in the Rand report, even equipped with a M-61 peashooter a CAS plane can still make enemy to squat down making or even feigning a strafing run.
    Add to that the fact that we found that the by far the most useful item in the Afghanistan scenario was the couple Reccelite pod and the “just in time” link with the same troops on the ground to explain why we are just a little conservative/skeptics on this matter of long range CAS.

    in reply to: 2017 F-35 news and discussion thread #2172347
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    While the death spiral ended hitting the wrong plane*, the Bees are training in Japan. Plenty of Japanese stuff including what seems to be grey S92 and an EH101. At 4:50 also a good angle on the exhaust pipe kinematic.

    *according to what claimed the 35 detractors

    Uhu, what is to made you so happy? It is because the F-35C is so late than (legacy) Hornet are falling down in pieces, so a good part of the blame is to be put on them the same.

    in reply to: Russia moving tac air troops to Syria #2173634
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    I think in those situations tactical uavs to have persistent surveillance would be as valuable as having the strike aircraft and munitions to target them. A half dozen Su-25s supported with the endurance ISR of MALE uavs would be a deadly combination, and if that aircraft has a few hellfire class missiles to hit targets of opportunity would very much be a secondary role for the kind of war Iraq or Syria is facing.

    And I think Iraq is using CH-4s

    RuAF operate is strict contact with SAA troops on the ground, not sending drones hundred of km into enemy line begging for found a viable target like int. coalition do, so even a tactical drone, just for keep a constant look from the air iis more than enough.
    Every time a formation of russian planes take off from Latakia it has several option of intervention thank of troops action on ground.

    in reply to: US CAS rethinking going on #2173766
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    I think the A-10 does two things for CAS…
    1) I think it has a fear factor for enemies just like the Stuka of WWII. Hearing the sound of that gun and knowing it is in the vicinity, would make any man tremble.
    2) It give one hell of a morale boost to the troops on the ground. Pretty much for the same reasons. Knowing not much would survive or continue to fight after a strafing run. Seeing it doing slow twists and turns down low to come in for another past has to be awe inspiring!

    …and on the other side ground troops do a great thing for the A-10 (and AMX, Su-25, Apache, Mi-28, Tiger ets, etc.):
    with their movement & fire they put the enemy force into the dire choice to show up & fight, so making them a suitable target for a CAS plane attack or insteadkeep to stay hidden and being overran.

    This even more when we talk about the current engagement in Afghanistan and Syria-Iraq against insurgent forces that blend themselves with the civilian population and use/rob their infrastuctures and life support in opposition to let’s say the centralized and logistically heavy armed forces under Saddam Hussein that offered a lot of targets for a strategic bombing campaign.

    in reply to: US CAS rethinking going on #2173769
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    People, there are a lot of other 30X173, 30×170 and 30x165mm aircraft guns in the word, a pod with one of them doesn’t cost so much to need to adapt the GAU-8 to the Scorpion.
    One can also reuse the 25mm pods of the Harriers, both with US gatling than British revolver ones.

    in reply to: RuAF News and development Thread part 15 #2174651
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    You have no conception of aerodynamics if you think the Su-24 “loiters like UAVs”.

    Not to mention this gem:

    “It was partly made for that. This is lifted from a report on the jet
    The aircraft had to be capable of hitting small ground targets, reaching supersonic speeds and breaking through low-altitude enemy air defenses at 50 meters – and make it home.”

    Does NOT support your argument one bit- since that is not how it has been used in Syria at all. At no point was its design mission anything like you have described it, or particularly efficient at the task at hand.

    Quit while you are behind. Your constant fanboyism is JSR level.

    Yes , what he has described id ìs the typical very low quote, high velocity attack that was typical of this class of aircraft during the cold war.
    It is the right contrary of the way the Su-24 his performing in the current Syria mission that is instead a medium /high quote loitering while emplo
    ing SVP-24 to engage targets from above their AA defence maximum quote.
    Te same video posted clearly show it: the Su-24 fly with swept wings as it was a Su-25 for performing such a mission.
    This doesn’t mean that he is not able to operate efficacely also in such a role also, right the contrary, just it doesn’t constitute a proof.
    So, my conclusion is, it is more complicated to tend about than Su-17 and Su-25 , yes, it is able to operate in their same mission range , yes, are they capable to do what it do instead, no.
    They are performing well, striking with precision and showing an overall good reliability and mission generation ratio? Yes,yes,yes and yes.
    Are their use somewhat endangering Su-34 acquisition prospective? no.
    So please, let them bomb those wahabi scum to oblivion and wish them good hunt and let’s pass to another argument as this is overdone.

    in reply to: US CAS rethinking going on #2175331
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    Marcellogo, what exactly is a randomly guided bomb?

    Have you actually looked at the types of munitions used in CAS missions lately? Would you consider the SDB-II random? What about laser guided SDB or GBU-54b? This is a failure to understand that the types of munitions have changed the nature of close air support. You seem to be under the impression that guided munitions need mission planning, that just isn’t the case when looking at the recent expenditures in Syria or Iraq.

    No offense, but your lacking in understanding on how close air support has been prosecuted by western air forces in recent campaigns. It isn’t the platform, it’s the timely intelligence and munitions. The B-1 has been the superstar, with the F-15E as a second, drones third, and F-16’s and A-10’s filling in on expeditionary air wings when the first two are rotated out. (In the case of the USAF).

    Maybe is because i’m not an english speaker, but it seems me that we are going to reach the peak of absurd here. Look, it was bring-it-on that has affirmed that i have sustained such a bestiality.
    After that i have replied him that he has just accused me of sustaining something that, in my eyes, violates the same principle of not contradiction, what more can i say????
    Let’me add how the presence or not of a guidance system has nothing to do really with it.
    Because it’s just a redundant i.e. unnecessary complication to the reasoning fault, as just the coupling of the world randomly and pre-designated is sufficient to made it to occur.

    Said so, in all my post about the argument I have not mentioned the alternative between weapon types, all of them are instead centered on the characteristics that a mission ought to have to be considered CAS and not just an aerial strike happening close to the location of friendly troops.
    because if the fundamental thesis of the ones that want ditch the A-10 or any other mission specific assets is that CAS is a mission not a plane, we have to talk about what this mission really is FIRST, not about what plane (or another asset) is better for it and even more what they would be its eventual weapons.
    Given that it seems me there is a difference between me and others about the mission pattern, i’ll like someone to reply to this, and not to something I have not asked nor i’m not, almost at this point of the discussion, interested in.

    Frankly, I have always seen said that have been the B-1B and the A-10 to operate in direct coordinations with (kurdish/SDF) forces on the front lines while the other planes were used for deep strikes into ISIS held territory.
    If you have other statistics/articles over them being instead used in this peculiar role, i’m obviously very interested.

    in reply to: Should Iraq have bought the Su-30? #2176444
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    Fuel consumption per hour of the MiG-29 is less than that for the F-16C? That would surprise me too, seeing as the MiG has 30% more weight and installed thrust than the F-16 – in fact I don’t believe it. Check out the internal fuel loads of both aircraft – and then check out the range/endurance of each aircraft on their own internal fuel load.

    Fuel consumption depends by the bypass ratio, by the overall power installed and by how much you have to push the engine to reach a certain speed.
    So every plane have a different pattern, two medium size engines being used in a relaxed regime can consume less than a single large one that need to be pushed to the limit in order to reach the same velocity.
    There is not a constant there as every plane and engine combination can produce different results.

    in reply to: Should Iraq have bought the Su-30? #2176482
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    And does Iraq currently need *any* of those types?

    If you’re primarily concerned with loitering and dropping PGMs in permssive air environment, as Iraq will be for the next decade, a special-missions Gulfstream will do it all more cheaply and probably better. And with more ISAR kit onboard, plus a toilet and oven.

    Hyper-expensive-per-hour fighters poddling around subsonic on account of big tanks and draggy munitions and having to bug-out of the fight due to fuel levels? Not sure I see the attraction.

    I think Iraq’s mistake was wanting to be back in the fast-jet club.

    To say it in the simplest way: No, they are not interested in just COIN, they wanted also a plane able to cover their own air space so to avoid that unfriendly nations (and there are a lot around) would use it instead.
    For the CAS/COIN mission against Daesh they have others asset actually and even with those few that they have they still perform more missions than the whole international coalition as any check on their relative numbers would eagerly show you.

    in reply to: US CAS rethinking going on #2176486
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    What you said was –

    Is it wrong for one to assume that given this is a forum where folks are reasonably well informed that if someone says that PGM investment constitutes a CAS capability it does not automatically mean that the person is saying take a smart bomb and randomly start dropping it at pre selected targets? Seriously, when someone says that don’t look just at the A-10 or *Insert your prefferd CAS craft* but look at the mission and how PGM’s have ushered in the era of non-traditional CAS (i.e. the Mission) one really shouldn’t need to explain how CAS is done with them (most folks here understand that).

    It should be understood that what I’m referring to is doing CAS with smart munitions (and the built up capability to do so) and not just some random strike on a target. Of course it entails leveraging other assets and investments (networking, targeting, communications, training etc), trained JTAC’s and something you practice regularly but that was not being debated here. No one is promoting that they shed the competencies associated with CAS, just the infatuation of always thinking of a CAS-plane every time CAS is mentioned.

    This is a basic level of understanding that is assumed on this forum. No one is arguing that position, at least not on this thread.

    Seems me that we have a grade A problem of undertanding there.
    If it is a fault of mine, my apologies but when you write that I had affirmed that is possible to send randomly a guided bomb on a predetermined target, you are implying that i’m violating the same logical principle of non-contradiction as the term random and predetermined are mutually exclusive one of the other.
    So or you randomly bomb a casual location or you purposely target a predetermined one, tertium non datur.

    Regardless of this, you are misunderstanding me again, i’m not saying that using the PGM in performing CAS is something wrong, i’m saying that CAS is a mission that not just envisage firing or dropping ordnance over an enemy but also other forms of support between the asset performing it and the friendly troops on the ground.

    In the same way there are a series of prerequisites to qualify a mission as CAS regardless of the assets used.
    As an example sending a Drone over the desert to look for the passing of an islamist terror leader and eventually targeting it is not a CAS mission as there is not friendly troops on the ground to support.
    Sending a plane to bomb (or delivery an artillery strike to) a predetermined location, even if it is very close to friendly troops, without envisaging a prosecution of the action or any contact and coordination with them is not CAS the same, as it lacks the aspect of persistence of action, coordination with the ground force and two way communication.
    Needless to say, the fact that in those actions are used guided or unguided ordnanceor the asset performing and even the quote/position from where the attack is performed have absolutely nothing to do with the mission being or not a CAS.
    Now.a question from my part to you, just to clarify what i consider the main point of difference in our respective views.
    Is the dropping a weapon/ killing someone an obligatory part of the CAS mission?
    Because, not in my opinion but in the operational experience of my own country’s air force this is not considered essential to consider a mission as doing CAS while the things i have listed above (repeat: persistence of action, coordination and two way communication) are.

    About the introduction of the airplane X or y in the discussion, I would repeat here again the original question/statement I have made, using different words: Given that actually the different facets that actually made up the whole of the CAS mission are covered in my own country by a single item, the Aeritalia/aerMacchi/Embraer AMX I fear that what you are descriving (i.e. every service asking separate allocations for covering a part of it) would end up splitting what actually is a niche mission in itself in various sub niches, so increasing the inherent danger that those separate components would be destined instead to other missions considered more important instead by each of the different specialities/branches/services manning them.

    I would instead prefer to have still a single item WHATEVER IT IS but able to cover the whole of CAS as its primary mission, so to avoid such temptations.

    The part that I consider important is the one in bold, other is secondary or better said accidental.

    in reply to: RuAF News and development Thread part 15 #2176711
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    This has been from Twitter.
    https://twitter.com/RSS_40/status/826889793753796608

    I think FGM-129C (CM) is actually FGM-129S (SM)??
    Anyone got any more info on this development and the PESAs that Phazotron had earlier showcased? Their website is not up to date and info is hard to get by.
    Hope its true, would love to see a Zhuk PESA radar, finally, on the 29s.

    A PESA or better sayd an hybrid PESA radar on a gimballing mount like on Flankers make much more sense in russian POW than the alternative between an outdated MFI and a fixed AESA…

    in reply to: US CAS rethinking going on #2176925
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    I’m fairly well aware of what CAS is and how it is defined. I’m also aware that its the goal and end that is important and not the means. For the rest, I’m not sure you understand the arguments here. It’s not about whether a service wants to do X Y or Z, but how it wants to do it given the resources. All other mission areas have seen prioritization, trades on account of anticipated resource availability. CAS is just one of them and not an outlier.

    Too bad you forgot to tell the forces that actually did CAS in the last few wars that PGM’s do not constitute CAS. I guess those troops on the ground should have turned those aircraft away and flooded the radios with ” Go Away..You are not CAS”.

    Bring-it-on, still with this damn habit of putting in mouth of person something that they have never said?
    Try not yo push you own point so farther to make it an absurd, please.

    Introducing a guided artillery or tank shell doesn’t make it a CAS asset, just add a precision attack mode to an existing weapon, it is not the weapon or even the carrier that made a CAS asset , it’s the mission pattern: so if , as an example ad absurdum, ,one would send an A-10 to made a simple low pass , drop all its payload at once, guided or not, at a predesignated target and fly away that would not be CAS mission at all, just a low quote aerial strike, made using a completely wrong plane for it
    Putting instead a B-1B at 20000 mts over Kobane together with predators for targeting, making it make rounds for hours and drop a single bomb at each ISIS unit getting in the open, is instead an hell of unconventional and costly form of perform it, but it is surely a CAS one.
    Needless to say, as soon as it was possible to put on a viable coordination with Kurdish SDF units and use Incirkik base they have immediately send A-10 for performing it.

    in reply to: US CAS rethinking going on #2177024
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    Why are we arguing about the definition of CAS. It is very clear.

    https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_09_3.pdf

    Another 340 odd pages after the above quote.

    And in the above quote there NOT any mention of using a whatsoever type of weapon, if you note well
    In those 340 pages you would find not just the description of plain bombing or even cannon use but also other forms of non fire support, like direction of artillery fire, target recognition, two way communication with the troops being in any way considered the paramount feature of such a mission and the discriminant between it and a single air strike, performed of not with PGM.
    It is because of that they made mention as first thing of the coordination of fire& movement with the ground forces, meaning with this expression the regular course of action of the generality of the field army, whose action have to be supported over time.
    Somewhere in time seems that lot of persons have instead mistaken it with the single air strike when it is performed under the direction of a a SF team, a FAC or even a drone instead of just a pre-designated target.
    Thank you to have made finally clear that this is NOT the case.

    in reply to: Would you choose a MiG-35 over an Su-30 or Su-35? #2177134
    Marcellogo
    Participant

    Combat Potency, MiG-35 – AESA:
    dog fight: Su-30MKM (1.25), the Su-35 (1.93), the MiG-35 (1.64)
    long-range air combat: Su-30MKM (0.92), the Su-35S (1.9), the MiG-35 (1.44)

    attack ground targets: Su-30MKM (1.09), the Su-35S (1.53), the MiG-35 (1.27)
    Self-Defense: Su-30MKM (0.62), the Su-35S (0.81), the MiG-35 (0.77)

    Total capacity:
    Su-30MKM 1.25 * 0.92 * 1.09 * 0.62 = 0.78
    Su-35S 1.93 * 1.9 * 1.53 * 0.81 = 4.54
    MiG-35 1.64 * 1.44 * 1.27 * 0.77 = 2.31

    cost of (the domestic price / external price)
    Su-30MKM 50 million. $ / 80 million. $ / 1.6
    Su-35S 42 million. $ / 62.5 million. $ / 1.25
    MiG-35 31 million. $ / 50 million. $ / 1.0

    Efficiency / Cost:
    Su-30MKM 0.78 / 1.6 = 0.49
    MiG-35 2.31 / 1.0 = 2.31
    Su-35S 4.54 / 1.25 = 3.63

    Su-35s – the best choice

    Still have to be considered the operative cost however.

Viewing 15 posts - 511 through 525 (of 1,560 total)