The Gannet was in no way directly comparable with the Tracker, as it was designed around a number of very stringent dimensional constraints. In the end, a double fold wing and paired turboprop was the the only technical solution to a very specific requirement, in turn dictated by the limited size of the RN’s carriers. At this stage in the aviation history, very little thought was given to the upgradability of airframes, as the rate of technological change was so rapid and service lives were expected to be short.

As far as the issue of obsolescence, the Gannet, at least in ASW form, was removed from service in favor of helicopters due to the same carrier size limitations that determined its odd configuration. A Whirlwind helicopter simply made fewer demands in terms of the hangar space and flight deck operations. It can also be argued that the ASW mission was far less important East of Suez, or in the Mediterranean, where the RN carriers predominantly operated. For the RN, the choice was easy, as it was inevitable that all carriers would have a helicopter flight for SAR, it made sense to shift to an all rotary wing ASW element, despite the limitations at longer ranges.

I also would be careful in any comparisons, as the US and Britain had different technological strengths in the this period. Britain was actually ahead of the United States in turboprop technology, and gas turbine technology in general, while the USN had actually invested a great deal in radial piston engine development far later than most people would expect. On the flip side, the United States was farther advanced in terms of avionics and electronics in general, so you would expect more space and weight reserved for those systems.

Of course, one thing you didn’t mention is that there were lighter weight alternatives to both types, most notably the French Alize and Britain’s own shortlived Seamew. As odd as it might seem today, the Gannet was considered to be quite a large and heavy aircraft for smaller carriers.

Then again the Mk8 Mod1 in its current fit with extended range rounds is a good piece of kit. So for me this is more about keeping experience within the UK for this kind of work.

Actually, BAE Systems already has plenty of “experience” through its Swedish and American subsidiaries? Why should BAE Systems compete with itself?

More to the point, why does the UK need a domestic naval gun engineering capacity when the RN has so few potential platforms for naval gunfire support? Obviously, the current MK8 gun makes sense as a legacy system, since the logistics are already in place. However, given the size of the domestic market, with the RN certain to fall below 20 front line combatants and perhaps even below 15, it makes more sense to look to foreign suppliers for an eventual replacement for the MK8, assuming that such a replacement is required.

Indeed its a mess, same thing has happened with CEC integration. Low risk technology insertion which will give a significant capability boost from the 155 conversion to CEC is quietly being strangled by not continuing what is moderate funding.

The problem is that there are already a number of off-the-shelf solutions, from BAE System’s own American subsidiary, not to mention OTO Melara. The merits of upgrading the existing Mk8 to a 155mm mounting are rather limited and the export prospects are non-existent. Given the recent track record of the British defence sector, I have a hard time believing that a supposedly “simple” 155mm naval gun will be available on time, or on budget, or even at all. Do we need to be reminded of the 25mm ADEN cannon that never quite made it to service?

The site has this as an unknown hospital ship. Anyone got any idea’s?

The ship is hardly unknown. It was the icebreaker “Bahia Paraiso,” which was legally operated as a hospital ship during the Falklands war. The ship apparently was built in Argentina, but was lost some years after the Falklands when she ran around and sunk!

http://translate.google.com/translate?sourceid=mozclient&u=http%3A//histarmar.net/Armada%2520Argentina/Buques1900a1970/BPolares/BPBParaiso.htm

When the CVF program started (conceptually at least) back in the mid 90s they were originally going to be 40,000 tonnes, so there would be no way even then an air group of 75 JSFs EACH would have been remotely possible. Lazy bored journalists looking for anything to fill the pages of their rags. The worrying thing is suposedly intelligent people give them any credence.

This is Rumour control, and here are the facts! With apologies to the late Brian Glover (prison warden, Alien 3)
There will be a lot of rumours flying around between now and the election, but it should be remembered that NO decisions will be made or announced until the Defence review has reported AFTER the election. The journos know this, so they are just making stuff up off the tops of their (pointy) heads in the hope someone in government will be spooked and break cover. Similarly various members of the forces and their supporters will be fanning the flames and feeding rumours masquerading as facts to the journos in order to whip up public support for their own particular branch. Cue tales of “RAF Aces face the Axe!” etc. Even though the RAF hasn’t had an ACE since WW2, as you have to shoot down five enemy aircraft to qualify, and the RAF hasn’t shot down anything since then. Brave soldiers of the RAF regiment who guard airfields may be worth their weight in gold out in the Stan for example, but they are not ‘Aces’. Heroes yes.

So here is where we stand. BOTH CVFs have been ordered. Two ships, one contract. Both will be delivered to the RN. Both will be capable of operating the F-35B. A first tranche of about 50 F-35Bs will be ordered once trials with the three F-35Bs we have on order now have been completed. These fifty aircraft will allow the phasing out of the Harrier GR9s of JFH between 2016-2020. JFH itself will stand up it’s fourth sqn, 801NAS next year now that the committment of airframes and crew to the Stan is over. Deployments aboard the CVS’s will increase for the next few years with 10+ aircraft deploying at a time. The RAF sqns will recieve less sea time the the FAA sqns, so will only qualify for daytime ops. The FAA sqns will qualify for night ops too. When the Lightning enters service it has already been announced that the FAA sqns will convert first, with the RAF continuing to operate the Harrier fleet for a couple more years until the transition is complete.

So the plan is that in 2018 or thereabouts, we will have two Queen Elizabeth class carriers in service, five sqns of F-35B (four frontline and one OCU, with the last Harriers leaving service that year), to provide one air group and one strike carrier on call at any given time. The second carrier will either be in refit, at short notice to relieve the ‘on call’ carrier or it will be acting as the ‘on call’ LPH. I believe HMS Ocean will be retained into the early 2020s as a matter of necessity. Further orders of F-35Bs will I believe be forthcoming thereafter, to eventually lead towards the oft quoted figure of 138 or somewhere in the vicinity. Wether or not these aircraft go on to forma second carrier air group or become replacements for the Tornado GR4s is another matter. Financial problems in 2009 will not have a direct bearing on orders to be placed teen years from now though…

At this point, even the modest scenario you’ve outlined seems overly ambitious from the financial standpoint. Even the financing of 50 F-35Bs will prove to be something of a stretch. At best, the RN might have a single carrier in service, with the other effectively in a “reserve” status, and the entire JSF force might consist of a two understrength squadrons and an OCU.

Given the financial constraints, I think we can forget about a 138 unit JSF order, or anything approaching that number, the RAF is going to be a very limited force based on a single type. The real question is who gets the much diminished JSF buy, the RAF or RN, assuming that it isn’t canceled – and it seems very likely that cancellation will be the final outcome.

From the Indian standpoint, with the ex-Gorshkov deal still subject to negotiations and with the indigenous aircraft carrier program moving towards larger platforms in the longer term, considering the purchase of the second CV-F not only gives short term leverage over the Russians but might also offer a solution for later indigenous aircraft carrier designs.

It doesn’t seem likely, and Indian defence negotiations can be very protracted, but there does seem to be merit to idea of disposing of an unaffordable “white elephant” to the Indians.

Of course, there would be a very real downside of the Indians as well, as the CV-F is very much an unproven design and will undoubtedly be subject to further cost overruns. There are significant risks associated with a CV-F purchase for India, but there are also risks in proceeding with the ex-Gorshkov.

For the RN, a CV-F sale to India would be a win-win situation, as the export sale would not only solve the long term procurement budget issues, but would provide “political cover” for the financial and technical difficulties that are yet to come. In a likely scenario of continued cost overruns and years of further delays, much like the Type 45, having India as an export customer might save the program from outright cancellation down the road. The worst case scenario might involve a pair of CV-Fs that are essentially complete but never go into service because of technical difficulties and a lack of political will to fund the correction of those deficiencies. That scenario seems far less likely with one hull going to a foreign navy rather than the RN.

In the end, the real problem with a CV-F sale to India is that the current RN standard design is so potentially compromised that it might be of very little use to the Indians. From the standpoint of the Indian Navy, a carrier built to the same standards as the abortive French PA2, with upgraded propulsion, would be far more ideal, although it be very expensive to make the sort of upgrades that the MN anticipated.

You reply to a post which specifically refers to LHA-6, & not a generic LHA/LHD, & when called on your reply lacking relevance, say “I wasn’t referring to LHA-6”. Then what the hell was your point? As far as I can see, there was none.

You then compound it by saying that the 3rd Mistral is effectively taking the place of PA2, when in fact, it is effectively replacing Jeanne d’Arc. PA2 is in the plans for when there’s money. JdA had to retire, & the only question was how to fill her role. The big worry was that it would be done by reallocating a slice of the amphibious capacity. Mistral 3 allays that fear – for now. We still have to wait & see what happens when it’s time to retire Foudre, & eventually (though not for a while – she’s 8 years newer) Siroco.

First of all, I was referring to a generic LHD/LHA, as the LHA-6 design is very specific to the USN and doesn’t have any relevance to a RN comparison.

Second of all, the 3rd Mistral was in effect a replacement for the deferred (or should I say cancelled) PA2. It kept the shipyard unions working, and that was the entire point of ordering a 3rd Mistral. Basically, the order was a political move, pure and simple. Actually, it made a lot of sense in terms of industrial policy, as the PA2 had become a very risky and costly solution.

I compared them with the LHA-6/USS America precisely because it does not have the docking well & lower vehicle deck. It is not a Wasp-class, but a very different ship, far more aviation-oriented.

I was referring to a generic LHD/LHA type, not specifically to the LHA-6. In the case of France, a further Mistral LHD effectively took the place of the CVF based PA2, although there still is the outside possibility of PA2 becoming a CdeG replacement.

It’s clear that the USN might actually have a minor surplus of platforms with docking wells, which no doubt figured into the shift in emphasis to aviation.