“Then-year” dollars for the F-18E/F & F-35 cover different periods, so are not comparable.
“Then-year” dollars are what was paid in the past, at the prices prevailing at the time, & expected to be paid in the future, at the prices predicted to prevail then. They can not be compared across programmes, unless the period, & annual breakdown of spending, is identical for both programmes – and that is never true.
Let me give an example of how using ‘then-year’ figures affects comparisons:
Assume two projects, one each for the purchase of 100 snarks & 100 boojums.
In year 1, 1 snark & 99 boojums are bought, at 1 groat each.
Over the next year, prices double.
In year 2, 99 snarks & 1 boojum are bought, at 2 groats each.Whenever you buy a snark, it’s the same price as a boojum. The unit prices of both are identical in constant dollars, whichever year you use, 1 or 2. But in then-year groats, snarks cost 1.99, & boojums only 1.01.
You see? You just can’t do it. The comparison is sensitive to period, weighting of spending, etc. You must use constant price estimates for programme cost comparisons for those comparisons to be meaningful.
OK, to continue this exercise:
Using the current estimates for both aircraft, and convert the base year dollars into 2010 dollars (using the BLS inflation calculator, you get:
F-35: 238,598.6 (2002) converts to 289,366.12 (2010) = $117.77m per
F-18: 44,732.1 (2000) converts to 56,675.73 (2010) = $110.05m per
A difference of 6.6% (110.05/117.77)
Would you say this is a fair cost comparison?
Aha!
The price of $133 mn for the JSF is the total procurement cost, at then-year dollars, from the December 2009 SAR –
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/2009%20DEC%20SAR.pdf
See Page 14.$328252.9 mn divided by 2457 = $133.6 mn.
That price not only includes future inflation, but all the development & other fixed costs. It is not a flyaway price.
In 2002$, it’s $97.1 mn per aircraft. Compare the F-18E programme; at 2000$, it’s $44,732.1 for 515 aircraft, i.e. $86.9 mn each. Multiply by 1.0425 (the official US budget office figure for budget inflation from 2000 to 2002) & you get $90.5 mn. Multiply by 1.0582 (the defence inflation figure) & it’s $91.91 mn.
So there you have it. Total programme (not flyaway) price of the JSF is currently estimated to be about 6-7% more per unit than the F-18E. That doesn’t tell us flyaway prices, unfortunately, but it does show us that one is much better off going to the source, not journalists reports which don’t say what figures they’re using.
Comparing “apples to apples”:
Using the 12/2009 SAR, the cost break down this way, all AUPC stated in Then Year Dollars, which accounts for inflation for the life of the program:
F-35A/B/C AverageUnitProcurementCost: $133.6m (328252.9/2457)
F/A-18E/F AverageUnitProcurementCost: $93.38m (48,091.4/515)
The AUPC averages the cost of all variants together.
The F/A-18E/F are 30% less expensive than F-35A/B/C (93.38/133.6=.698) using these figures.
AUPC as defined by the DAU:
“US Code, Title 10, Section 2432, defines Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC): The amount found by dividing the total of funds programmed to be available for obligation for procurement by the number of fully configured end items to be procured.
Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) is calculated by dividing total procurement cost by the number of articles to be procured. Total procurement cost includes flyaway, rollaway, sailaway cost (that is, recurring and nonrecurring costs associated with production of the item such as hardware/software, Systems Engineering (SE), engineering changes and warranties) plus the costs of procuring Technical Data (TD), training, support equipment, and initial spares. This definition may be found in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook.
The APUC would include procurement fund expenditures for platform installs, labor, and support equipment necessary to produce the item. “
From ARES/Wall:
Canada’s, Netherland’s, even Australia’s F-35 prospects controversial.
Most carrier tanking is not strategic its support tanking – topping off planes waiting for a strike to form up prior to ingress or recovery tanking covering for bolters etc.
STOVL jets dont have to orbit round waiting for catapult cycles to launch strike packages so can form up without the need for a top off. Also a STOVL jet has to work very hard to bolter. This means that the aircraft can return with a much smaller reserve. Sharkey Wards claim that he’d tear strips off any of his SHAR pilots who landed with more than 500lb’s left in the tanks was only half joking!.
In the USN, you *might* launch light on fuel to maximize your weps loadout, then tank for range. If the F-35B has no tanking option, range is limited to an extent.
How would the RN handle in-flight refueling of F-35B’s if the carrier was deployed out of range of a land-based tanker? Is their a buddy store for the F-35B? If not, I guess Cobham could cobble something together…
Could I just ask, and I’m not singling Hawkeye out here by the way, I’m just using his post to illustrate my point, why when discussing the possible purchase of SHs that they talk about the F/A-18F? Surely, whilst the purchase of a few Gs for ECM (and possibly tanker duties) and maybe a few Fs for training, the main version should be the single-seat E if only for just that reason, that they only need a single crew member which is less labour intensive. Also if they go down the CATOBAR route why can’t they be fitted, at least initially with steam catapults or keed the ski jump and add arrestor wires and an angled deck?
I would buy 2 -F’s for every 1 -E: use the -E’s for tanking and strike, and use -F for air superiority and complex strike missions. You could either buy a few -G’s, or order prewired -F’s for conversion to -G’s.
Ok, let’s see, if i get a electronic system that require cooling for it normal operation and i cool it down , for it normal operation, then means is stealth-oriented designed?
Some Airbus actually use the fuel-sink system, are Airbus planes meant to decrease their IR signature?
There are more important things, there are more important reasons, not everything has to do with a benchmarketed feature.
let’s see, the LM team worried for the lift fan temperature , using the fuel as heat sump, are they worried for the IR signature? or worried that the luboil viscosity-operative temperature would reach dangerous values?
No they are not worried for the IR signature
There are more important things
How about this: you can transfer the heat in a way that reduces your IR signature or degrades it. A design that solves several problems at once is called elegant. Or you may call it coincidental. From either viewpoint, IR is effectively reduced.
The concord does this and it has nothing to do with stealth, i bet many other supersonic planes do the same.
There is a limit for it, and i doubt the engines heat is being dumped to the fuel, as a way of cooling, is mostly heat for subsystems, radars and so.
Nothing to do with stealth, is a old, common practice, when there are not restricted safety measures.
Interesting that the Concorde did it. I will agree that exhaust heat is not dumped into the fuel, but the engine core heat is shielded by the cooler mass of fuel surrounding it. I was actually referring to avionics and accessories heat being dumped into the fuel, and although it cools these devices so they can operate, it also functions to reduce the IR signature of the aircraft. So I disagree with your assertion that it has nothing to do with stealth.
…and you cannot tell RCS of an airplane by flying it around.
v=o_QyUD6V5_I[/URL]
Yea you can, in practical terms. Just fly it around and see if the radar picks it up. 😉
For compliance to contract specifications, the testing and certification has to be done in a controlled environment, free from interference. I don’t see why a pole model could not be used for this. Flight testing will be done later.
I’m curious how they would test the IR signature since onboard systems besides the engines create heat that is mitigated by dumping it into the fuel, etc.
The F-35B test aircraft are demonstrating some teething problems with maintenance right now – hopefully they will get it sorted shortly. But it is still the most mechanically complex model of the series, with the additional modes of failure associated with more complexity.
The SH is arguably a newer platform than the Rafale, and certainly has a spanking fit of avionics, and an enviable upgrade path. The UK couldn’t go wrong with either, but the SH would be the less expensive option compared to either the Rafale or the F-35B. And this exercise seems to be about money.
F-35B testing still behind schedule, but improving
From ARES / Warwick:
“Lockheed Martin has launched an investigation into parts failures that have slowed flight testing of the STOVL F-35B, but the simpler CTOL F-35A continues to rack up flights. Overall the program logged 49 flights in July, against 41 planned, for a year-to-date total of 185 against 159 planned (target for the year being 394).
But the four F-35Bs at Pax River logged only 22 of those flights, eight short of the plan for the month, and the STOVL fleet ended July with a year-to-date total of 96 flights against 124 planned. August has started well, however, with four STOVL flights so far – and, more importantly, four vertical landings in the past week.
Lockheed says the F-35B reliability and flight rate is improving, but it will surely be a challenge to clear the fleet for STOVL operations by year end to pave the way for initial ship operations in March 2011. Testing has been slowed by maintenance issues with cooling fans, lift-fan door actuators, valves and power system components.”
The good news is that the less (mechanically) complex F-35A/C’s are somewhat ahead of schedule, and the -BF-1 banged out four more VL’s.
From ARES / Sweetman:
“A new UK government is ready to carry out sweeping defense cuts. The Royal Navy, anxious to protect its new aircraft carrier program, is reported to be ready to ditch a joint RAF/RN short take-off, vertical-landing jet in favor of a proven US catapult-arrest design. “
Taken from a broader article about how the current era in defense acquisition is looking a lot like the 1960’s, and British history with American carrier aircraft.
remind me again, what partner is seriously looking at buying another aircraft ?
who is taking that navair seriously ? it seems even navair arent
again, that navair has nothing to do with the partner buy prices or running costs, do you even know what it is ?
I’ll assume that you read aviation news from multiple sources, so I don’t really need to answer your first question.
The Congress takes NavAir studies seriously, as well as the DoD and the administration. I take NavAir studies seriously, and I don’t pick and choose which ones I think are valid or not. But I do use various studies and sources to support a position and show alternate points of view, and I also don’t accuse others of bad intentions when they post information that may not align with my opinions and analyses.
As far as this discussion goes, I was making a point that the F-35B/C O&S, according to the aforementioned study, was estimated to be more expensive than certain legacy platforms, in this case, the F/A-18A-D. I said nothing about partner buy prices being set by the NavAir, but NavAir certainly knows the O&S for the F/A-18’s. I do not have any other information on costs or purchase prices other than what is available to the public.
AFA created that graph themselves. They also listed F-35 as having 48,000lbs of thrust…
Hardly authorative…
Yea, not sure where they got the 48,000 lbs thrust figure from… possibly the F136 powered aircraft? 😉
Has anybody seen any service ceiling estimates for the different models? The -C has a lot more wing area which potentially helps.