Exactly my point. You were faulting the F-35C for not being what it was not intended to be. The F-35C is a F/A-18A-D replacement & aside from being a single engine aircraft is otherwise what the USN was looking for when it was an independent (rather than joint/common) program, not an A-6 replacement (which ended up being F/A-18E/F which itself is to be replaced by NGAD begining in 2025).
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29,996 – 26,664 = 3332 / 26,664 = 12.496%.
The greater wing area produces more lift.—
So are you still trying to say P&W sucks by comparing a 1960s P&W engine that was not designed nor intended for the F-14 with a 1980’s GE engine that was?
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But the DOD no longer has the budgets to do such a thing and unlike the TF-30, which was even then a previous generation engine that was only intended as a stop gap while the actual service engine was developed, the F135 is a new engine designed specifically for the F-35 based on the already developed, proven & awesome performance (& reliability) F119 from the F-22.
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The is also a “non-competitive SDD contract for the F136 propulsion system” which has thus far received funding every year despite the military saying it is not needed.
– I have been consistent with my criticism of the F-35C – it is not the right aircraft for the fleet: it lacks the range to allow carriers to stand off defended shores; it lacks two engines that provide a crucial safety margin in the overwater ops and tactical survivability; there is no provision for a second crewmember – vital for FAC(A), precision strike of non-stationary targets, situational awareness, control of off-board sensors and UCAS-N’s, etc; and it costs twice as much an a F/A-18E/F and brings little new in terms of capability save stealthiness. And it is projected to cost significantly more to operate vs. the F/A-18 series. The Navy needed a “high-end” replacement for the A-6 (long range strike) and the F-14 (long range air superiority) and the A/F-X design promised to be the solution, but the Clinton Administration forced the Navy to drop the A/F-X and join a program to develop a “low-end” aircraft to replace the F/A-18A/C and F-16A/C’s.
– Those old weight numbers again (sigh.) The larger wing provides for lower landing (stall) speed and higher alpha – both critical attributes necessary for carrier ops. Extra room for fuel is positive side effect as well as lower wing loading, with the penalties of increased structural weight and increased drag – thus requiring more thrust to overcome the increased weight and drag of the -C v. -A.
– I am saying that the TF-30 was the only choice available in that thrust class because Congress decided not to fund the TF-100 derivative. That decision (not to have an alternate / replacement engine resulted in the loss of 40 aircraft – nearly 1 bn dollars, and many lives. It took 17 years bns more dollars to get a satisfactory powerplant in the F-14. Do we want to put ourselves in a similar situation with the F-35 – having only one engine option in the needed thrust class? You either pay now or pay later – and later costs more in money and potentially lives.
Do all Pratt engines blow? No, but the TF-30 sure did in F-14’s. Do I have reason to be concerned about the F135? Yes, considering it already had 2bn dollars with of overruns – even with the engine being based on and sharing sections of proven designs (F119/F100.)
– The DoD has the money to fund the F136 if Congress appropriates it or directs the DoD to reprogram funds from other areas.
– P&W was awarded the engine contract without competition – pretty much a fact. I’ll take the Undersecretary’s word for it.
New CBO Report – Strategies for Maintaining the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ Inventories
I haven’t read the report yet – I just got wind of it, but the article mentions cutting the JSF buy and purchasing more Supers to counter the strike fighter shortfall.
Is this the beginning of the “death spiral?”
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/05/navy_CBO_report_052910w/
The F-35C is 3332 lbs (12.5%) heavier than the F-35A but also has a 160 sq ft (34.8%) greater wing area.
The TF30 was only meant as a temporary stop-gap engine for the F-14 while the definitive engine was developed. Unfortunately said definitive engine was cancelled. How about you show some intellectual honesty & note the time difference between the TF50 & the F110-400. 🙂
There was a ‘competition’. P&W won with a lower cost, lower risk engine that was years ahead of GE in development. Get over it.
And what even remotely comparable engine did GE (or anybody else) have in 1970? The simple truth is the TF30 wasn’t designed to meet the F-14 performace goals, it was simply a temporary stop-gap engine so as to be able to get the F-14 into service.
– The F-35C is ~16% heavier and has an 160 sqft greater wing area. Both the extra weight and increased drag from the 34.8% greater wing area demand more thrust to compensate vis a vis a F-35A.
– The TF-30 was the only engine in its class at the time the F-14 was designed, and Grumman was not entirely satisfied with it – it had a poor compressor stall margin and insufficient thrust (In fleet service, those deficiencies turned out to be deadly – resulting in the loss of 40 aircraft and numerous naval aviators.) A common core variant of the F-100 was supposed to replace the TF-30 in the 7th production aircraft and those aircraft would be designated F-14B’s. However the costs of the F-100 derivative skyrocketed, and that engine program was cancelled. The Navy spent almost a billion dollars trying to fix the TF-30’s deficiencies, but never managed to attain a complete solution. 17 years later, in 1987, the Navy was able to begin re-engining Tomcats with the GE-F-110. The result was the F-14A+. The F110-GE-400 Advanced Technology Engine equipped the F-14D – a beast of an aircraft.
Source: “Tomcat! The Grumman F-14 Story,” P.T. Gillcrist, RADM, 1994.
Like with the F-14, there is only one engine option currently available for the F-35 series. As a hedge against unknown – unknowns, I would be more comfortable with another engine option.
– In congressional testimony, Secretary Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, March 24, 2010: “Pratt & Whitney [F135] was awarded a non-competitive SDD contract for the F135 propulsion system” in 2001. Carter admitted that the F135 contract was a non-competitive award. That testimony was referenced in the debate yesterday on the House floor.
No it won’t. Sure E/A-18G support will be helpful at times (other times it will be counter-productive) but the F-35A/B/C will not need E/A-18G support.
Maj. Gen. David J. Scott, head of Air Force operational capability requirements, seems to disagree with you. Here are some statements he made in an article published in the January 2010 edition of Air Force Magazine:
“The United States Air Force believes we need a stand-in capability,” he told the Old Crows audience. “We believe that we need to get into a place, … fight in that place, kill things in that place, and get out.”
Stealth features, he added, do not do that “completely,” and EW support will be needed.”
Scott hastened to add that his words are not meant to suggest that there is something amiss with stealth systems. It is just that, as technology advances and the nation’s military foes develop increasingly sophisticated countermeasures to stealth, it would pay to give the adversary multiple problems to solve.
The loss of an F-117 in Kosovo was reason enough to add insurance in this way, he said.
For the standoff jamming function, the Air Force will continue to depend on the Navy, which is in the process of transitioning from its EA-6B Prowler jammers to EA-18G Growlers. The latter is a variant of the carrier-based F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighter.
In major combat operations, Scott said, the Growlers will “blow a hole” in the outer ring of enemy integrated air defense systems. From outside the enemy IADS, F-16s, B-52s, and possibly other legacy-type aircraft will shoot swarms of Miniature Air Launched Decoys, or MALDs, into enemy territory.
[Then] stealthy F-22 and F-35 fighters and B-2 bombers, by virtue of their low observability and onboard electronic countermeasures, will be able to fly through enemy airspace undetected, and help destroy enemy defenses.
The F-35C is not a bad idea. If the USN were replacing the F/A-18A-D with its own unique airframe (as opposed to common with USAF & USMC) about the only significant change would be the preference for two engines but the USN’s requirements for the F-35C are pretty much otherwise the same as what they were prior to the merge to JSF.
The ‘significantly longer range’ aircraft you are thinking of is what comes next – NGAD (formerly known as F/A-XX)…
The aircraft that I was referring to was the Navy’s A-X / A/F-X, an advanced, “high-end,” (vs. “low-end F/A-18A-D and F-35C) carrier-based multi-mission aircraft with day/night/all-weather capability, low observables, long range, two engines, two-crew, and advanced, integrated avionics and countermeasures. It was conceived in the early 1990’s as a new program to replace A-6’s (after the A-12 debacle) but it eventually became a multi-role aircraft. It’s IOC was planned to be ~2008.
One of the first major moves by the then new Clinton Administration was to conduct a BUR (Bottom Up Review) of defense dept. programs. One result was to cancel the A-X / A/F-X program and Air Force’s MRF (Multi-role Fighter) program – a “low-end” aircraft designed to replace the F-16 series. Many of the design concepts and preliminary planning work from these programs were transitioned to the JSF nee JAST program. The CBO justified the A/F-X cancellation by claiming the upcoming F/A-18E/F would be adequate for the foreseeable future, and savings of $3.6 bn over 5 years. Seems like peanuts now.
F136 turn of events – Pt.2
The F136 survived a floor vote by an unexpectedly wide margin tonight – but that doesn’t mean that it will be funded in the end. The Senate still needs to weigh in, and the Obama administration continues to threaten to veto the entire defense appropriation bill over this issue (and others – like language limiting to F-35 buy to 30 airframes unless program performance goals are met.) But yeah, the F136 still lives – for now.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/05/27/obama-loses-house-f136-vote/
The House voted to oppose the amendment to kill the F136. The voice vote was challenged, and further action is postponed until later today.
For all you F136 haters out there, the word is that it will not get funded. Depends on the debate/vote on the House floor today.
F-35 HMDS
“It costs more than your house,” said Bob Foote, chief technology officer of helmet manufacturer Vision Systems International.
Rumor had it that helmets cost about $250,000 each, but Foote would not confirm it.
Pretty awesome nonetheless.
There’s already room and wiring on F-35s for the NGJ, as well as systems that can fit in the weapons bay for either EA or increased AESA coverage.
There are many challenges integrating the NGJ on the F-35 platform – power generation, signature degradation, and attack prosecution.
– EW/EA typically demands a pant load of power – more than engine driven generators can produce – and the F-35 has only one engine. RAT’s can provide the additional power required, but they would degrade the stealthiness of the host. From “Next-Generation Jammer Takes Shape,” Jan 22, 2010:
“We want an open, modular, scalable architecture that will open capabilities incrementally once the program is out there and going,” Orbell says. “That includes things like the RAT (ram-air turbine for electrical power generation). How do we generate the kind of power that is needed? It’s one of the technology trades that we continue to look at.”
Another vendor says:
“We believe there is a different power solution for the F-35,” says Jim Bailey, Raytheon’s NJG capture director. “I don’t believe the RAT fits. Our approach is not to adversely affect the signature; but the F-35 is already packed.”
– If you fill up the mission bays with electronics, then you are a dedicated EW platform. If you use your AESA in an EA mode, then that aircraft is dedicated to that task. From “Next-Generation Jammer Takes Shape,” Jan 22, 2010:
“Adding more [NGJ] hardware to the F-35 is not something [the Navy] wants to do,” Carlson says. “If there is support jamming on an F-35, you can get by with less hardware if the AESA [radar] is allowed to [manipulate] the frequencies it can handle. If [jamming and electronic attack] is the mission for the radar, you will have to dedicate the airplane which means it’s not going to be targeting and all those other things.”
Then there is the man/machine interface – task saturation issue. Can a single crewed aircraft handle the complexity of EW/EA and safely operate the aircraft simultaneously? EA-6B’s had four crew, and the E/A-18G has two.
In any event, an EW/EA platform of some type will accompany strike missions for years to come. The EW/EA aircraft with not be stealthy, either because of its planform, the external stores it carries, or the emissions it creates to degrade the enemy. The idea of an F-35 group attacking a defended target on its own without EW/EA support is ludicrous.
Of the USN, it was once said “The U.S. Navy…200 years of tradition, unhampered by progress.”
Fortunately, there are some smart guys at NAVAIR. They understand what F-18 can and cannot do when facing a modern IADS. And the circus of jammers and decoys and AWACS still do not provide the F-18 with enough cover to allow it to put sensors and weapons on a defended mobile target. That is why NAVAIR persists in buying F-35Cs. Without F-35Cs, the CVBG should stay in port and let USAF fight the IADS.
Yep, there are some very smart people at NAVAIR – they know how to develop the best performance possible from their assets, no doubt about that. They also have to make due with bad ideas like the F-35C when or if it enters fleet service. The Navy was forced to buy into the program back in the 1990’s when the JSF was projected to cost less than Supers (and now will cost almost twice as much.) Given the choice, the Navy would much rather have developed a very different airframe with a significantly longer range. But that’s politics, and the F-35C is what they will have to work with if nothing changes.
In it’s infinite wisdom, the USAF chose to let it’s organic tactical EW/EA assets wither, and must rely on those traditionalists in the Navy to provide it for their current aircraft as well as the F-35’s – with their circus of jammers. And speaking of circuses, the USAF has the biggest one around: EC-130 Compass Call, RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, etc.
Tactical EW/EA is essential in defeating IADS’s – and their will be a “circus” of specialized aircraft and decoys and UCAV-N’s to provide it.
They’re using a hi/low mix just like the USAF is using F-22/35 mix. The Super Hornets will have Growlers supporting them.
The F-35A/B/C will also require E/A-18G support in contested / defended territory. The Next Generation Jammer is in early development and will initially be integrated into Growlers, and later deployed on a F-35 airframe – if EA/EW workloads can be simplified enough for a single-crewed aircraft, and they can figure out where to stuff all the associated electronics.
Can you recalculate those numbers based upon the per capita figures of single engine fighters in the inventory vs. twin engine, if we’re really interested in a fair comparison.
I’ll allow you to do that, mainly because it makes no difference.
http://www.afsc.af.mil/organizations/aviation/enginestatistics/index.asp
Very interesting link – thank you. The documents describe Class A accident (more than 1m USD in damage to the aircraft) rates where the primary cause of the accident is engine related, and the engine failures are not mishaps caused by FOD, birdstrike, or failure of support systems external to the engine (ex. fuel starvation.)
The chart that is relevant to this discussion describes single engine aircraft:
http://www.afsc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080819-035.pdf
(This document is dated 31DEC2009 – nice – up to date)
The F100-229 is indeed impressive – no mishaps. But the rates for the other engines: F100-200 (1.84), F110-100 (1.17), F100-220 (1.12), and F110-129 (1.12) are similar, with the F100-200 trending somewhat higher.
What these numbers cannot describe is the overall reliability of the engines, the mission ready rates of aircraft related to engine issues, etc.
But good info nonetheless.
The collection of charts does illustrate the engine related Class A accident rates for 2 engined fighters are significantly less: F-15 F100-100 (0.24), F-15 F100-220 (0.29), F-15 F100- 229 (0.47), and F-22 F119 (0.0)(!).
If you throw out the high and low numbers for each, the average rate is:
1.14 for single engined fighters
0.27 for twin engined fighters
Or ~ 75% less for twin engined fighters.
– Digression alert.
So you have an expensive single engined F-35C that is 3x more likely to experience an engine-related Class A accident, and you want to fly in the maritime environment?
An official program overview briefing by the Program Executive Officer (Brigadier General Charles R. Davis) of the F-35 Lightning II Program Office. It IS an official program document prepared BY the program FOR an official program overview briefing.
ONE MORE TIME
2002
F-35A: 26,500 lbs
F-35B: 29,735 lbs
F-35C: 30,049 lbs
2003
F-35A: 27,100 lbs
F-35B: 30,500 lbs
F-35C: 30,700 lbs
2004 (at which point they were deemed overweight)
F-35A: 29,036 lbs
F-35B: 32,161 lbs
F-35C: 32,072 lbsSWAT (2004-2006)
2007
F-35A: 26,664 lbs
F-35B: 29,695 lbs
F-35C: 29,996 lbs
OK, about your sources. They are just old. This one:
http://img169.imageshack.us/f/img169…5sheet2vs2.gif
– January 2006.
And the source mentioned at the top, and the specs that you consider accurate:
– October 2007.
The author. It appears that you are confusing then Major “Digger” Davis of HQ ACC/8th AF with then Brigadier General Charles R. Davis, Program Executive Officer, F-35 Lightning II Program Office. Major Davis gave the powerpoint presentation at a UAVs & Range Operations Symposium briefing about JSF Range and Airspace Requirements. The last time I checked, the JSF Program Office is not part of ACC, thus your assertion that it is:
“An official program overview briefing by the Program Executive Officer (Brigadier General Charles R. Davis) of the F-35 Lightning II Program Office. It IS an official program document prepared BY the program FOR an official program overview briefing.”
– Is inaccurate. It is not a JSF program office document.