maus92The amphibs cant hide. They have to be in the other guys littoral in order to put forces ashore. The whole point is that opposing entry-denial forces are attrited to the point that the amphibious assembly area is viable for operations before the amphibs get there. AFTER that point the nature of the action changes and the carrier groups inherent mobility advantage is wasted if it has to be shackled to the beachhead.
I take your point about mobility, understand it, get it. You might want to read this article, and the comments:http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3A501391e5-eb78-4e9d-8824-895c5e8d4fc6
Who else is there that can effect a forced entry if there is no convenient (and viable) land border to jump across?. How else do you put heavy forces in enemy territory if you cant go overland?.
The Marines will be good at it, if that scenario exists somewhere. Point of fact: the US Army have conducted amphibious landings in Asia, Africa, and Europe, and could reconstitute that ability if necessary.
maus92Your being extremely optimistics to say the least. Sure the USN was able to field 5-6 Carriers during both Gulf Wars. Yet, the threat was very low! Clearly, from a high threat the US wouldn’t put its most valuable assets in harms way.
Nonetheless, this debate is just running in circles. The USMC will field large numbers of F-35B’s to replace both AV-8B Harriers and F/A-18C Hornets. The USMC are experts in the field and know better than most on this Forum. What is the best solution for providing Air Support for the Troops.
Are you suggesting that CVN’s are to be hidden away in anything but a low-threat environment, but the gators will not?
The naval services (USN and USMC) are constantly debating doctrine in various forums – war colleges, sabbaticals, postings, position papers, consultancies, etc. – but for some reason, not this one (at least officially.) Amphibious doctrine has evolved over the years, mostly due to technological advances, but is still largely based upon the Marines experience in WWII – the heyday of assault from the sea on a global scale. We are not living in the same world. There is no expansionist power like Japan or Germany to threaten territory on a wide scale, hence the USN is a shadow of its former self – yet the USMC still considers storming beaches (forcible entry) its raison d’etre – and focuses huge sums of money on the technology (V-22, EFV, F-35B, etc.) to keep that option viable. People both inside the naval services and outside (DoD, Congress, think tanks, etc.) have been debating issues surrounding the Marines and amphibious operations for decades – and it will and should continue. No doubt that the USMC (USN) are experts in amphibious ops, but that doesn’t mean that alternative strategies (and equipment) should not be considered.
maus92Nonsense. The amphibious ships, by definition, have to be reasonably close to the landing beachhead. Whether that is within visual range of the coast or just over the horizon is irrelevent. The amphibs have to go inshore.
Which calls into question current USMC amphibious doctrine. Potential adversaries that the US might face have plenty of coastal artillery (tubes, mobile SSM’s, and possibly ballistic missiles) that will function to keep ships far from the beaches until missiles are expended and defenses attritted – by the CAW/USAF. This is not like in WWII where you could (relatively) safely park multiple CVE’s just offshore and generate sorties to support the assault. Breaking the door down was hard then, and much harder to do now.
Nonsense
The CVN airwing is needed to secure the assembly area and beachhead. Tying a carrier to that beachhead afterwards unnecessarily is dumb!. The RN carrier groups didnt lay just off San Carlos after the landings in 1982. The idea there was to establish a FOB and base fighters close in where they were needed. Not tie down aircraft that could be more valuably employed elsewhere and limit ships mobility and increase their exposue to unnecessary risk.
The CAW will most definitely secure the beachhead and assembly areas – air supremacy needs to be guaranteed before amphibs can venture close enough for the assault. Unlike WWII, the USN has no peer fleet to chase after, so they will be around to support inland operations, much like they have done since the Korean War.
I don’t know much about the Falklands conflict, but the RN carrier group(s) could not afford to hang around San Carlos – the Argies still could strike, plus they had a supply chain to defend with limited AEW and aircraft.
FOB’s need to be supplied – which was found to be difficult to do in Desert Storm. Add the complexity of the F-35B….
maus92What? This is the point- its not! a LHA will not replace the CVN in real ops-ops that dont need a CVN dont need fighter support(ie F-35B)!
I have to agree with you. A deckfull of F-35B’s does not replace a CAW. Who will provide AEW, tankers, EW, logistical (spares) support for a LHA based group? By the time you configure F-35B’s with the proper pods (refueling/EW, -AEW and logistics) to enable services usually provided by a CAW, you have very few sorties available for real work.
maus92No, the Amphibious Forces are not safer. Which, is why they need support from the F-35B’s. As the Carriers have to keep a safe distance and Land Based Forces maybe to far away. (i.e. Likely)
Are the gators expendable? Don’t the gators need to keep a safe distance as well? The fact is that an opposed amphibious assault will be supported by Navy tacair provided by a CVN air group. LHA basing for limited numbers of redundant F-35B’s wastes space needed for transport, attack, and logistical helicopters.
maus92Heres one for the F-35 heads around here.
Does the F-35B have the strengthened landing gear of the C modelHow hard would it be to put the tougher landing gear, hook and catapult nose gear so the F-35s could just fit into a normal carrier circuit?
F-35B doesn’t have a keel like the F-35C.
maus92Negative. They will be eating up carrier deck space as the 400 squadron will be Marine F-35s. Why do they need a 100+ million dollar (in LRIP) aircraft? Because they serve two purposes. The Navy/Marine Corps team needs to be able to fight certain war scenarios with minimal assistance from the Army and Air Force. Ground Marines are the Navy’s infantry and Marine air is the Navy’s ground air force. Being able to land on ships makes training uniform and transport to say, a pacific island like Wake or Midway. It also allows marine squadron to be a reserve backup should there be a shortfall in deployable navy squadrons.
F-35B’s will not be operating from CVN’s.
maus92President Obama has very little say on what is or is not purchased for the US Military. The purse strings are in fact in the hands of the US Congress. Which, is now controlled by the Republican Party. That is very Pro-US Military. Which, is not to say we won’t see Defense Cuts. Just that what the White House wants and what it gets. Are two very different things. Hell, the President has been trying to cancel the C-17 and GE F136 for the last few years. Yet, they both keep going strong.;)
In short I’ve seen no Political will to cancel the F-35B and the USMC is in very high favor at the moment. The odds are virtually nil in my book……
In short the problems with the F-35B will be resolved and the USMC will acquire the aircraft.
BTW Let’s also not forget that the F-35B* will provide the cornerstone of Future Naval Aviation for Italy and Spain in the coming decade. Which, is an extremely important part of the US Alliance with Western Europe.
*Note: Several countries have expressed interest in the F-35B for Small Carriers and Amphibious Ships.
Dick Chaney is a Republican and a former defense secretary. He canceled several very expensive and non-performing programs, most notably the A-12. The Executive Branch in not powerless in budgetary matters.
maus92Which version to cut? The F35B, no question. The USMC fast jets are “nice to have”, but a bigger carrier/airwing fleet would be better, and it would force the two to depend on each other. The F35C is the most important version in that most of the US power comes from the CVNs, and the aircraft from them are equally capable of being land based. In fact, an all F35C fleet for the USN and USAF would be great, but its not really economical, so keeping the F35A and F35C makes sense. As the Superhornets leave service, it might be a good idea to standardise on single USN type (F35C), easing logistics on carriers (sea force being where logistics is going to be the hardest) and driving down the cost of the SH replacement.
Super Hornets will be around until 2030 or so…. -A-D’s are to be replaced by the F-35C, and eventually the Rhinos will be replaced by UCAV-N’s and the NGAD aircraft.
maus92I think this has nothing to do with the stealth thing, is funny because everything that is wrong with the 35 and 22 programs, everything MUST has to do with the stealth thing…is like some sort of face saving measure, Im sure similar problems were faced on other compossite/aluminium airframes, but solved successfully.
The ATF program was badly mannaged from the beginning, but don’t worry, here is the stealth tale to save your face…
Corrosion and stealth don’t mix.
This is a major reason why a navalized version of the F-22 is a bad idea.
maus92Somehow I have serious doubts that the C will/would be more expensive than the B. The most complex and most demanding version should also be the most expensive.
I say the average fly-away price of a F-35 at IOC will be at least 150 million Euro (whatever that means in USD at that point).
The pricing being discussed is for the LRIP 4 jets. Production volume will lower the costs somewhat: Burbage: “…each time the quantity ordered doubles, the per-unit price will decrease by 25-28 percent.” Whether Lockheed maintains the curve and for how long is open for debate.
The -C is the most expensive airframe atm for two main reasons: it uses more materials – it is the largest and heaviest of the three, and it is the least produced model at this point. As more -C’s are produced, its cost will come down compared to the -B (and -A).
maus92With regards to ‘prices and costs’, one could phrase the above LRIP numbers as being a sub-set ‘price’ which make up the total Procurement Unit Cost.
By all appearance the latest released ‘prices’ could be assessed as somewhat of an URF, minus the engine, but with components of Total Flyaway and possibly even snips of the ‘rest of’ weapon system cost included.
So basically, we’ll need to wait until Feb 2011 for the budget estimate’s release (see Spudman’s countdown clock), in order to fully ascertain LRIP IV’s URF, Total Flyaway, Net, Gross, Weapon system and total PUC cost.
The cost “targets” revealed in last week’s JPO memo seem to be some type of unit cost – Burbage has said that they are 3-4% above Lockheed’s URF.
The budget due in February is for FY 2012 – wouldn’t the budgeteering in this document reflect estimates for LRIP V pricing? The Congress reportedly wants to buy fewer jets (to punish the program) in FY 2012 (LRIP V jets?) than planned, which would tend keep the prices higher per unit.
The most important document in accurately estimating costs will be Venlet’s Technical Baseline Review. Whether that will be made public is uncertain, but certainly its conclusions will apparent in the program’s way forward.
maus92@maus92
What rock have you been under… Graham Warwick reported on the STOVL inlet door issue at the beginning of October.
Certainly not the one that you live under. It seems that you are assuming the inlet door issue is causing the transition issue. Could be the same issue, maybe not.
maus92Here are some numbers I stole from another post on the ARES blog:
“LRIP IV price targets + estimated F-135 cost.
F-35A: 111.6 + (.9*19) = 128.7m
F-35B: 109.4 + (.9*38) = 143.6m
F-35C: 142.9 + (.9*19) = 160.0m”
Accounting for Burbage’s statement that these targets include test equipment, thus are 3-4% higher than LM’s URF:
F-35A: (111.6*.965) + (.9*19) = 107.7 + 17.1 = 124.8m
F-35B: (109.4*.965) + (.9*38) = 105.6 + 34.2 = 139.8m
F-35C: (142.9*.965) + (.9*19) = 137.9 + 17.1 = 155.0m
maus92Amos: F-35B has issues transitioning from vertical to horizontal flight
“But he [Gen. Amos] acknowledged the F-35B has technical issues, particularly in the transition from horizontal to vertical flight.”
This is the first time I’ve heard about this issue.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704073804576023621887891598.html
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