pfcemThe basic misunderstanding of the rules that govern procurement demonstrated by this statement is beyond belief.
The USAF knew that a competitive tender was a legal requirement, it knew that its spec would not allow a ‘competitive’ tender to occur yet carried on regardless.Either the competition can take place and you accept that alternatives offer different advantages.. or you go single source and deal with it. The route between the two gives you nothing.
BS.
It is (normally) the resposibility of contractors to make a competative offer, it is NOT the responsibility of the military to alter its requirements criteria to fit/accomodate a noncompetative offer just for the sake of competition. But that was thrown out when Congress demanded another competition.
Nonsense? Try reading what is said rather than your version of it. The lease price and decision was all ‘clear’ in terms of the price/ technical evaluation. Other issues derailed it. However we are talking now about the follow-on, when EADs had radically altered the ground becuase it had a boom equipped offer.
Now you are contradicting yourself.
Yes the tanker lease was cancelled. But it was not because of unfair pricing by Boeing as you had stated.
Boeing will not cheat, but they will charge what they feel they can get away with.
Again, Boeing can not charge any price it feels like! The GAO would reject it.
The truth of the matter is illustrated by the price comparison between a smaller airframe whose infrastrucutre/ design has been amortised over its production run and a newer airframe demanding investment in a new assembly plant and education of a new workforce to produce a larger aircraft, being broadly similar. At some point one has to ask the questions.. is the proft margin the same to both? Or is somebody ‘buying’ the contract (knowing it will cost more than its income?) or is in reality the 767AT a design that requires a heavy investment in design and certification in order to justify the price….
Not even close. Your ingorance &/or disingenuous is really showing.
Hmm.. As I understand it the CMARPS data was altered, at Airbus’s request for sure, to include data from the USAF obtained during combat operations as opposed to the ‘base’ ops case it was based on. Willing to be corrected, but it would seem that to exclude certain data points that may alter the basic reference material is pretty strange.
Agreed that some of the justifications were not well argued.
Not by Airbus’s request, by the demand to have a competition & Airbus/EADS inability/unwillingness to offer a competative product.
Nor do you have to be an AMC tanker general to understand that in order to meet the requirements the physical size of the tanker is only one aspect of the problem. The 767 is hardly a ‘size match’ to the 135…
Yes the physical size of the tanker is only one aspect but a CRITIAL aspect.
And as I have said before, even the 767-200 is larger/heavier than necessary. But at least is it not too big/heavy.
So we acknowledge that the USAF had already selected a product prior to the competition.
Not so such already selected a product but already recognized the proper size/capability of product to meet its requirements (recapitalization efforts stared in 1996). That the 767 was the only commercial product in production at the time made it obvious & even prior to 9/11/01 the USAF had all but selected the 767 as its next tanker.
Agreed its not the USAF’s fault that Airbus would not offer another product, but its the USAF’s responsibility to abide by procurement rules. The knowledge that it would need a competitive tender was not secret. So the USAF’s position is difficult to say the least.
A ‘competitive tender’ only means opening up the contract to more than one contractor for consideration, NOT to alter criteria to accomodate a noncompetative offer.
Airbus/EADS COULD have offered the A300-600 as it was still in production & with as much comonality as there is between the A310 & A300 the A310 was not beyond the realm of possibility. But Airbus/EADS felt that the A300/A310 would have been noncompetative (no A300/A310 has the OEW/MTOW to match the payload/fuel capacity of the 767-200ER) & tried instead to trump the 767-200ER with the larger/greater capacity A330-200.
Absolutely. Why waste time and money on a competition you know you will not win? Basic captialist rule. Oh sorry the US is supposed to work under a fair competitive system where the best product wins against others. At soem point a choice has to be made.. either have a fiar competition and accept the consequences or single source and face a different set of consequences.
Altering requirements/criteria to accomodate a noncompetative offer is NOT fair competition! Fair competitoin is selecting the best fit for the requirements/criteria among the ‘competing’ offers.
Again, it is (normally) the resposibility of contractors to make a competative offer, it is NOT the responsibility of the military to alter its requirements criteria to fit/accomodate a noncompetative offer just for the sake of competition.
Agreed for the lease deal it was. But we are not talking about that. And the only person to say that the price was an issue is you.
What thread are you reading?
I think you have failed to grasp the basic fact. “You” are spending your money and do not have to justify the choice to anyone but “you”.
The USAF is spending sombody else’s money, they have a choice…use the model you have in the analogy and deal with the consequences…or have sufficient objective justification for your choice.
Just saying that because they did not offer exactly what I wanted I went elsewhere and took what they had regardless is not acceptable.
The challenge is then is what did the others offer? Well they offered something different, that had other advatanges and disadvantages. On analysis the disadvantages of the other offer were such that its offer was not acceptable is the way forward.
However the Source selection decision was not to that effect.
It does not matter if it is YOUR money or sombody else’s. Your 1st responsibility is the select the right product based on your needs, NOT to alter your needs to accomodate one that doesn’t when one that does is offered.
There we disagree.
The issue returns to the basic spec and the evaluation criteria used as a result.
The USAF had defined the 767 as its requirement and criteria were established based on what that airframe could do….so upgrades (in capacity etc from that) were given lower credit scores than failures to meet the 767 abilities…it was well crafted in order to ‘favour’ the 767 solution.
No, the USAF requirements/criteria were NOT established based on what the 767 could do. The USAF requirements/criteria were established based on what its needs are/were & the 767 was obviusly the best fit for its requirements/criteria.
Don’t confuse the tanker lease requirements/criteria with the KC-X requirements/criteria.
That in itself is NOT a problem, the USAF knows what it would like to have and aims to provide itself with that. Where is falls over is that its paymasters need to be seem to be looking for an open competitive tendering process…and that is the issue. When it knows that it cannot do that then the problems arise.. hence the legitimate Boeing challenge to the scoring system used.
Again, it is (normally) the resposibility of contractors to make a competative offer, it is NOT the responsibility of the military to alter its requirements criteria to fit/accomodate a noncompetative offer just for the sake of competition.
Again you are too quick to jump to the conclusion that the procurement of this airframe is a technical exercise, it is primarily political… ‘a’ new tanker would be a great step forward…’a’ would replace the 135 well…
The ‘best’ one will be the one that enters service…not necessarily becuase it best suits the requirements but because it fulfills the politcal aspects best.. see procurement of the KC-10 as a prime example of politics over capability.
No, I ‘jump’ to the reality that the selection is SUPPOSED to be a technical exercise but that unfortunately politics play far too great a role.
pfcemFor the US air forces, the “50,000 ft service ceiling” is a self imposed operational limit rather than a physical limitation of the aircraft themselves.
pfcemDid you ask for clarification in such a short notice?! I can nothing read about that.
Sticking to the facts all known to us. 2 April 2007 Captain Knudson did his paper claims.
From the August 2009 fact sheet about the F-35 Lightning II Program.Dec 19, 2008 the roll-out of the first weight-optimized F-35A CTOL variant, AF-1.
😮
Over 20 month after Knudsons paper work a modified prototype had to made its first test-flight at all to get some real data from. The F-35B and F-35C prototypes are even later. All do differ from the later service variants to come for technical reasons.
Non of the prototypes has even passed all critical milestones or opened up the whole flight enevelope till Sept. 2009.
Under such conditions you have the chuzpe to claim reliable data from 2007 based on computer-simulations at best and not the related hardware at hand.How about a personal reality check.
You have a serious disconnect from reality.
Again, Captain Wade Knudson (F-35 Lightning II Program Air Vehicle Director) was the presenter of the PROGRAM UPDATE given 2 April 2007. He is not claiming anything, he is simply presenting the PROGRAM UPDATE information put together by the F-35 Program at that time.
Data from 2007 based on computer-simulations is MUCH more reliable than regurgitation of the KPP THRESHOLDS! And agian, did you happen to notice that lockheedmartin.com/products/f35 now gives combat radius numbers close to the data provied in the 2 April 2007 Program Update as opposed to the usual regurgitation of the KPP THRESHOLDS? Thus far the F-35 is exceeding flight performance expectations. So by what convoluted reality is it you assume that the 2 April 2007 PROGRAM UPDATE combat radius values are inaccurate. My god, the F-35B carrys about the same amount of internal fuel as a F-15C & flies its entire mission CLEAN.
It is NOT the combat radius numbers which are wrong. The program KPP THRESHOLDS are 590nm, 450nm & 600nm for which the most accurate public data available as to what the actual combat radius of the F-35 (A, B & C) is comes from the 2 April 2007 PROGRAM UPDATE (625nm, 498nm & 642nm) representing a ~6%, ~10% & ~7% exceedance respectively of the KPP THRESHOLDS. There are no range requirements & no combat aircraft has a ‘range’ of just 2x its combat radius. The ‘range’ numbers you see are completely made up with no relation to reality. Looks to me as though someone with no clue whatsoever simply took the combat radius KPP THRESHOLDS & basically doubled them, ignorantly thinking that ‘range’ was simply 2x combat radius.
Flight test programs are to verify predicted/designed flight performance, not discover flight performance.
pfcemAll the data are from official US-sources including the related claims.
Non does prevent you to ask the sources given for a personal clarification. 😉
We are all eager to learn about your attempts in that direction.
USN Captain Wade Knudson can claim what he want. The first standard F-35 has still to fly. 😎
The NAVAIR 00-110AV8-4 is not to dispute or your Naval Air System Command is cheating the US-Public. 😀
On page 4 you can read the combat radius and the related combat range for the AV-8B. Something be done that way, see the data from that.
LM does it a similar way about the F-35s. Either the claimed range on internal fuel is wrong or it is not the claimed combat radius.
On your mind all US sources are wrong in general including that declassified one from the Naval Air System Command. :diablo:I agree with you about the present claims about the F-35B, which are hard to keep to stay polite. 😉
Again I ask. What are you talking about?
The F-35 Program is THE source for all F-35 data.
Captain Wade Knudson is not claiming anything. He was the presenter of the 2 April 2007 Program Update from which I got the more accurate data (rather than the typical regurgitation of the KPP THRESHOLDS) from.
The ‘range’ numbers are NONSENSE. The program KKP THRESHOLDS are for combat radius, which inlcudes, take-off, ingress, combat, egress & landing. NO combat aircraft has a ‘range’ of just 2x its combat radius. Did you happen to notice that lockheedmartin.com/products/f35 now gives combat radius numbers close to the data provied in the 2 April 2007 Program Update as opposed to the usual regurgitation of the KPP THRESHOLDS?
Where have I said that NAVAIR 00-110AV8-4 is wrong or that the F-35 claims about the F-35B are hard to keep?
You are seriously lost. I really wich you (& other like you) would stop accusing me of making claims that I have not made.
pfcemRec. Flywaway costs comprises: airframe, electronics, engine, armament (sum of cost codes 1 through 7).
The difference between Rec. Flyaway Cost and Total Flyaway Cost is from:
+ Cost code 9: Non-Recur Cost
+ Cost code 10: Ancillary Equip
+ Costcode 11: other ‘support’The difference between Total Flyaway Cost and Procurement cost is from:
+ Cost code 21: support cost (sum of cost codes 13 thru 20)
– Cost code 23: advanced procurement credit
+ Cost code 25: advanced procurement calender year
+ Cost code 27: Initial spares:
(Cost codes 22, 24, 26 are subtotals)The difference therefor is in support costs, initial spares, and ‘government accounting’ (i.e. shuffling money back and forth between FYs and CYs)
I understand that perfectly well thank you, much more so than most here I can guarantee. But what I said is that I don’t know how it could, at this point in the F/A-18E/F program, add up to ~$30 million per airframe.
The F-22 has 2 handicaps. F-22 and F-35 for US yield a hi-lo mix of aircraft. Obviously, all other things being equal, the more advanced F-22 should/will cost more than the less advanced F-35. Another key difference between F-35 (lo) and F-22 (hi) is that F-35 development has foreign partners and exports are foreseen (and are more likely). The F-22 was for US consumption only/mainly. That automatically means a smaller production run for F-22, and higher per unit costs. IMHO
But the handicap the F-35 has at the moment is that LRIP is just starting. For the USAF, the F-35A costs more to procure than the F-22. Such that even with the expected quickly reduced cost year-to-year, for FY2010-FY2012 the average cost of the F-35A is expected to be about the same as additional F-22s would likely cost and such that for the amount of money that will be speant on those 150 ‘accelerated” LRIP F-35s (As, Bs & Cs) from FY2010-FY2015 could/should go get us 100-120 additional F-22s.
As good as the F-35 is, it is no F-22 & despite the wet dreams of some we will not be getting enough F-35s quicly enough to replace the all the aircraft the F-35 is supposed to be replacing much less the F-22 we should be but are not getting.
pfcemWIth the F/A-18E/F example, you used procurement cost (whereas I used flyaway cost, which you considered wrong). Yet here, you use flyaway unit cost. So, what does it need to be?
I posted the numbers I have. Actually I have each & every budget going back to FY1998 readily at hand but it is quicker/easier to just post the numbers from a single document. The numbers I posted are supperted by said budgets.
Unfortunately, both of the documents you posted numbers from, the document itself in a number of placed is unreadable so I don’t know if the numbers you posted are correct or if you are missing/misreading something. Although I do not know what additional weapon system costs for the F/A-18E/F could possibly add up to ~$30 million per airframe at this point in the program.
At any rate what needs to be is apples-to-apples. If you are comparing based on flyaway cost then all being compared must be flyaway cost, if you are comparing based on weapons system cost then all being compared must be weapons system cost, et cetera.
ALso, you’re not listing number of unit here.
Yes I did.
page 43 of pdf
F-35 Flyaway Unit Cost
FY2007: $247.450 million (02)
FY2008: $215.035 million (06)
FY2009: $199.489 million (08)
FY2010: $158.546 million (12)
FY2011: $124.580 million (24)
FY2012: $101.726 million (42)
FY2013: $091.223 million (48)
Total Program (average): $083.131 million
page 55 of pdf
F-22 Flyaway Unit Cost
FY2007: $136.826 million (20)
FY2008: $137.467 million (20)
FY2009: $146.388 million (20)
Total Program (average): $154.267 million
The program average F35 is severely affected by the 1621 aircraft beyond FY2013, out of a total of 1763
Exactly. It continues to drop each & every year until some time after 2015 when full rate production is underway. That is why accelerating LRIP procurement & procuring 150 more F-35s during FY2010-FY2015 (amazing how there is/was no money for additional F-22s but that without any additional F-22 procurement there is money for 150 more LRIP F-35s that will cost about the same as 100-120 additional F-22s would) is more expensive than sticking to the plan & procuring those 150 F-35s during full rate production.
pfcemEpic fail. I wrote, ‘US policy’…. The USAF is certainly not in the business of determining that level of risk. If this is representative of your thinking then perhaps the remainder of your post needs to be dismissed.
Of course the USAF is not in the business of determining US policy that is the job of the Administration. Perhaps you don’t understand the difference between polocy & the application of US airpower…
Correct. The USAF has determined, either by its internal studies or being pressured that 187 is the minimum acceptable with high level of risk, it has determined that US air power has a high risk of failure at this level of procurement.
It has determined that 187 represents a high risk of failure. It has not said it is acceptable!
Once that is established then those who determine the level of risk acceptable to US policy make the call. Not the USAF.
Except that by only supporting the hish risk option, the Administration is ignoring what is acceptable.
As above.. the USAF have stated that there is high risk of failure. Thank you.. we have heard and you know what tough on the USAF. If they felt that 187 was not going to have a chance of success that should have been stated.
So the problem it that you do not understand what is meant by high risk?
High risk means almost certain. It it more a matter of IF the force is put to task than IF the force can do its job IF put to task.
OK, please enlighten me as to what the 187 airframes associated with a high risk actually means. To me it means that with 187 airframes the job can be done, however there is a high risk of failure if things do not go exactly according to the plan…
First of all it is NOT 187. That 187 is actually only 179. The 187 includes 6 Production Representative Test Vehicle (PRTV) II aircraft & 2 EMD aircraft. Subtract ~1/4 of the fleet for training, maintenance & attrition reserves & you are down to just 134 aircraft. That is only enough for 1/2 squadron (12 aircraft) for ech of the 10 AEFs!
If it means to you that the USAF cannot do the job then please show us some sort of supporting argument.
Good God, you do not understand the consequences of the US failing to obtian &/or maintain air superiority is some potential future conflict!
Losing your job because you happen to disagree with what your boss is trying to ram down your throat is something you as a professional know is incorrect is massive part of the role the top brass play. Their job is to give advice as to how best to do the job. If they feel what is being proposed is inadequate to do the job (regardless of risk level) they are duty bound to stat it and take the consequences.
Two top USAF officials lost their jobs for that very reason.
Meaning?
Meaning it is not over yet. The Senate & the House have to pass the same legislation.
pfcemBy all means, elaborate.
FY 2009 Budget Estimates
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT AIR FORCE, VOLUME I
http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080204-081.pdf
page 43 of pdf
F-35 Flyaway Unit Cost
FY2007: $247.450 million (02)
FY2008: $215.035 million (06)
FY2009: $199.489 million (08)
FY2010: $158.546 million (12)
FY2011: $124.580 million (24)
FY2012: $101.726 million (42)
FY2013: $091.223 million (48)
Total Program (average): $083.131 million
page 55 of pdf
F-22 Flyaway Unit Cost
FY2007: $136.826 million (20)
FY2008: $137.467 million (20)
FY2009: $146.388 million (20)
Total Program (average): $154.267 million
Numbers are in then year dollars. So the FY2007, FY2008 & FY2009 dollars are the same dollars but the Total Program (average) dollars are not comparable since the F-35 Total Program goes through 2035 where as the F-22 Total Program (in the reference document) only goes through 2009 (it only goes through the 183 F-22s).
Of course if we were continuing to procure more F-22’s the price would still be decreasing & if we were procuring them at more than 20 per year the price would be lower as well. It has been said that if we were to procure an additional 100 (over the 183) that the price would drop to below $120 million.
In other words, the cost of the F-35 won’t reach ~1/2 the $140 million average of the last 60 F-22 until it reaches full-rate production.
If we were to procure a significant number of additional F-22s & we assume that for FY2010-FY1012 the average cost were ~$10 million less than then for FY2010-FY1012 then those F-22’s would cost (average per airframe) almost exactly what is projected (average) for the FY2010-FY1012 F-35s. So cutting the F-22 & buying more LRIP F-35s doesn’t really save much if any money – all it does is buy more high cost LRIP F-35s that actually cost about the same as additional F-22’s would.
And that is just point 1. Your points 2 & 3 are complete speculation with absolutely no basis in fact.
pfcemSurely less than an F-15
Unit cost of F/A-18E/F is US$54.7 million (2009 flyaway cost) [Number built >350 as of 2008 ]
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2009 BUDGET ESTIMATES
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, NAVY Volume I: BUDGET ACTIVITIES 1- 4
F/ A- 18E/ F (FIGHTER) HORNET (MYP)
Unit Cost ($ M)
FY2007 $74.759
FY2008 $87.765
FY2009 $83.486
FY2010 $90.628
FY2011 $93.024
FY2012 $78.865
FY2013 $82.733
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You misunderstood.
For the money you spend on one F-22 for it’s entire lifetime, you could get 3-4 F-35s.
This is how.
1. At over $150 mil for each F-22, you get two F-35s.
2. With the cost savings for the lifetime costs of the F-22, you might get another one. The pilot training and salary costs are in this category also.
3. If you took funds from the F-35 program to pay for a F-22, the cost of the remaining F-35s increases to the point of almost reaching another airframe.
So in total, if you took funds from the F-35 program to pay for, and maintain for a lifetime, a F-22, your total lost F-35s would be 3-4 airframes.
Your numbers are incorrect & your logic is flawed.
pfcemYou have very clearly stated what the 381 represents.
The risk associated with that provision is so very clearly stated.
So if you change the risk that is associated with the job, you change the number.
Increase risk = lower numbers.
Decrease risk = higher numbers.
And the point at which the risk becomes a concern is at 381.
The USAF is not in the business of determining the acceptable level of risk in the application of US policy aims.
The USAF very much is in the business of determining the acceptable level of risk in the application of US airpower.
So all of your strident claims about minimums are completely undermined by the fact that there is a risk associated with the numbers presented (and how they are derived is irrelevant).
Quite the opposite. It is the level of risk which determines what the minimums are. And it is the level of risk which make the minimums important.
There is nothing anywhere which indicates that 183, 187 or 243 are a requirement or acceptable number.
The issue which you seem determined to ignore, as I am assuming you are not unable to see it, is that the USAF has allowed itself to be railroaded into stating that 187 will allow them to do the job, albeit with a high risk level.
The USAF has done no such thing. The USAF has faught VERY hard to get every F-22 that the DOD/Cogress/Administration will “allow” it to have! The USAF has not stated that 187 will allow them to do the job. Quite the opposite. The USAF a clearly & on multiple occation indicated that 183/187 represents a high risk. As in high risk that it would fail to get the job done.
The politicians see the ‘the USAF can do the job with 187 airframes’ and ignore ‘but at high risk of failure’. As the politicians are the only ones taking a risk right now on this issue and they control the money plus they are the ones who determine which risks are acceptable to the US and which are not the USAF is left high and dry with its own words.
Again, the USAF has not said it can do the job with 187 airframes. Only those who want to cut the program (or are in fear of losing their jobs if they dare to contradict SecDef Gates) have said that.
Whether or not they meant this or that is now irrelevant.. or their preference is X or Y with high or low risk…that bridge has been crossed and this particular procurement opportunity has passed. The real issue is now how to ensure they get sufficient F-35s to replace the F-16s and F-15Es to create a credible airforce. The F-35 s the only player in the game right now.. whether its good, bad or indifferent is moot.. the USAF cannot consider alternatives.
On the contrary, a similar provision has passed the House…
pfcemThis is a typical number wizardry. All those flyaway cost and FY dollar definitions are meant to make up the numbers and make them look better than they are. Claiming $140mil cost is nonsense if you need additional $110mil in order to fire up the systems, make the bird maintainable and operational. Makes me wonder what such immense sum is actually for if a spare radar and spare engine won’t make it together over $12-13mil. Maybe diamond-plated screwdrivers?
Regardless of your throwing around cheapishly-looking figures, you need $250mil for a single Raptor to do its job. And whether you decide to deceive a little and to shift a part of procurement cost into auxilliary equipment and support cost category makes zero difference on overall result, the money needs to be paid and Bangladesh or Namibia sure as hell won’t do that for you.
All this mess about F-22 and F-35 cost is only intended to make politicians, fanboys and their housewives happy about oh how cheap the Raptor actually is.. and guess what.. it works very well.. Taxpayers are paying their sweat and blood and they are even happy 🙂
Good luck paying that.. I will rather buy another Porsche instead..
No, $140 million is documented fact as to the average flyaway cost of the last 60 F-22s!
Every aircraft has other costs. The point is to be intellectually honest & compare apples-to-apples costs. Unfortunately naysayers like you are not intellectually honest & compares total weapons system unit cost (or worse total program unit cost) of the F-22 to flyaway cost of the obsolete (compared to the F-22) past generation fighters they compare them to in order to deliberately mislead as to the cost of the F-22 vs obsolete (compared to the F-22) past generation fighters.
Not to mention the fact that if were to procure a real number of F-22s (300+) at a real rate (30+ per year) the unit cost would be lower than they have been.
pfcemThe ONLY study to be done which takes into account what the USAF is expected to be able to (NOT BASED OF FIGHTING RUSSIA OR CHINA) & what is needed for the USAF do what it is expected to be able to indicates 381 F-22s + 186 “Golden Eagle” F-15Cs (somehow kept combat capable well beyond 2025) is the low risk MINIMUM.
No other number(s) have ANY basis on USAF needs/requirements!
183 (actually 175 production + 6 Production Representative Test Vehicle (PRTV) II aircraft + 2 previously procured EMD aircraft) is NOTHING more than the number that has been funded thru FY2009 (the Bush Administration completely punted the number of F-22 to the next/current Administration).
187 is NOTHING more than the 183 plus 4 funded as attrition replacements for (other) aircraft losses during the WOT.
243 is NOTHING more than the 183 plus 60 (assuming another multi-year agremement like the last).
With ANY number significantly less than 381 there is at least a moderate risk that the USAF could fail to obtain &/or maintain air superiority is some potential future conflict. The risk goes from moderate to high with any number significantly less than ~250.
We will be lucky to get enough F-35s quickly enough to do the jobs they are meant to do much less to do the job of the F-22 we don’t get. And despite the wet dreams of some, the F-15C fleet is already (& has been for quite some time) in ‘less than good’ shape & has been operating under significant flight restriction just to TRY & keep they air worthy longer that could be otherwise even AFTER doubling their airframe life beyond what they were built for.
pfcemWell, the Raptor is under production right now, is not like they would start the production from nothing, the deal with that new order was to produce them while the line is running , so there is not a real argument there
I absolutely guarantee if the DOD had supported the USAF & its need for a minumum of 381 and the DOD/Congress spent ‘just’ ~$1 billion more each year (not even a drop in the bucket) thru FY2009 (& ~$3.0-3.5 billion each year continuing after that) procuring 30+ F-22 per year for 10+ year that the average flyaway unit cost of the F-22 would be significantly lower than even the ~$140 million the 60 lot 7-9 aircraft did.
I think the new F35s will have a moderate cost, what will be interesting is how the 35 will be bashed because will end with a similar cost of the “cheap” Raptor…but the reallity could be that the real cost of the raptor was higher, but at that time i guess thousands of books have already printed the cheaper raptor “fact”…
No, the fact is the F-22 is expensive (as the numbers show), but that it is not as expensive as the naysayers want people to believe and if the DOD had supported the program all these years it would not even be as expensive as it is/has been.
pfcemThat’s an astonishing $250.000.000 unit cost!
$46,75 billion for 187 units …
$1.75 billion divided by seven aircraft is Weapon System Unit Cost not Flyaway Unit Cost…
It is insane to assume that procuring just seven F-22s in one year would result in comparable per unit cost as 60 over three years.
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they say f-22 is degraded and loosing its stelth carakteristics during time ,especialy now showing on first examples ,and even with super expencive maintaining its now visible to radars from 40 miles away.:eek:
Who are “they”? :rolleyes:
***
That is not the point. The point is that there has been a constant misbelief with US fans on this forum that an actual flyaway price of a Raptor (for the last batch) was somewhere close to $140mil and that the astronomic figures are only related to overall program cost, including R&D. And this horsesh!t is then being constantly repeated over and over and used as argument to whatever debate.
AFD-080204-081 (FY 2009 Budget Estimates AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT AIR FORCE, VOLUME I) proves that the average flyaway unit cost of the 60 lot 7-9 F-22s was ~$140 million (no doubt would have been a few million less if FY2009 assumed/included that more were to be procured beyond FY2009) – and that includes Advance Procurement Cost (not just the final payment out a number of instalments). From the same document, $42.306 million for FY2010 & $42.006 million for FY2011 can be seen as continued Production Cost “to complete the procurement of equipment for operational locations (i. e. equipment, support, etc.) and other necessary expenses to deliver the MYP aircraft” even though zero F-22s are assumed to be procured in FY2010 &/or FY2011.
The point really is that anti-Raptor fanatics deliberately mislead everyone as the the cost of the F-22 by comparing non-comparable cost (such as total program unit of the F-22 vs flyaway unit cost of everything else). Add to that the fact that the F-22’s cost is still artifictially high due to insanely low production numbers (the cost is/was still dropping).
Last time we were discussing the F-35 cost over in the other thread I have rejected the fanstasmagoric figures provided by DoD and projected Lightning’s cost to soar way over $100mil I immediately had two/three fanboys on my back throwing around the $140mil figures for F-22.
Now pfcem and other gentlemen, eat your own dirt. I hope you got napkins ready.
http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showpost.php?p=1434632&postcount=518
last paragraphhttp://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?p=1434578&highlight=gentlemen#post1434578
In a light of these figures I raise my cost prediction for F-35 from $120mil to at least $150mil. First numbers cut will raise that to … $180mil..?
We have actual documentation proving what the expected cost of the F-35 is to be. These are DOD numbers not LM numbers… You have nothing but pure BS.
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The airforce who set up and compile most of that data have claimed on countless occassions that they want more F-22s – with 187 being the high risk option – 243 the medium risk and 381 the low risk approach. It has been confirmed recently that Gates and the DoD have no study that actually vindicates their decision at all. They were pushed for this after congress demanded the information… the fact of the matter is the F-35 is a business for america and the F-22 isn’t – it’s as simple as that. People who opposed the SecDefs decision making were fired. People with a much more intimate understanding of air ops than Gates…
More so than that, the 381 number is the only one based on any sort of study to actually determine the number actually needed. The number 183/187 is nothing more than the number currently/thus far funded & the 243 number is nothing more than the 183 number plus 60 (assuming another multi-year agreement).
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so what the USAF has said is that
187- high risk but OK
243- medium risk but OK
381- low risk but OK.as I understadn it the USAF has, by providing this breakdown stated that it can do ‘the job’ required with 187 airframes. Yes the risk is higher but ‘the job’ is still doable.
The USAF has said no such thing. Quite the opposite in fact. That “high risk” means that there is a high risk of not being able to get the job done.
We all know its more complex than that and that the 187 figure is one that has taken countless rounds of analysis and ‘staffing’, both political and military, to arrive at and that in reality the USAF may feel 187 is too ‘high risk’…but that is not what has been said.
What alternate universe are you from?
They are stuck between a rock and a hard place and there may now be an element of….187 F-22s and a decent number of F-35s (like the F-15/F16 mix or…250 (ish F-22s) and no F-35s…
I think that is the overall picture that should inform the actual F-22 procurement…how many 22s and how many 35s…too many of the former may mean none of the later….
Just a thought.
BS. Even if the USAF were to get 500 F-22s (the true number needed – the 381 “low risk” includes by some wet dream keeping 186 F-15C “Golden Eagle” combat worthy well beyond 2025) it would still get 1,000+ F-35As.
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I thought they were removed because they lost nuclear weapons (among other operational foul ups), and had alleged monitary/ethical problems (thundervision scandal among others).
Now you are alleging they were fired because they had the temerity to support the F-22?
No, that was just the lame excuse given. The true reason was their continued & quite vocal support for more F-22s even after Gates had told them to stop.
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IMO, that is the real cost of the raptor is interesting because is close to the cost offered to Japan
No, that is the Weapon System Unit Cost if only 7 are procured in FY2010.
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Many interesting points.. sadly you have however missed the only real point.
Can the USAF do the job being asked of it today with 187 airframes.
Today we are not fighting any sort of conflict that requires any effort whatsoever to obtain/maintain air superiority.
The current USAF recorded view is yes.
No, the current USAF recorded view is that 381 (thats 381 F-22 + 186 F-15C “Golden Eagle to be more precise) is the minimum number needed. Any less & there is significant risk of failure to obtain/maintain air superiority is some potential future conflict.
Its the highest risk option the USAF is prepared to accept and still say yes.
No, the USAF has no choice. If it did it absolutely would not accept just 187.
Preferences etc are not being challenged at all… if 187 is OK but high risk then that is the ‘bottom line’..
No, 187 is not OK. 381 would be OK.
If they had thought 243 was the bottom line then that was to have been made clear…which from my viewing of the history of the programme is not the case…going on the record saying you would prefer 243 as a lower risk approach to getting the job done is just that.. a preference. That difference is the key to this issue and from what you have written I am not certain its one whose importance you have understood. Preferences and opinions are not the same as stating for the record you can get the job done with 187.
No, 381 is the bottom line. More than 381 would be preferred.
Sadly the F-22 history is its greatest Achillies heal. Born of a now non-existant threat with numbers to match all the history provides is ammunition to reduce its acquisition to the minimum needed for the current job in hand. To use previous numbers and options is very dangerous as the very threat that created its capability is no longer current and for many not credible for a long time to come in the future. Hence to rely on them is to deny the world stage has changed sufficiently to alter one’s view of what is currently needed to deal with it.
No, the 381 minimum requirement is already based on “reduced threat”. The requirement base on the “original threat” was 750.
Bearing in mind what the ‘job is now’ then much of the F-35’s capability is gold plating. Sure the threat changes and the next war may well be more demanding and ideally the equipment to fight it is in place. However it is very debateable as to whether or not the challenge of integrating all of this is so great. None of the F-35’s envisaged roles are new, they are established.
There is no doubt that three versions and multi national participation makes it more difficult.. but none of those are new issues and in light of the time and money so far spent this reasoning is very very thin.I agree that not investing in the future is out of the question.. but the issue is not one of what should be done… you say VLO.. others would disagree using the ‘what is needed now’…the USN are thinking of developing an armed Turcano to support its ops in ‘Stan…because the FJ/Legacy airframes are not suited. Who is correct? Your crystal ball or theirs?
Do you see the irony here? An F-22/F-35 brings nothing right now to the table.. and many would argue (and perhaps rightly) that the reasonable foreseeable threats do not require VLO airframes. Its not to say there are not threats out there but are they ‘reasonable’? That is the question upon which it all hangs and that answer does NOT come from the ‘experts’…
BS. What is needed now is to continue to replace the already aged & flight restricted F-15Cs with F-22s and to ASAP begin to replace USAF F-16, USN F/A-18s and USMC F/A-18s & AV-8Bs! Failure to do both will result in major fighter shortfalls which could in dire cosequenses in some potential conflict 10, 20, even 30 years from now.
The F-35 is unsuited to the current ‘internal’ financial wars….it ‘may’ bring in lots of cash to the US.. if it survives the internal US budget pressures which do not see a short term (election cycle time frame) benefit from this programme versus the benefits from other expenditure.
The ‘if ‘ makes the F-35 very vulnerable…its already late, its already facing massive issues with overseas partners…we could go on.. you have pointed out its inherent risks etc… For a politician fighting to balance books or get a country out of recession then all of this is utopian dreaming..which is perhaps easier to sweep aside ‘for the moment’.
There is a huge difference in what is being procured now and what is needed in the current war…its a new situation and one which makes programmes like the F-22, F-35 very vulnerable and the USAF, mindful of its longer term obligations (as it sees them) needs to tread a very fine line.
Don’t let the sordid reality of political ambition and financial avarice however tarnish your obvious passion for the technical and military aspects… even if in truth these are at this stage of the programme but bit players in the procurement script.
The only thing needed for the currect conflict(s) is the political will to fight & win.
pfcem$1.75bn is the cost of seven extra F-22 fighters.
Make it $250mil for a Raptor, sorry to ruin your bubble.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8162106.stm
Hereby, your arguments are dismissed.
LOL.
$1.75 billion divided by seven aircraft is Weapon System Unit Cost not Flyaway Unit Cost…
AFD-080204-081 (FY 2009 Budget Estimates AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT AIR FORCE, VOLUME I) proves that the average flyaway unit cost of the 60 lot 7-9 F-22s was ~$140 million (no doubt would have been a few million less if FY2009 assumed/included that more were to be procured beyond FY2009) – and that includes Advance Procurement Cost (not just the final payment out a number of instalments). From the same document, $42.306 million for FY2010 & $42.006 million for FY2011 can be seen as continued Production Cost “to complete the procurement of equipment for operational locations (i. e. equipment, support, etc.) and other necessary expenses to deliver the MYP aircraft” even though zero F-22s are assumed to be procured in FY2010 &/or FY2011.
It is insane to assume that procuring just seven F-22s in one year would result in comparable per unit cost as 60 over three years.
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