It’s easy to get suckered into the physical sizes of the two contenders, but the important thing to remember is that the bigger Airbus has some of the advantages that you’d intuitively expect from a smaller aircraft.
The A330 can operate from an airfield with a shorter balanced field length (with it’s full fuel load) than the KC-767 can.
That’s right, the ‘small’ KC-767A needs a longer runway than is required by the ‘big’ A330 to take-off with full fuel (91.8 tonnes for the 767, 111 tonnes for the A330). This means that the ‘small’ KC-767 won’t be able to operate from a 9,000 ft runway WITH FULL FUEL, whereas a ‘big’ KC-30 will.
That means that the ‘big’ A330 is more likely to be able to use forward airfields closer to the action, if required, and closer to the towline, and will do so carrying full fuel. The ‘small’ KC-767 has less basing flexibility.
BS.
The KC-767AT is not a 767-200ER so stop using the 767-200ER runway length requiremnts!
The KC-767AT with a full load of 200,000 lbs of fuel is >20,000 lbs under its MTOW.
What is easy to get suckered into is the BS that runway length is the limiting factor in whether an aicraft can or can not operate from a given airfield. The reality is the weight (PCN/ACN) &/or size (footprint) of aircraft the airfield can accomodate is more often the limiting factor. Even more so in the case of the KC-X since even the smaller KC-767AT exceeds the fuel offload & airlift requirements. We rarely even utilize the full fuel offload capacity of the KC-135R, much less the >25,000 lbs/500nm more the KC-767AT provides.
What EADS/KC-30 Kool-Aid drinks continue to ignore is that fact that the real world fuel offload requirements are significanlty lower than asked for in the KC-X. The real limiting factor as to whether all the aircraft than need refueled get refueled is the number of booms in the air, not the amount of fuel each individual tanker can offlaod. And the KC-30 simply can not compete because its size (footprint) & weight (ACN) are too large to operate in enough numbers from enough airfields close enough the the refueling points/tracks without spending tens of billion of dollars upgrading the existing infrastructure.
The practical implications are huge. When limited to a 10,000ft balanced field at sea level (assuming ISA standard conditions and still wind), on a four hour sortie (landing with the equivalent of another hours flight time as a reserve) the KC-767A can carry just 77 tonnes, and will have just 50,000 kg of fuel to give away. The A330 will have 82,500 kg.
BS. The KC-767AT “when limited to a 10,000ft balanced field at sea level (assuming ISA standard conditions and still wind), on a four hour sortie (landing with the equivalent of another hours flight time as a reserve) the KC-767A can carry a full load of 200,000+ lbs. Which is more than the vast majority of tanker sorties require.
And because of its lower size (footprint) & weight (ACN), the KC-767AT can operate from airfields the KC-30 can not (or can only do so at reduced take-off weight) and can operate in larger numbers from each airfield.
Interestingly, even the standard A310MRTT would have 45,500 kg to give away – or 51,200 kg with a fifth ACT. Oops! So even an A310 could give away more than a 767!
Not only is the KC-767 not as good as a 330, but it’s third best, behind the A310 as well!
Not. EADS did not proposed the A310MRTT because it knew it could not match the KC-767’s fuel offload.
Alternatively, the RAF looked at how much fuel would be available to offload during a 90 minute AAR task, one hour’s flying from the tanker base, landing with the equivalent of an hour’s fuel as reserves for diversion.
With four ACTs, the A310 MRTT had 47 tonnes to give away – 1.7 tonnes (less than 5%) less than the KC-767. With a fifth ACT, though, the A310 was much better (by about five tonnes, or by more than 10%).
By comparison, the A330 MRTT had 84 tonnes to give away.
The figures were:
A330MRTT: 84.0 tonnes
B767: 48.7 tonnes
VC10K3: 47.3 tonnes
A310MRTT (4 ACTs): 47.0 tonnes
A400M with 2 cargo bay tanks: 41.0 tonnes
VC10K4 or C1K: 36.3 tonnesAnd just for the historians:
Victor K2: 33.9 tonnes
KC-767 with 160,000 lbs of fuel capacity like the Italian & Japanese (which can still be fitted with the auxillery fuel tanks to bring them up to 200,000+ lbs) and at that even they would be below their MTOW…
And it’s worse for the 777, which needs even more runway than the 767. Boeing don’t have an aircraft that can lift a decent fuel load from a standard tanker base runway.
Boeing is’t being as disengenous as EADS in trying to claim the KC-777 is a ‘medium’ tanker suitable for replacing USAF KC-135s…
The KC-767AT (hell, even the Italian & Japanese KC-767s) can lift more fuel load than is required from airfields even smaller & more limiting than one with a standard tanker base runway.
And I bet a KC-777 loaded with ‘just’ the 246,000 lbs the KC-30 can carry would surprise you are to how short a runway it could take-off from…
Then why do you dismiss this argument so quickly?
It has nothing to do with the KC-X program. The KC-X program is to develope & procure 179 tankers for the USAF & is expected to cost $35-40 billion. Thats it.
If you want to talk about the additional benefit of the bids beyond the KC-X program, fine just be honest that they have nothing to do with the KC-X program & that quite the opposite of what the EADS/KC-30 Kool-Aid drinkers want people to believe, the NG/EADS bid is not the only one to have benefits beyong the KC-X program.
It seems logical that building let’s say 150 KC30 with 55% US content + Y A330F could lead to a greater input to the US economy than building 150 KC-767. IMO, A330F should easily exceed 200 sales.
But you are forgetting the additional aircraft the Boeing manufacturing & assembly plant (more specifically the existing 767 production line) could lead to. There is quite a large gap between the 737 & the 787 which could very well need to be filled some time in the next decade or so…
BS. IFARA parameters were adjusted at NG’s request during the pre-RFP period and Boeing did not object to these modifications at the time (which explains why their subsequent GAO protests on this part were rightly rejected).
Boeing did object to the modifications at the time. But was assured that “the ability to satisfy real-world mission requirements as reflected in the 2005 study would remain an important aspect of its IFARA evaluation”. And in fact the revised RFP stated that “Government will report the ‘fleet effectiveness value’ [generated by the CMARPS model] along with major insights & observations gleaned from the evaluation.”
The modifications were made because the IFARA model was in fact not reflecting the reality. For example, it took for taxiway strength the value of the weakest taxiway in the entire airbase. The effect was that a megabase with a small dedicated runway for fighters would suddenly become unable to operate tankers! NG argued that the strongest taxiway value should be used and the USAF (and Boeing) agreed. Other adjustments include reducing the distance between parked airplanes to reflect actual USAF practice. All these modifications were made to get the IFARA model to come closer to the real world, not the opposite.
Exactly the opposite. The model, as complex as it was, was limited in it ability to reflect reality. It did not use fighter taxiway weight limits for the entire base (when modeling tanker/airlift operations such areas would obviously be ignored). If it did, no base that had dedicated fighter operations would have been able to operate any tankers at all (& they obviously did). Using the strongest taxiway value for the entire base is utter nonsense as it magically allows those big heavy tankers to operate from taxiways that in reality it can not. Sorry but real world USAF pracatice is for tankers to only be parked 25′ apart when parked in the parking area, not when fueled & in the taxiways. All of the modifications took the model away from reality for the sole purpose of getting it such that the KC-30 could even get enough tankers on the ground/in the air to complete the mission scenarios.
Runway requirements are not a direct consequence of aircraft size. An A330 can operate from shorter runways than a 767, especially the KC-767ADV version that is extremely heavy for its limited size. At any given payload, the KC-30 will need shorter runways and be able to climb faster and higher.
Runway requirements are seldom the limiting factor as to whether a given aircraft can or can not operate from a given airfield as most airfields (for safey reasons) have “oversized” runways that can accomodant larger/heavier aircraft than any other part of the airfiled can. To use a reali-life example. The airport near where I grew up (single terminal, two gates) does not operate anything bigger than a 737 or A310 but when the airshow is in town they manage to put a C-5 on display.
The KC-767AT with 200,000 lbs of fuel is >20,000 lbs under its MTOW but has the wing, landing gear & engines of 767 models heavier than any other -200 varient. It is not heavy for it size but can carry a payload greater than its own operational empty weight.
And you are completely FOS if you think the KC-30 can climb faster & higher. It is the KC-30’s inability to climb fast enough that prevents it from meeting one of the USAF’s key requirements.
What higher cost? Do you know NG’s bid and Boeing’s details? If so please share them because from all information available, both bids were in the same ballpark so the USAF would had larger tabkers at more or less the same cost.
Higher operating cost which are not in the same ballpark. In fact the KC-X Source Selection Team disengenously evacualted the KC-X Most Probable Life Cycle Cost (MPLCC) for only 25 years despite the requirement being for the KC-X to operate for 40 years in order to minimized the greater operational cost of the KC-30. In reality, over the 40 year life of the KC-X, the difference in total lifetime cost of the KC-767AT & the KC-30 could be greater than the $35-40 billion to develope & procure them.
Perhaps if Boeing wasn’t so greedy and hadn’t ried to overcharge the USAF, the contract would be theirs already?
Where do you get that Boeing tried to overcharge the USAF. Independent auditors concluded that the agreed upon price for the tanker lease was fair.
IMO, the best solution would be to split the contract on a 60/40 basis with 60% going to Boeing for vanilla KC-767 (Japanese and Italian design) and 40% to NG for KC-30. That way there would be minimal development costs (both platforms are flying) and the USAF would get a mix of small/medium tankers with the KC-767 used for bomm saturation and the KC-30 used for long range refueling, and mixed refueling/cargo missions (e.g. airlift deployment).
Such approach would keep suppliers honest (screw up and we get more of the other guy product) and get the USAF new tankers faster. But it makes too much sense so it won’t happen.
No, then the USAF would be forced into only getting 107 of the tankers it wants & be saddled with 72 tankers which are too big & heavy (and no better) for what the KC-X is supposed to be which would no doubt be used to argue that it does not need as many of the other tankers it wants for KC-Y even though the KC-30 most certainly does not meet the KC-Y requirements.
If there were no plans for the larger KC-Y some of the arguments for the KC-30 would be valid. But since the plan is to have both ‘medium’ & ‘large’ tankers, the KC-30 is just simply the wrong way to go. It is too big/heavy for the ‘medium’ tanker & lacks the capacity & capability for the ‘larger’ tanker despite being larger & heavier than our current ‘large’ tanker.
***
As said before by some, it’s a pitty that Airbus doesn’t do the KC-310 any more, since that one would be the perfect 1:1 replacement for the KC-135.
And then the tender formulation for KC-X was ****** up, but that is known.
If the KC-30 is better than why on earth would you say that?
It all depends on assumptions of how future operations will look like. Is the emphasis on cargo & pax correct? Maybe. Thing is that the KC-767 could offer the same fuel offload over distance as the KC-330, but probably NOT while keeping the upper deck available for pallets/ULDs/palletized snap-in seats. And the KC-330 simply offers more of what is assumed to be in demand – more pallet and ULD capacity (and different size: LD2 vs LD6), and more palletized snap-in pax seats = more flexibility, while not having a larger footprint.
Well, in order to offer the same fuel offload as the KC-30 (which is not needed anyay, the KC-767AT already exceeds the fuel offload requirements by 25,000 lbs/500nm) it would have to go with the -400ER wing & MTOW but it could be done…
The KC-30 offers less of what the demand for tankers is! Booms in the air to meet the demand to refuel large numbers of fighter/attack aircraft.
The KC-30 has a larger footprint than any aircraft in US inventory (larger than the KC-10, larger than the B-52, larger than the C-17) except for the C-5 & a handful of specialized 747-based aircraft.
I still think that this here is needed and will emerge at one point
http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?t=91472
but the KC-330 would be a good (interim) large common combat support platform, if used for KC-X and KC-Y folded into one, and as C-135 replacement (E-, WC-, RC-, OC-, airborne theatre UAV C2 post, &c).
No, the KC-30 is not good, even for interim. It is too big & heavy but does not offer sufficient capacity/capability for its size. Even if the US was to stupitly go the “one size fits all” route, the 767 is still the better way to go as the need for ‘medium’ tankers is greater (in number & importance) than for ‘larger’ tankers. Tankers are supposed to be tankers 1st, cargo haulers 2nd, not the other way around. And the KC-767’s cargo capacity/capability for the types of cargo tankers are used for is greater than that of the C-17!
I’m not sure about the 777 seems far to big for KC-X. I think Boeing are trying to cover every avenue to make sure they can protest if the contract goes to Northrop Grumman by saying we have offered a range of suitable aircraft.
No, it is “covering every avenue” so as to be able to propose a tanker which specifically fits what ever the new requirements/criteria are.
Does anyone have a picture of size comparison between the KC135, 767, A330, and 777? I’m sure i have seen it somewhere (maybe minus the 777)?
KC-135, KC-767 & KC-30
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/images/kc-x-image01.gif
KC-135, KC-767, KC-30 & KC-777
http://catch4all.com/BadDecisionKC45/PUB_KC-X_Options_Comparison_lg.gif
KC-767 & KC-777
http://www.windsofchange.net/images/AIR_KC-767_and_KC-777_Concept_lg.jpg
KC-135, KC-767, KC-30, KC-10 & KC-777
I know there is one out there that I have seen & will post it if/when I find it.
Found it but it is a part of the Boeing protest PDF rather than a separate image.
Why don’t Boeing offer the 787 surely this is the perfect size to compete with the A330. Maybe it’s because of all the foreign content in that makes the argument of Made in America not hold any water. I thought the 777 had a lot of foreign content as well though?
That is exactly the trap NG/EADS wants you to fall into. Boeing does not have to compete with the A330 by proposing something the same size as the A330. The KC-767AT is more than large enough. It meets or exceeds all the KC-X key requirements (including fuel offload & airlift). It exceeds the fuel offload requirement by >25,000 lbs/500nm (as in exceeds the required fuel offload for a given range by >25,000 lbs or exceeds the required range for a given fuel offload by >500nm).
Just like the 767, about 30% of the 777 airframe is foreign manufactured – but that is just the airframe.
no, it found no problem with the calculations showing the KC-30 as more capable
that means they approve of the IFARA numbers showing the KC-30 is more capable
the gao disagrees with you
Read the ruling again.
1. again ifara proves you wrong
2. you keep shifting the argument. in case you don’t remember, you started off with
1. No it doesn’t. It proves me right. Using real world data the KC-30 could not even complete some missions. The data had to be altered from reality so that it could.
2. Where have I shifted the argument?f
increased airlift capability is never a bad thing
Yes it is. It meant a bigger/heavier aircraft that can not operate from as many airfields nor can as many tankers operate from each airfield both of which lead to insufficient booms in the air to meet the peak demand. And the greater the airlift capacity the greater the chance the tanker will be utilized for airlift & not be availaibe to perform its primary misison of aerial refueling.
It is really quite simple, if greater fuel offload &/or airlift were really have the benefit you want people to believe then ther would be no “medium’ KC-X &/or KC-Z. Instead the entire fleet would be KC-Y and were would be comparing KC-747 vs KC-380.
as a side note, we don’t actually know that
your only source for that is the selection report, the same report that, as you may recall, also said the KC-30 met or exceeded all requirements.
Yes but The GAO was not convinced that the KC-X Source Selection Team could justify how it is it determined that the KC-30 did.
the only one who continues to ignore the greater capability of the KC-30 is you
Wrong. The KC-30 does not offer greater capability, just excess/unneeded capacity. Even with its greater capacity reality has to be altered (or tens of billions of dollars needs to be spent upgrading/rebuilding airbases) in order for it to even do the job of the KC-135R better than the KC-135R does.
oh geez, not this garbage again :rolleyes:
I know the truth hurts & that the EADS/KC-30 Kool-Aid keeps telling you it isn’t true but it is. The USAF said so.
i’m not the one who needs to refresh their memory . . .
Yes you are because you keep make BS inaccurate claims as to what the ruling says.
false, the benefit is very real
It is no benefit to the KC-X program.true, but that is a separate issue
Just because we don’t know how long EADS will run the factory or exactly how many people they will continue to employ does not mean that it is not a very real and tangible benefit
It is no benefit to the KC-X program. And you nor anybody else has any idea if its net long-term benfit is equal to or greater than that of tha Boeing bid.
not at all, but it is already fully accounted for in your 85% domestic content calculation
once production of KC-X ends, there is no further benefit from the program if you go with boeing
on the other hand, the NG/EADS bid offers a substantial future benefit
no we don’t know exactly what it will be, but the point is that your 85/59 number is inadequate to describe the full impact of the selection
LOL
Yeah right. A new Final Assembly plant has benefit beyond the KC-X but keeping an already existing Manufacturing & Assembly Plant and the thousands of workers who work there doesn’t.
Could you PLEASE at least get the numbers right. It is 85% & 58% (not 59) and the 58% is BS, in reality it is lower than that.
Those number represents how much of the projected $35-40 billion the KC-X developement & procurement program is stays in the US & how much goes overseas. That is what matters.
it is also buying an assembly line that will continue to have value long after KC-X is finished, something that can’t be said of the boeing bid.
BS.
BS. A substantial part of EADS offer/bribe is to build an assembly line here that will continue to build Airbus planes after KC-X is over.
from a purely economic standpoint, that is a significant value to the US
Sorry, the KC-X Developement & Procurment Program is projected to be $35-40 billion.
And despite you complete ignorance to the fact the Boeing bid will keep a Manufactuing & Assemply plant (& all the associated workers) in business rather than shut down. And when the last KC-X is bult that same plant & those same workers will be able to (because they still exist) go on to build other Boeing aircraft.
lololol, i’ve asked you now THREE TIMES to enumerate these phantom ‘non-program benefits’ from boeing but you have yet to identify a single one
The same as the NG/EADS bid except for that they are for a Manufacturing & Assembly Plant rather than just a Final Assembly Plant.
Contrary to what you so obviously want people to believe, Boeing does build more than just tankers for the USAF.
what you keep ignoring is reality
No, that would be you.
IFARA proves you wrong, suck it up and get over it
No it doesn’t becasue it was not based on reality but some alternate reality that had to be created within the computer model in order for the KC-30 to even complete some mission scenarios.
well of course that’s boeing’s spin on the situation
the FACT is that the gao REJECTED such arguments, reaffirming that the KC-30 is more capable
perhaps boeing’s arguments weren’t as good as you believe?
It isn’t spin. It is what the USAF has said had to be done. And again, read the GAO ruling.
why thank you for admitting that your previous statement
is wrong
I have done no such thing & you know it.
nice spin, the real reason is that large tankers are expensive and they can’t afford a fleet full of KC-777s. However if they can get more capability for a similar price, they will jump all over it (and they did).
LOL.
Thanks for debunking your own BS.
If bigger was in fact better as you want people to believe then the higher cost of larger tankers would be offset by their greater capability & thus fewer tankers needed.
But the reality is that the USAF needs a number of tankers in order to meet the demand for the number of booms in the air and even the KC-135R has more than enough fuel offload capability but they can’t fly forever. There is a reason why the USAF set the fuel offload requirement at the capability of the KC-135R rather than higher (in fact it could be argued that since we rarely even use the full fuel offload of the KC-135R that the KC-X would not necessarily even have to match the KC-135R but we all know how much of a no-no it is to even think of a tanker with less fuel offload than the KC-135R even though the reality is that tankers with less fuel offload would not represent any real loss in capability).
For the benefit of the others, this personal guess is not bolstered by the official claim of max subsonic range with max possible fuel load to stay polite.
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=199
Someone out of time to provide a single link is not time-limited about the own guessings. :rolleyes:
There is absolutely nothing there which indicates that the F-22’s “Mission 1” requirement does not include 30+ minutes flying at supersonic speed.
The internal fuel capacity of the F-22 is 20,650 lbs as per ground crew safety document Technical Order 00-105E-9. As I have posted before, I believe that the differnece between the 20,650 lbs of fuel ground crews put into the F-22 & the “18,000 lbs” indicated is that the F-22 requires a ‘reserve’ of ~2650 lbs of fuel in order to maintain its skin cooling.
they certainly could sustain a protest if the capabilities were incorrectly calculated
It did.
they specifically DENIED a number of protests about IFARA
So?
in this case it was
No it wasn’t, isn’t & never will be.
it’s called FLEXIBILITY
No it isn’t. With the KC-30 you actually lose flexibility due to the limitations its large/heavy airframe emposes on operational realities.
The KC-767AT met or exceeded all key requirements (i.e. it met or exceeded the desired flexibility).
so we should remove capability to FORCE the USAF to make the ‘right decision’?
Chosing a tanker that fits the requirements vs one that does not is not removing capbility. Again, you are confusing capacity with capability.
the USAF has been forced to alter its requirements/criteria to accomodat the C-30 which it had previously rejected for not fitting its requirements/criteria.
the USAF is a big boy, they can handle the responsibility themselves
So instead of telling the USAF it has to have a competition we should let it get on with procuring the tankers it selected based on their own requiremnts/criteria instead of altered requiremnts/criteria to accomodate a tanker it rejected.
that was ALREADY INCLUDED in the decision
And was one of the item the GAO said was inaccurately calculated & should to be looked at (i.e. corrected).
granted the GAO didn’t approve of the way they estimated the cost (they wanted more actual numbers instead of an estimate), but to within an order of magnitude, all that cost was already accounted for
Read the ruleing again…
there’s nothing theoretical about a plant turning out Airbus planes, it is very real
The ‘projected’ benefit is theoretical. Nobody knows how much benefit it would provide.
And the Boeing manufacturing & assembly line is very real as well but of course you want to ignore that…
how can you say ‘has nothing to do with the KC-X program’?
it is a DIRECT RESULT of the KC-X program
Because it doesn’t. The KC-X program is not buying any civilian A330 airliners &/or frieghters, it is buying tankers for the USAF.
and that is a very dishonest comparison because it completely ignores a substantial chunk of what the EADS/NG bid offers
BS. It is a comparision of exacty (at least using estimated numbers) what the KC-X program is from an purely economic standpoint. How much of its’ $35-40 billion is in US workshare (thus going into the US economy) & how much is non-US workshare (thus not going into the US economy).
And as you continue to do, you ignor that the Boeing bid offers more non-program related benefits as well.
nothing insidious or surprising about it, they have stated that they are looking to replace euro suppliers with american suppliers where they can, and that shift you see is the fruit of that search
Except for that if it was indeed and “American tanker” as they want people to believe, they would not have to do so, the suppliers would already be American.
the jobs numbers are always bogus, what matters is the money
but if NG inflated the jobs numbers, they learned from the best (Boeing) 😀
Try looking at number from outside sources, not those of Boeing &/or NG/EADS. While they are all different because used different reasoning criteria for their estimates but they all show that the Boeing bid provides more US jobs than the NG/EADS bid.
you can keep spinning it however you want, but the fact remains the KC-30 is
a) more capable individually
b) more capable as a fleetgetting a less capable tanker simply to suit your preconceived notions of the ‘proper’ size is silly
No you keep ignoring the realities of US tanker operations. The KC-767AT is not a less capable tanker.
nope, that’s why they have the IFARA simulations to take into account all those ‘not so simple’ issues
Which had to have model data altered significantly from reality just so that the KC-30 could complete some missions…
you are deliberately obfuscating the scale of the difference. The KC-30 would (possibly) cost a SMALL amount more. The KC-777 would cost a GINORMOUS amount more. There is a difference there even if you don’t acknowledge it
LOL. I made absolutely no indication of scale. Too big/heavy is too big/heavy period. Of course with the KC-30 being too big/heavy the larger & heavier still KC777 would be even more too big/heavy.
only in Boeing/pfcem fantasy land
No in the real world. And according to the very people who know best, the USAF AMC, Generals & tanker crews.
in the real world, we have stuff like the KC-Y program. Please explain for the audience what capabilities KC-Y is/was targetting. (here’s a hint: they were MORE than the KC-767AT)
But we are talking about KC-X not KC-Y. Different tankers with different requirements/criteria. A ‘large’ KC-Y/KC-10 tanker has its purposes but so do ‘medium’ KC-X/KC-Z/KC-135 tankers. But without a larger number of ‘medium’ KC-X/KC-Z/KC-135 tankers, a fleet of ‘large’ KC-Y/KC-10 tankers is a significant loss in real world tanker operations. That is why the plan is to recapitalize the tanker fleet with more ‘medium’ KC-X/KC-Z tankers than ‘large’ KC-Y tankers.
some areas had extra credit, some didn’t, the issue is a little more subtle than what you’re saying
Name the areas that gave extra credit.
The only ‘extra credit’ that was to be given was in meeting non-key requirements (you only needed to meet the key requirments to be selected) which the KC-767AT met far more of (but did not recieve credit for).
1. they are historical reference to explain the reasoning behind the selection (as requested by Al.)
Which proved to be nonsense.
2. many of the components still stand. what the GAO struck down was fairly narrow. we are still left with:
a) the KC-30 is more capable individually (offload, range, pallets)
b) the KC-30 is more capable as a group (IFARA simulation)
BS. The GAO was very limited on what it could sustain a protest over & what it could not. Plus even the seemingly small number of specific sustainment points (by the GAO’s own admission) emcompass many points of protest (the GAO did not even loook at it in terms of x number of points of protest vs y number of points of sustainment). And the GAO even went so far as to include in its decision a number of additional items that it strongly recommended be looked further into (i.e. corrected).
a) Sorry, bigger is not necessarily better. For example, the KC-135Rs do not need to be replaced because they lack the fuel offload capability to do the job. In fact we rarely even utilized the full fuel offoad capability of the KC-135R. And as the US has learned with the KC-10, a tanker with a lot of airlift capacity increases the likleyhood that it will be used for airlift & a tanker tasked with airlift is unavailable for its primary purpose of aerial refuleing
b) Not unless you spend tens of billions of dollars upgrading (dare say completely rebuilding &/or relocating) quite a significant portion of the airfields USAF tankers do &/or have been identified as possible location to operate from. Even Kadena Air Base (the largest US airbase in the Pacific theater) requires major reconstruction in order to accomdate the KC-30 in the number necessary.
and yet you keep harping on 85 vs 59 as if that was the definitive number when you know it’s not
as far as the benefits of Boeing’s offer, please share
That is the US workshare of the KC-X program itself, not some theoretical post program benefit that has nothing to do with the KC-X program. It means that for the projected $35-40 billion of the KC-X development & procurement program the KC-767AT provides $29.75-34.0 billion in US workshare vs ‘just’ $20.3-23.2 billion for the KC-30. That is a difference of $9.45-10.8 billion.
And yes many are fully aware NG/EADS are FOS with their “58%” number since early in the process it was significantly lower but they kept increasing it (along with the supposed number of US jobs – even to the point were they claimed the same number of US jobs as Boeing) in order to make a BS case that it was an “American tanker”.
***
the whole ‘right-sized’ thing is a red herring
No it isn’t. It is key. In fact it is one of the reasons for having both a ‘medium’ tanker & a ‘large tanker’ and why the plan is for more ‘medium’ tankers than ‘large’ tankers.
Size very much matters but bigger is not necessarily better.
it’s about capability for the cost
It is about providing the right amount of (not the most) capability at the best cost – and being the right size is key in providing the right amount of capability. Too small/not big enough & you are unable to provide enough capability. Too big and any theoretical benefit of your greater capacity is wasted & results in greater cost (not just $) thus providing no additional value.
The requirements/criteria (before they were altered to accomodate the non-competitive A330) were set at the leves they were for good reason. There simply is no need (nor justification) for a tanker with significantly more fuel capacity than the KC-135R. And the KC-767AT exceeded the fuel offload & airlift requirements (fuel offload by 25,000 lbs/500nm).
the KC-767 and KC-30 are very similar in cost, yet the KC-30 offers substantially higher capability so I prefer it
No they are not. Not unless you use deliberately bogus fuzzy math like requiring a tanker that is to be operational for 40 years but only calculate its cost over 25 years…
And as the typical EADS/KC-30 Kool-Aid drinker that you are you confuse capacity with capability. The real world isn’t so simple.
the KC-777 is even more capable than the KC-30, yet everything i have seen indicates that the cost would be SUBSTANTIALLY higher than the KC-30
if boeing can prove me wrong and offer the KC-777 for only slightly more than the KC-30 i would be all over that
Of course a KC-777 would have even greater capacity & higher cost than the KC-30. And just like the KC-30 that extra size comes at a cost (& I do not just mean $).
but as it stands now, the KC-30 seems to offer by far the best VALUE
No it doesn’t. It is more expensive than the KC-767AT (the KC-X Source Selection Team even admitted to that – & that was still using their bogus 25 year cost – shortly before the GAO was scheduled to rule on the protest) and there is no valued added in exceeding requirements met or exceeded by KC-767AT.
AYAYAYAYAY, pfcem.
Cruising at SUBsonic speeds is “SUBcrusing” or just “cruising”. (Mach <~0.8)
Cruising at TRANSonic speeds is “TRANScruising”. (Mach ~0.8 – ~1.2)
Cruising at SUPERsonic speeds is “SUPERcruising”. (Mach >~1.2)That has nothing to do with Mach 1.5 whatsoever/LOL, but with natural phenomenon called sound barrier. I may be wrong, but I don’t think LM patented air. 🙂
As for EF, official figures claim it can go Mach 1.5 with 4*recessed AIMs, but otherwise clean (no FTs or other weapons).
No, supercruise was coined/defined by the USAF/DOD in describing the capability criteria for the AFT (now F-22). For that the threashold for supercruise is Mach 1.5. But others wanted to play “me too” (prior to the AFT it was not even considered a big deal/significant) & started describing their aircraft’s ability to cruise supersonically as supercruising.
Unfortunately you have been confused by pfcem who believes that exceeding the requirements at less risk is a bad thing.
No, exceeding requirements by more than your competator exceeds them is of no falue benefit (the solicitaion was clear & unabiguous on that).
And both bids were assested has having equal risk, just that the assumed risks were in different areas of the bid.
Here’s a good overview from when the contract was awarded:
http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=143009
http://lexingtoninstitute.org/printer_1234.shtml
Since proven to be utter nonsense.
See the GAO decision on that.
Just an FYI some of pfcem’s other ‘pet’ foibles include ignoring the benefit of an Airbus plant in the US (no! we must focus strictly on KC-X! If we look at the broader picture it hurts Boeing) and pretending that Boeing has a magic development cycle that can turn out a new model in zero time.
No I am not ignoring the benefit of an Airbus plant in the US. But if you want to include that you must aslo include such benefits the Boeing offer…
Okay, thanks for that correction.
No problem. I know a lot of people want everyone to forget that.
So WHY was the tanker lease cancelled (and can whoever made the decision explain their reasoning to UK gov?)
Because the DOD rushed the process (& more specifically skipped required steps in the process). It was Boeing bringing to light the Durgen/Sears corruption which prompted several program-wide investigations which made them an issue. Prior to that, those than ‘knew’ were willing to go along/let it slide in order to get the much needed tankers ASAP.
Okay, interesting. The remaining 15% are they components bought in bulk off the shelf or bits of kit specifically manufactured by experts outside of the US? Are the rivets bought in bulk and happen to be made in Asia or the ICs made cheaper/greater yield at Kobe? Or are there mysterious fuel pump secrets only held by German engineers?
Part of it comes from specific airframe components (~30% of the 767 airframe workshare/value) being manufactured overseas.
So why was it selected? There must have been some reason, even if you do not agree with it. Or even if said reason is nonsense.
To punish Boeing for blowing the lid on the Durgen/Sears corruption which lead to the cancellation of the tanker lease.
To pay off foreign interest groups.
Being fooled by “bigger is better”.
Surely that depends on how sophisticated the selection process is? Or did KC-767 fail to meet other objectives and thus rule itself out on those grounds (NB: that are a genuine request for info not a billy goat dangling over a bridge)
The KC-X had a very sophisticated selection process (there were some 800 discrete criteria outlined in total).
Not meeting an OBJECTIVE can not rule out an offer. Only failing to meet THRESHOLDS.
So are Boeing addressing a reason for the original decision going against them or cannily tring to sew up orders for two programmes with but one airframe?
It is signally to the DOD that if it further alters the requirements/criteria to favor the larger KC-30 (as opposed to staying with the requireements/criteria the USAF developed) that it can & will ‘trump’ the “bigger is better” argument with something bigger than the KC-30.
Which are…..?
And are they Bill Shut arguments made by Airbus or the DoD selction team? Or both? Neither?
That being bigger means the KC-30 is better.
More Money For Silent Eagle
Posted by Bill Sweetman at 6/22/2009 6:32 AM CDT
Boeing quietly announced at Paris last week that it is dedicating more funds to the development of the F-15SE Silent Eagle, with a goal of flying a demonstrator in the third quarter of next year. At the same time the company is saying that it has received strong encouragement from potential customers – led by Saudi Arabia and Korea – to continue working on the F-15SE, which features optional internal weapon bays.
This is, says Boeing Military Aircraft president Chris Chadwick, a matter of applying “the General Atomics model” to fighter development. GA’s success with its unmanned air vehicles is largely attributable to its willingness to invest in developments when the customer is indicating interest – but before the customer has made money available.
Chadwick is confident that both the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the F-15 will still be in production in 2020 – despite Pentagon plans to close out the Super Hornet line. “It will always be less expensive than the F-35,” he says, “and it will have the best capability of any multirole fighter out there, for at least another decade.”
Chadwick’s statements are based in part on Boeing assessments of how much the JSF will eventually cost, and when it will deliver its full planned capability – which as always will trail initial operational capability by some years. “I’m not an expert on the F-35, but when we look at where we are in terms of flight test and at the history of aircraft development … we know we find things out in flight test.” In terms of costs, he notes that “there’s an extended period before the economies of scale kick in.”
Chadwick does not think that the Pentagon’s decision to end production of the Super Hornet will hold. “When all is said and done there is still a [US Navy] force structure shortfall. There is a need to procure additional Super Hornets, perhaps a third multi-year buy.” Another issue is industrial base: “Secretary Gates said in his April 6 announcement that he did not take industrial base into account. I respect and agree with that – but industrial base is an issue in Congress.”
In the wings, but not firmly planned is an uprated engine for the Super Hornet. “General Electric has demonstrated its feasibility and we’ve simulated the performance,” Chadwick says. The company’s idea is to repeat what Boeing and GE did for the F/A-18C/D: develop the uprated engine for the export market and then offer it for retrofit to the US Navy,
But who cry?
Funny how it took an unfair bidding process in order for NG/EADS to “win”.
Clear example of the maturity of the typical anti-Boeing crowd.
Coolig can prevent some IR-radiation but not all, it’s more usefull to use a paint that translated your surface IR-emission in uncomon IR-bands. You can make little against the stagnations temperature in the mach cone or you travel not so fast. The avonics, RADAR and air conditioning system cooled by fuel too. Specially the Radar overheating make some headaches.;)
The point & comment was made in response to the BS assertion that skin heating was the limiting factor in how far the F-22 could supercruise. As long as the F-22 has a reserve of fuel (I suspect this ‘reserve’ to be where the difference between the 20,650 lb & 18,000 lbs inturnal fuel capacity number out there) its skin is cooled by fuel.
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The difference between “cruise” and “supercruise” (TM) :), in theory, is 1 knot!
Yes, 861 kts & higher (supercruising) vs 860 kts & lower (not supercruising). 🙂
One moment you’re subsonic and the other you’re supersonic and that makes SC merely a semantic category.
Mearly being supersonic does not mean you are supercruising…
The term supercruise is used to describe the aircraft’s ability to stay above its transonic velocity region (supersonic) without afterburner.
No, ability to stay above Mach 1.5
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Efa supercruiser is 1,5 mach with external tank(1000)+4 asraam + 2 iris t.
No, Mach 1.2-1.3. Mach 1.5 is estimated with uprated (EJ220) engines.
One thing I keep wondering; if the 767 was so much better suited to the requirement, on what grounds did the USAF select the A330?
Surely they would be best placed to decide what would be best?
The USAF didn’t select the A330, the KC-X Source Selection Team did. Which was a much more DOD (under the direct control of Gates/Young) than USAF entity. It did not assess the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation criteria identified in the solicitation in doing so (it could not even justify to the GAO how it realistically determined that the KC-30 even met some key requirements). And this was even requirements/criterial changed from what the USAF wanted in order to accomodate the otherwise non-competative A330 so that there could even be a competition.
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Regardless of whether A330 is better I am amazed that it won first time out.
It didn’t win the 1st time, the KC-767 did. First time waa the tanker lease.
What did A330 provide that the wholly domestic machines didn’t?
The KC-767 isn’t wholly domestic, but at 85% US workshare is much more domestic than the KC-30 at just 58% US workshare.
In terms of the KC-X requirements & criteria the KC-30 doesn’t provide anything the KC-767AT does not. The KC-767AT met or exceeded all key requirements (including both fuel offload & airlift requirements, met more non-key requirements & was found superior in far far more requirements. And there is no value added in exceeding OBJECTIVES that are met or exceeded by the competator.
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Thats partly why I found the Boeing 777 proposal confusing, as this certainly would be encroaching on KC-Y capabilities.
Exactly, in saying that it may/could propose a 777-based tanker Boeing is saying that if the requirements are further altered to accomodate the larger KC-30, that it can ‘trump’ the KC-30 with a blatantly obviouly KC-Y rather than KC-X KC-777 which takes everything that people think is so superior about the larger KC-30 & exceeds it.
It’s also equal in size or bigger than the A330, negating one of the best arguments for the 767 over the airbus.
Actually it negates the BS arguments for the KC-30…
Another source confirming that the PAK-FA is a Flanker-like air-to-air oriented beast & that air-to ground will be more the task of other aircraft.
More specifically (confimed by UAC CEO Alexey Fyodorov) that Russia intends to continue the Flanker/Fulcrum mix with the PAK-FA replacing/taking on the roles of the Flanker & a smaller less expensive Lightweight Multirole Frontal Aircraft (LMFS) replacing/taking on the roles of the Fulcrum.