Is it an unreasonable supposition that the centre (lateral axis) of the comp. face is in-line with the LEVCON root?

Yes it is absolutely an unreasonable supposition.

http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showpost.php?p=1573395&postcount=482

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Here’s something else. The circumference of the top-half of that metal engine casing is smaller than the lower half. Hence only the top-side can be indicative of engine alignment & positioning. It also explains that slight and unusual divergence of the nozzles.

The ‘upper half’ (actually <50%) only appears to be of smaller circumference due to the fuselage breaking the circle prior to it reaching its full width

Therefore trying to assess engine placement using bottom elevation is mis-leading, as for the topside, it’s pretty clear & speaks for itself, as posted above (in the AN-124).

Quite the opposite. It is from above which is misleading due to all the other (fuselage) structure distorting shape & the fact that you can not even see the intakes &/or the weapons bays. From below you can see everything.

The image from inside the AN-124 would be MUCH more usefull if taken from a more ‘straight on’ (directly in line with the inside edge of the LEVCON & at a height <1′ above the top edge of the engine housing would be best) angle/POV.

One from directly above (centered length & wingspan as seen in top view drawings) would also be nice. As would one centered straight into the intake (along its axis) & one centered straight into the exhaust (along its axis) with proper lighting so as to see inside.

The ‘outer ring’ for US carrier groups is E-2 Hawkeye & F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. Your Tornados won’t get won’t get within 200nm of the carrier.

But modern technology allows one person to do so much more than before.

I am NOT saying that there are not in fact situations/missions where two is definitely better than one but rather that modern technology allows one to be adequite for many situations/missions that in the past have required two to do effectively.

Also note that there are limits, I for one do not believe anyone posting here is likely to see unmanned systems (air, ground or sea) completely (or even mostly) replace manned systems. We are still more than a decade away from the 1st true strike-capable UCAV (with all but certain delays it could be two decades) & even then it is to only make up ONE of five US CAW fighter/attack squadrons.

I’ll start the conversation. I’ve flown combat in a fighter…Vietnam, F-4. I’ve also flown single seat in a variety of mission roles…F-104 and A-10…US and Europe.

With all due gratitude & respect, the F-4, F-104 & A-10 are nothing like modern combat aircraft.

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Accounts of real 21st centry AH-64D pilots make clear that these brilliant 21st century systems are too much to handle for any human being in a combat situation;

There is a HUGE difference between the ways modern fixed wing aircraft operate & helicopters.

The problem is that you claim a lot but provide next to zero evidence.

BS. The PROOF (not ‘evidence’ but PROOF) was provided earlier.

What you claim is ALWAYS in favor of the F-35, which is very suspicious. In your world, the F-35 is always faster, cheaper, better, lighter and more stealthy than it really is. If somebody proves you wrong, you simply change tune and persuade everyone that you never claimed otherwise.

No, in my world the F-35 is as ‘fast’, ‘cheap’, ‘good’, ‘light’ & as ‘stealthy’ as the official data says. I have not been proven wrong on ANY of those facts.

Due to this, your credibility is close to zero and it is your own fault, noone else’s. Even if you accidentally posted correct figures from time to time, I would not take them seriously anymore. Just like with that Dr.Kopp guy.

Quite the opposite.

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There are huge differences between the USG and contractor cost estimates.

The contractor cost projections are based on reality (the ACTUAL status of the program(s) & the ACTUAL costs thus far) while ‘government’ projections are based on fantasy.

LM says costs for the current LRIP buy are down 20%. P&W says engine costs are down 10%. But USG claims all costs are up. My bets are the Obama administration has ordered the program be cut and the USG cost analysts are following those orders by using tricks to make JSF seem more expensive than it really is. The same tactic was used in the 1990s against the F-22 program.

I bet your bet is more likely true than that the costs are (or would if the program is not cut) actually going anywhere near the latest Pentagon ‘projections’.

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Well at that price , if i would be some folk from the Pentagon i’d kick myself for sacrificing some aspects of the JSF’s performance ( notably airframe performance and stealth) in the initial SOR , for the sake of affordability, which seems to me now its moot.

ACTUAL costs are significantly lower than these BS projections.

IMO a JSF with a suprecruise speed of 1.4-1.5M , a max speed of M1.8+ , better manoeuvrability thru TVC and other little tweaks to the level of 4+ and 5th gen fighers , would have been a much more formidable player in the fighter world , especially on its own. (because imo , unlike US which will use F-22 to clear the way for the F-35, other countries will have to use the F-35 to both clear the way of oposing fighters AND do SEAD and other IADS elimination tasks in a hypothetical conflict, besides other countries wouldnt have the myriad of suport measures for their F-35s like the americans have …)

But would cost significantly more than what the F-35 costs.

For other countries bar US ,F-35 is far too expensive for what it delivers …my 2 pence.

Not true. Full rate production F-35s will cost LESS than Rafale &/or Typhoon.

Could you please explain me how i should interprete the CBO statements on “scenarios” for filling the gap casued by F-35 delays?

As the CBO doing its job of giving plausible solutions to the problem.

To me it looks like decision makers are releasing such info to prepare the public for a policy change away from the F-35 but that can’t possibly be true, right????

The ‘decision makers’ are trying to make the case for significant across the board defense cuts.

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I do not see the F-35C as a replacement for an A/F-X type. They are two different classes of aircraft. So yes, I do not disagree.

Those two sentences are the exact opposite of what you have been posting.

I do foresee that it will be asked to perform some roles that an A/F-X would have been better suited, but like you said, that is not the fault of the F-35C.

But that is EXACTLY what you are faulting the F-35C for. Nevermind that it will do the jobs the A/F-X was to have done better than the F/A-18E/F (which is what the USN was forced to take in its place).

I think that you understand my displeasure with the course the Navy chose (or forced to choose more likely,) when it changed its requirements and joined the JAST program. If the Navy wasn’t going to be allowed to build the aircraft it needed, it made sense to join a program that promised to replace legacy Hornets with a more stealthy jet for less than the cost of a Super Hornet.

Exactly which requirements were changed?

I do not think that the F-35 series will be a bad aircraft. It certainly promises to bring some advanced systems to the strike community. I am actually excited to see what it can do – and even more excited to see what systems can be migrated to the NGAD F/A-XX.

More contradition to what you have been posting.

The major problem that the F-35C is facing is cost. We already know that the aircraft will be expensive to procure. If NAVAIR is to be believed, the F-35C will cost significantly more to operate per flight hour than the aircraft it replaces – even after you factor in the SLEP. This will result in fewer F-35C’s purchased simply because the Navy can’t afford to support them. To fill decks, we will either have to buy more Super Hornets, or retire a few carriers. Not pretty.

No, the major problem that the F-35C is facing is people ignoring/dismissing the reality of the F-35 program &/or not putting that reality into any kind of perspective/historical context.

In the end, I think that the Navy will be forced by fiscal realities to reduce their buy of F-35C’s, and mitigate the fighter gap with Super Hornets. And it needs to move forward with the NGAD / F/A-XX. The ASM threat looms larger than ever.

I think it would be much more genuine/intellectually honest for the doom & gloomers to wait until after the upcoming mid-term elections to see whether the next Congress will be more fiscally responsible or continue with the current administration’s disasterous fiscal policies.

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Just another bunch of naysayers, pfcem said the cost were below the projections, so why worry.. :rolleyes:

No, the JPO & actual costs to date say the projections are wildly inaccurate – I have ‘just’ been posting those facts.

– Fact: The F-35C is designed to have more range than the F/A-18A-D. However, the Navy Acquisition says:

“Range: Current assessment 499 nm (Threshold 600 nm)”

Source: https://acquisition.navy.mil/rda/hom…s/air/f_35_jsf

Thanks for so clearly demonstrating your ignorance/disingenuousness/intellectual dishonesty. Clearly the editor of said web page mixed some of the F-35B & F-35C ‘data’. And some ‘data’ there (weight & fuel load in particular/most obviously) dates back to PRE WEIGHT REDUCTION!

In any event, it does not promise the range of the A/F-X design – and the long range is what will be needed against enemies armed with coastal / long ranged ASM’s and coastal subs. The A/F-X should have been developed, but was not – and leaves the Navy with a range problem. Instead, the Navy’s requirement was changed when the A/F-X program was closed and merged with the MRF program to eventually become the JAST (JSF.) The F-35C, even if it meets its design goals, is the wrong aircraft for the Navy. The Navy should buy more Supers in the interim, and begin development on the NGAD (F/A-XX) now – not in 2015. Buy as few F-35C’s as possible. Yesterday, the GAO posited just this sort of approach, sans the NGAD which was not part of their study.

It was never supposed to! The F-35C is a replacement for the F/A-18A-D (NOT THE A-6 / A-12 / A-X / A/F-X / F/A-18E/F line) & yet is achives range ON INTERNAL FUEL that the A-6 & F/A-18E/F require two external tanks to achieve.

Yes the A/F-X should have been developed but the USN was stuck with the F/A-18E/F instead. But the F-35C is a TOATLLY DIFFERENT developement to replace the F/A-18A-D.

The F-35C is meeting or exceeding its design goals & is MUCH more the right aircraft for the USN than the F/A-18E/F ever was.

The F/A-XX program began in 2008 but the USN can not wait until 2025 to get a stealth strike fighter.

– Fact: The F/A-18E/F was not developed to replace either the A-6 or the F-14, but inherited their missions when those airframes were retired / not further developed. The Super Hornet was developed as a low risk solution to address the shortcomings of the F/A-18A-D’s, and had it’s beginnings prior to the A/F-X.

Wrong. The F/A-18E/F WAS to replace the A-6. Had the A-12 or A-X / A/F-X continued there would be no F/A-18E/F.

– Fact: The Super Hornet still has room for development, and can incorporate many of the systems currently being developed for the F-35 series. In fact, many systems planned for the F-35 series are developments of F/A-18E/F systems.

The F/A-18E/F will never match the capabilities of the F-35C.

– Sorry, the TF-30 was crap, there was not a competing powerplant available, and it took almost 2 decades to fix the F-14’s engine problems – with a totally new engine. If the DoD had followed through with development of another engine in the class – the TF-100 derivative* – many lives, aircraft, and money would have saved. Not BS. Not only my opinion.

See: “Tomcat! The Grumman F-14 Story,” Paul T. Gillcrist, RADM, Chapter 9 “The Little Engine That Couldn’t.” *

This gentleman is a legend in naval aviation, and a F-14 expert. I believe the experts. They tend to be correct.

*This is the source for the TF-100 nomenclature, not me.

Again, the TF-30 was a 1960’s engine that was not designed for the F-14’s flight performance but it was the only engine that even came close when the intended engine (the F401) was cancelled. Even when the intended engine (the F401) was cancelled, the TF-30 was seen as only a interim engine for the F-14 in order to get it into service while a ‘definitive’ was developed.

Perhaps instead of faulting P&W for the TF-30 you should fault GE for not having anything better for two decades.

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The Navy is on record that it is confident in the capabilities of the Super Hornet until 2020’s – plenty of time to develop the NGAD/F/A-XX.

Because it knows that the F-35C will be able to do what the F/A-18E/F will not.

What the Navy could do is an interim buy of a limited number of F-35C’s to fill a few specialized strike squadrons, ready to be deployed in a crisis – similar to the way F-117A squadrons were utilized. Use the savings to fund the development of the NGAD/F/A-XX, and continue to purchase Super Hornets as the F/A-18A-D’s wear out. This gives the Navy a stealth option sooner, and allows for time to develop a naval aircraft that can fulfill its longer term needs.

What the USN SHOULD do is change its IOC requirements to accept Block II F-35C & stop waiting money on any more F/A-18E/F. That would bring the F-35C’s IOC up to 2012.

If the Navy does decide to buy fewer F-35C’s – which Friday’s GAO report suggested – perhaps the F-35 numbers could be supported by re-capitaiizing some Air National Guard squadrons. They certainly need new(er) airframes.

The F-35C IS part of the USN’s ‘longer term’ needs!

The USN “2025 CAW”
1 squadron of twelve F/A-18E [12] (to be replace by F/A-XX, now NGAD)
1 squadron of twelve F/A-18F [12] (to be replace by F/A-XX, now NGAD)
2 squadrons of ten F-35C [20]
1 squadron of twelve UCAS [12]
1 squadron of 5 E/A-18G [5]
12-15 other support aircraft & helicopters

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– My position is the F-35C doesn’t address the Navy’s need for a long range strike fighter, and gives the Navy an expensive to build and operate, single engined, singled crewed aircraft that is only incrementally more capable (notwithstanding stealth) than a much cheaper, proven F/A-18E/F that could be procured to replace legacy Hornets. Furthermore, the Navy needs to start the development of the NGAD / F/A-XX now and fund it by plowing in its share of F-35 development and procurement funds. The danger of this strategy is leaving the fleet without a 5G stealthy strike fighter for another 10 years. Is it worth the gamble to wait and procure a proper naval aircraft, or buy a compromise (in terms of engining/crewing) now. Maybe both avenues should be pursued.

But the F-35C isn’t intended to doesn’t address the Navy’s need for a long range strike fighter (although it DOES more so than the F/A-18E/F ‘did’). It will not be as expensive to build OR operate as you want so despirately to believe & even without stealth (including stealth simply puts in in a who different league) is a MAJOR improvement in capability of the the F/A-18E/F.

The F/A-XX began in 2008. Take a wild guess how expensive to build & operate it is going to be…not to mention that the USN simply can not wait for it to enter service.