pfcemOne can have wonderful discussions and gives pro and contra for one aircraft. But there is one fact out there that clearly shows what is considered best for the USAF: the decision of the USAF.
That went clearly in favor of the larger tanker.
Then why do you suupport taking the decision away from the USAF & forcing changing the requirements to accomodate what it rejected in 2002?
The USAF DID NOT chose the larger tanker, the USAF REJECTED the larger tanker. Don’t confuse the KC-X source selection team with the USAF.
Read the 2007 RFP (especially the SRD). It is pretty clear the USAF desires a tanker MUCH closer to the KC-135 than something larger & heavier than the KC-10.
The decision was overturned by the GAO not because it considered the Air Force to have made a poor choice but because it violated its own rules and apparently favored one contender.
The GAO overturned the selection of the KC-30 because it found a number of errors in the Air Force’s conduct of this procurement, including the failure to evaluate proposals in accordance with the RFP criteria and requirements and to conduct discussions in a fair and equal manner. But for these errors, Boeing would have had a substantial chance of being selected for award. THAT IS A POOR CHOICE.
pfcemI’m wondering why the “The 767 must be bought because the USAF needs more booms in the sky” mob aren’t lobbying their congressmen for the USAF tactical fleet* to convert to hose and drogue refuelling.
Probably becasue they are better informed than you of the realities of US tanker operations.
It was investigated & costed years ago, & IIRC the conclusion was that in terms of cost & operational flexibility everything was in favour of it.
A number of studies into multipoint aerial refueling during the early/mid 90’s. The conclusion was that the benefit was not half what it was though to have been before the studies were done.
While multipoint aerial refueling provides some benefit to anchorpoint refueling, it provides virtually none to track refueling.
Exert from 1990 Rand study conclusion.
However, the operational realities of fighter and tanker employment, as
well as the two-MRC strategy, appear to limit the potential of multipoint
for bringing about actual reductions in tanker force structure. Future
major contingencies will continue to require such tanker tactics as track
operations, which mitigate the potential benefits of multipoint by making
boom/receptacle operations often just as efficient as multipoint operations.
In addition, allowing for the possibility of another near-simultaneous MRC,
tanker forces could well be stretched quite thinly, especially boom/receptacle
tankers. Although standardizing on multipoint probe/drogue technology
would improve the situation by increasing the effectiveness of the tanker
force, it is still unknown whether multipoint could increase that effectiveness
so that fewer KC-135s would be required in the inventory.
Of the various studies, the 1995 Frontier Technology study was the most thorough and detailed. It found that the reductions in tankers made possible with multipoint in the scenarios they examined ranged from 17 to 37 percent.
The only reason the USAF uses booms is that SAC wanted booms for its bomber fleet. Refuelling tactical aircraft was not taken into consideration when selecting boom refuelling. We’re arguing about the choice of tanker, when the USAF has a huge self-inflicted wound which causes more costs, & operational problems, than any difference in tankers, & which could be corrected for a small part of the cost of new tankers. Crazy!
*The bombers & transports are better-off sticking with booms.
No, the USAF uses booms because it feels it is overall a better way of refueling aircraft. Booms are more reliable, safer, offer higher fuel transfer rates & requires less training on the part of receiver pilots.
The F-22 & F-35 SHOULD be able to receive fuel at a rate equal to or greater than the F-15 which will further shift the balance in favor of booms.
pfcemMore tankers means more crews which means more training and continuance flying which means more overal costs.
But the KC-767AT doesn’t require more tankers. The number of KC-X tankers that will be procured & the number needed to fill the need that KC-X is intended to fill & will fill day in and day out WILL NOT increase with the KC-767AT vs the KC-30.
Planning don’t always get it right, the less fuel-load on the a/c the more chance they have of running out at the wrong moment.
That is why the plans always have a significant reserve to account for such contingecies. The KC-135s aren’t runing out of fuel at the wrong moment, quite the opposite in fact, most of the time they return with excess fuel still in the tank. The KC-135s doesn’t need to be replaced because they don’t have the capacity, they need to be replaced because they are old & expensive to maintain. Even the 2007 KC-X RFP didn’t require more fuel offload capability than the KC-135R & the offerors were unambiguously informed that their proposals would not receive additional consideration or credit for exceeding a KPP objective.
We’re not trying the change the requirements to fit the KC30, the airforce can do that on their own.
Yes you are.
Your arguments go around in circles and are weak at best.
What is weak about my arguments?
pfcemIt is when your planning all your tanker sorties in your bunker somewhere and suddenly find you need to put 10klbs or so more gas in that bit of sky at that time than the other tanker can manage; or, another scenario, as the crew, the weather isn’t great, your nominated diversion has changed to a more distant airfield for whatever reason, and you find that you can’t actually get enough fuel in the jet to complete the task as published.:)
That is nothing but a wet dream & shows you know nothing of how tankers operate. The number of booms necessary to fulfill the need trumps the amount of fuel each tanker needs to transfer & sortie planning always has a significant reserve capacity to accoodate contingencies. And that is even with the KC-135 much less the significantly better KC-767AT. And of course when you do need A LOT of fuel for comparatively few receivers, THAT IS WHAT THE KC-10s (& its replacemment) ARE FOR.
The KC-767AT exceeds the stated offload requirement by more than 25,000 lbs for the desired radius or exceeds the stated radius requirement by more than 500nm for the desired fuel offload. And in the real world if you look at the historical average offload per sortie, the KC-767AT is capable of DOUBLE the average (for Operation Desert Storm & Operation Allied Force at ~1,500nm, for Operation Iraqi Freedom at ~1,000nm & for Operation Enduring Freedom at ~500nm).
Quit trying to change the requirments/missions to fit the KC-30.
True flexibility is when your infrastusture can support more tankers than are needed to do the job & you can operate them from the most effective & efficient locations. Or similarly, your tankers don’t take up SO much ramp & parking space that you still have significant room for other assets rather than having to displace so many other assets in order to accomodate your tankers. And because your tankers (when used for airlift) carry the same number of pallets (actually +1) or roughly double the passengers &/or patients as your workhorse transport [the C-17] you don’t have to make up an alternate load plan for them.
pfcemI think you will find that the USAF disagrees with you there.
No I won’t. A comparatively small number in the Pentagon, but not the USAF…
I don’t pretend to know the detail of what the USAF is looking for, but I’m sure the requirement isn’t a million miles away from that of the RAF or RAAF, and remember that neither of these forces has the numbers of large aircraft that need refueling that the USAF does.
I don’t pretend to know the detail of what other nations are looking for but I DO realize the significant differences between USAF tanker operational requirements & those of other nations. For example, the 2007 RFP had over 100 specific requirements, I doubt any other nation has/had half that many.
I also don’t pretend that any/every other nation’s choice is/was not based to some extent on factors other than the relative merits of the KC-767 & KC-30.
Actually in my previous post I made no comment about the KC-767, so how I misrepresented or misinterpreted anything relating to it. Here are a few facts that are not up for dispute:
1. The USAF has a vested interest in choosing the best aircraft for the job.
2. The USAF has more expertise on what it wants than any of us here.
3. The USAF chose the NG/EADS KC-330.The points made that the Airbus is more expensive to operate than the Boeing could be interpreted as the USAF picking the best equipment for the job in spite of the additional cost.
3. No, the USAF chose the KC-767 PRIOR to 9/11/01. That choice was taken away from it because of the mistakes it made in attempting to get them sooner rather than late. The USAF flat out rejected the KC-330 for NOT being what it wanted or what it asked for in its 2002 RFI. Congress in its infinite wisdom (NOT) thought it could “fix” the problem by demanding a full competition & thus forced the USAF to alter its requirments to accomodate the A330 platforn & as Gen. Handy says, “Somewhere in the acquisition process, it is obvious to me that someone lost sight of the requirement.”
Quite simply the selection of the KC-30 was not made in accordance with what the USAF has said its required since 2002 up to & including the 2007 RFP. So if you argee (as MOST did) that the KC-X solicitation reasonably accurately represented what the requirements ARE & you look at said requirements HONESTLY, it is clear that the KC-767AT (which met or exceeded all key requirements, met FAR more non-key requirements & did so at lower Most Probable Life Cycle Cost) is MUCH closer to what the solicitation asked for than the KC-30. And if you read the GAO ruling HONESTLY it is hard not to conclude that the selection was made DESPITE what the solicitation asked for &/or those who ran the solicitation were incompotent.
The additional size of the airbus, whether it is a significant hindrance or not, does give additional flexibility in terms of fuel to offload, time on station or cargo capacity than the Boeing.
No, the additional capacity of the KC-30 won’t even be utilized the vast majority of the time &, for the most part, even when it is it is when doing non-primary KC-X missions but missions which the KC-10 & its replacement ARE intended for. Greater capacity IS NOT greater flexibility, it is just greater capacity.
pfcemswerve,
Perhaps I was TOO subtle.
In “replying” to your post, I was talking to EADS/KC-30 supporters in general.
pfcemBigger isn’t necessarily better, but sometimes it clearly is, and when deciding between the two bids on this occasion it is a clearly valid argument.
You are missing the point. THE main argument EADS/KC-30 supporters have is that it is better because it is bigger while ignoring the fact that bigger is NOT necessarily better.
In the case of the KC-X, bigger clearly is NOT better.
And who says that just because the KC-30 is unsuitable for some nations that means it is unsuitable for the USAF?
Nobody is saying that but EADS/KC-30 supporters are ignoring that just because some other nations (with VERY different requiremnts) have chosen the KC-30 that does NOT mean it is the right choice for the USAF.
I’m afraid you’ve pointed out nothing but your own inability to state a logical argument
No, I have pointed out the adsurdity of the EADS/KC-30 supporter’s argumnets & how they can’t counter the por-Boeing/KC-767AT points (like you just did) misinterpret & misrepresent them (either through ignorance or on purpose) Just as they misinterpret & misrepresent “fact” they use to support EADS/KC-30.
pfcemThe KC-380 reductio ad absurdum argument is just that – absurd. A rhetorical trick, not appropriate in a reasoned debate except to remind someone who is tending to an extreme view of where that could lead. Of course, bigger is not always better: a C-17 is not better at everything than a C-27. That isn’t being argued here. What is being argued about is exactly what is the optimum size for a USAF tanker. There’s room for disagreement on this, since it depends on exactly how they’ll be used. Past usage is not an infallible guide (see what SOC says about the KC-135 & cargo, for example).
No, mention of a KC-380 shows the absurdity of just about the only argument that EADS/KC-30 supports have for the KC-30. That is that it is better because it is bigger.
But thank you for admitting that bigger is not necessarliy better. So now please stop using such an absurd argument.
The RAFs experience with VC-10 & Tristar tankers, especially since 2001, led it to seek something nearer the Tristar than the VC-10 in size, & the greater fuel offload at range, & time on station, of the A330 were rated as major plus points in the evaluation when it was compared to the KC-767, as was the cargo-carrying ability. The RAAF came to the same conclusions, & apparently for much the same reasons, thinking the A330 is the right replacement for its Boeing 707 tankers, about the same jump as from KC-135 to A330. Canada & Germany preferred smaller tankers, & bought converted secondhand A310s, in the latter case to operate (eventually) alongside A400M tankers. The Italians have gone for a KC-767 & KC-130J mix, the KC-767 being as much as they think they want. Horses for courses. There is no single right answer.
So you admit what may be the best option for one nation may not be for another…
Wow, two fondations of the who BS EADS/KC-30 superiority dispelled by an EADS/KC-30 supporter. 🙂
pfcemOnly one jailed from each side, but others involved. Read the published evidence. Druyun & Boeings CFO were jailed. Boeings CEO (later resigned) offered Druyun a job at Boeing while she was working for the USAF on another bid from Boeing.
Look at the published e-mails. Druyun & Sears didn’t leave much of a paper trail, but they seem to have been unaware of e-mail archives. Others were involved in both the USAF & Boeing. The difference is that although they left a great deal of evidence of partiality (e.g. exchanging e-mails containing crude language about EADS staff, expressing pleasure in problems encountered by Boeing rivals, etc, procurement officials adopting the e-mail signature “Go Boeing!”), they didn’t leave mountains of unambiguous evidence of criminality – and in any case, the Pentagon & Boeing had already chosen their ritual sacrifices, & didn’t need more.
Ship 741’s post implied that only those from Boeing were bad eggs which I corrected.
Note that Air Force Secretary James G. Roche & Air Force Assistant Secretary for Acquisitions Marvin R. Sambur resigned as well…
But that is the whole point, EADS/KC-30 supporters blaim Boeing for everything that was wrong with the tanker lease when in fact while Congress & Boeing played their parts the USAF & DOD were in control.
pfcemSOC,
Again let me irritate, no disrespect indended but much of what you replied to in my post was a quote from General John Handy, USAF (Ret.), I was just making sure that everyone trying to follow along (or those who may read it later) realized that & much of what you posted stands in stark contrast to what other tanker flight & maintenance crew have stated.
You are of course entitled to your opinion & your point of view and, as I said, much of what has been said in support of the KC-30 applies the the KC-767AT but to many EADS/KC-30 supported fail to realize or refuse to recognize that. It is not like the KC-767AT did not met or exceed ALL KEY REQUIREMENTS (from a RFP which has already been changed a number of times in order to accomodate the KC-30, a platform which the USAF had previously rejected).
It is not my intent to argue every little detail with you. You seem to be a reasonable person who unfortunately appears to (as Generay Hady said) “lost sight of the requirement” & are injecting an alternate set of requirements in order to justify the preference of the KC-30 over the KC-767AT.
But let me remind you, the KC-X is a replacement for the KC-135, not the KC-10. There has been [on the part of EADS/KC-30 supporters] FAR too much injection of missions/requirements that the KC-10 [& its eventual replacement] is better suited to than the KC-135 & FAR to little recognition of missions/requirements the KC-135 is better suited to & performs MUCH more often. As well as a failure (either deliberate or through ignorance) to realize/recognize that the KC-767AT is MORE than capable of doing everything the KC-X is intended to do. The KC-X is only meant to be the 1st step (primarily intended to replace the KC-135Es), not the last. And PLEASE don’t give me that nonsense (not say you will but other have) that the selection of the KC-30 could remove the need for something else to replace the KC-10s with later. Just as the KC-30 does not fit the requirements for a KC-135 replacement, it does not fit the requirments for a KC-10 replacement.
To address one specifit point however. The fact that the KC-X solicitation included the desire to operate not only from more airfields but smaller airfields stands in stark contrast to what is said to be the reasons why the KC-30 was selected (I am sure you have seen the article) & a clear representation how the selection of the KC-30 is inconsistent with what was asked for in the solicitation. And since you ask, the KC-30 fails on this point due to its 193′ 7″ length, 197′ 10″ wingspan & 268,949 lb (122,000 kg) operational emplty weight. It is bigger (by a considerable margin) & heavier [operational emplty weight ~C-17] than every aircraft in US inventory except for the C-5 & a few specialized 747-based platforms.
pfcemNo the contract was won by an American firm (Northrop Grumman) who partnered with a foreign owned firm. As for EADS it has never stated its stance on American foreign policy, its a firm interested in selling its wares not passing comment on American policy.
No, the contract was awarded to a TEAM consisting of Northrop Grumman & EADS with NG billed as the primary contractor for political reasons even though its content share not likely greater than 1/3 & possibly not even greater than that of EADS’s.
pfcemLet’s recap:
The original 767-based offer was considerably larger than the airplane it was replacing (KC45 EW = 265,000, KC767 EW = 181,000). Boeing had a couple of bad eggs who broke the law on the original bid. Those people got fired, paid big fines, and went to jail. We have now had mission creep and a foreign owned firm that does not support U.S. foreign policy wants to provide an airplane that is almost 46% larger (by empty weight) than the 767 based platform (which was large to begin with, KC-1355R EW is only 99,000 lbs). They’ve dressed up their pig in makeup by offering to produce it in a red state, because the military people who make the selection currently have red civilian masters. But the money gets appropriated by a blue Congress. Meanwhile, those heros in white scarves with stars on their shoulders, who claimed they desperately needed these tankers 6 years ago, are soldiering along just fine.
Them’s the facts.
Correction, the USAF had a bad egg, who with a Boeing bad egg, broke the law & went to jail for it.
And as EADS/KC-30 supporters conveniently leave out, the USAF bad egg [Druyun] left the USAF in Nov 2002 (a YEAR before the lease was finalized & a month short of 2 YEARS before the lease was cancelled), and Boeing fired them BOTH (a month before the lease was finalized & a month short of a YEAR before the lease was cancelled).
pfcemNo the a330 won the recent competition based on the critera provided, in each area it beat the 767 on performance except one where they were equal. It was chosen as by that criteria it was the lower risk, the cargo and fuel off load was a seperate issue.
No, it didn’t, thus the GAO ruled. It could not have been more clear on this.
Protest is sustained, where the agency, in making the award decision, did not
assess the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation criteria
identified in the solicitation, which provided for a relative order of importance for
the various technical requirements, and where the agency did not take into account
the fact that one of the proposals offered to satisfy more “trade space” technical
requirements than the other proposal, even though the solicitation expressly
requested offerors to satisfy as many of these technical requirements as possible.
Lets look at how the “scoring” should have gone based on the GAO ruling…
Factor 1 – Mission Capability
Advantage Boeing
Factor 2 – Proposal Risk
Draw
Factor 3 – Past Performance
Draw
Factor 4 – Cost/Price
Advantage Boeing
Factor 5 – Integrated Assessment
Advantage NG/EADS [this could change however if there are further portests]
It was given extra credit for also being able to carry more fuel and cargo which is where all the trouble started. Technically under the criteria they shouldn’t of done that, if the USAF hadn’t done that then Boeing would of had less reason to protest.
If it hadn’t have done that then BOEING WOULD HAVE WON!
Note that if the solicitation has asked for greater fuel & cargo capacity, Boieng would have likley offered a platform with greater fuel & cargo. As it is, the KC-767AT EXCEEDED the fuel & cargo capacity requirements.
pfcemFalse. The comparison of 767 & A330 sales was first done by Ship741, in support of his premise that the greater number of 767s than A330s delivered (so far) is an argument for buying 767 tankers.
BS, Ship741 was NOT the 1st to use a comparision of 767 & A330 airliner sales as if it has ANY bearing on their relative merits as a replacement for USAF KC-135 tankers.
He may have been the 1st to use a comparison of 767 & A330 sales IN THIS THREAD but TRY to no be so nieve.
pfcemWho is implying that everyone should have to pay for the prejudices of two people?…Thats exactly what the USAF was doing by only looking at the choice offered by boeing, and choosing the requirements to fit one aircraft(the congressional Budget office states the ‘everyone’ (or in this case the USAF and US taxpayer) was paying around $6Billion extra for the prejudices of the two people!).
Good god do you not know any REAL history, or just the EADS/KC-30 supporters rewrite of it?
The USAF did NOT only look at the choice offered by Boeing. Even AFTER it had decided that the KC-767 was what it wanted, it STILL sent out (as required) a RFI to industry (specifically, Boeing AND Airbus). Aibus responded to the RFI with a KC-330. It so clearly DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS that it was rejected. It was too risky, too expensive & TOO BIG.
What the hell are you talking about the prejudices of the two people?
The fix is to stand back and look what the airforce actually needs, today, with the hindsight of Iraq and Afghanistan, where transport is at a premium.
No, the fix is to get EVERYONE ELSE out of the solicitation process & let the people who actually know [& can justify] what the USAF requirements are set the requirements & select the offer which best fits the requirements. You DO NOT keep changing the already well established USAF requirements to fit what was already determined to NOT be what the USAF needed.
If the KC-30 is ‘too big’, surely that makes the KC-767 ‘too big ‘also? We are constantly told it offers 20% more fuel thant than the KC–135? Then within the same breath told the average fuel offload is much smaller than the KC-135 can offer, making the KC-30 too big)
How does the KC-30 being too big make the SIGNIFICANTLY SMALLER & LIGHTER KC-767AT too big? If there was an offer for something smaller & lighter than the KC-767AT that met &/or exceeded all requirements, then you could make a case that the KC-767AT was too big.
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