Please also notice the date that was written, 2001. Now if I recall, there was some events that took place in September of that year, followed by another event that took place in 2003 that TOTALLY changed what the USAF was doing, their tanker, AND transport requirements.

What was written in 2001? The final KC-X RFP was written in 2007.

How did 9/11/01 change what the USAF was doing?

Also note that the author of this, Roche, was also implicated in the tanker scandel and resigned later. He also stated that he offered no other option and that he was not a great fan of airbus:

So I assume that you are talking about the letter from the Secretary of the Air Force asking Congress to support the USAF’s plans to jump-start its tanker recapitalization through the lease of KC-767s. Note that I posted it to ONCE AGAIN dispel the utter nonsese that the lease idea (&/or the choice of the KC-767) was forced on USAF by Congress.

Note that it was written AFTER 9/11/01…

Yes, unlike the individuals that screwed up the last solicitation, Secretary Roche owned up to his mistakes & resigned.

Please also note that my opening paragraph stated the concern about the C-17’s delivering pallets to/from CIVILIAN air fields, and suggesting that the C-17 should in fact be used for theatre based operations.

Doesn’t change the fact that without security in the air, C-17s are going anywhere.

As for the cargo requirements, yes the 767 can do this, but is far less capable.

So we should never have bothered with C-27s, C-135s, C-130s or C-141s or C-17s since bigger is better no matter what the ACTUAL requirements are. :rolleyes:

I agree with you that the 767 does all that was asked of it, and that the USAF should have made its requirements and how overachieving the requirements would be marked.

IT DID & was unambiguous that credit was not to be given for exceeding objectives.

Just for completeness, the lease idea was forced on USAF by the actions of Congress. Congress wanted a certain amount of tankers in place by a certain amount of time, but steadfastly refused to provide enough annual funding within that timeframe to actually buy the tankers. They then patted themselves on the back for engineering cost “savings”. So, the idea of the lease was born.

That is a complete & utter 100% lie. During the tanker lease, Congress did not force ANYTHING on the USAF. It was the USAF, NOT CONGRESS, that wanted a certain amount of tankers in place by a certain amount of time but knew that Congress was unlikely to provide the required procurement funds to do so ahead of the (pre-911) tanker recapitalization roadmap.

A history lesson:

During the first half of 2001 the Program Analysis and Evaluation (an entity of the Department of Defense – NOT CONGRESS) studied leasing verses buying capital assets and concluded that leasing was more expensive than purchasing capital assets.

On October 9, 2001, Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force sent a letter to a Representative. In the letter, the Secretary stated:
“
Dear [Representative]:
I appreciate your interest in jump-starting the replacement
program for our venerable KC-135 tanker fleet. These critical aircraft,
which are the backbone of our nation’s Global Reach capability, have an
average age of over 41 years and are becoming more and more expensive
to maintain. Due to the effects of age, these aircraft are spending over
300 days on average in depot maintenance, which affects our ability to
respond to the many global demands on our force.
I strongly endorse beginning to upgrade this critical warfighting
capability with new Boeing 767 aircraft. If Congress provides the
needed supporting language, we could initiate this program through an
operating lease with an option to purchase the aircraft in the future. This
leasing approach will allow more rapid retirement and replacement of the
KC-135Es. However, if the Congress determines this approach is not
advisable, completing the upgrade through the purchase of new 767
airframes beginning in FY 02 will be in the best interest of the Air Force.
To implement this transition, we intend to work with the USD(AT&L)
and the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Comptroller to amend
the FYO3 budget currently being vetted through the Department.
From the warfighter’s perspective, this initiative could provide
the opportunity to expand our tanker vision from air refueling and limited
airlift to include other key mission areas. We intend to consider elements
of command and control, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) for the KC-X-in other words, a smart tanker. This
initiative will further enhance our efforts to expedite development and
fielding of a Joint Stars Radar Technology Improvement Program on a
767 multi-mission command and control aircraft platform which we are
hopeful the Congress will also expedite in the FY02 Appropriations Act.
I very much appreciate your support in the FY02 Appropriations
Act as we work to upgrade our overburdened tanker and ISR fleets.
Your interest and support are crucial as we move forward with this
critical recapitalization effort.
“

On January 10, 2002, in Section 8159 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2002, Congress authorized the Air Force to make payments on a multiyear pilot program for leasing not more than 100 general purpose Boeing 767 aircraft for not more than 10 years per aircraft, inclusive of any options to renew or extend the initial lease term, and for not more than 90 percent of the fair market value of the aircraft obtained under the lease.

Note that this establishes a number of things.

1) That it was known beforehand that leasing was more expensive overall.

2) That the age & rising maintainence time/costs are the reasons why the KC-135s need to be replaced, not a lack of capacity.

3) That the USAF had already identified the KC-767 as its preferred choice BEFORE Oct 2001.

4) That the USAF asked Congress for supporting language for its plan to lease KC-767s in order to allow more rapid retirement and replacement of the KC-135Es.

5) That the tanker vision was for air refueling and limited airlift.

6) That the 767 platform was intended to be utilized for more than just tankers.

Just like with cars, when you lease, your payments are less in any given year than they would be if you went out and bought the same car. On the other hand, you build up no ownership, and a the end of the lease the company providing the asset gets it back to sell or do something else with. Now, just as with a car, you can buy the asset at the end of the lease, but it will cost you more in total than if you just bought the car outright. The tanker lease was the same way. It would cost more to lease then buy than to simply buy the tankers, just like it is with every other lease/buy. That’s the price you pay for having lower payments during the period of the lease.

BINGO!

Congress acted shocked when it was shown that the lease/buy was more expensive, but unless you’re willing to do that, no one is going to enter into a lease with you. The idea was dumb, but given what Congress did, it was the only viable option.

Congress did not such thing, in fact Congress questioned whether leasing was the best option. Some realized that it was the only way the USAF was going to get the tankers it said it needed when it wanted them but some just could not get past the higher overall costs while completely ignoring that it was not the 1st time not would it be the last time the US leased something.

The idea was not dumb, just as you (or anyone else) chosing to lease something that you can not afford to purchase is not dumb.

Sekant,

you’re wasting your time. You’ll get RSI, then die of old age, before pfcem acknowledges reality.

I am not the one who is failing to acknowledge reality.

Funny, you claim to understand the GAO process as opposed to those who do not support your viewpoint, yet you do not seem to even understand that the GAO does not overturn a decision and does not have the capacity to do so. So much for your superior understanding.

I never said, nor implied that the GAO overturns decision. :rolleyes:

And I have pointed out more than once that the GAO’s authority is limited.

But isn’t amazing how when the GAO sustains a protest that the decision IS overturned (or at least put on hold)…

Thank you for repeating exactly what I said. The GAO did not question the fact that the USAF concluded that the KC-30 was much more competitive than the 767 and on balance an aircraft that better meets its needs (The GAO simply said that Airbus was given added points because it surpassed some key requirements stated in the RPF and Boeing was not made aware of that fact).

YES IT DID! It ruled that the agency did not assess the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation criteria identified in the solicitation.

And the USAF didn’t create an alternative reality to buy a larger aircraft for the sake of buying a larger aircraft.

I didn’t say the USAF created an alternate reality to buy a larger aircraft for the sake of buying a larger aircraft. It created an alternate reality where an otherwise noncompetative larger tanker appeared competative for the sake of having a Congress mandated competition since the only “competition” was a noncompetetive larger aircraft.

The conclusion that the 330 was more competitive was based on a the USAF assessing how tankers are and will be used, what its missions are and what type of refuelling it requires. The result was that the 330 was deemed to better meet the needs of the USAF than the 767. This fact was not based on what you or a retiree think the USAF needs are or will be – it was based on a thorough evaluation by the USAF itself.

LOL…

Your comments make clear that you can hardly read. The GAO report stated that the USAF could alter the specifications of the RPF it it deemed necessarily to ensure that its needs are met. The USAF just did that with some Boeing whining as a result.

The USAF has done NOTHING, its selection authority was taken away from it.

But that changes have been made is not the issue, the GAO even recommended that some changes be made. The issue is that some changes (made not by the USAF but by Under Secretary Young) alters the solicitation to something CONTRADICTORY to previous solicitations & that there is no justification for said changes (other than an appearant preference towards the offer with a larger aircraft) & that is in fact what the USAF had said it did NOT want.

Apparently, all the ‘Boeing or else’ crowd has either not read the GAO reports or simply decided to misinterpret it.

Actually it is MORE than appearant that EADS/KC-30 supporters haven’t read the GAO report (&/or other comments it has made) &/or misinterpreting (either deliberately &/or through ingorance) it.

First & foremost it to realize that the GAO is limited in both scope & authority and CAN NOT (no matter how much it may wish to do so) rule as to the merits of the firms’ respective offers.

To quote General John Handy, USAF (Ret.) again…
Most of us in the Air Force mobility community were a bit surprised by the decision to buy the quite large Airbus-330 tanker instead of the smaller Boeing 767 tanker. But the real shock was in the unusually harsh language used by the Government Accountability Office in overturning that decision. It was the harshest language used to overturn an action by the Air Force that I have read in my entire career.

The USAF decision to grant the contract to the A330 was based on the conclusion that the A330 offered superior performance. It was based on the fact that the A330 was exceeding by far the requirements when Boeing was simply meeting them. This fact was not challenged by the GAO report.

No, the selection was based on exaggerating the KC-30s supposed (yet unproven & unjustified and NOT REQUESTED/REQUIRED) strengths while ignoring its weaknesses (which are MUCH more important). The GAO COULDN’T rule on the merits of the respective offers!

And sorry, but the KC-767AT not only meat ALL key requirements (the USAF & NG/EADS failed to justify the determination that the KC-30 did) but EXCEEDED many of them, including those which EADS/KC-30 supporters feel are so great about the KC-30, met more non-key requirements AND was found to have fewer weaknesses.

What the GAO report found in this regard was that there was a discrepancy between what was asked in the RPF and the criterion effectively used. I quote the GAO report: “we found that a key discriminator relied upon by the Air Force in its selection of Northrop Grumman’s proposal for award was not consistent with the terms of the solicitation…. the Air Force credited Northrop Grumman for proposing to exceed a solicitation key performance parameter objective for fuel offload versus unrefueled range to a greater extent than Boeing proposed, but the solicitation plainly provided that no consideration would be given for proposing to exceed key performance parameter objectives.” Contrary to what posters above say: 1) The 330 was found to be a more potent aircraft than the 767 by the USAF, 2) the GAO did not question this conclusion.

1) Only in an alternate reality created to make the KC-30 appear competative…

2) The GAO COULDN’T question this conclusion. But what it COULD do & did do was rule that the conclusion was not consistent with the terms of the solicitation.

Since seem to be having such difficulty understanding the concept I will translate it with an analogy you MAY understand. Most of us own a pair of sneakers (tennis/running shoes). When they get old & worn out, you go to the shoe store & ask to see some new sneakers (tennis/running shoes) to replace them. What the KC-X selection team did is akin to instead of buying a new pair of sneakers (tennis/running shoes), buying a pair of hiking boots. Sure the hiking boots are better for long hikes in the woods but MOST people spend FAR more time doing activities sneakers (tennis/running shoes) are MUCH more suited for.

The Boeing crowd is also dishonest in cherry picking elements of the GAO reports for its propaganda campaign. They lambast the USAF for altering the RPF, for introducing new requirements in this document, when the GAo report stated in its recommandations: “GAO recommends that the Air Force reopen discussions with the offerors, obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals, and make a new source selection decision, consistent with this decision. If the Air Force believes that the solicitation does not adequately state its needs, the agency should amend the solicitation prior to conducting further discussions with the offerors.”

But the USAF didn’t & isn’t going to reopen discussions with the offerors, obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals, and make a new source selection decision, consistent with this decision…

Under Secretary John Young (of the DOD, not USAF) has altered the requirements once again (even after they have already been altered so that the KC-30 could be appear competative). So what Mr. young is asking for in 2008 IS NOT what the USAF asked for in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 OR 2007.

I would be MORE than happy to go through the GOA ruling point-by-point/statement-by-statement but your comments here make it clear doing so would be a waste of time since you ignor most of it & hark on what it did not say.

What think you happens when Boeing win the contract? The outsourced this tanker to Asia and Europe like the 787 (70% foreign).
Kawasaki build then the wing and Alenia the fuselage for the 767!

No, all of the foreign contend of the 767 is PARTS, not whole wings or whole fuselages. When you add the tanker spesific workd done by Boeing Intergrated Defense Systems & the US content of the KC-767AT is 85%, with just 15% being foreign.

Plus there is a MAJOR difference between a global market airliner & a USAF aerial refueling tanker…

It isn’t a game. “Fair” or “unfair” are inappropriate concepts in this context. It’s about drawing up a requirement which fits the needs of the USAF, & buying whichever aircraft best fits those needs. This farce is because the USAF hasn’t drawn up a requirement which actually fits what it wants. For example, it’s clear from public statements that the USAF attaches far more importance to cargo-carrying capacity & fuel offload than the written requirement suggests. Whatever incompetence or politicking led to the requirement not being corectly stated shouldn’t concern us now: we should accept that if it needs re-stating to match what’s really wanted, them so be it.

And the reason why the USAF can’t drawn up a requirement which actually fits what it wants is because Congress has dictated that there HAS to be a “competition”. And since the only even realistic “competition” to the Boeing 767 is something from EADS/Airbus & EADS/Airbus wouldn’t/won’t compete for a contract it (& “everyone” else) KNEW/KNOWS it can’t win, the “requirement” HAD to be changed to accomodate the noncompetative A330 EADS/Airbus wanted/wants to offer. Although an HONEST evaluation of even the last “requirement” (which was written as much to keep EADS/Airbus in the “competiton” as it was to actually indicate the real requirement) STILL indicates something along the lines of the 767-200 (if not something smaller & less capable).

But lets look at the two “big” things that appearantly make the KC-30 so attractive.

Fuel offload vs radius: The KC-767AT exceeds the stated offload requirement by more than 25,000 lbs for the desired radius or exceeds the stated radius requirement by more than 500nm for the desired fuel offload. And in the real world if you look at the historical average offload per sortie, the KC-767AT is capable of DOUBLE the average (for Operation Desert Storm & Operation Allied Force at ~1,500nm, for Operation Iraqi Freedom at ~1,000nm & for Operation Enduring Freedom at ~500nm).

Airlift: The only “airlift” requirement given a quantitative value was patient capacity which the KC-767AT can carry double the stated requirement. As an airlift asset, the KC-767AT can carry as many 463L pallets or roughly twice as many passengers or patients as a C-17. Unless you are going to argue that we need to replace all our C-17s with something with significantly greater capacity there is no justification for such in a TANKER [there ARE reasons why the C-17 is what it is & not another C-5]. The USAF/DOD has not done the GAO requested analysis justifying passenger & cargo capability in its replacement refueling aircraft. Nobody doubts the utility of having passenger & cargo capability in a tanker BUT, just like fuel offload vs radius, it is a matter of providing the RIGHT amount of capacity/capability not providing the most otherwise even the KC-30 is too small & we should be looking at the 747 vs A380 (or heaven forbid something akin to the An-225).

No, it is NOT clear from public statements that the USAF attaches far more importance to cargo-carrying capacity & fuel offload than the written requirement suggests. It is clear from public statements that those “in charge” (which is not even the USAF any more) of selecting the KC-X are trying to save face & justify the choice of the KC-30 by exaggerating the advantages of a LARGE tanker like the KC-30 while ignoring the MUCH more important disadvantages. There SHOULD be every bit as much investigation into the KC-30 selection (what went wrong, who is to blaim & what should be done to prevent it from happening again) as there was into the tanker lease deal.

Prior to being FORCED to change the requirement to accomodate the A330 for the sake of having a Congress mandated “competition”, the USAF was quite clear on what it wanted (& why the A330 was NOT it) & the results of investigations into the tanker lease show just how much the USAF was willing to do in order to get it ASAP.

General John Handy, USAF (Ret.) summed it up quite nicely.

Most of us in the Air Force mobility community were a bit surprised by the decision to buy the quite large Airbus-330 tanker instead of the smaller Boeing 767 tanker. But the real shock was in the unusually harsh language used by the Government Accountability Office in overturning that decision. It was the harshest language used to overturn an action by the Air Force that I have read in my entire career.

In that career — spanning 39 years in the Air Force — I was fortunate enough to have been the Commander of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the USAF Air Mobility Command (AMC) from November 2001 until retiring from the Air Force in October 2005.

I devoted many years to the operation of air refueling tankers in support of the hundreds of other aircraft and tens of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and Coast Guardsmen who depend on them to create the “air bridge” that enables American forces and relief supplies to reach any corner of the world in only a few hours. Without the tankers performing when and where needed, America would not — quite literally — be a “superpower.”

In the many challenges we faced in those years, the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines in TRANSCOM pulled together as a joint team to get the job done on a daily basis throughout the entire time I was blessed to be their commander. We engaged in multiple crises around the world — humanitarian disasters as well as significant military conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The most serious limitation we had was our equipment: the shortage of adequate mobility assets — meaning airlift and air refueling aircraft. First among those problems was then, and is now, the tankers.

I spoke about the air refueling tanker age and shortages on a routine basis with anyone who would listen. And I did so in the context of the other requirement those badly needed assets would support which includes virtually everything the armed services have to move from one place to another that can be loaded onto an airplane.

The shocking language of the GAO decision compels me to do something I’ve never done before: to speak out publicly. I am not employed by either Boeing or Northrop-Grumman. But the service I’ve devoted most of my life to appears to need a bit of help.

Somewhere in the acquisition process, it is obvious to me that someone lost sight of the requirement. Based on what the GAO decided, it’s up to people such as myself to remind everyone of the warfighter requirement for a modern air refueling tanker aircraft.

Recall that we started this acquisition process in order to replace the Eisenhower era KC-135 aircraft with a modern version capable of accomplishing everything the current fleet does plus additional needs for the future. Thus the required aircraft is of small to medium size much like the KC-135. Not a very large aircraft like the current KC-10, which may be replaced later with a comparably large aircraft.

Why a smaller to medium size aircraft? Because, first of all, you want tankers to deploy in sufficient numbers in order to accomplish all assigned tasks. You need to bed them down on the maximum number of airfields around the world along with or close to the customer — airborne fighters, bombers and other mobility assets in need of fuel close to or right over the fight or crisis. This allows the supported combatant commander the ability to conduct effective operations around the clock. The impact of more tankers is more refueling booms in the sky, more refueling orbits covered, wider geographic coverage, more aircraft refueled, and more fuel provided. A “KC-135 like” aircraft takes up far less ramp space, is far more maneuverable on the ground and does not have the risk of jet blast reorganizing your entire ramp when engine power is applied.

The second requirement is survivability. The aircraft and crew must be able to compete in a threat environment that contains enhanced surface to air missiles and other significant threats. The crew must receive superior situational awareness to include automatic route planning and re-routing and steering cues to avoid those threats. They must have maximum armor protection, fuel tank explosion protection and world class chemical/biological protection. All of this means the warfighter has the requirement for a large number of highly flexible and survivable air refueling aircraft.

I also want the acquired aircraft to be integrated with the current defense transportation system. That means 463L compatible pallets; floor loaded on a freighter capable floor all compatible with the current modern airlift fleet. When I put passenger seats in this aircraft, I want to be able to use existing airlift aircraft seats and pallets. When tasked with our precious aero medical mission, I want to be able to use integral medical crew seats, onboard oxygen generation systems, more outlets and be able to use the USAF patient support pallet. I do not want to harness the USAF with the problem of going out to acquire unique assets due to a more radically sized and equipped tanker aircraft.

Now, if you look at these rather simple requirements and look at the previous offerings from industry, you might agree with me that the KC-767 more closely meets these needs than the competition. If that’s what the warfighters need, that’s what they should get.

My purpose is only to help select the right aircraft that meets the warfighter’s requirements. It is not anything else. With that thought in mind, the KC-767 — or another that is the same size and has the same capabilities — is the right aircraft for the USAF. Now let’s see what the new leadership of the Air Force does to obtain the right aircraft for the warfighter.

Keep in mind that General Handy was one of those who has openly called for the future USAF tanker force to include more large KC-10-like tankers & thus knows full well the benefits of such tankers. But he also knows full well the benefits of medium KC-135-like tankers and how large KC-10-like tankers & medium KC-135-like tankers have their advantages & disadvantages vs the other. Thus he, like so many others who know what they are talking about, understands the folly of replacing the KC-135 with a tanker which is larger than the KC-10 but not as good as the KC-135 at doing what the KC-135 does for the USAF OR as good as the KC-10 at what the KC-10 does for the USAF.