I bet if the SH is sold to Brazil, the lady will get promoted.

Notice also this:

– Arrange for an interview of the SecDef, or other senior

Administration representative, with a prominent Brazilian

journalist to underline importance of U.S.-Brazilian

partnership and how the FX2 sale will help.

This is a gentle way of saying “the future of our relations will be affected from whether or not you will buy Super Hornet”.

In Greece we ‘ve heard much worse, but it’s a polite way to say “put political pressure on them”.

Really, after the end of the Cold War, the market for weapons is a disaster. Countries don’t buy like before. Defence budgets shrink everywhere. Some new “big enemy” must be found soon in order for the industry to continue to prosper, before it’s too late.

In Greece, even in this period, various countries still try to sell weapons. This alone shows how desperate the companies are.

coming from an american embassy, this source could/should be taken with a bit of salt I guess.

Yes, but if you read it in the context of the report, i think it’s a sort of genuine frustration.

I would be eager to see the exact part subject to such license and how hard it would be to remplace them (not speaking of the political cost).

That would be interesting to know in deed.

All in all, a Rafale/Typhoon/Gripen NG would still put India way less at risk of US political cloud than an US plane. And if ever USA was trying to annoy Rafale/Typhoon/Gripen NG they would not only annoy India but as well the selling country, which both would try to change the situation. Once again, something quite different than having an US plane.

Oh i agree. There’s no doubt that buying a 100% american aircraft is much more committing to good relations with USA.

For me the only relevant bit is this

That means a lot to the Indian and Brazil competitons whatever you buy, you buy American strings.

In deed.

This is the entire text from the pictures i posted earlier:

VZCZCXRO8264

RR RUEHRG

DE RUEHBR #0634/01 1391639

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

R 191639Z MAY 09

FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4328

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0490

RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0075

RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9551

RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7753

RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4071

RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

S E C R E T

SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000634

NOFORN

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA AND PM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019

TAGS: PREL MASS ETTC BR

SUBJECT: BRAZIL’S FIGHTER PURCHASE: ENDGAME STRATEGY

REF: A. BRASILIA 216

¶B. BRASILIA 41

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.4(d)

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST. With two months

remaining before the Government of Brazil decides on a next

generation fighter aircraft, the U.S. competitor, Boeing’s

F18 Super Hornet is still perceived by many Brazilians in and

outside the GOB as a likely second or even third-place

finisher, despite having the best aircraft and best offset

package. Most Brazilian contacts tell us that they do not

believe the USG is supporting the sale strongly, raising

doubts in their minds about our long term reliability as a

partner. Between now and July, there will be several

opportunities to assure the Brazilians at senior levels that

the USG will be behind the sale. Paragraphs 3-7 below

contain proposed steps to address key Brazilian concerns and

maximize chances for selection of the U.S. competitor. Among

these steps, high level contacts, especially by the President

and Secretary will be critical to overcome the perception of

a lack of U.S. support. We also need to underscore our

assurances that technology transfer has been approved and

highlight the superiority of Boeing’s proposal to that of its

French competitor. As noted reftels, Embassy believes State

will play a critical role in roviding assurances that will be

essential to a winning bid. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (S/NF) As the FX2 competition moves into its final

stages, the U.S. has a strong offer from Boeing for the F18

Super Hornet that comes with a huge package of industrial

cooperation and a competitive overall cost. While we can be

confident that the Super Hornet would be Brazil,s choice

based on its superior capabilities and attractive offset

package, it still has no better than a fifty/fifty chance of

success because of political support for the French

competitor and a lingering belief among some Brazilian

leaders that a close relationship with the U.S. may not be to

Brazil,s advantage. Winning the FX2 endgame, therefore,

will depend on an effective strategy to overcome our

political disadvantages and allow the Super Hornet,s

superiority be the deciding factor. Such a strategy must

address several key issues:

Perception of a lack of USG support

———————————–

¶3. (S/NF) With the French sale effort being managed directly

from President Sarkozy,s cabinet and ongoing Swedish

engagement on the Ministerial level, the USG is perceived by

most Brazilians as lukewarm at best in its support for the

FX2 sale. This is a critical disadvantage in a Brazilian

society that depends on personal relationships as a

foundation for business. The difficulty is exacerbated by

the separation between government and industry in the United

States. We cannot, for example, offer government financing

to support a state owned company as can our competitors. To

address this problem, high level contacts will be essential,

particularly from the Department of State which is assumed by

the Brazilian Air Force to be restrictive of mil-mil

ooperation. In such contacts, U.S. officials will need to

highlight expanding U.S.-Brazil partnership and how

cooperation with the United States as Brazil modernizes its

obsolescent military will not only provide the best

operational capabilities, but will enhance our overall

cooperation. This is why we have been forward leaning in

approving transfers of technology in support of this sale.

In addition to taking advantage of the near-term

opportunities for high level contacts presented by MOD

Jobim,s May 20 visit to Washington And Secretary Clinton,s

possible visit to Brazil in late May, Embassy believes that

phone calls between Presidents Obama and Lula, between NSA

Jones and Presidential Foreign Affairs Advisor Marco Aurelio

Garcia, and between SecDef Gates and MOD Jobim, would boost

our case significantly.

Tech Transfer

————-

¶4. (S/NF) Although the major decisions to approve the

BRASILIA 00000634 002 OF 003

transfer of technology for the FX2 sale have been made,

Brazilian leaders continue to doubt U.S. ability to follow

through. While the problem has been mitigated by an

effective public affairs strategy, we still hear that, absent

specific high level State Department assurances, the

Brazilians cannot be sure. It may well be that the

Brazilians want to keep tech transfer doubts alive in order

to have a ready-made excuse for buying an inferior plane,

should political leaders decide to do so. Repeated concerns

about unreleasable source code could have a similar basis.

Finally, we have heard that there are concerns on Capitol

Hill about the possibility of a South American arms race.

Should these reach Brazilian ears, there will be additional

worries that Congress will intervene to block the sale.

Embassy recommends the following as next steps to strengthen

our case on tech transfer:

– An advocacy letter from President Obama to President Lula

– A letter from Secretary Clinton to MOD Jobim stating that

the USG has approved the transfer of all appropriate

technology.

– Interagency guidance on source code (cleared for April

Revista Forca Area article) should be disseminated for use.

– All high-level contacts, including by Secretaries of

State and Defense and POTUS should include reassurance that

tech transfer has been approved.

– Washington agencies should begin consultations with

appropriate Hill staff as early as possible to overcome

misperceptions that arms sales to Brazil could be

destabilizing.

Financing

———

¶5. (S/NF) U.S. inability to offer government financing or

guarantees puts the Super Hornet at a significant

disadvantage to its competitors. EXIM is prohibited from

engaging in sales of defense articles, leaving Brazil to

depend on commercial financing at higher rates. According to

Washington agencies, it would be possible to seek

Congressional relief for EXIM to support the sale. This has

been done in the past on rare occasions. The Brazilian Air

Force finance office has told us that even a statement that

we are willing to seek such legislative action would be

considered a positive sign. Embassy recommends that

Washington explore the possibility of legislative action to

allow EXIM Financing and respond by the May 29 deadline to

the GOB request to provide information on government

financing options.

Making the Case

—————

¶6. (S/NF) We have been successful in getting across the

points that the Super Hornet is a highly capable aircraft,

and now need to focus on the broader picture — how

partnership on the fighter sale will yield benefits for both

sides both in military terms and in economic benefits. As

the world,s largest aerospace company, Boeing is able to

offer a much greater scope of opportunities for Brazilian

industry, including some outside of the FX2 offset program.

The early June visit of Brazilian legislators to Washington

will be an opportunity to get the message to political

leaders. By focusing on key Senators, we have the

opportunity to bring on board individuals who can influence

the decision makers and ensure that the people who will have

to approve spending Brazilian government money understand

that the F18 offers them the best value. Embassy will

continue to highlight tech transfer and Expand our message

to include economic benefits to Brazil of the Boeing

proposal. We also recommend the following:

– Make an expert on the aerospace industry available for

interview to highlight economic health of Boeing compared to

its competitors.

– Use visit of Brazilian Congress to drive home message

that partnership with the U.S. entails benefits to both sides

that go well beyond offset program. Ensure that Brazilian

Senators understand significantly lower life

cycle costs of the Super Hornet.

BRASILIA 00000634 003 OF 003

– Arrange for an interview of the SecDef, or other senior

Administration representative, with a prominent Brazilian

journalist to underline importance of U.S.-Brazilian

partnership and how the FX2 sale will help.

Attack the French Bid

———————

¶7. (S/NF) Although the French offer a less capable fighter

at a higher cost, the Rafale has been the presumptive winner

since the inception of the FX2 competition. While the

technical evaluations of the aircraft should result in a

significant advantage for the Super Hornet, we need to take

steps to erode the French political edge. While a major

element of this will be highlighting Boeing,s lower cost,

there are several other measures that can make a case against

the French. The first step will be to remind the Brazilians

that their interest in the Rafale was driven by an assumption

that the United States would not release technology. Since

we have approved release of the relevant technology, we

should ask if Brazil still needs the French as a safety.

Over the last few months, the French sales effort has been

based on a misleading, if not fraudulent, claim that their

plane involves only French content (rendering it free of

meddlesome U.S. export controls). This is not the case. A

DTSA analysis found a high level of U.S. content, including

targeting systems, radar components and safety systems that

will require U.S. licenses. Next steps:

– Although it does not appear that the tech data provided

with the French bid violated ITAR regs, PM/DDTC and DTSA

should continue to monitor French marketing to ensure

Dassault does not skirt ITAR restrictions.

– Investigate India,s decision to drop the Rafale from its

fighter competition to see if there is a reason that would

make the aircraft less attractive to Brazil.

– Ensure the Brazilians are aware that we expect to be

issuing retransfer licenses for U.S.-origin components on the

French plane and have already approved transfer of some

technical data.

KUBISKE

What i find amusing is Mrs’ Kubiske’s repeating of how inferior the Rafale is. I would be really curious to know whether she trully believes that or is it out of courtesy or patriotism. 😀

The politics behind aircraft deals. 😀 For the romantics that still think about “competitions” (i ‘ve written before that in Greece foreign ambassadors act as weapons salesmen). Pubblished in a greek blog:

Wiki leaks from the US embassy in Brazil:

Just look at it. Sarkozy’s cabinet, the Swedes have put a minister and now Obama and Clinton! 😀 Just to see how desperate people are to sell and how closely connected are weapons companies to their respective goverments.

True. They even have a very influent think tank widely spread among the administration to the very top: it’s the “Projet for a New American Century” which aim is to keep the power the US gained during the 20th century; after WWII when Europe has sef-destroyed itself with 2 world wars and left the field.

Yes, i have read about that Project, which among other things requires new wars. It’s logical if you think about it. Usually after a war (as long as it’s not on your soil), there are changes which are very profitable for some. You can get new energy fields, new spheres of influence, get access to new sources of wealth, destroy the wealth of your competitors, and so on. The capitalist system, from time to time gets reborn either out of wars or global economic disasters that “reboot” it. And seeing that the US economy does comes to trouble, the Project for the New American Century was to be expected to say what they said. For example now (after the facts) some US politicians have admitted that in Iraq the real deal was the oil actually…

Because, even by looking at this map, you understand that there’s something wrong going on with the west and it’s not going to go on like this forever:

http://www.economist.com/content/global_debt_clock

And there’s nowhere written by God’s hand that the West is bound to be the rich of the world and the others the 3rd world.

As you said, nothing shocking and it’s not anti-americanism to notice the obvious.

Anyway, for strategical affairs it’s better to deal with powers of comparable strenth as you.

Yes or with big powers that will most likely have the same interests as you for a reasonably long period of time.

Have we seen any activity by the KPAAF? I’m surprised that the North hasn’t probed the US and RoK defences for reaction times. Could this be seen as a reluctance by the North to risk escalating the situation or perhaps an indication of the poor state of the KPAAF’s fighter force in terms of air worthiness

I think the North played this in the safest way possible. They didn’t try to challenge in the air, but where they are more comfortable with. This is exactly what a clever strategist does.

As for South Korea, Defencenet shows the satellite images which were showed by the North, where one can see the results of the S. Korean retaliation, which were very poor.

In the first photo, 1,2,3,4 designate the positions of north Korean artillery.

The yellow lines show the North Korean artillery lines.

In the second photo,it shows the results of the shots of the south korean K-9 howitzer against the closest (and apparently fixed!) north korean artillery positions:

http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15907&Itemid=42

North Koreans: Fired 170 shells, 80 found their targets, using old tech artillery.

South Koreans: Fired 70 shells, 35 ended up in the sea, 45 ended in north korean terrain, but only 14 relatively near to the north korean fixed artillery position, but they fell in rice crops (this according to the north korean side, but it seems the proof showed agrees).

Potential explanations:

1) The K-9 is new tech, but its accuracy isn’t great. It would be weird though.
2) The South Korean artillery needs trainning. For their sake, i hope it’s not true.
3) The South Koreans don’t have ready the coordinates of the North Korean fixed artillery. For their sake, i hope it’s not true.
4) The South Koreans got so surprised, that they went in a “panic” mode, which made them mess with 1,2,3. Maybe more probable, but once more, i hope for their sake that it’s not true.

In any case, i think the North conducted this admirably. They chose as terrain of confrontation a sector where they are very strong and obviously very well trainned, since using much older technology artillery they managed to outperform the South Koreans with their high tech. And they avoided use of airforce, where they know they ‘re weak and also an eventual shooting down would ruin their prestige and morale victory. They brought the battle where they are strong and they avoided to give their foes a fight in the sector of their most weakness. When you do that in war, that’s actually how you win. of course in an all out war, they wouldn’t avoid South Korean airforce, still, it shows the north has a very sound planning.

Fortunately with a bit of delay the South decided to warn the North with Air strike if this happens again. And they did well to threaten with use of airforce, since its where they are stronger.

Anyway, i think it was a perfectly executed plan for the North. It showed that they know well their enemy and that they are well trainned at least in artillery.

My view on this is the following:

If North Korea really wanted to start an all out war, it would have done so. Contrary to most other countries in the world, that are “respectable” members of the international community, North Korean is isolated and labelled as “rogue”. They don’t need an “excuse” to legimitize their actions, like most of the other countries (they proved it since the sinking of the S. Koran ship and onwards). North Korea uses tension as political leverage. Every time that wants something (loosen pressure from the West or satisfy demands), they play “crazy”. They shoot some missile towards Japan, they push the S. Koreans, etc. But they don’t war (yet) real war or they would have already done so. Instead of pounding the S. Korean positions for a while, they could have simply invaded. They don’t, because, despite the “i am crazy” profile that they try to sell to the rest of the world, they are also aware that even in case of victory, it would be a Pyrrhic one.

IMHO, South Korea, by never replying, encourages North Korea to continue with use of force. Unlike popular belief, if you reply to an episode like the one that occured with the shelling, you don’t necessarily go to war. It can be limited locally to a “hot episode”, when both sides don’t really want to go to war. By not reacting, you send the wrong message to the other side that “you can shell me again and sink my ship again and i won’t react”. The type of reaction shows how much you want to escalate. For example, they sink your ship. If you send out all your fleet in pursue of the North Korean, then of course you risk all out war, because you show that you seek escalation. If however, you pick an isolated N. Korean ship and you order a submarine or aircraft attack on it, it’s a more conservative response or “equal response” if you like.

S. Korea did nothing after the sinking of their ship. This only encouraged the North to go a step further. In this way, the North appears more “credible” in its threats and the South appears less credible in its effort to show that can present deterrent.

As for the rest, as it was pointed out, unlike Iraq, where the terrain allows any kind of ground manouver and the only cover is at best a camouflage net, Korea is more mountainous, which limits the paths for the tanks. No wonder the North Koreans have such a massive artillery firepower. It can do more damage than tanks in that terrain. Also, despite their material being old, the N. Koreans showed a flawless execution of their plan. I think i read somewhere that S. Korea tried to destroy the enemy artillery positions bringing out their superior K-9 howitzers, but it seemed that the N. Koreans did well the “shoot and scoot”, changing promptly their position and they had also deployed observers which were rapidly correcting their artillery fire, whereas the S. Koreans were caught by surprise. Before the S. Koreans could get a hold of the situation and overcome the surprise, the N. Korean artillery had executed her plan and back to their base positions.

In any case, S. Korea by doing nothing, is only putting her signature for the next bloody attack, since N. Korea will be convinced that she can do all kind of border episodes with impunity. And this is a strategical and a political error for the South Koreans, undermining their effort to show to the North that they are ready to fight.