SOCAt that point the number of decoys becomes slightly irrelevant as you will have to ensure that every RV is killed because you cannot discriminate between them. That allows you to develop strategies to effectively use MIRVs to oversaturate ABM defenses and limit the number of decoys you need. Let’s say I have four RVs. If you can tell that three of them are decoys, you only need to hit one. If you can’t, then you need to hit all four. If you have four ABM launchers, that means I need two missiles to hit the target you’re defending. But in the first example, I need to fire five.
SOCI have come accross a couple of Russian sources that claim it was an SA-6.
:confused::confused::confused:
It was an SA-3, the battery commander was even interviewed about the incident not that long ago. That one wasn’t really all that surpising given what led to the shootdown if you ask me.
SOCThink of it this way. If I take two RV shapes, fit a nuke in one and ballast of the same mass and volume into another, how will you tell them apart with any kind of sensor?
SOCABM S-300 will have nuke warheads as they were doing during the coldwar, there no reason for them to stop, especially if they say they’ve “stopped” deploying nukes on the warheads.
S-300P yes, S-300V no. I’ve never seen anything purporting that the S-300V had a nuclear warhead. It wouldn’t have made sense anyway, being a tactical SAM designed to follow maneuvering armored units. The reason Lee thought the S-200 was part of an ABM network was because nuclear warhead storage sites were identified. With the security measures Russia and the USSR placed on their nuclear capabilities assuming that they would’ve let tactical SAM batteries drive around the countryside with them makes no sense at all.
So if you surrounded the RV with a balloon and made the balloon the same temp as the decoys (and none of the heat from the RV was visible through the balloon) it might work but that’s much more of a PITA than simply duplicating the radar RCS.
You’re thinking backwards. You make the decoy mimic the RV, not vice-versa.
I thought there were two versions of the small S-400 missile, the normal larger missile and the “big” missile (40N6 that apparently doesn’t have exoatmospheric capability). Is the S-500 only suppose to incorporate one additional missile and if so is it both endo and exo capable as well as all phase (boost/midcourse/terminal) against ICBMs?
I have no idea what missile is destined for the S-500, very little information has trickled out on that system and I summarized pretty much all of it on my blog in various places. It’s developmental and probably not going to be exportable so we may or may not hear much about it for a while. I will say that with the exoatmospheric capability needed for ASAT kills it might be able to make do with one missile, as exoatmospheric kills in the ABM role would be possible as well. Remember that the S-500 won’t need to have any air-to-air capability as that role will be filled by the S-400. What I envision is a large-scale missile similar to a smaller GORGON produced using more modern powerplants and systems. You could mount a three or four-round set of canisters on the back of an SS-25 style TEL and go to town.
There are two versions of the 9M96 (9M96 and 9M96D for domestic, 9M96E/E1 and 9M96E2 for export) missile for the S-400, but they haven’t been deployed yet as evidenced by the lack of smaller canisters on any of the deployed S-400 TELs we’ve seen, and are also compatible with the Favorit system so that may have played into why they have two versions. Star49’s link, which was pretty interesting as it seems to show the 91N6 EW radar is a development of the 64N6 like the 92N6 engagement radar was derived from 36N6, doesn’t even mention the 9M96E or E2. That page is describing a likely export model, as all the designators have the E suffix, and that makes me think that since the 9M96 has been offered for export before, perhaps it has been cancelled?
SOCThis report came out in the yearly 2000’s:
“Over the years, the Russians have tested the S-300V against a wide array of targets. Antey officials claim that, in a recent series of tests in early 1997, the Gladiator and Giant interceptors successfully destroyed more than 60 ballistic and cruise missiles. Among the target missiles were Scud Bs modified to simulate Iraq’s Al-Hussein short-range ballistic missile used in the Persian Gulf War. In a series of tests, S-300V had a single-shot kill probability of 0.4 to 0.7 against tactical ballistic missiles. An average of 1.5 to 1.75 interceptors are required to bring down a single target.”
http://www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.51/system_detail.asp
But that’s simply an anti-tactical ballistic missile test. The S-300V has been able to obliterate those for years. True intercontinental ballistic missiles are much harder targets to deal with because they have much higher velocities, otherwise the USA could use the PAC-3 ERINT as an ABM system and Russia could simply deploy hundreds of S-300V2 batteries in the same role.
SOCI wont speak for the poster in question but my reading has so far indicated that that after the mid 70’s the west were normally consistently ( and apparently deliberately) underestimating Russian both capabilities and force levels.
Was the USSR underestimated in a lot of areas? Most definitely. But there is no evidence to support the assertion that this was done purposely. Hell, they’d been underestimating the USSR in some areas since the end of WWII, why should the 70’s be different 😀
Since i can’t read Russian this is not something i can do but given my general agreement with your point of view your opinion on those books would certainly be appreciated. Just what does he say about the cold war ABM capabilities of the USSR and are the books recent enough to have escaped cold war censorship?
The SAM volume was written in 1997, with the space volume written in 2003. They have most certainly gotten by the old Cold War censors. The level of detail in some areas is very impressive and rivals anything you’ll find in the West on a similar topic. Some of the designers and administrators have rather amusing stories to tell about some of the screw-ups that occurred during the testing of the S-300P. There was also one incident when one of the chief officials at Sary Shagan overseeing the S-300P’s test program went out to witness a mass launch and intercept exercise. He was horrified when it appeared that the missiles all pitched over and slammed into the ground, but learned that they were testing the system against very low level targets. What he thought were impacts downrange were actually intercepts of targets simulating terrain-hugging cruise missiles.
One can intercept at 4.8km/sec and the other 2.8km/sec. thats the only difference but if 250KM weopon can intercept at 4.8km/sec target than why only 50km range increase as it has far greater energy and why same altitude interception.
What they have to have done is incorporate a higher impulse motor to boost the speed and consequently the range. With a slightly heavier weapon, after you figure in the trajectory shaping to take advantage of the kinematics to get a higher range (which again may be as high as 300km), gravity still factors into the equation and is what likely keeps the altitude down in concert with the trajectory shaping. It looks like the warhead is heavier as well by nearly 40 kg over the earlier 48N6 series. OKB Fakel’s book, aptly titled Fakel’s Missiles, gives a figure of 143 kg for the 48N6’s warhead (although I think I’ve seen 160 kg or thereabouts for the enhanced 48N6D/48N6E2).
Oh, and after re-reading the specs on that page, you seem to have made an error. The 1835 kg weight figure is for the 48N6E3 (48N6DM) weapon. That is 35 kg heavier overall than the quoted figure for the 48N6 from Fakel (the dimensions match, meaning the new missile is not physically larger). The 2635 kg figure is the weapon’s weight inside the sealed launch canister. That’s what they mean by TПK, транспортно-пусковых контейнеров. без TПK is literally “without TПK”, meaning the weight without the launch canister. Providing the weight of the sealed canister/missile combo isn’t unusual as the weapon is designed (or at least the 5V55 and earlier 48N6s were) to remain sealed inside the canister for decades and still function.
SOCAll you have provided is 20 year old speculation. Where is the evidence that the Western speculation has turned out to be accurate?
SAM Weapons of the National Air Defense Forces by Mikhail Perov and Creation of Space-Missile Defense Systems by the same author are two references you should locate. Both of them are Russian-language books (massive books, around 500 pages each and well worth the read) and are populated with interviews and information by the designers and testers of various systems like Terra-3, Okno, Krona, the S-200, and the S-300.
SOCHey, flattery will get you everywhere 😀
And with that, since we’ve hit 20 pages, this thread will be closed down. Which of course does not in any way imply that a new iteration should not be started, preferably one loaded with photos!
SOCHad you persisted, I was going to post the link to that file :diablo:
SOCASW is probably handled by helicopters and the carrier’s escorts, I suppose. And tanker support is provided by outside sources like USAF KC-135Rs or, even better, USN Super Hornets!
SOC[color=red]Yeah, I’m working on editing out the trash right now. If you want to debate your own concepts of world economics and ethnicity, take it to the General Discussion forum. And EVERYONE is part of the problem. If you reply to someone who starts down on that road, you’re just as guilty as they are for derailing this mess![/color]
SOCRussia did have laser systems. They probably still exist unless the aliens from Area 51 broke out and stole them. The point is that nobody ever claimed that a national laser defense system of some sort existed, and claiming that one does because it was speclated about 20 years ago is illogical.
And the reporting I am claiming is flawed is reporting speculating about future events when there is no evidence to support the idea that the events they described ever came to pass.
But whatever, I forgot, everything Russia says these days is a pack of lies to trick the West :rolleyes: I guess that they still have nuclear ABMs in service, the Bulava has performed flawlessly in testing, the Kursk never sunk, and there is a laser on every lightpost to shoot down ICBMs. You’re making all of these fanciful claims but have absolutely no real evidence to back them up. Russia is only telling lies…and you can prove this how? Certainly you must have first-hand evidence to prove that they are deceiving everyone.
SOCThe UAE’s M2K fleet might have been withdrawn prematurely in terms of aircraft life, but they are getting advanced F-16s so it’s not like they’re giving up on the fighter fleet.
For a prematurely retired aircraft, how about the USN’s carrier-based S-3 Vikings? With the proliferation of diesel-electric subs and constant UN operations in areas where they represent significant threats, I’d think that a carrier-based ASW platform is still a good idea. Plus, it made for a capable tanker and even a decent A/G platform.
SOCYou’re still missing the point. A US report from the 1980’s talking about an operational system that could be produced from laser research efforts does not mean that such a system is in service today. What if their reporting was flawed? The systems they are speculating about were not in existance when the reports were written, so how can you logically assume that they exist now? There were reports dealing with Soviet fighter development as well, are you going to believe that Russia is secretly operating 500 fifth-generation fighters right now as well?
And Russian laser weapon research was public knowledge back in the 1980’s thanks to the release of the DoD’s unclassified Soviet Military Power publication, so saying that the US was trying to hide such systems from the public is also wrong. There was some pretty amusing artwork of a lot of the laser systems in one of them as well. But even if those test systems still exist, that does not mean that they have been operationally fielded.
SOCLand based SAM coverage won’t necessarily cover an amphibious assault, I do agree there. My main point initially was that there are numerous long-range SAM systems and it appeared like you were discounting them entirely from any discussion of air warfare over the strait. However, the naval SAM complement is increasing rapidly. There are already DDGs fitted with HHQ-9s, and others fitted with S-300FMs (can’t recall the ship classes off the top of my head). What that land-based SAM coverage does provide is cover for massing forces and protection to a degree from aerial attack while crossing the strait. Couple that with PLAAF and PLANAF fighter coverage and air cover for any assault on Formosa should be pretty robust. There is also the KJ-2000 AWACS fleet to provide battle management in concert with the land-based 64N6 radar systems. None of this, however, is relevant, until China possesses an amphibious landing capability of sufficient size to actually take this on.
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