On September 7, at 0600, two Mirage F1 (and 1 one Breguet Atlantic) aircraft were patrolling north of N’djamena, while the
firing team of the Hawk site was about to be relieved by the next one. On the ground, the Centaur radar detected a suspect
trail ; after having flown over Niger by using an air traffic corridor and having turned off over Nigeria, it flew over Cameroon
and seemed to arrive at great speed right onto the Chadian capital. Without waiting, the tactical cell (CETAC) control officer
set off a general alert, initiated the interception of the doubtful aircraft by the F1s and put the whole Hawk battery into full
action state. After having received the target engagement report by the Hawk unit and after having noted the no-answer to the
various IFF interrogations by the unknown aircraft – besides, assuming that the Mirage F1 would not be able to intercept it in
time – the air controller considered the target as hostile and, through his LO, ordered the Hawk to fire, as soon as it would have crossed the Chadian border. Then the target was 8 nautical miles away from the Hawk battery ; in his tactical cell, the FDO (Fire Direction Officer) ordered squad Bravo to fire. Bravo fired, but the missile did not start (no ignition reported on carriage Nr 4); immediately, the FDO ordered squad Alpha to fire, what it did and reported : “missile fired, carriage Nr 1, Alpha arm, ADP
mode”, and soon after: “target destroyed”.
It was 0659 hrs. The Hawk missile hit the aircraft, as this one was in the vicinity of the Chadian capital. The attacker was
hit with its bays open ; when later reviewing its trajectory, it showed that it was obviously about to bomb the Épervier major
facilities, through its alignment on a series of water towers, perfectly visible from the sky. On impact, the carried 1 500 kg cluster bombs were ejected out of the aircraft, without having been completely activated. One only burned slowly, neither without exploding, nor without inflicting Chadian casualties. Owing to his altitude and the local cloud cover, the attacker was seen by eyewitnesses only short before its interception; first, the aircraft broke into three, then several burning parts scattered around and crashed a few hundred meters away of Camp Dubut. The three crewmembers were burned to death. Despite the looting of the debris, onto which the population rushed, the aircraft was easily identified as having been a Tupolev 22, whose enemy origin was indisputable. On the same evening, when answering my questions, the Hawk firing team explained me soberly that everything had happened very quickly, but that the task looked very easy: one unique threat, with an easily identifiable hostile attitude, having probably emitted minor counter-measures towards the Hawk, a ligth air traffic general environment at that time, clear-cut orders from the tactical cell (CETAC) carried out by all the participants without any procrastination in such a case with an easily palliated misfire: Sir, it was exactly as during training! (sic).
More informations available at:
http://www.cdes.terre.defense.gouv.fr/sitefr/Objdoc/cahier_retex/retex6.pdf
(first part in french, the second one in english)
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