Isn’t that one day too soon, Hotdog? Those pics are from some console game and the RIA site doesn’t show any hits for Su-33SM!

I agree completely with CommanderJB.

It’s 1:56am, April 1 2009 where i am. 😉

swerve: it wasn’t that RAF should have taken RN’s type; rather that MoS should not have split UK resources after Gloster won RAF. We took US AI (free!) in 207 of our 257 Sea Venoms, and should have replaced that with (free, if poss, else fixed price/proven Spec.) F-8 on Strike carriers, A-4 on Light Fleets. Ah! hindsight!

13 April,1949: RAF F(AW) ITPs. MoS leant towards (HSAL)Gloster G.A.5 and its F.9: (HSAL)ASM had much (Metrovick) test behind, much money ahead for F.9 in HP’s Medium. Work was in hand on reheat. D.H.110 rested on RR, whose prowess in reheat was zero, in axial design (AJ.65), negative. But “insurance”, again, funded 2 types. By 1952 DH Props was underway on the IR-sensor AAM (to be) Firestreak, to be matched as UK’s first Weapon System to its own candidate, D.H.110 and/or G.A.5. If you were MoS, and its Korean War paymaster, US Govt. in the Mutual Support Program, what would you do? Choose DH, with an engine rejected by US for its licenced Canberra; DH, attempting to turn wooden Venom into an all-metal System, while pouring all their Corporate energy into Comets (Vixen, like Sea Venom, was fostered to Airspeed)? Or flush HSAL’s contender with the better engine? Quite. That’s what US thought too, and supplied much cash and many AI sets for Javelins.

If Javelin was ever a credible weapon, it would be FAW.8(US AI)/9(R)(UK AI) from, say 1962, just in time to usher in Lightning (ITP,12/5/49). If Vixen…it would be FAW.2/Red Top, at sea 12/64. >15 years’ gestation. Prejudicial to Defence of the Realm. Scandalous. Better USN kit (Tiger, Crusader, Skyhawk) sat surplus from about 1960.

swerve: RAF Buccaneer: OR.343 could not have been met 12/58 by Gyron Jr. N.A.39. So now it’s 4/65: you choose to chop TSR.2, but to keep an Indian O. deep penetrator. PM swerve is offered Bucc. S.2* with much TSR.2 kit -you know, the stuff that after 6 years lab.pain still doesn’t work. S.2* is kited to you as quickly built by the team that had taken 9 years to deliver 20 DB/40 S.1. That team. The one that charges well. Or you can have, on deferred terms, fixed price F-111, 50 off a line budgetted for 3,000. So, go on, which is it? Healey in 1968 did add 26 S.2B(RAF) to bridge to Tornado. He did decline further avionic upgrades: (while we’re doing hindsight: ) just as well, when the type was grounded, 2-7/80, de-fanging RAFG’s nuclear strike Task.

I’d have kept the Sea Vixen, fitted with with a gun, even if podded, given it a better radar when it became available (aka.blue fox) and kept it in service rather then replacing it with the Phantom. One important advantage of this being that you can then keep the smaller and cheaper to run Centaurs operating giving Centaur, Hermes and Eagle for the carrier role, with Albion and Bulwark as commando carriers.

That decision may also allow CVA-01 to go forward as it may allow a smaller ship to be procured.

Well, I think that with less carriers than the Navy now operates, the current deployment scheme is unsupportable over a longer time, or in case one of them is damaged.
At the same time I think it’s an overkill and a waste of money to have 50% or so of battle groups deployed at any time in times of peace/colonial war. There is no justification for that. Training in various environments has to be, but deployment is a different thing.

With, say, eight or nine carriers a new deployment scheme would be needed, one that only deploys them in case a shooting war is possible. And then the Navy is not alone, versus Persia for example the Air Force is in a perfect position from bases on the southen shore of the Gulf (500nm) and from Diego Garcia (2000nm). Only politics – to stay “relevant” lets the Navy waste billions by using carrier battle groups on mission that could be done by frigates.

One carrier fleet on each coast, with overseas fleet station. Nine would allow one in RCOH (which takes around 3 years), and four on each coast. Of these one could be in short maintenance, while the other three would be available (training). So two thirds ready at any time. With eight carriers, the fleets would have to borrow during some times.

I also think that more permanent overseas fleet stations are necessary. Yokosuka is not a good location any more, Guam only a fall-back position against China (but especially vulnerable against a pre-emptive nuclear strike).
I see Singapore as the perfect location (and already has a nuclear-capable dry dock), as it can cover both the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf and the South and East China Sea.
Homebasing two carriers there (I know! Politics!) would take a lot of pressure off the transit times and increase in-theatre availability even with a smaller fleet.

And then the question of “presence”, especially in the world’s backwaters. Perfect for a few light carriers, no more than 15.000ts fully loaded, maybe built to commercial standards only. Zumwalt’s Sea Control concept is still valid!

You could use Wasp class LHD’s or America class LHA’s for most of the roles currently carried out using Nimitz class carriers.

6. I am really annoyed that Airbus/BAe/MoD/RAF/RN dropped the ball on Nimrod replacement and did not develop a new platform for MR which could then have been sold to all of the air arms looking to upgrade and replace. If P8 corners the market and allows maximum interoperability by having boom slot and probe then good luck to Boeing/DoD I say.

Even just using new build comets would have solved that issue.

Sorry, all you are proposing is cut after cut. In reality the size of the USN continues to shrink every year! Also, the size on the USN is not based on just being the largest or even most powerful. Its based on the providing enough resources to handle two major conflicts (WARS) in opposite parts of the world simultaneously……….

Honestly, with the exception of the early removal from service of Enterprise, none of the other suggestions i’ve made would impact the USN’s war readiness. The perry’s are not capable of being sent into a hot war zone as they have no means of self defense (phalanx doesnt count) from enemy air attack and their 3″ gun isnt anywhere near as effective as the 5″ guns on the Destroyers and Cruisers for NGFS.

As for the NSC, they cost more then a T23 frigate.

Sorry, I have no problem with you making suggestions. Yet, that will not work………try again!:o

I would be interested in your reasons for disagreeing with this idea.

True to an extent. However, I was looking at this from a least work, cost and risk point of view AS WELL AS starting with a ship from which Mk13 and STIR have been stripped (as is the case with USN Perry’s that are still in service with the USN – these are the future trasferrees). Which means not so much an UPGRADE of existing AAW capabilities (which is what the Aussie and Turkeish navies are looking for) as REINSTATING some meaningfull ASuW and AAW capabilities onto the Perry as they transfer from US to other nation’s naval service… (lest the OHP stays an ASW capable OPV)

Compared to the Aussie fit, it woulnd’t matter much if the single Mk41 installation in the location of the Mk13 as I proposed rather than further forward. The ships were already kitted for and compatible with Harpoon (after all, this was fired from Mk13), so unless associated consoles etc were removed, it would be a matter of installing and hooking up some launch racks. I doubt adding RAM or swapping out Phalanx for RAM requires much additional modification either. Likewise for the remorely operated 25mm cannon. Pretty low cost and risk free IMHO.

I was under the impression that when the mk.13 was removed all the below deck fittings remained in place with just the launcher armed removed, with the hole plated over. If correct, then replacing the Mk.13 wouldn’t exactly be difficult.

With respect to those OHP ships that may become available for non-US users and that already have lost their Mk13 launcher and STIR, I see 4 simple routes to maintain a minimal/reasonable AAW/AShW capability:
a) 1x 21-round RAM launcher + 2×2 Harpoon forward (no FCS modification)
b) dito, plus Phalanx replaced with another RAM launcher and 2 Remotely Controlled and Stabilized 25 mm Mark 38 Mod 2
c) 1x 8-cell Mk41 (32 ESSM) + 2×4 Harpoon forward (reinstallation of STIR, some FCS modifications for multiple channel ESSM control.)
d) dito, plus Phalanx replaced with a RAM launcher and 2 Remotely Controlled and Stabilized 25 mm Mark 38 Mod 2

The upgrades carried out on the Australian OHP’s are a less risky option now that it has been carried out 4 times, most of the problems in the upgrade have been sorted out and if it was carried out on further ships the upgrades would be more straight forward and less expensive then the Australian upgrades because of that.