My dear Mercurius , we are starting to get somewhere .
I enjoy your various posts as well as your tone , it is a real pleasure to discuss with you 🙂

These may take a day or two to locate.

Take your time , no hurry .

but is most unlikely to be a true stealth missile in the class of the AGM-129

I agree but the AGM-129 is a different fish ! It is a strategic cruise missile with an outstanding range capable to deliver a huge nuclear warhead .
The Scalp is not .

the photo I have of the proposed stealthy follow-on shows a completely new airframe – a pure delta of very narrow span.

Can you post it or is it classified ?

Thanks for that Onera reference, which makes interesting reading. But even if this technology makes its transition out of the laboratory, this technology is not on a timescale that will fit a Scalp mid-life update

You ‘re welcome .
Indeed and as I said , there is nothing in the pipe-line . Too complicated , too expensive and … too late for the Scalp . I would rather bet on a new ASMP/A-NG around 2020 .

I have discussed Storm Shadow / Scalp mid-life updating plans with MBDA, and these are much simpler than you are suggesting. No major ‘surgery’ is planned

I have never said otherwise , the plasma shielding was a futur proposal and nothing else but they gave up . They still work on the technology , as you know .

their proposals cover areas such as adding a datalink and giving connectivity via satcom with future Network Centric Warfare environments.

That makes sense . The Scalp family can ‘t be “re-tasked” or even destroyed after launch which is somehow a pain in the a$$ (or at least has to be accounted for) during planning . Since the Rafale (the launcher) has satcom link , the aircraft could take care of the update-link the first 100nm if needed , the AWACs could then take the relay (if needed) and the last word would go to the mission planners themselves with direct satcom link .
Communications run the show nowadays , more than aircraft performance . But this is another story …

I do not see how you can be so sure that he was “a bit surprised”, unless you know him personally and have heard the story from him, or were present at the briefing. My experience of talking to Thales is that the company is very keen on having ‘minders’ sitting in on discussions with outsiders.

No , I don ‘t know Mr Chaltiel and I am ready to take your words “on-board” .
I trust you . Anyway , I still believe that he made a mistake since no one from Thalès ever dared to talk about it again afterwards . This is still the only source we have , which is … strange and unuasul from Thalès .

No, the idea I think that Chaltiel was referring to a technique that involves robbing the radar’s receiver of its sensitivity while it is looking in the direction of the aircraft being protected. If you can reduce the receiver gain to 1/100 of normal while the radar is illuminating the target, you have the same effect that reducing the aircraft’s RCS to 1/100 would have achieved. You have – in Chaltiel’s own words “obtain[ed] the signature of a real LO [low-observable] aircraft.”

Ok , that ‘s not “brouillage par barrage” . What you are refering to is very difficult to archive . Or you know the exact sensitivity of the adverse receiver and your ECM suite is dealing with it head-on , or you somehow (?) use the adverse radar sidelobes to affect the receiver .
Since the receiver (the radar itself) knows what the echoes should look like , you still have to work on the echoes , don ‘t you ? At least if you use the first option . The sidelobes tactic is also problematic , your RWR must provide the exact characteristics of the adverse radar (algorithms or library , or both) to blind the receiver on carefuly chosen frequencies .
A radar does NOT change of mode unless something is going on or if the pilot is asking for . From there on , if you know how the adverse radar various modes work , you can work on the known frequencies used by the radar at that precise moment in time as long as your RWR and its back-end are up to the task as well as your active Aesa antennas .
On paper , it works .
But I beleive that active cancellation is something diffferent . It is written on the tin , if I may say : cancelling out the returned signals . It is simpler but harder to archive .

Cheers .

SpudmanWP :

If the A has the combat radius (ie taking off from an airstrip, attaining altitude, roundtrip to target, landing) of 600+nm, then it certainly can do the same (if not a bit more) without spending the fuel to gain altitude.

That ‘s right but don ‘t forget the safety margin , any aircraft with less than 1,5 Ton of fuel left is approaching the “Bingo” stage and is usualy seen as a non-combat capable aircraft from the chain of command .

Cheers .

Mercurius :

It was not ‘leaked’, but announced during a 1999 symposium at which I was present, and was first described during a formal briefing created in 2002. I have had that briefing.

Fine , tell us more if you can .

It may not make sense to you, but it made sense to the engineers who were doing the work. They were looking at a possible Scalp mid-life update or even a Scalp follow-on, and had investigated a possible low-RCS airframe.

The Scalp already has a low-RCS airframe .
The update idea was to use plasma-stealth based on the work from Thalès and Onera .
http://www.onera.fr/vo-portrait/2006-02.php

But this has very little to do with “active cancellation” as per say . AFAIK , there is nothing in the pipe-line .

Chaltiel’s quoted words were that Spectra uses “stealthy jamming modes that not only have a saturating effect, but make the aircraft invisible… There are some very specific techniques to obtain the signature of a real LO [low-observable] aircraft.”

That was a “leak” . He was a bit surprised by the question and he responded “on the spot” with his own technical language . It ‘s good for us (:D) but it was a mistake to speak about .

If you are indeed “a bit versed into the ECM business”, these those words ‘saturating effect’ should give you a clue to what is probably meant. I think that one specific EW technique I have in mind has been mentioned in the unclassified literature

Maybe you are refering to what we call in France “brouillage par barrage” coupled to specific DRFM techniques . While it does marvels vs frequency hoping radars , this is not yet active cancellation . The main problem with this highly effective jamming technique is that you have to spread your total output power into various frequencies carefully chosen by the ECM suite .

On the contrary, close range self-protection is probably the situation where active-cancellation is easiest.

This is the first time I am told such thing . Could you or would you explain a bit more , please ? 🙂

Cheers .

Phaid :

Very stealthy:

Another very stealthy (from Renault , it ‘s a Mégane) :

Anechoic chambers are used to do many things , of course .
In this case , Renault is testing how silencious the car is and how the sound is propagated .
Even some hoovers (known brand mark using the cyclone technology) are tested in small anechoic chambers .
Phaid , there is no way to tell from a picture of an aircraft in an anechoic chamber what the staff is testing , I agree . We all could waste a bit of bandwidth by posting multiple pictures of various aircrafts in anechoic chambers but indeed , it doesn ‘t prove anything . Again , I agree .
It is not because I post a picture of a Rafale in an anechoic chamber that I am trying to prove that the aircraft is using active cancellation . At least , give me that 😉

Mercurius, when you say :

You are confusing chamber work conducted for electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) testing of a complete aircraft and chamber work done to test the concept of active cancellation. I could show you photos of US aircraft mounted in anechoic chambers, but these would prove nothing about the capability of their ECM systems, let alone the existence of US active-cancellation capabilities.

No , I am not confusing anything and I agree with what you say . 🙂
We first heard of France doing active cancellation research when some people leaked that they were working on the SCALP/APACHE cruise missile .
I am sorry but that doesn ‘t make sense at all since the said missile has no ECM whatsoever . I could add “yet” but I would go into unknown ground …
Then , Chaltiel leaked by mistake (yes it was a mistake) that Spectra was capable to lower the RCS signature of the Rafale . I am a bit versed into the ECM business and I do not know any ECM techniques that could archive the trick under specific conditions . Active electronic jamming is not lowering the RCS of an aircraft , it is playing a kind of cat & mouse game with the adverse radar by trying to fool it with various wrond datas and/or to blind it with noise . This has nothing to do with active cancellation , as per say .

I got some 15 years old articles that they say that nothing will be possible in the next 10 years :p ‘know what I mean ?
As I speak , I firmly believe that Thalès & Dassault found the trick and if Spectra is more advanced than the RBE2-AA , it is for a reason .
I am not saying that it is a “klingon” device but that the system is working from far away on known EM spikes generated by the airframe with a known load . The goal is not to pass over or under the agressor unnoticed but to diminish the enemy time response by closing in unnoticed or by fleeing unnoticed . Unless the Rafale is clean (or with a couple of Micas) , I bet my right hand that active cancellation doesn ‘t work at close range . Too many spikes to deal with .

Cheers .

@Mercurius ,
Wrt “crystal video detector” being Bragg cells , that was a brain fart and I will now re-read my posts before hitting the submit button . No big deal , it will hopefuly not happen again .

And how do you perform the task of “diluting the feeble echo” with beams of jamming energy?

I ‘m not gonna put my neck under the axe and start to speak about the various techniques used by a system like Spectra to to jam ie : monopulse radars . I don ‘t know and I am not even sure that the Rafale pilots know the ins and outs , so me … 😮
Some rather technical papers and studies are talking about this much better than I could , to be honest . I have my own guess and it has nothing to do with active cancellation .

Or are we returning to the rumour that Spectra uses active cancellation?

No .
My belief is that active cancellation is possible to archive against some radars and near impossible against other radars . As an exemple , many SAM systems don ‘t have LPI and frequency hoping capability and the software running them don ‘t allow the user to manipulate the pulse train(s) at will .
This kind of system is the perfect pigeon for active cancellation .
Fooling a AN/APG-77 with this technique is a different story .

As I pointed out in my posting number 235 in the “Eurofighter Typhoon News & Discussions VI” thread, the timescale of known French research into active cancellation would not have allowed it to be used in Spectra as originally fielded. In that posting, I questioned the practicality of the technique having become mature enough to be in service today as the result of a Spectra upgrade. There are good technical reasons why the initial French work in this field seems to have been focussed on missile applications rather than aircraft self-protection.

That was long ago Mercurius , we ‘re talking about the 90s here . 22 years have passed since … 22 years .
Dassault and Thalès have always been very shy to talk openly about Spetra but these recent years , they did let some infos leak into the public domain .
They said that the system (since the F3 upgrade) is using more advanced components that the Aesa RBE2 (advanced GaN MIMIC vs GaAS for the radar) , which clearly say that the 3 active antennas have been replaced .
The system running the show has also been upgraded , CPUs , memory , data buses as well as the optical fiber wiring .
I don ‘t bookmark everything but links exist .
Now , if one with a bit of knowledge wants to have a rather quick look at some of Thalès patents , one will notice few interesting things with regard to DRFM , interferrometry and bragg cells :
http://www.faqs.org/patents/assignee/thales/

Some hints can be found on this study :
http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFullText/RTO/EN/RTO-EN-028///EN-028-09.pdf

Mercurius , when I said :

AFAIK , Spectra covers these radio bands : 200 MHz – 40GHz
That includes high VHF , UHF , L , S , C , X , Ku , K , Ka bands .

I was wrong . Spectra stops at 20GHz . Also , it obviously doesn ‘t cover the whole lot .
It is taking care of the high VHF and UHF bands when asked but it is not the system ‘s usual mode . The pilot has no input on it , it is a pre-mission set-up . Don ‘t ask me where I get that from , you will not get any answer .
The system covers the following NATO bands :
C , D , E , I , J , Ku . That obviously include the X band (part of I and J bands) .
I can ‘t talk about technicals like what is the real bandwith covered in between each “jump” when following an adverse frequency hoping radar because it is classified but I trust Thalès on this .

@Scorpion ,
Let ‘s start from there , shall we ? I said :

I always find it very hard to make people understand that Spectra is a different kind of fish in the ECM World . The components and the technology used are unique to start with , so the capabilities are underestimated .

You responded with :

No doubt Spectra is an excellent system and for sure one of the best of its kind

thank you , and :

but concluding that all of its technology is unique and its capabilities are more or less unmatched is ignorant and either demonstrating that you are nothing by a full blown die hard fanboy and/or that you have absolutely no clue about the subject and developments, other than that of the French.

Sorry ?
First , I sincerely believe that Spectra HAS some uniques capabilities .
Secondly , the entire system is ahead of any other ECM suite wrt the components used (active Aesa , GaN MIMICs , bragg cells) which are not part of some fighters like the F-22 , SU-35 , Typhoon , etc …
This is not “fanboy-ism” to name the components . Then , if you ‘re a bit in the fighter business you should know that the French ECMs are usualy very highly regarded within NATO . The M2000-5 ICMS suite is known to “pi$$ off any RWR/Radar around (!) and this ECM suite is rather old :p

In fact , most of you don ‘t want to think , believe or accept that we are the best in the electronic counter mesures field . Like we are the best at making wines , cheeses , perfumes , clothes , giving the wife an orgasm :D, etc …

INEWS on F-22, IDECM on F/A-18E/F blk II, FalconEdge of F-16 blk 60 or DASS on Typhoon for example. All are displaying threat emitters with their threat circles on situational awareness display formats.

Fair call , or not ?.. :rolleyes:
What about managing the threats ? Threats libraries are one thing , interferrometry is one thing , but what about passive ranging ? What about autopilot planning “on the fly” ? What about choosing to jam to most lethal threat instead of the closest one ? Who ‘s deciding ? Who ‘s making the right choice ? The pilot because he/she sees the threat circles on the display(s) or the system ? How the automated functions are run ?
In few words , how good are the sensor fusion and the AI running the show ?

For one , I believe that Spectra brings a couple of new capabilities to help the pilot in his/her mission . We often talked about passive engagement , wich implies a passive ranging even against flying targets but only Dassault/Thalès are claiming to archive the trick :
http://www.thalesgroup.com/Portfolio/Defence/Aerospace_Product_SPECTRA/?pid=1568

Note that they are not talking about the LRF since it ‘s part of the OSF and not part of Spectra .

The idea of ECM is to prevent the enemy from targeting you in the first place in order to prevent the enemy from engaging you!

I agree !! But … In the first place , you said ? No .
First , you can try to hide within the fog of war with electronic means before the targeting . This is called active stealth . We ‘re not into DASS territory here …

Cheers …

Scorpion :

Improving capabilities by updating the software/algorithms and libraries isn’t new or uncommon these dates. All current generation EWS are updated this way.

True . The main point being how to use them afterwards and how the system is using the available datas . Spectra can do stuff the Thalès ICMS Mk2 or Mk3 can ‘t . The closer piece of kit is the IMEWS (M2000-9) .

If you know what you are talking about you can. It’s owed to your ignorance towards any non Spectra system that you regard Spectra as some kind of alien ware.

SERVAL is in no way comparable to Spectra Scorpion and I am SURE that you know it .
SERVAL (from Jane ‘s) :

The Serval RWR is a channelised crystal video detector that provides the pilot with warning when his aircraft is illuminated by surface or airborne threat radars. Frequency coverage is E- through J-band (2 to 20 GHz). Displayed information comprises threat direction, level and identification. The latter is obtained by comparison of the received signal with a threat library contained in the system. The display unit is a panel-mounted cathode ray tube where several threats can be displayed simultaneously. At the same time, an audio alarm is generated in the pilot’s headset. Four antennas are used, located at the aircraft wingtips and vertical fin. They are connected to an analogue and digital processing unit. Thales Airborne Systems is also understood to have developed a second-generation Serval RWR under the designation Serval Nouvelle Génération-Distance (New Generation-Distance – NG-D). Serval NG-D added range data to the baseline configuration’s bearing, amplitude and identification capabilities.

A very nice piece of kit but it doesn ‘t do half of what Spectra do .
Btw , one can note the channelised crystal video detector = Bragg cells . Yes , not superheterodynes like on the Typhoon 😀 and that was looong ago .

People interested should check what superheterodynes and bragg cells are , they really should . Then , they would understand why Spectra ‘s accuracy in detection and jamming is ahead of most ECM/ECCM systems including US systems . But this is another story .

Those danger zones and SAM bubbles could be programmed in if the positions and types were known prior the mission and displayed if they were detected. Newer systems can do this in real time when dealing with threat emitters. There are other systems than Spectra offering such capabilities as well.

True and I have never said that Spectra was unique for this task . But tell me , what other operational systems can do it and on what aircraft ? I am talking about sensor fusion here and not about RWR warning display 😉

Jamming multiple threat emitters with directed beams isn’t new or unique to Spectra either and performance of such tactical systems is limited. It’s funny how you declare Spectra to be a medium stand-off range ECM system and declare others to be “short range” only, without any data to back this up. Self defence is the purpose of this system in the first place, as is the case with other EWS.

Directed beams , well … Spectra has been the very first onboard ECM system to provide the capability to start with (if we leave aside the US B1 Lancer ECM suite miss) . Even today , very few aircraft have an Aesa jamming capability and nobody pushed the technology as far as the French did .
When I talk about Spectra being a medium stand-off range ECM system , I take onboard what I should call the overall “discretion” of the aircraft at range .
Spectra detection range is big because it needs to know ealier and act quicker to help the low observability concept by evading the threat first or to stealthily jamming it from long range when the aircraft ‘s RCS is still low for the adverse radar . It was again part of the blueprint .
What we call “short-range” ECM systems are electronic suites designed to protect the fighter from already airborne threats like missiles by jamming the adverse radar ‘s tracking , the missile ‘s uplink or its seeker .
Spectra is preventive first and can hide Rafale within the fog of war with better ease .
Dassault and Thalès had to use electronic means since the Rafale is not a stealth aircraft .

I always find it very hard to make people understand that Spectra is a different kind of fish in the ECM World . The components and the technology used are unique to start with , so the capabilities are underestimated .
Again , we are talking about how to use and understand EM emisions with different technologies at hand . Thalès is the only one company to use Bragg cells over superheterodynes (USA , Europe , Russia) and a more clever filtering by optical reading over digital recognition . This in itself put the DRFM capabilities to a new level , make no mistake .

Cheers .

I can ‘t sleep right now (next door is having a birthday party , good to them , bad for me) .
Opit , I fully understand what you mean by “byproduct capabilities” and while I have to say that you are correct , you are somehow forgeting the original goal of Spectra . It is true that the AdA and the MN are finding new ways to use Spectra after each campaign because the end product is simply better than expected . The ELINT/SIGINT capabilities were requested from day one to help the low observability concept , as I said , but it turned out that the Spectra system was more capable than expected . When it happens , the people using the hardware are discovering as they go new ways to exploit the system . But (and this is important) , Spectra was built to provide an active self-defense system to protect the fighter as well as a system capable to evade and invade EM saturated areas by analysing and recording the EM threats to provide to the crew a very clear picture of what is going on around , as far as 200km away . It was part of the low observability concept , as I said earlier on .

Now , you can ‘t compare SERVAL and Spectra , you simply can ‘t . They aren ‘t in the same league …
You also said :

You can’t go over any area then come back with a complete mapping of threats using SPECTRA alone. That’s why it’s inadequate for tactical ELINT/SIGINT and missions planning.

The first phrase is true , the second one is not . If you know what “danger zone” and “SAM bubbles” means and how it can be displayed to the pilot(s) , you wouldn ‘t say that . A basic RWR will give you a warning that the enemy is “pinging” you , a clever RWR will give you a warning before the “ping” , a very clever RWR will give you a bearing on the adverse radar(s) and a very very clever RWR will give you the area where you can be detected .
Now , if the very very clever RWR (and the system behind it) is also capable of recording (mapping) the various adverse EM emissions and share them in real time with the fleet , you GET a ELINT/SIGINT system . While it is NOT as capable as some dedicated systems , it is a very useful tool for pre-mission planning and briefings . Saying otherwise is not knowing the “stings” .

You also say “band limited” . Well , I disagree .
Spectra band range is wide , very wide . It covers many bands used by airborne radars , ground based radars and also various bands used by EM missile seekers . Sure , it doesn ‘t have the storage and recording capabilities of a dedicated system but it does the job .

You also talk about “low power output” .
Again , Spectra wasn ‘t built to “blanket” an area with powerful jamming but to fool many radars at once by diluting the feeble echo with AESA pencil beams if needed . It is again about the low observability concept : you don ‘t want to wake up every RWR around while you ‘re jamming .
The Rafale CANNOT act as a “Growler” and it is the reason why Thalès is making the AEA pod .

You said :

The design goal was to allow the detection and geolocation of threats to best avoid them in real time. That’s not a tactical tool ; that’s a key mission enabler.

It is both 🙂 (and I know what you mean)
In fact and when I think about it , the Rafale is very much an omnirole aircraft . When properly loaded , it can do so much things in one single flight (and in one single pass) that it is astonishing . It is the most beautiful “combo” there is around and it is probably the reason why the aircraft has been so highly rated in various foreign competitions .
I am not thumping my chest , I am just praising the people who made the aircraft . Dassault had a win-win fighter with the M2000 variants and the Rafale is following the same path .

Cheers .

SPECTRA is an active and passive airborne countermeasures and defensive aids system.

Spot on. SPECTRA is not a wide band analyzer/recorder and as such it’s of limited help to picture a valuable tactical situation for pre-flight briefings.

You are both reducing Spectra to the DASS level , which is wrong .
The Thalès system is quite good at ELINT and SIGINT . It is a “mini” ASTAC . There are enough papers and pilot reports explaining some of the capabilities of the system . It can clearly “map” a zone by analysing the various adverse EM emissions threatening or not the aircraft . From there , the informations gathered and recorded can be use for immediate or futur action(s) . Spectra can analyze them , compare them to what is already stored in the databank and update the situational awareness of the fleet in real time .
This job is far away from a job done by a “standard” ECM suite .
So , it is a very useful tool for pre-flight briefings .

Cheers .