To be complete, you may want to add that the report on which the article is based concerned the test version of the NH-90 and not its production version. That the test version is precisely here to identify shortcomings. And stuff like a not solid enough ramp does not seem to be a deadly one, that cannot be corrected.
You have your opinion, I have mine.
You feel the report is just.
I feel the report smudges over a few important facts.I did not comment further on the spacer as I did not feel it necessary.
If you want to accuse me of not having a backbone because of that then fair play to you. But allow me a retort by saying that your attitude in this thread has been one of utter contempt to anyone with a view different to yours.I will concede however, that my recollection of the spacer causing the plane to veer from the centerline was in error. A combination of a long day and a migraine impeeded my judgement. For that I apologise.
Nevertheless, I still think the investigation washed over that matter with too much ease.
I highlighted the above issues to show what I think is a rather dismissive attitude in the report which I still maintain lends too much weight to the significance of the famous metal strip.
The problem is that you do not start with question marks or doubts. You come up with an entire alternative narrative that simply do not withstand even basic scrutiny. You have not come up with serious challenges to the report, but simply try to collate elements here and there that do not make any sense. Basically, you try not to find holes in the report because there may be holes in it, but start from the premise that it is French, therefore its is a cover up and any (even if mindless) alternative narrative will demonstrate. This is just not serious and shows simple prejudices. It’s basically the same process as some anti-americans have in France. The 9-11 report, being american, is necessarily a cover up and loopholes are found to prove that (even though these loopholes are ridiculous).
Now, for whatever this is worth, my take in this story is that those that are to blame are the manufacturer(s), the operators (on both sides of the channel) and the aviation authorities (on both sides of the channel) for not addressing an underlying issue with Concorde that was bound to create such an accident. If you look at it, of the 60 something incidents having affected BA between 1978 and today, all but 8 concerned Concorde (and the same thing applies to Air France) – and when you look at the number of flights of Concorde compared with the rest of the fleet, that tells you a lot.
But I guess it is easier to bash frogs for the end of the Concorde than to face reality, which is that Concorde was unsafe and all parties that exploited or had the task to supervise its exploitation failed in making the necessary modifications mandatory.
Agreed.
The weight of your argumentation in the case carries the day.
In your first post, you claim that the accident is due to the plane veering sideway before hitting the Continental metal strip. I challenged you to prove this was correct (as the FDR shows that this is a lot of bull) and you are suddenly changing your tune arguing that it is a weight issue. That is what we call having a lot of backbone.
As you say, Concorde should have made it with No.2 shutdown. I admit I got the sequence wrong by a second or so, it had been a while since I read the report.
The aircraft should have been able to turn round with one, perhaps even two engines shut down. But why didn’t they?
Perhaps because she was overweight?
Certainly not. That is the contrary of what I said. The plane would not have made it whether No. 2 had been shutdown or not, irrespective of the weight. Even if it had not been switched off, nr 2 would not have provided power as it was ingesting kerosene. Nr 1 was never able to give sufficient power as it was also affected. This was compounded by the fact that the gear could not be retracted because of the damage created by the bursting tire. And the wing structure was losing in shape as a result of the fire, all of which made the plane totally uncontrollable.
My point and primary beef is: The authorities are blaming the metal strip and it appears only that metal strip. The entire report states “damaged by the metal strip” from the very first pages, to the last.
They dismiss everything else within one page, sometimes a single paragraph and continue to focus on the metal strip.It stinks of coverup and protectionism.
It will be interesting to see what happens in this trial.
You are either willfully misleading, have been misled or have not red the report. The report says that the Continental metal strip is one element among several. This is why, contrary to what you state, the current legal procedure has not only indicted Continental representatives but also :
– Aerospatiale/EADS representative for not taking decisive action as the repeated tyre incidents showed that the plane was unsafe (exploding tyres and burst tanks on dozens of occasions, both on AF and BA Concordes)
– DGAC (French aviation authorities) for basically the same reason as for EADS.
I guess that, should France judges have indicted Air France but not EADS and the DGAC, you would have here again claimed that it was all a cover-up.
Decency would request, before making allegations as reported in post nr 2 above, to read the inquiry report. If you don’t trust the BEA/aviation authorities, you can then avail yourself of the raw data appended to the inquiry report.
This raw data show the allegations made in post nr 2 to be a lot of bull. For instance,
Then perhaps Air France should explain why the wheel spacer was left on a work bench when the left MLG was re-assembled the night before. This caused the forward wheels of the bogey to rattle under speed like supermarket trolley wheels, dragging the plane to the left of the runway, which is when it hit the famous strip of metal.
Had the wheels not dragged the plane to the left, the plane would never have gone over said metal strip.
when FDR data (appendix 4 to the report) shows that there was no rudder input until the plane hit the metal strip, and that both center line and acceleration were maintained up to that point.
And then, again
Then, the engineer shut down the perfectly servicable engines without command from the Capt or Co Pilot and when the aircraft was far too slow. I’m certainly not judging the crews actions, they were under pressure, but it was that unfortunate mistake that sealed the aircraft’s fate. She stalled out of the air.
when transcripts show that the F/E shut down engine 2 one second before the FO asked him to do so (as requested by procedures) and when data shows that the plane would not have made it irrespective of the shutting (or not shutting down) engine 2.
But ranting against the frogs is so much easier than reading a report.
There is a major difference between asking questions and challenging some elements of an inquiry, and submitting an entire alternative narrative without backing it with any data or hard proof.
Also, this is disingenous insofar as you do not question the gospel of authorities writ large – you question the existing narrative as a matter of principle because we speak of the French authorities.
Frankly, who needs a judicial system and a safety board when we have such brilliant bloggers who can tell you exactly what happened and apportion blame faultlessly (French and/or Airbus, therefore cheating and culpable), this without accessing primary data but relying on an article published by the excellent Observer?????
Never mind the data that shows that the plane remained centered until it hit the metal strip. Never mind that the structures of the planes was so badly damaged that the plane was doomed as it took off. Never mind the facts…
Flying Frankfurt-Chicago-Dallas today, am fearing the worse in terms of security check, delay and stuff…..
Flying Frankfurt-Chicago-Dallas today, am fearing the worse in terms of security check, delay and stuff…..
No idea, the jolly CAA in South Africa have not yet released the investigation report. You can see all the finalized reports on http://www.caa.co.za
The one in 2004 was also Emirates.
Cheers
🙂
The report says that the incident was due to an erroneous takeoff technique employed by the flying pilot (that they were taught by Emirates). Both the pilots and co-pilots had just started working on the 340 (I think it was only the 2nd flight on 340 for the pilot).
I understand that, I just don’t see how an aircraft where there are so many examples still being put to good use around the world can really be called a ‘disaster’.
Paul
An airliner that did not meet its announced specs in terms of fuel burn and range, that saw numerous cancellations as a result, that was only produced at 130 something units (passengers variant), and that resulted in the company producing it being bought up by its competitor meets a priori the definition of disaster.
In any case, I would like to thank Schorsch for bringing a technical input to the discussions, and an added value as a result. And he is about the only one to do that.
As regards the fact that a specific person can not refrain from turning a technical question/discussion on the 787 in a A vs B issue, there is nothing new and surprising here. Been going on for years.
I have a question, not sure anybody can answer it, but will ask it anyway.
As far as I understand it, after the fix on the 787 concerning the wingbox/wing joint, the test that was passed to start the certification process was only the limit load test (ie the maximum load the plane is expected to meet while in service).
But Boeing has not yet tested the 787 for ultimate load (test at 150% of limit load) that is requested by FAA and other agencies for certification.
So, my questions are:
1) is it normal for the ultimate load test to happen only at a later stage in the certification process?
2) what is the likelihood that a plane such as the 787 does not meet the 150 % threshold (i.e. is it highly unlikely or still a challenge considering that the 787 failed the limit load test (100%) the first time around)?
The nuclear sub contract does NOT involve nuclear reactor technology. I think the current treaties forbid that kind of transfer. Brazil already has a nuclear power plant prototype.
Both correct and incorrect. Correct in the sense that the sub-contract does not involve nuclear reactor technology for the planned Brasilian nuclear powered sub. But not correct when you state that France is be legally barred from cooperating with Brazil on nuclear reactor technology.
Under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, France (as a recognised nuclear weapons state) is barred from transfering nuclear weapons or assist any country in developing one.
But the NPT does not prevent any export in the field of nuclear power generation, provided the recipient has demonstrated it does not intend to use the transferred technology to produce nuclear weapon (technically, it requires that the recipient has concluded a safeguard agreement with the IAEA (NPT article III), a step Brazil has long taken).
According to EADS, it will take two years between the first flight of the 400M and its entry into service (ie first deliveries planned for late 2012).
According to Boeing, twelve months are foreseen to certify the 787 (eio in late 2011).
Could anyone explain what accounts for this much longer certification period for the 400M?