You can use those only, which are on the battle field. Rising the numbers stationed near the frontline does not go unnoticed.
How many Anti-tank helicopters did the NATO field in Central Europe? How many could be moved in from the Western areas similar in size to Western Theatre Theatre area?!

No, buddy! All another Hinds assigned to the Western Thertre would have been redeployed forward in GDR and Czechoslovakia in about two-three hours! 😀

The WP estimated
2-4 Div (Hamburg-Lübeck)
25 Div (Hamburg-Kassel)
27 Div (Kassel-Passau)
for mobile defences and counter attacks.
Not all reserve forces are committed than and enough reserve personal was available to fill-up ranks several times.
The topography did channel the attack-forces.
So here the WP could field ~100 Div against an alarmed NATO with ~55 Div.

You have no authentic informations about NATO ground forces deployment and mobilization readiness in the CENTAG/NOTHAG forward areas. Check it precisely, guy because your data are ridiculous.

When the WP-Div offered similar firepower to NATO-ones, they had just half the personal and the related staying-power by that.
Even when we know, that in a single front war the attacker may have the advantage of tactical surprise, because he could choose his ‘Schwerpunkte’ of attack, the force ratio was not good enough for the time-limited conventional phase of that “multi-front-war”.

Another drollery: “WP divisions had similiar firepower th NATO ones”. Yes, but WarPac had two and half times more divisions than NATO in Central Region. If you have even twofold overall numerical superiority, you can choose “Schwerpunkte” where your forces are fivefold stronger! NATO divisions bigger manpower was caused by increased logistic support but it didn’t matter much in the one week long combat. Bersides in 1985 WP land and air forces had about 1.8 million metric tons of ammunition and 2.5 million metric tons of POLs stockpiled in GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland alone! Moreover only Soviet NONDIVISIONAL motor transport units in GDR could deliver about 47 thousand tons of supplies simultaneusly! These reserves would be enough to equip not only first echelon WP troops but also a second echelon Soviet forces moved from Western USSR for two-three months long intensive conventional warfare, buddy!

Neither the ‘Hellfire’ nor the AT-6 is hypersonic, but both are supersonic, what you show by the numbers given. Do I see a lack of understanding by you, mon Marshal?!

So, you should have given us AGM-114A velocity first, buddy. 😀

Great article quoted by iceHawk here! But I have one doubt referring to this paragraph:

Of course, we should not make a mistake: the WarPact people had no illusions either.

If we listen to what Michael explained about what they thought about such an air war, they were sure that they’d lose 80% or more of their ground and air forces: especially the units that were permanently stationed in Germany and Czechoslovakia were expecting to suffer such losses. By the end of the week one – and by the time the war would have to be finished according to their plans – the expected loss rate was up to 95% of the initially deployed force.

By the time their forward units would also run out of fuel and supplies, and most of their heavy equipment would be in a bad need of complete overhaul. But, if they were successful, that mattered little.

I am sure first echelon of WarPac ground forces couldn’t suffer such a huge losses during one week long war! Take into account NATO’s air forces inability to screen NATO ground forces due to heavy casualties inflicted by WP planes and very good WP ground forces SAM shield.
Moreover reality of land battle in Central Europe was similiar to reality of air warfare described above by iceHawk! That is a good theme for another great thread, but in short: WP tanks, like T-64B/T-72B/T-80B-U, all equipped with reactive armour were right equal to the NATO’s third generation MBTs like M1/M1A1, Challenger I and Leopard IIA4 but WP had three times more MBTs on the theatre! Also Soviet emphasis on artillery resulted in four-to-one superiority ratio over NATO. Its prime task was to saturate prepared NATO antitank positions with massive firestorms. A few people know that Soviets increased number of Mi-24D/V gunships (with hypersonic AT-6 ATGMs!) in Central Europe by 100% up to 1000 platforms in the late 1980s. All these factors taken together allow me to judge that WP fully mechanized forces were able to achieve a quick and decisive breaktrough in the NATO’s frontline without enomous victims. So, I think WP’s first echelon would get only up to 50% losses, not more! Can you tell me how big NATO ground forces losses would be after one week of conventional warfare, iceHawk???

In fact it is very stange to me why Gorbi escaped from Europe without one shot like a stinking coward! That was rather Reagan who should have escaped from Europe at those days! Don’t you think, guys??? :diablo:

Excellent article describing Soviet “Air Operation” Concept!

Air University Review, March-April 1985

Soviet Air and Antiair Operations

Phillip A. Petersen
Major John R. Clark

SINCE the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964, the Soviets have accepted the possibility of a conventional war in central Europe.1 Before this change, which resulted from the October 1964 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviets planned to shift the correlation of military forces dramatically in their favor by means of a nuclear attack against NATO’s air and nuclear forces should war occur. Having overcome “certain incorrect views within military-scientific circles connected with the overevaluation of the potential of the atomic weapon, its influence on the character of war and on the further development of the Armed Forces,”2 the Soviets realized that in a conventional war they would face the possibility that NATO air power might survive and neutralize the Soviet superiority in conventional ground forces. Further complicating the Soviet problem was the enemy’s potential for escalation to nuclear warfare at some point in a conflict. Thus, any plan for conventional warfare had to include the destruction of enough of NATO’s nuclear assets to discourage the West from escalating to nuclear warfare should a deteriorating military situation so warrant.

An analysis of Warsaw Pact professional military literature indicates that a conventional war would begin with a Warsaw Pact strike deep into Western Europe to cripple NATO air and nuclear assets. Unfortunately, Western efforts to understand how the Soviets might conduct such an operation have been hindered by an inadequate understanding of key Soviet air power concepts. Such terms as air operation, independent air operation, air defense operation, and air offensive are often used interchangeably and incorrectly, frequently with little appreciation that each has a very precise meaning in the Soviet military lexicon. The misuse of such terms contributes to confusion among those struggling to comprehend the Soviet military thought processes.

Some intelligence analysts have stumbled over the term protivovozdushnaya operatsiya, particularly when it was translated as air defense operation. American analysts were clearly confused by the differences between their own and Soviet military cultures. The American interpretation of air defense did not adequately reflect the very offensive nature of the Soviet plan––which would probably be translated more accurately as antiair operation. It is also important to understand that for the Soviet military an air operation involves much more than just aviation, an independent air operation is not the same as an air operation, and an air offensive is a front-level activity rather than a theater-level activity. These terms are crucial to understanding Soviet military art, and once grasped conceptually, they will lead to a more complete understanding of how the Soviets would probably wage a conventional war in Europe.

Definitional problems, particularly when two very different languages are involved, should not be surprising. People generally tend to make judgments in terms of their own cultural biases or frames of reference, thereby imposing their concepts and views on what they are attempting to understand. Fortunately, in preparing this article, we have been allowed to use a number of Warsaw Pact documents that may help resolve the semantic difficulties associated with understanding Soviet air power thinking. Referring to this literature, we shall review the Soviet’s own assessment of their historical experience with aviation in support of strategic nonnuclear operations, examine contemporary Soviet concepts of operational-strategic-scale air and antiair operations, and discuss Soviet perceptions of the probability for success in such undertakings. Although air and air defense activities are interrelated, readers should note that they are distinct operational components of a Soviet combined-arms operation at the strategic level and therefore will be presented here as the Soviets view them, i.e., independently. Readers may find that a chart on terminology associated with Soviet operational concepts (Figure 1), a graph depicting the distances that these terms represent (Figure 2), and a glossary of key Soviet terms may clarify many of these aspects.

Historical Employment of Soviet Air Forces
in Strategic Operations

When the Soviets accepted the possibility of a conventional local war, especially in central Europe, they were faced with the awesome task of finding an adequate substitute for the initial mass nuclear strike. If a Soviet strategic offensive operation would not commence with a massive nuclear strike, NATO’s aviation would be available for combat actions that could possibly neutralize the Soviet superiority in conventional ground forces. A high probability of NATO nuclear escalation would also exist.

Figure 1. Technology associated with Soviet operational concepts

Thus, in addition to neutralizing NATO’s aviation, the conventional fire plan for a strategic operation would have to destroy sufficient nuclear assets to dissuade NATO from escalating to nuclear use. To achieve this end, the Soviets looked to their historical experience with the operational-strategic employment of their air forces.

Figure 2. Distances represented by Soviet operational concepts

Not surprisingly, the Soviets based their analysis of the potential of air power on their experience in World War II. An article by Colonel Yu. Bryukhanov in the June 1969 issue of Soviet Voyennaya mysl’ provides insight into the early, internal Soviet military-theoretical discussions.3 Colonel Bryukhanov argued that military operations employing only conventional weapons increased the requirement for the massed employment of aviation.

If the ground forces launch the main attack primarily against the weak spot in the enemy’s operational formation, air power must be brought to bear not only against the enemy force in that area but also against enemy nuclear-capable aircraft and nuclear missiles. Neutralization of such aircraft and missiles will constitute the major task, requiring a large number of aircraft. Therefore, only limited air power can be assigned to support ground operations. The requisite degree of massed air power employed in the area of the main ground thrust is achieved primarily by reducing the width and depth of combat operations. This in turn conditions the character of the process of overwhelming the opposing ground force, based on sequential thrusts aimed at deep penetration.4

More than six years later in the same journal, Lieutenant General of Aviation N. N. Ostroumov drew attention to “the wealth of experience in employing the Air Force in the strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War” and noted that “many points of the art of warfare formulated before and during the war are of current significance under present-day conditions and must be taken into consideration in the further development of military theory.”5 This assessment by Ostroumov of the operational-strategic employment of the Soviet Air Forces in the Second World War indicates

… that principal air force efforts in a strategic operation were concentrated primarily on performing the following basic missions: (1) air supremacy; (2) close air support of ground troops in front and army operations; and (3) independent actions against operational reserves, lines of communication, and other important targets in the enemy’s rear areas.6

According to Ostroumov, the effort to gain air supremacy would take two forms:

the (1) air operation and (2) local combat actions as an inseparable component of front operations. The former was employed on the scale of an entire strategic operation throughout the entire area covered by the operation and was conducted on the basis of the decision and plan of Headquarters, Supreme High Command with the participation of long-range bombers and front-controlled aviation, as a rule prior to the beginning of the strategic operation. The second form was employed by the front command within the framework and according to the plans of front operations, employing front-controlled aviation forces. In the former case, preference was given to such a method of operational employment of air forces as massive attacks on enemy aircraft on the ground, while in the latter, aerial engagements and battles constituted the principal method.7

Ostroumov also found that combat experience in the strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War indicated that the following were required to gain air supremacy:

* Vigorous actions aimed at seizing the initiative and mounting continuous attacks on the enemy’s most important air forces; of the greatest importance was an initial surprise, i.e., massive attack by air armies with simultaneous conduct of aerial engagements and air battles.

* Establishment of local air superiority on the main axes of advance of the fronts.

* Destruction of enemy aircraft through the joint effort of the air force, air defense forces, and ground and naval forces.

* Continuous monitoring of the condition and basing of enemy aircraft and the location of the enemy’s antiaircraft defenses.

* Strikes conducted simultaneously in the sector of several fronts against airfields according to a unified plan. This coordinated assault would involve the prior execution of measures to neutralize enemy antiaircraft defenses and to seal off and mine enemy airfields in order to prevent aircraft from taking off.

* Massive employment of forces in an attempt to gain air supremacy.8

Ostroumov concluded that in World War II the development of well-coordinated massive air actions on the main axes of ground advance became an extremely important operational mission of the Soviet Air Forces. These massive actions consisted of air preparation (involving preliminary and immediate air bombardment) conducted as part of the front plan and close support of advancing troops to the entire depth of front operations (conducted in support of the plans of the maneuver armies). “During close air support, weapons, centers of resistance, tanks and personnel, tactical reserves, and enemy troop control systems on the battlefield and in the immediate rear would be destroyed and neutralized.”9 The combat actions of the ground troops and aviation were, in some instances, mutually supportive. “When tank armies moved to operational depth, the air armies continued to deliver airstrikes in support of the mobile troops. During the offensive the latter seized enemy airfields and thus assisted in ensuring continuous support and cover of the tank combined units.”10

Independent air operations were also conducted in support of a strategic operation. Such operations were aimed at destroying enemy forces and important military installations in the enemy’s rear areas. They usually involved the employment of long-range bombers and some front-controlled aviation, which for the most part provided cover for the bombers.11

The Air Operation in a
Contemporary Strategic Offensive

Although written years ago, an article by Lieutenant Colonel Jan Blumenstein in the August 1975 issue of the Czechoslovak version of Voyennaya mysl’ remains an excellent summary of what Warsaw Pact military scientists mean when they write about conducting an air operation. Blumenstein noted that “an air operation … is a component of a strategic operation which is initiated and fought without nuclear weapons. Its purpose is to destroy or weaken the enemy air forces and nuclear missile forces of an operational and operational-tactical range, to win supremacy in the air and to gain superiority in nuclear forces.”12

However, Colonel Aleksander Musial, in a March 1982 Polish article, did allow for the conceptual possibility of an air operation, still nonnuclear in character, occurring in the context of a nuclear war. He argued that “…depending on the situation and the quantity of aviation still viable, air operations can be conducted after the belligerents have used their basic stocks of nuclear weapons”––i.e., even if an air operation occurred in a nuclear conflict, the operation itself would be nonnuclear.13 Confusion in the United States on this point may be due, in part, to the way deistvii aviatsiya (the activity of aviation) has been confused with vozdushnaya operatsiya (air operation).14 Clearly, aircraft could be employed to deliver nuclear ordnance, but such activity by aviation would be as a part of the execution of nuclear strike plans and not a part of an air operation which by definition does not involve the use of nuclear weapons.

Colonel Musial described the target set of an air operation more specifically but completely consistent with the earlier works by Ostroumov and Blumenstein. An air operation would involve the following:

* Destruction of aircraft and aircrews on airfields.

* Destruction of enemy aircraft and aircrews in aerial battles.

* Destruction of aircraft carriers at sea and in port.

* Destruction of operational-tactical missiles.

* Disruption of command and control systems and enemy aircraft guidance systems.

* Destruction of nuclear warheads, storage sites, fuel dumps, conventional weapons, and materiel and technical supplies.

* Destroying, blockading, and mining airfields.15

As part of a strategic offensive operation, an air operation is a joint operation comprising the aggregate combat activities of strategic aviation in coordination with other branches of aviation, as well as other services of the armed forces on an operational-strategic scale.16 Colonel Musial explains that, consequently, its component parts include:

* Air operations by air armies of operational strategic and strategic air forces.

* Combat action of frontal and naval aviation to destroy enemy air forces on airfields and in the air.

* Joint action by the units of an air army of the operational-strategic air force and by naval aviation to destroy aircraft carriers.

* Attacks by missile troops using conventional cluster munitions against airfields, antiaircraft defenses, and enemy command and control systems.

* Joint action of frontal fighter aviation, frontal antiaircraft defense, and operational formations of the National Air Defense Forces against enemy air forces in the air.

* Actions by the forces of the fronts (1) to neutralize enemy antiaircraft defense and to protect air force strike groups en route to their objectives and (2) to advance and overrun or threaten major air bases.17

Thus, an air operation could include not only aviation strikes but also strikes by artillery and missiles, as well as assaults by airborne, heliborne, andspecial-purpose troops. Commencing simultaneously with the initiation of front offensive operations, an air operation might last several days.18

According to the lecture materials used at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow during the mid-1970s, “the scale of the air operation is determined generally by the scale of the strategic operation, the disposition of enemy air forces, and the capabilities, force, and means employed for their destruction”––which would mean that, in the western theater of military action (shown in Figure 3), “the area where missions are accomplished for the destruction of the enemy’s air forces can reach 800-1,000 km in width and l,200 km in depth.”19 Colonel Musial confirmed in 1982 that “the air operation will be conducted simultaneously on all or several strategic axes over the whole depth of the strategic operation conducted in the theater of military action.” However, he also pointed out that “in some cases it can be conducted within one front acting on an independent axis.”20 For example, in the northwestern theater of military action (against Scandinavia) an air operation would be conducted in support of a strategic offensive comprised of a single front operating on the only strategic direction with the theater of military action.

An air operation conducted against as sophisticated an air defense system as that of NATO in central Europe would employ penetration corridors to reduce aircraft losses.21 Soviet planners envision a typical initial penetration corridor as about 40-50 kilometers wide and 150-200 kilometers deep.22 With one or two air penetration corridors established over each first-echelon front, there might be as many as six corridors created over the inter-German and FRG-Czech borders.

Figure 3. As is suggested by this map, the boundaries of theaters of military action are scenario dependent and may even shift during the course of a conflict

In developing their specific plans for air operations, Soviet planners use a model of the NATO air defense system that resembles a pyramid: surveillance radars at the top, initial and final acquisition radars below, and finally air defense weapon radars at the bottom. The Soviets plan to attack the NATO air defense system from the top down. The air operation phase of the strategic operation would focus electronic countermeasures initially at the air defense radars. Time delays induced at the top would be passed on down through the pyramid. Additional delays would be accomplished by physically attacking key nodes in the air defense structure. Countermeasures introduced at other levels in the pyramid would add to the overall delay. If sufficient degradation can be achieved at the top of the pyramid, there will be fewer requirements for countermeasures at the bottom.23 This progression offers a considerable advantage for the offense, since the bottom elements are the most difficult to degrade or defeat. Also, in stressing countermeasures against the top of the pyramid, the Soviets place the highest priority in the areas requiring the lowest-order technological solutions.

Prior to and during the initial phase of the air operation, ground-based signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection units along the various fronts would be monitoring and locating NATO electronic emissions continually and forwarding these data to filter centers and command headquarters for targeting purposes.24 Additionally, airborne reconnaissance units would fly SIGINT, photoreconnaissance, and radarmapping missions along the border area. At this time, concentrated intelligence collection efforts would be directed at the areas where the air corridors were to be established.25 Airborne platforms would support these efforts––probably with near real-time data links. Unknown emitters could be assigned to frontal aviation reconnaissance platforms or ground-based direction-finding sites for specific collection requirements.

As explained by Blumenstein, an air operation involves two or three massed strikes on the first day of the operation and one or two massed strikes on subsequent days. “The first massed strike is the most massive, and its aim is to cause decisive losses to the air and the nuclear rocket forces of the enemy and to lower his strength and ability to conduct effective retaliatory strikes.”26 Thus, success does not require the total annihilation of the enemy’s air and nuclear assets. Instead, its quantitative nature is determined in terms of time and the capability of the enemy to restore the combat capabilities of its forces and to reorganize its ability to counter the actions of friendly forces. “In order to destroy the capabilities of enemy air forces for organized resistance against friendly forces, it is required that up to 60 percent of the aircraft in the theater of action be totally annihilated.”27

As the first massed strike of the air operation began, Warsaw Pact electronic jamming systems would be used to “blind” enemy air defense radars and associated communications to facilitate the subsequent destruction of enemy air defense systems by missiles and aircraft.28 Specific targets would be designated for jamming or for destruction, based on the priority or the characteristics of the target. Targets that could not be accurately located because of their mobility (e.g., tactical air communications between aircraft and controller) would be jammed.29 Other targets, because of their priority, would be assigned both jamming and destruction––examples being the Hawk and other air defense batteries, which would be attacked by massive jamming and firepower simultaneously.30

Ground communications jammers subordinate to the front’s general support communications jamming battalion would be targeted against high-frequency command communications of the army group, corps, surface-to-surface missile units, tactical air control centers, and air defense control centers.31 These jammers probably would be targeted primarily against American high-frequency (HF) nuclear release nets, such as the “Cemetery Net.”32

The army’s direct-support communications jamming battalion would probably be targeted against tactical communications of the NATO battalion, brigade, division; corps command communications assets; missile units, such as the lance; and artillery units. The direct-support communications jamming battalion has HF, VHF, and UHF (including radio-relay) communications jamming capability.33 This unit also has its own organic SIGINT resources for identifying and locating jamming targets.

Helicopter jamming units would be used to jam by “periodically disrupting” radio-relay command nets of the brigade, division, and corps. NATO radio-relay communications of tactical aviation and air command forces would also be targeted.34 Although these directional communications are the hardest to jam because of their highly directional antennas, the Soviets believe that they are vulnerable because relatively low power is required to jam the closest relay points.

Artillery, coupled with operational-tactical and tactical rockets and missiles armed with improved conventional munitions, would initiate the air operation with strikes to suppress time-critical air and air defense activities.35 It is important to recognize that to the extent that weapons inventories would allow, the Soviets would strike an enemy’s air defenses and airfields initially with means other than aircraft. For example, it is now estimated that the SS-21 with a new conventional warhead incorporating submunitions with highly accurate guidance could attack Hawk sites effectively.36

Throughout the theater of military action, special-purpose troops (spetsnaz) of the General Staff’s Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) would attempt to neutralize NATO’s nuclear delivery systems, nuclear storage facilities, and associated command, control, and communications (C3) facilities. GRU spetsnaz brigades familiarize their personnel on NATO nuclear sites; Hawk, Pershing, Lance, and Honest John missiles; nuclear-capable artillery; and nuclear-associated airstrips. The Defense Communications Agency’s European communications sites, POMCUS (prepositioned overseas material configured in unit sets) sites, and NATO’s early warning capability also provide potential targets for GRU spetsnaz teams. Although individual acts of sabotage, by themselves, would not be decisive, their cumulative effect could contribute greatly to the success of a Soviet theater offensive. GRU spetsnaz teams operating in the western theater of military action would be prepared to destroy nuclear weapons being unloaded in staging areas. Ideally, the Soviet planner would want to destroy NATO’s nuclear weapons before they were dispersed to field positions. In subsequent operations to neutralize or destroy NATO’s nuclear assets, spetsnaz teams would simultaneously engage in combat, using small arms and antitank rocket launchers to destroy command posts, control centers, firing positions, and equipment in order to prevent NATO’s launching of nuclear-armed aircraft or missiles. If the team commander deemed it impossible to neutralize or destroy the target directly, its type and location would be reported for destruction by other means.37 Some of these spetsnaz actions would be integrated into the air operation plan and others would occur as part of the various front offensive operations.38 Like some of the spetsnaz actions, some airborne, airmobile, and amphibious assault activity would be integrated directly into the air operation plan. In Soviet thinking, such assaults would represent the selective use of troop strikes (udary voysk) in lieu of nuclear strikes (yadernye udary) against critical targets.39 Airborne and airmobile assaults conducted as part of the air operation would most often focus on objectives such as airfields, nuclear storage facilities, and associated C3.40 In the case of airfields, the Soviets would sometimes try to seize them for their own use rather than destroy them.

Although reinforcement is possible, in the western theater of military action the first massed strike by Soviet aviation probably would number some 1200 aircraft, out of a total of more than 2800 aircraft available. (See Table I.)

Table I. Aircraft available for the first mass strike in the western theater of military action.

It is quite unlikely that the Soviets would be willing to compromise surprise or to put frontal aviation aircraft at risk by forward-deploying aircraft that cannot be sheltered. If evenly distributed, air penetration corridor use in central Europe could average 200 to 410 aircraft per corridor during the first massed strike without forward deploying additional aircraft.

Nuclear-capable aircraft withheld during the first massed strike of an air operation in the western theater of military action would likely be about 7.5 percent of the available fighter and fighter-bomber aviation and about 30 percent of the available bombers. Assuming that approximately 20 percent of the bombers would not be available for maintenance and other reasons, the bombers could provide strike squadrons of 7 to 8 aircraft each for the air operation while still withholding an aircraft from each squadron for nuclear missions. Out of its total of 45 combat aircraft, each frontal aviation fighter and fighter-bomber regiment has the responsibility of providing 39 aircraft for combat. These regiments could use 36 aircraft in meeting their regimental targeting obligations during the first massed strike, leaving 3 aircraft in each regiment for immediate nuclear response. Soviet fighter and fighter-bomber aviation in the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia could provide a 57 aircraft nuclear immediate-response force. Bomber aviation could provide an additional 147 aircraft. Therefore, the air operation could be conducted in the western theater of military action with an aviation nuclear withhold of approximately 200 aircraft. (See Table II.)

Table II. The first mass strike of the air operation in the western theater of military action

With each of the Soviet fighter and fighter-bomber regiments in the forward area providing 36 aircraft on the first massed strike of the air operation, the Soviets could undertake nineteen regimental-size missions (capable of attacking nineteen main operating bases). The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact air assets of the three northern tier states could be reserved for air defense and direct support of their national armies. The potential for their participation in an air operation, of course, will increase as these northern tier states receive greater numbers of Flogger aircraft. Bombers of frontal aviation and reserve air armies of the Supreme High Command, working in squadrons of about 7 to 8 aircraft each, could strike forty-seven main operating bases or the equivalent.

Standoff jamming to suppress NATO’s air defense radars by An-12/Cub C/D aircraft would probably begin before the first wave of strike aircraft penetrates the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). This airborne jamming would be in coordination with Soviet ground-based jamming of vulnerable communication nets. The Cubs would primarily jam early warning/ground-control intercept (EW/GCI) radars and would lay chaff corridors. (See Figure 4.) By overlapping chaff corridors to form a blanket, the Soviets could help mask attack formations from early detection. Initially, standoff jamming aircraft would be positioned behind the FEBA, and their jamming would help screen the penetration corridor as aircraft attacked defenses within the corridor. Escort jamming aircraft would be stationed initially near the beginning of the penetration corridor in a standoff jamming role outside the lethal range of air defenses. In addition, each aircraft in an attack element can be equipped with an electronic countermeasures pod if it does not already have internal equipment for self-protection jamming of terminal air defense radars.

Fighter-bomber aircraft would undertake defense suppression missions within the penetration corridor. Primary targets for destruction would be air defenses-surface-to-air missile systems, antiaircraft artillery, and command and control facilities. The tactic for attacking an air defense battery, such as a Hawk site, calls for two flights of four fighter-bombers. Two of these aircraft would be equipped with antiradiation missiles and would penetrate at low altitude. They would pop up and fire their antiradiation missiles, which would home on the Hawk radar emissions and presumably force the Hawk radar to disengage or be destroyed. The remaining 6 aircraft, in pairs, would then pop up, roll in, and deliver conventional ordnance on single passes from three different headings. The Soviets appear to believe that the destruction of radar stations supporting missile air defense would lead to a breakdown of command posts and fire batteries of Hawk and other air defense units and to the disruption of their automated control support units.41

Figure 4. Corridor busting would consist of artillery, surface-to-surface missiles, and aircraft destroying air defense systems supported by stand-off and escort aircraft dispensing chaff and providing jamming

Fighter aircraft, too, would be assigned to the first wave of the mass strike and committed to help clear the corridors. These fighters would be tasked with preventing NATO interceptors from operating in the corridors to substitute for the loss of the destroyed ground-based air defenses. Fighters and fighter-bombers would be directed also against selected airfields, nuclear storage facilities, and key command-and-control points throughout the depth of frontal aviation activity (about 300 kilometers). Although Blumenstein stated in 1975 that as many as 50 percent of frontal aviation fighter aircraft might conduct ground attack, modernization of Soviet fighter-bombers and bombers has probably reduced the number of fighters allocated to conduct ground attack on the first mass strike of an air operation to between 10-20 percent. This frontal aviation activity would be supported by Yak-28/Brewer Es moving into the penetration corridor to provide escort jamming and to extend the chaff corridor.42 Simultaneously, reconnaissance aircraft would accompany the attack force to provide continuous reconnaissance and near real-time damage assessment for follow-on attacks.

Badger H aircraft following the deeper penetrating aircraft in the first wave of the first mass strike would extend the chaff corridor as air defenses were neutralized. 43 Standoff jamming would be continued by Cubs and, as the air penetration corridor became more secure, Cubs could move into the corridor to resow chaff. As strike aircraft in the chaff corridor approached their targets, they would exit, strike their targets, and subsequently egress from enemy airspace via the chaff corridor. During the invasion of Czechoslovakia, for example, a 200-nm chaff corridor and electronic jamming were used for more than six hours against Czechoslovakian ground radars. Since then, the Soviets have continued to demonstrate their capability to reseed chaff corridors used to screen penetrating aircraft. This reseeding capability attests to the priority the Soviets place on chaff application as a penetration aid. Not only does the corridor screen the strike aircraft, but it masks the standoff jamming platforms as well. In addition, the Soviets equip many of their aircraft with a self-protection chaff capability.

The final wave of the first massed strike probably would follow the previous wave by minutes and consist largely of aviation reserves of the Supreme High Command. The mission of this main strike force would be to deny the enemy the ability to restore the combat power of its air forces through reconstitution at rear airfields out of range of frontal aviation.44 Thus, penetration by the final wave of strike aircraft might well be 300 kilometers or more. Badger Js would provide escort jamming support for these strike aircraft.45 Brewer E and CubC/D standoff jamming probably would be moved over NATO territory to support the strike aircraft of this final wave of the first mass strike.

Blumenstein notes that long-range aviation probably would fly no more than two strikes on the first day of the air operation. Between the two mass strikes, frontal aviation could conduct an additional mass strike alone. According to Voroshilov General Staff Academy lecture materials, this second long-range strike and all subsequent mass strikes against enemy airfields would be “organized and carried out on the basis of reconnaissance information about the results of the initial mass strike.” Furthermore, “subsequent massed strikes must be brought to bear on the enemy after the shortest of intervals following the initial mass strikes, so the enemy is denied the chance of restoring his airfields and regrouping his air forces.”46

Between mass strikes, frontal aviation would concentrate its efforts on newly detected and reconstituted targets to a depth of 300 kilometers. Musial makes the point that even

the completion of an air operation does not mean that the struggle for air supremacy has ended. An important role in [the struggle for air supremacy] is played by determined action by ground troops and especially operational maneuver groups [OMGs] as well as airborne assault forces.47

Antiair Operation in a
Contemporary Strategic Offensive

While an initial air operation in the contemporary period would have as a principal goal the attainment of overall fire superiority, an antiair operation would be focused on defending friendly forces and contributing to achieving air superiority. However, although the air and antiair operations have different objectives, they have an overlapping target set (i.e., aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, and associated C3 facilities), which both makes them mutually supportive and requires careful coordination.

The Soviets intend to unify air defense assets in any given theater of operations under a single concept and plan within the context of the strategic action.48 If the Soviets do not hold the initiative in the air, then their immediate priority would be to conduct an antiair operation to provide friendly forces freedom of movement while simultaneously causing maximum attrition of enemy air and air defense assets. The Soviets would attempt to gain the initiative through combined offensive and defensive actions of frontal aviation, the National Air Defense Forces, missile troops and artillery, and the antiaircraft defense elements of other branches of the armed forces.49 If the Soviets seized the initiative in the air through the preemptive execution of an air operation or have been able to wrest the initiative from the enemy, the major focus of the antiair operation would be on defensive actions to protect friendly forces and installations from NATO’s remaining offensive air capability.

On their own side of the forward edge of the battle area, the Soviets would have to limit the passage of aircraft carefully by time and altitude. Given the Soviets’ respect for NATO air power, plus their view that frontal aviation regiments constitute assets no less expendable than ground force divisions, it is likely that returning Soviet aviation not on the specified altitude and time schedule would run a high risk of being brought down by their own ground-based air defenses.

Although the loss of 175 aircraft over the course of the air operation would exceed historical attrition-rate experience, even the loss of 1000 aircraft might be considered acceptable by the Soviets if the operation succeeded in suppressing NATO’s air and nuclear assets.50 Within the framework of such losses, frontal aviation fighter aircraft will have to assume increased responsibility for ground attack. Some fighter-interceptors which, in fact, may have played some part in supporting aviation reserves of the Supreme High Command during the air operation might need to be moved forward to supplement those frontal aviation fighters still performing the air-to-air mission.

While the Soviets might move a limited number of fighter and ground attack aircraft to airfields seized by operational maneuver groups in the first days of a strategic offensive, within a day or two of the conclusion of a successful air operation, the Soviets probably would seek to move entire fighter regiments from the German Democratic Republic to captured and repaired NATO airfields. Frontal aviation fighter-bombers or bombers could then be moved forward to these vacated airfields in order to facilitate meeting ground force requirements. In these ways, the aviation air defense zone of activity would be moved forward over captured NATO territory early on. Subsequently, independent air defense formations––as large as a front for each strategic direction––would be created to ensure continuity of the air defense effort from the rear of the first echelon fronts back to Soviet or Soviet-allied territory.51 Such air defense formations would incorporate both ground-based air defense assets and fighter aircraft. In addition, by the time the first-echelon fronts should have accomplished their initial objectives (likely to include the Kiel Canal, the Ems-Rhine riverline, and the isolation of U.S. forces in the south), the Soviets could move twenty-three additional regiments of fighters and fighter-bombers from the Soviet interior. This action would be sufficient to create two new air armies to support maneuver fronts of the second operational echelon of the first strategic echelon.

The Soviets would also use radioelectronic warfare resources to protect key installations from enemy air attack. The unit that is assigned this mission is the air defense jamming battalion. One unit is allocated to protect front assets while another ensures that army-level assets are not destroyed.52

Soviet Perceptions Concerning Success

Soviet military scientists have given much thought to the use of air power in a conventional local war. According to their analysis, “in the 1950’s through the 1970’s, no local war involving modern (for that period) combat aircraft and air defense weapons was carried out without air strikes against enemy airfields.”53 The objective in these local wars was seen to have been as in earlier wars––i.e., to catch the enemy aircraft unsheltered. However, “particular attention was given to knocking out the operating area of the airfield, the concrete landing strip (for a certain time). Concrete-penetrating bombs were used for sealing off the airfield, and the resulting craters prevented takeoffs and landings.” Except for “attacks made against the entrance doors of aircraft shelters using guided missiles,” modern precision-guided weapons were not employed.54

Despite the reaffirmation of operational lessons learned, the experience of local wars of the 1950s through the 1970s also introduced new factors that had to be considered in the elaboration of tactics: “the increased fire power of the aircraft, the equipping of them with sight and navigation systems and electronic countermeasures equipment; the defending of the airfields by surface-to-air missile complexes (in cooperation with antiaircraft artillery); the building of reinforced concrete aircraft shelters; [and] the creation of a tactical air defense zone equipped with organic antiaircraft weapons which had to be crossed by the aircraft on the way to the objective (the airfield).”55

Of particular interest, however, is how the Soviets concluded that modern weapons could contribute to making older weapons more effective. In describing the Soviet assessment in 1980, Colonel E. Tomilin wrote: “Despite the defense of airfields by surface-to-air missile complexes, the attacking side suffered a majority of losses from conventional antiaircraft artillery. This was explained by the fact that in fearing to be spotted by the detection and guidance radars of the surface-to-air missiles, the pilots in the strike groups used low altitudes. Avoiding danger from the modern defensive weapons, they fell under intensive firing by obsolete weapons which had been quickly readied for use.”56

From this experience, the Soviets drew lessons concerning both “the importance of avoidance maneuvers” for the conduct of various aviation actions and the utility of traditional antiaircraft guns.57

The plausibility of a successful Soviet air operation has significantly increased as a result of the deployment of more capable aircraft and more accurate tactical (Frog and SS-21) and operational-tactical (Scud and SS-23) missiles. Thus, more accurate delivery systems have allowed the Soviets to obtain a greater potential for suppressing NATO’s air and nuclear assets without nuclear means, while still having the ability to complete the task with nuclear means if that should be necessary. In addition, supporting both nuclear arid nonnuclear options, Soviet radioelectronic combat activity is designed to introduce critical delays or confusion into the NATO command, control, and communications systems through a combination of radioelectronic warfare and physical destruction. The Soviets have studied the NATO command and control structure in detail and believe that the high degree of NATO dependence on electronic control systems constitutes a significant vulnerability that can be exploited.

As was noted in the Voroshilov General Staff Academy lecture materials, “success in air operations is ensured by delivering surprise mass initial strikes on enemy airfields, where the main body of enemy aircraft is concentrated, with first priority on enemy nuclear-armed aircraft.” Such surprise massed blows on the enemy’s air forces “create favorable conditions for effective actions of friendly air forces, ensure better results of actions against the enemy airfields, contain and limit the deployment or redeployment of the enemy air forces, neutralize its activity, and deprive it of the initiative and the capability to support ground forces.”58

The results of historical assessment and the experience of training exercises have led the Soviets to conclude that “despite the difficulties, the destruction of enemy air assets in the theater of action can be achieved in a short time by wise and clever actions.”59 In addition to citing the Israeli destruction of the Arab air forces in the 1967 Middle East War as a practical example of the successful execution of an air operation in the contemporary period, the Voroshilov General Staff Academy lecture materials cite the following example:

During one training exercise, where strikes were delivered against 313 aircraft positioned on ten dummy airfields, 45 percent of the aircraft, all runways, and 51 percent of command posts were destroyed. In addition 43 percent of radar posts, 45 percent of SAM control points, and 43 percent of antiaircraft artillery batteries were knocked out.60

Implications for NATO

Over the last twenty years, the Soviets have given much serious thought to how the Warsaw Pact might best pursue victory in a European war initiated and perhaps limited to the use of conventional weapons alone. As a result, NATO’s strategy of deterrence demands careful consideration of such Soviet plans. While Western analysts and strategic thinkers continue to argue over whether Soviet military thought suggests a preference for nuclear use if war should occur, the evidence indicates that the Soviets seek to avoid having to fight at all and especially with nuclear weapons. At the same time, the evidence also suggests that the Soviets remain hostile to the principles of Western democracy and that they have not deemphasized the necessity of being prepared to fight with the use of nuclear weapons as the best means of restraining NATO from employing such weapons. As a result, NATO must be prepared to deter conventional war independent of its effort to deter Soviet nuclear use.

As the credibility of the NATO nuclear deterrent has weakened with the West’s loss of an obvious global and theater nuclear superiority, the balance of conventional forces has come to be ever more crucial. Because NATO has accepted a conventional force numerical imbalance, it is critical that NATO exploit its advantage in air power, where approximately 50 percent of NATO’s firepower lies. If the Soviets are convinced that NATO air power cannot be neutralized, their confidence in their ability to win a conflict against NATO and especially their confidence about being able to keep any such conflict nonnuclear will be affected significantly. Thus, if the Soviets perceive that NATO can quickly break the back of a Soviet air operation in the Western theater of military action, deterrence will be substantially enhanced at the conventional level.

The air operation plan is the linchpin for a Soviet strategic offensive against NATO. Given NATO’s defensive nature, the first priority for NATO is to be able to survive an initial attack on NATO air bases. Two areas could improve NATO’s chances to survive a Soviet air operation––modernized and more numerous ground-based air defenses, plus a surface-to-surface missile capability to suppress Warsaw Pact airfields. If our air assets are made more survivable and if the Warsaw Pact main operating bases are threatened with immediate response, then the entire Soviet strategic offensive in the theater of military action will be placed at considerable risk.

Washington, D.C.

It looks like you know very well what you are talking about, iceHawk! Unfortunately your forum is closed for unregistered users. 😉

It is obvious to me that NATO “qualitative superiority” was mostly a myth. It is noteworthy, Soviets invested a huge amount of money since 1970 in improving their conventional air-to-ground capabilities against NATO. Simply compare basic Soviet planes in 1970 and in 1980! You will discover a scary difference between them:

– in 1970 Soviet air foces had primarly primitive, BVR-lacked MiG-17/19/21 short-range fighters and scant Su-7, Yak-28, Il-28, Tu-16 short-range and unsophisticated bombers.

– in 1980 USSR possessed MiG-23 and MiG-25 all weather, BVR capable fighters and Su-17, MiG-27, Su-24, Tu-22M supersonic bombers with much greater range, payload, ECM and PGM capabilities.

Moreover Soviets armed their planes with entire new generation of precision munitions. Soviet KAB-500/1500L LGBs appeared about 1975. Next USSR introduced family of AS-10 and AS-14 air-to-surface missiles guided by various methods. In the 1980s Soviets had the most sophisticated antiradiation missiles: AS-16 and AS-17, far more effective than HARM. Moreover USSR also fielded KAB-500/1500KR/TK electrooptical guided bombs and stand-off missiles, like AS-13/18. The most funny is fact, that NATO didn’t know much about all these Soviet PGMs! Even in late 1970s and early 1980s US/NATO analysis stated that Soviet Tactical Aviation (FA-VVS) was using only some general purpose unguided bombs and rockets from World War II era! 😀
The most important threat to NATO air and nuclear forces at those days posed Su-24 Fencers-D and Tu-22M Backfires. Do you know why Carter demanded so hardly limitation of Backfire production under SALT-II treaty??? Because secret DIA simulations proved that if Soviets had replaced Bagders with Backfires they would have been able to destroy about a half of NATO planes in Central Europe and close 80% runways during three attacks on NATO airfields!
Remaining Soviet weakness was lack of long range fighters capable of escorting Fencers and Backfires in the NATO airspace. But this shortcoming was solved by introduction of Su-27 Flanker-B air superiority interceptor in the late 1980s.

Having spoken to plenty of service personnel from the former WP nations I’ve become less and less convinced of their loyalty to the Soviet Union. I’ve often wondered if this would have been a decisive factor in the event of a conflict.

I suppose that you like many other guys from US and UK are still sure all US/UK enemies must escape or not willing to fight against your armies. That is because after WWII US/UK armies mostly fought against Third World’s underdeveloped countries. Of course, such an enemies were outmanned, outgunned, outmaneuvered and “outbragged” many times over and moreover they had only some junk weapon systems. So, it isn’t surprise their morale wasn’t high. But WarPac war machine wasn’t so inferior to NATO that WarPac soldiers had to surrdender “en masse” to the US Army only because they didn’t like Soviets and they liked “Uncle Sam”. It is rather certain US Army couldn’t repeat 1991’s War in Gulf victory against Warpac armies simply because nobody is so stupid to belive that NATO air forces were able to bomb Warsaw Pact countries for a month with impunity like on exercises!

As for their loyalty to the USSR: Now former NSWP guys can tell you that they always hated Soviets but it may be only their present conformity because USSR had falled a long time ago and later most of their East European post-communist countries joined NATO. In the contrary twenty years ago there were West Europeans, who really doubted whether US would defend Western Europe against WarPac offensive risking some disgraceful convertional defeat or nuclear confrontation with USSR…

As for WarPac air defense assets on the Western Theatre of Military Operations in 1987 I have some basic data from one article in the “Military Review”, June 1987:

– 4500 tactical SAM launchers: SA-4/6/8/9/11/12/13
– 25000 hand-held SAM launchers: SA-7/14/16
– 12000 antiaircraft guns 23-130 mm calibre

All of them mobile and easy to camouflage. I don’t know if author of this article counted as tactical SAMs also PVO heavy missile launchers of SA-2/3/5/10 types but he probably didn’t. If so, that was worse for NATO planes! 😀

OK, I have also found Warsaw Pact Air Forces OdeB as for July 1989, so we can already compare both aliances air strength in Cental Europe!

1. FIGHTER-INTERCEPTORS: 2737

– 675 MiG-21 Fishbed-J/K/L/N
– 943 MiG-23 Flogger-B/D/K
– 849 MiG-29 Fulcrum-A/B/C
– 180 Su-27 Flanker-B/C
– 75 MiG-25 Foxbat-E
– 15 MiG-31 Foxhound-A

2. FIGHTER-BOMBERS: 1063

– 45 MiG-17 Fresco-C
– 250 Su-7/17/20/22 Fitter-A/C/D/H
– 468 MiG-27 Flogger-B/D/J
– 285 Su-25 Froogfoot-A
– 15 L-39

3. MEDIUM BOMBERS: 920

– 575 Su-24 Fencer-A/C/D
– 161 Tu-16 Bagder-C/G
– 184 Tu-22M Backfire-B/C

4. AUXILIARY PLANES: 378

– 10 AWACS A-50 Mainstay
– 78 MiG-21 Fishbed-H
– 90 MiG-25 Foxbat-F
– 50 Su-17 Fitter-H/K
– 70 Su-24 Fencer-E/F
– 40 Tu-16 Bagder-F/J/K
– 40 Tu-22 Blinder-C/E
– 12 Tu-22M Backfire-D

GRAND TOTAL: 5098 military planes.

PS. F-5As were operated by RNAF’s 314th Fighter/Bomber Squadron based in Gilze-Rijen and 316th Fighter/Bomber Squadron based in Eindhoven.
As for Lightings and Tornado ADVs: 11th RAF Squadron was equipped with 12 Lighting F Mk.6 and 5th RAF Squadron was equipped with 12 Tornado ADV F3. Both squadrons based in Binbrook, Lincs, UK. I don’t know why these both squadrons were included in the Central Europe’s NATO OdeB. So, I removed them both from my OdeB because I take only RAF-Germany planes into account here.
Remaining A-10A planes were based in CONUS during peacetime. They would be redeployed to Europe as a part of REFORGER plan.

depends on how the war would have taken place in this hypothetical scenario. Which side would be the attacking side and which one would be the defenders..

Let’s assume (following of the time NATO concerns) that WP air forces would strike first and both sides would be using only conventional weapons.

I think we allready have a thread about this!!!

I had been looking for thread about similiar matters and I didn’t find it. 😮

so the RAF only had 24 interceptors in 1987 !!!!!!!.

No! There are only UK aircrafts based in West Germany counted above. Only part of USAF planes besed in UK and designed to operate in Central Europe is taken into account here! I think, I must describe here both sides air formations included in my comparision tables.

1. Warsaw Pact air forces:

– entire Polish, Czechoslovak and GDR air forces
– five Soviet Frontal Aviation Air Armies based in Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Baltic, Belarussian and Carpathian Military Districts
– three Soviet Long Range Aviation Air Armies with their headquarters in Smolensk, Leignitz and Vinnitsa.
– Baltic Fleet Naval Air Arm without ASW aircrafts

2. NATO air forces:

– entire FRG’s, Dannish, Belgian and Dutch air forces
– entire Canadian, UK, France and USAFE contingents based in above countries
– part of USAFE planes based in UK and designed to operate over Cental Europe
– part of Armee de l’Air based in France but designed to strenghten French air contingent in FRG when hostilities begin