Not an air combat example
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_73_Easting
Unsure how that is an example of quantity overwhelming quality. The 2ACR achieved a decisive victory over a numerically superior force of heavier AFVs. If anything it is a demonstration that a technologically superior force can defeat a numerically superior and more heavily armed opponent.
Who said anything about “repelling” dude? It’s obvious they don’t have a chance against “NATO”(US) militarily speaking. The question is how much damage they can do to a potential attacker?
Minimal to none. The real complication in dealing with Syria is Russia’s support for them, not the Syrian military. The gold-plated weapon systems Syria buys from Russia mean a lot more in symbolic support than they possibly can in military capability.
Russian arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa:
Syria: MiG-29 modernization
Syria: purchase of 8 battalions of Buk-M2E missile systems ($1 billion)
Syria: modernization of S-125 Pechora-2 SAMs to the Pechora-2M level
Syria: modernization of 200 T-72 tanks to T-72M1M level (part of $500 million contract to modernize 1000 tanks, 800 already completed)
Syria: purchase of 9M123 Chrystanthemum self-propelled anti-tank missile systems
Syria: purchase of 30 Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile systems (part of 2006 contract)
Let’s pretend they really do have all of this, and Kh-31, and Yakhont. Do they have an air defense network in place to use these systems properly? Do they have over the horizon targeting for their ASMs? Are their pilots trained properly? We’ve seen lots of countries with long lists of upgraded Russian and Chinese systems that totally failed to live up to their paper potential because they were just vanity purchases bought piecemeal and not part of a serious defensive strategy.
The last time I heard about an attack on Syria, their vaunted air defenses were not particularly successful, and in fact were defeated with jamming and conventional or laser-guided bombs rather than stealthy aircraft and state of the art weapons. And given the state of Syria’s military and government right now, the notion that all of these shiny systems are manned and ready and lying in wait to handily repel a NATO air and sea attack is pretty much fantasy.
Well there isn’t much evidence to support that anyway. Cruise missiles would be used largely against C4I and little if at all against air bases. My point was that the US would do this against a peer or near-peer just as much as against an inferior opponent. Remember that Iraq prior to the hostilities was, on paper at least, not really inferior to the coalition forces.
Not really Korea 1950-53 and Vietnam 1965-73 in mind. Just with the smart weapons from the 70s and no political limitations it became a real option for a conventional warfare. Desert Storm was the first test of that against an inferior opponent, when Desert Shield gave the time in need (several month) to do the related recce/intel work.
Yes that’s really what I meant by “since the cold war”, although it was definitely part of the doctrine in Europe in the 80s. The difference with Europe is that NATO was expected to fight a defensive war against a massive land offensive, so there would have to be more deep strike against convoys and rear areas early on, compared to an offensive war like Iraq where they could take their time.
The Americans have stuck to the concept for limited strikes, at the very start of a war, on radars & the like, against adversaries who they outnumber greatly. It’s for minimising their own losses, in a situation where they have great enough superiority to dictate the terms of engagement.
A peer or near peer wouldn’t be able to do the same.
Rolling back an enemy’s C4I and air defenses is a fundamental part of gaining air superiority. The US has adhered to this concept since the Cold War regardless of the scale of the conflict or the adversary.
Relic or not, if I were flying in harms way with people trying to shoot me
down, I think I’d rather be in an A-10 than any attack helicopter.
More importantly an A-10 is simply far more effective than an attack helicopter at CAS. It has longer range, higher speed, and more persistence (can be air refueled) so a smaller number of A-10s can provide CAS for a much wider area.
Attack helicopters are important and have their place, but they are not a direct substitute for fixed-wing CAS. The idea that they are stems from the ignorant video-game like thinking most people have about air combat, where aircraft magically teleport to “the combat area” and duke it out.
Very nice. And as someone else pointed out on the F-16.net thread, a Block 50 with a -132 engine has to be a lot of fun to fly.
It has greater internal fuel capacity, doesn’t it? Ah yes: over 5000lbs extra. Add that in to the equation, & if it takes off with full external & internal fuel, how much can it give away, compared to a Super Hornet?
[Edit: I actually looked up the specs on the buddy store used by the Super Hornet, so corrections follow]
The F/A-18E/F carries its buddy store pod on the centerline, and 4 480-gallon external tanks on the wings.
The F-35C has two plumbed wing hardpoints. I will assume that the F-35C will carry the same Cobham buddy store that the F/A-18E/F does, along with a 480-gallon tank on the other side.
The buddy store has an internal fuel capacity of 300 gallons. I had originally expressed concern about load asymmetry if carrying only one external tank. The buddy pack weighs 800lbs empty, plus 2025 lbs of fuel, while a 480-gallon tank weighs about 3300 lbs full. So that should not be an issue.
F-35C internal fuel 19,145 lbs plus 5265 lbs external (1×300 gal plus 1×480 gal) == 24,410 lbs total fuel carried.
F/A-18E internal fuel 14,400 lbs plus 14,985 lbs external (1 x 300 plus 4x480gal) == 29,385 lbs total fuel carried.
So basically the F-35C as a tanker has about 5/6 the capacity of an F/A-18E. I see no reason it can’t be done, it’s mostly a matter of funding and certification.
Flying from a carrier deck, a C-2 is limited to 10,000lbs of cargo. So in fact its hypothetical fuel capacity is actually less than a Super Hornet’s, which is around 13,500 lbs in external tanks. Plus the fact that it flies lower and slower, which just makes it less tactically flexible.
Rafale has 5, all of which can take 1,250l tanks and the inner 3 can take 2000l tanks. A bit less total capacity than the Super Hornet for tanking, which also has 5 wet stations. When used as a tanker the typical SH load is 4 x 480-gal tanks and 1 x 330-gal tank which has the hose and reel apparatus.
For the F-35, gross stores weight is not so much the concern. The problem is that it only has two wet stores stations, each rated to 5000lbs, so offload capacity would not be very large even compared to a Super Hornet which can carry 5 tanks.
Isn’t the host carrier itself the strategic tanker??
Not if an airplane can’t get aboard. Buddy tankers are used much more for recovery tanking than to extend mission radius. If a pilot fails to trap due to weather, nerves, what have you, at some point he will either run out of gas or have to divert. And depending where the CV is, diverting may not be an option.
Thats because its a YF-17.
Technically, a YF-17 prototype converted into a YF-18L.
“No one is saying there has been no impact.” :rolleyes:
This article would be more credible if the issues delaying the F-35 really were avionics / software related. The majority of them are flight-test issues and hardware design problems. I don’t think the powerpack redesign, the tailhook issue, the roll-off, cracking bulkhead, failure to meet acceleration KPPs, or the rest of the litany of bugs uncovered in flight-test have anything to do with Chinese hacking.