Apparently the RN is in fact studying the concept of using F-35Cs as buddy tankers.

But yes as DJCross points out, today’s tankers in the USN, including Hornets, are only useful as recovery tankers. The days of escort tanking went out with the KA-6D (and were pretty marginal even then, only the KA-3B was really useful in that role). Hornets don’t have the endurance, even if on paper they can haul a lot of gas. And the now retired KS-3 never had the altitude or speed performance to accompany strike packages. Still, a recovery tanker can be a lifesaving asset on a carrier.

Um… Mirage IIIG was a heavy, variable-geometry (swing-wing) fighter, having almost nothing in common with the 2000 in terms of planform. It would help if you actually read the link you pasted.

Dassault then worked on several new aircraft concepts evolved from their “Mirage G” variable-geometry experimental prototype, resulting in a sophisticated design with the designation “Avion de Combat Futur (ACF / Future Combat Aircraft)”. The ACF prototype was almost complete when the French government canceled it in December 1975; the ACF was simply too big and expensive. However, Dassault had been considering other fighter options in the meantime, partly because the export potential of the ACF was unpromising.

These alternatives were smaller, simpler, and cheaper than the ACF, and took the form of a number of “Mini-Mirage (Mimi)” concepts developed beginning in 1972 on a “back-burner” basis. These concepts congealed into an aircraft known at first as the “Super Mirage III”, then the “Delta 1000”, “Delta 2000”, “Super Mirage 2000”, and finally just “Mirage 2000”. When the ACF was canceled, Dassault was able to immediately offer the Mirage 2000 as an alternative, and the French Defense Council accepted it. It wasn’t exactly an even trade, since the ACF was a strike aircraft first and an interceptor second, while the Mirage 2000 was exactly the reverse — but the Mirage 2000 was much more affordable.

You are confusing the ACF, which was to be an evolution of the Mirage IIIG, with the Mirage 4000. Your entire story is simply confused. The ACF went nowhere, the Mirage 2000 and 4000 were based on the same design and developed simultaneously, but whereas the 2000 was specifically aimed at a AdlA requirement, the 4000 was a privately-funded expansion of the same design aimed at export more than at the AdlA.

And the Mirage 2000N and now the Rafale replaced the Mirage IV in the nuclear deterrent role, so size is obviously not really a reason either.

Basically the Mirage 4000 did not meet any French needs that were not already met by existing French aircraft, so its only real purpose was R&D and export hopes. At the time there was plenty of market for Mirage 2000 sized fighters, so investing in the 4000 just to be able to compete in the heavy fighter market that was already American dominated was not seen as a good idea.

A little détail, at the beginning of 80’s, the french navy had one plane in mind to replace the F-8, the Hornet.
IIRC, some discussion even happened at that time with USA but Dassault (among others) paid attention that nothing could put a shadow over the ACX/Rafale, not even renting some F-18.

It happened twice, actually. Once in the 1970s with the F-18FL

And then a second time during the 80s with the F/A-18 proper. It’s an interesting story, there’s a writeup of it here.

Falklands II: Electric Boogaloo. Apparently calling Prince William a ‘Conquistador’ has struck a nerve.

Boeing had to include the expensive EPE engine upgrade for Super Hornet — where the current engine isn’t exactly lacking in thrust as evidenced by Gripen NG’s Mach 1.2 supercruise — to even meet India’s requirements for transonic acceleration.

Right, just as Dassault and EADS had to include the expensive AESA radar upgrade for their aircraft to even meet India’s requirements for sensor performance. Point blank, none of the proposed aircraft in their current production forms meet the RFP requirements. So sure, the F/A-18 is “fat”, just like the Rafale is “myopic”. Yawn.

I dont think Su-30 production is going to end in 2017.
what will happen in reality that Rafale is super expensie and complex so the induction will be even slower than BAE Hawk/Su-30. same thing will happen with LCA-MK2. So nothing else Su-30 will be continued to be built.
without substational investments i failed to see how Dassault can produce extra 40 Rafale in next 4 years. BAE with EF and Boeing with F-18E cannot do it for new customer.
First 40 will not be delivered before 2020.

Not sure about the continued MKI production, but it’s pretty obvious you are correct that the first 40 aircraft are unlikely to be delivered before 2020.

Indigenous production of the 108 locally produced aircraft would not begin until 4.5 years after the contract starts anyhow. I am not sure how Dassault’s proposal is structured, but Boeing’s in 2008 went like this:

This was 4 years ago, so you have to shift all of the dates. I imagine Dassault’s schedule is very similar, given the parameters of RFP milestones regarding time and money, IAF force structure schedule, etc. Of course, all of this is still subject to extensive negotiations. I don’t see the contract being signed in less than 18 months. So given that, the first 18 aircraft would not have been delivered until 2018, which leaves 2 years to produce a further 22 aircraft to reach 40. Possible, certainly, but that assumes no slippage anywhere on either side of the ocean, which is not likely.