geogenGeoff B,
Your suggestion of the often conceptualized ‘improved’ ASTOVL program – independent of a separate twin-engined, Navalized (joint-service) mutli-role platform – would have with little doubt been the proper route doing it all over… going back to the mid/late-90s.
The only exception would be that the late 90s mentality would have probably still screwed up such a Naval/AF joint program, as the paradigm back then was still in the ‘old acquisition process’ mindset. I.e., just put the hammer down, we’re going to the moon with this Industrial-complex dream baby!
There was simply little cost-effective thinking going on back in the late 90s which could have more effectively influenced the organic business model from inception. Thus, it would have very likely still ended up being a very expensive aircraft once the reality hit that eventual FRP procurement rates would not be as high as the pre-conceived economy of scale model required.
Recall, the thinking back in 1999 and 2000 for the USAF at least was along the lines of: who needs mature, currently-in-production, cheap F-15E (or any interim legacy upgrade), when we can simply double and triple our combat aviation Procurement budgets in 5+ yrs (quadruple+ the budget within 15 yrs) and go to town with the game-changing, industrial-minded JSF platform – ultimately producing 1000s of cheap fighters and which will achieve IOC by 2010. It sounds too good to be true?
Likewise, it would have probably been an instant career killer to have suggested something like: hey guys, let’s think about down-sizing the requirement for an economy of scale super-jet for the world and think more realistically about building a very modern but more importantly sustainable production-model, based on the likely lower production rates due to the likely high cost of such a next-gen game-changer? Decision makers around the room would have just stared at the poor ******* and said; ‘you’re fired’.
imho, the best opportunity would have probably emanated if (tragically) 9-11 had never gone down and base defense budgets from 2002 onward, albeit probably increased incrementally, had been assessed to simply not be capable of affording both the JSF and F-22 programs simultaneously.
Deciders and politicians alike would have likely concluded that either there be a complete do-over of the JSF business model and design, etc, i.e., to enter a more sustainable LRIP/FRP rate 5 yrs later than envisioned – starting after the F-23, I mean F-22 had completed it’s acquisition – or continue with an advanced upgrade program to legacy airframe production until a 5.5 gen model could be designed.
I know, I know… the counter-argument goes: ‘but partner nations needed a replacement aircraft by the 2012-2015 time frame and would not wait 5 yrs more.’
God speed-
geogenThe way I see it… it will always come down to budgets vs the cost per total unit procurement and projected life cycle costs, etc. Whether it’s the USAF, PLAAF, RAAF, RNLAF, the new RCAF, VVS, you name it, assessed budgets and costs will be king and dominate the decision making process end of story.
There is some discussion I believe, or at least misrepresentations of discussions anyhow, that PAK FA will eventually be a solo class recapitalization of all Mig-29/Mig-35D and Su-30xx/35 in the near/mid-term. That to some might be dubious however.
It would therefore make more logical probability for a continued Mig-35 and Su-35S mix ‘Hi-Lo’ production through the early 2020s possibly, in supplementing a very ‘Hi’ low rate PAK FA which will likely be very expensive to both procure and operate. By 2025 or so, the force structure could possibly be split between the three variants @ 2:2:1 ratio imho. (not including Su-34). Still, nothing to sneeze at, very impressive.
But with possible Oil revs down over the next key 3-5 yrs at least, there will likely be substantial reliance of ‘borrowing’ just to maintain balanced Ru Fed budgets in the near-term at least. So in the near term at least, Ru planners will probably need to get economical shall we say – nearly as well as the rest of the world… and arguably to mutual benefit of the global taxpayer 😉 imho. Respects-
geogenIf I were in the market (whether a FMS customer or Partner) buying this jet, I’d wait for a mature block IV follow-on block – the block which was originally intended to be the procured baseline variant (Not the initial SDD-mature block III, or even block II which USMC will apparently be getting at first). Too much gamble, risk and extreme high cost to buy a late block II or early block III, let alone not as much modern capability as the block IV.
How much wait will it be for a mature block IV STOVL variant to be completed? 2019? 2020? What will be the actual PUC cost in Then Year dollars/euros, given far fewer orders to be produced than currently expected?? We’ll have to wait & see.
geogenRealistically… we’re talking Rafale-M, which is probably the most politically correct and most joint-operationally prudent… or, definitely more radical… how about in exchange for PBoC Euro bond buying, procure the J-15? Customize with a joint-GE/RR developed next-gen advanced augmented TVC F110 motor, APG-82 and F-15SE displays/computer/BAE EW suite? Just sub in Pirate IRST for the domestic IRST and call it a day?
geogen…it looks like the Canadian order will be secured at some point in the next year or so, unless cost overruns go way out of control..
Yet, it won’t be for another 1.5 to 2 yrs of course before the really big cost overruns become truly evident… i.e., when the news is finally released regarding annual FRP rates being significantly reduced. But by then who knows… maybe a block III SH or F-15SE will be more mature in development and offered for less !
Just don’t sign any deal which contains major cancel fees if first jets won’t be delivered prior to 2017. imho.
geogenI don’t think my head has hurt as much by reading this last page of comments, than it has on any previous thread 😉
Don’t know where to start, lol…
I guess first off I’ll tend to concur mostly with semi-Lobster’s take on the plausible industrial tech transfer and pragmatic based decision making process argued in his post.
Two, it just shouldn’t be exploited as a debate tactic imho (or ideology in all fairness) with regards to whom will maintain some form of perceived hegemony over Japan’s sovereignty, if it’s an American fighter selected in the near-term… or anyone elses for that matter, be it Russian, Euro or even Swede. These points should really be irrelevant I feel, since once Japan has a next-gen industrial base invested in (coupled with more future looking autonomy in mind politically), by definition she can be more autonomous in her future self-defense decision making policies. I.e., this is arguably the very anti-thesis of Japan being ‘owned’ long-term in this stage of history, by some foreign military fighter jet sale’s influence. Moreover, one could argue that in the political sphere of things, Japan wants more and more to pursue an independent and sovereign national defense posture (at least prior to the recent cataclysmic disaster). Anyway, I realize the competitive frustration of certain traditionally competitive weapon dealers trying to break into a traditionally exclusive market such as Japans… but while I do think any of the manufacturers could have a fair joint-development opportunity in this particular case (justified by their own merits), it just shouldn’t be thrown out the window that oh… Boeing will get it, only because it is American. What a bunch of rubbish. imho.
Regarding the hypothetical F-2XL+ type (or possibly unstretched F-16U concept)… that would indeed be a very credible and logical investment (be it unilateral or joint, multi-party developed) imho… and be able to perform FAR MORE than mere CAS, seriously folks… lol. :confused:
And lastly, as far as the argument might go that Typhoon and SH will be technically obsolete by 2020… hence an interim off-the-shelf ‘LEASE’ deal (perhaps including custom integrations) might behoove Japan until a more mature next-gen strategic picture can be formulated… well, that is certainly a fair argument imho (as I’ve suggested before myself).
But I’m still in a camp of thought that says SH, Typhoon, Rafale, Gripen NG, Su-30/35, J-10, J-11, F-15 and Mig-35 all have a very long, relevant life ahead of them given the proper systems and weapons upgrades. As long as one of the above class is relevevant as a deployed in a major air force around the world, I would argue that all could be relevant… again, as long as they are sufficiently upgraded and invested in. Respects-
geogenAs an aside, I’ve been in a camp of thought with those thinking it could behoove Japan’s industry to separately study a possible joint development of their F-2, for a common conversion into an F-16XL+ type variant taking more economical range into account, as well as other potential advantages gained?
geogenFair points, AD.
Indeed it would be an unprecedented and unconventional approach to acquiring a modern day tactical airframe on this scale. But I just foresee a future business model in tactical aviation where some degree of ‘Lease’ deals are factored into the overall production and procurement plan. With procurement for increasingly complex aircraft becoming more expensive (and risky), I feel it would be more feasible for many govts to acquire under such a risk-mitigating model.
Another view I have which I guess fits into this thinking, is that especially going forward it’s not the most prudent plan to operate an airframe for 40 yrs – squeezing out every economical life year. Upgrade costs and SLEP investments, as these jets get older, will just be such an under-estimated burden in itself i think. For the price of 2 upgrade cycles, I’d contemplate whether it could be more cost-effective to simply complete the short term 10-12-15 yr lease and upgrade to the next-best leased platform, factory fresh? I think for wealthier air forces at least, wanting to stay modern, that might be a plausible option – especially if there is a leap in TACAIR doctrine and capabilities one wishes not to miss out on, if locked into a 30-40 yr existing airframe life cycle. I could be off, but I feel under some circumstances for big airforces (e.g. convenient stopgaps) and for wealthy airforces operating under a couple hundred fast jets, it might be feasible for at least part of their structure. After the lease term, if it’s still a modern and capable jet perhaps only awaiting a timely upgrade… then there would surely be a next-in-line buyer for it (perhaps even picked up by USAF/USN for cheap?), or perhaps there would be an option to extend the orginial lease. imho.
As far as any next-gen SH R&D cost share is concerned, I think at least some of the aircraft sub-components development is already in motion and at least partly company-funded by various vendors? Some R&D could be rolled into a theoretical Lease deal too perhaps?? So no, I wouldn’t suggest any one country, including US or AUS or…x,y,z would front the R&D for an improved Super Hornet per se (or any type aircraft), as part of the business model. It would likely comprise of joint ventures and company innovation. imho. Cheers-
geogenSpud…. you are describing an IOC 2018 scenario there? 2019? How can you begin to assume what a creatively upgraded SH could go to Red Flag with in 2018/2019, fully equipped and asymmetrically armed for less than the raw F-35A unit Weapon system cost (no weapons included)?
BTW, a specialized follow-on ALQ-218 V3 + a next gen LW IRST equipping such next-gen 2018 SH would enable superior BVR situational awareness. Just add a modified asymmetrical AAM capability and Litening or Sniper SE pod for added superiority. imho.
Sincerely, ABJ geo 😉
geogenGood posts, AD and Madrat…
But I guess I’m in the camp of thought with those questioning why no F-15J+ follow-on block candidacy included here?
It would likely be in the same Procurement price range of the EF and block II/III F-35A… sans a new-aircraft MILCON, infrastructure and logistics expense??
Beyond that, a late model F-15J+ – with option for full-blown SE upgradeability, if required… same investment option Japan might wish later via F-35 retrofit to block IV – would offer the most superior BVR situational awareness capabilities.
Anyway, given the 3 choices stated and factoring in reliability, upgradeability and cost, I’d have to currently support the SH option. Although, I would propose a “LEASE”, maybe 10-12 yrs… and not a buy. Free up flexibility for an even better ‘mix’ (including unmanned UCAV) and cost-effective capability, by the late 20s. JASDF could secure a pretty good Lease deal from Boeing under that heavy competition, I think.
With savings made from selecting the SH however, potential investment could go into asymmetrical enhancements such as: CFT, LW IRST-tank, next-gen Sniper SE pod (possible centerline mount), Grolwer-lite wiring (on either E or F), integrating a next-gen EA/SoJ jamming pod (under development by numerous manufacturers today), selecting the upgraded F414EPE engine (variably set depending on the squadron’s primary role), JASSM-ER (as possible deterrent)… and from the savings also invest in an air-launched SM-6 ERAM variant, minus booster (e.g., multi-mission-missile, mmm-174) to integrate off-the-shelf dual, or multi-mode seeking (passive RF, IIR, mmw, etc).
Moreover, the slow landing speed and gear durability could prove to be a viable candidate for austere road-operations in a similar league with Gripen?
geogenSpud – this should be of no surprise to experts, but can be expected as a surprise I guess, at this late a point in the game by general public (and the general Congressional member not properly informed on these issues in advance).
Just wait for FY13 revisions (budget wide) to the currently assumed, unrealistic and unsustainable F-35 budget. Congress will simply vote the revision out of the raw reality of the day. USAF and national defense will unfortunately be stunned and left holding the bag to this well-intentioned but heavily flawed program from inception.
geogenHey Spud,
Do we even know the actual, revised Lot-4 LRIP PUC costs afterall this?? 😮
And have you seen what the estimated Gross cost + initial spares for FY12s F-35A?!? 😮 (compared to the previously estimated costs for this lot)?
Sir, with all due respect… mark these words… there will be NO FRP as is still being advertised! Not in annual a/c numbers procured, nor in the currently estimated FY16 PUC costs… very unfortunately.
Regarding an actual F-15E replacement conjecture… while I’m not necessarily in the camp of thought advocating to replace F-15E in 2025-2030 with an evolved F-15SE… in the short/mid-term, a bought (or Leased) F-15SA/F-15E+ stopgap procurement would be cheaper than near-term F-35A. Thus, by the 2025-2030 timeframe, it could be argued that the original F-15E should be replaced with a mix of UCAV and either FB-22 type or F/A-xx type. (i.e. a mix of more specialized and capable airframe). I’d tend to support the FB-22 concept (which could be largely F-35’ized), as it could begin replacing older F-15E sooner and would likely cost much cheaper to develop than an F/A-XX.
geogenMy gut feeling is that the expected price being quoted there is for the latest estimated ‘total flyaway’ cost, but one which is apparently still based on an assumed 3,000+ F-35 production run.
By 2013-2014’ish of course, things will be radically restructured and require a few recalculations.
geogenHaha, MSphere. Cheap shot, but good to see even Spud gettting a chuckle out of it!
Regarding F-35 cost estimates… of course the first few LRIP lots will see annual cost decreases from lot 1 being the baseline. But where the cost will start to flatten out, followed by annual increase to match inflation and upgraded systems… will likely be at a price much higher than originally estimated. I think that is the critical and relevant point to evaluate.
e.g., USAF’s FY12 F-35A Gross cost + initial spares are estimated to cost $195.5M per jet! What would Congress have said to that if they only knew this reality back in Feb of 2008??
Bottom line, the unfortunate, harsh reality is that by FY15 or FY16 (if not sooner as Congress is starting to realize actual looming debt issues), Defense budgets will begin seeing real reductions, beyond mere buying power reductions. Thus, the budgets required to support such a cost-exploded-aircraft acquisition beyond what they are currently assumed to be funded at, will simply not be sustainable – short of cannibalizing virtually everything in aircraft procurement.
This is not bashing a fine F-35 jet as being a potentially capable technology platform in the near-future… it’s about making calculated, competent, strategic planning given realities still apparently being denied at the top levels. imho.
geogenThey need a helo to get the maximin amount of water at a pinpoint position. The chinook or even better the Mi-26 uses the biggest Bambi Buckets to do that job. The problem is the radiation level which restricts the minimum flightlevel to 90 m. or higher.
Or perhaps a 6 pack of these in remote-control mode:
200-ton load water bomber. Lights out!
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