I did and they are total BS. Its a snow job trying to convince everyone that the F-35 program is suddenly underbudget a mere two months after admiting the program was overbudget and behind schedule.

Oh…guys your forgetting something else that’s very important….one word……inflation.

Well, maybe only some of us guys are forgetting that 🙂 In fairness, Spud does take that into account – just we disagree on the premium figure in the equation prior to inflation added 🙁

My base assessment for argument sake – for those who don’t know me – is roughly $150m UPC (in 2010 dollars) starting around FY15 (supposed 70 jets). Conservative imho. Now add inflation. x 70. Hence, the required year over year $12+ billion appropriated budget for USAF F-35A procurement alone (@ projected 80 jets via FRP). Unfortunately not going to happen, especially when much $ is going to have to extend life and modernize Legacy now – ‘staying the course’ (a probable reason for at least one LRIP jet cut in FY12 and then likely more reductions by FY13, for a few reasons). Well intentioned but Single-dimensional strategic forecasting syndrome, sadly. 🙁

Good for parity though. Hopefully, that will be a good thing. God speed ~

In the long run any money spent on new F-15s &/or F-16s would be better spent on more F-22s &/or accelerated F-35s.

Sorry I missed this exchange, but thank you for point for point reply..

I’ll just comment that while I agree with your assessment for justifying another 60+ block 35 F-22A, that option has been killed and will of course typical of policy making now be more expensive if the decision is determined to be reversed in the near-future.

Moreover, accelerating unproven, pre-mature, pre-SDD LRIP F-35 at $200+ million Procurement Cost (plus follow-on $ for necessary updates accordingly, prior to IOC) just doesn’t sound realistic, calculating or strategic. Besides, can the global industrial base even support that acceleration?

The more secure and strategic option would in fact be to continue w/ R&D and simultarneously procure combination of 4.5 Super Hornets/F-16++ and F-15++ until at least IOC is achieved and FRP justified. Furthermore, your new build F-15SG+ variant if ordered around say FY12 (very plausible in fact – tell the fat lady she’s early), would definitely be a strategic interim type ‘high end’ platform to augment the very required additional F-22s you note as being justified. And a proven and operational one at that..

Regards-

The 50th LRIP unit will not be in the historical pretense though, that’s the point being missed here. Maybe by the 50th ‘mature’, post SDD-complete unit such learning curves/stabilization will be more predictable relative to history, but then costs will be unknown and challenged all over again with the Block IV?

PFCEM –

With all due respect… and I appreciate your dedicated defensiveness and faith in your convictions… but 1) URF costs for FY09 alone (the 3rd lot) was what, $163m? Then add the modifications needed to meet block III configuration?

Anyway, URF costs are irrelevant and URF costs can actually be hidden elsewhere in the total UPC cost…

But it’s the UPC which Defense pays for in annual procurements, NOT the URF!

I.e., It’s the cost to BUY each unit, which is relevant here not the cost to PRODUCE.. See?

Moreover, USAF will NOT be affording anywhere close to still scheduled orders. Not even half. For one thing, short of WWIII Defense appropriations budgets will be reduced even before FRP is supposed to kick in. There’s no way USAF will have $12+ billion/yr for F-35 procurement alone, sorry.

F-35 is a well intentioned 90s bubble era wet dream, but unfortunately the ‘stay-the-course’ policy is locking USAF/services into a dangerous game of chicken beyond any strategic logic. Most the deciders know this, just they are not stupid to forfeit their careers. Unfortunately too, only a few Congressional members know this or care.

It will take the Program to be so obviously impossible to be sustained as estimated, for deciders and top brass to finally speak up and say to Congress that they need to alter the plans some. Altered by default, in a tacair structure outlook, far below what is required or expected today.

Take that to the bank 🙁 God speed.

Hi,

I’m curious if there is any public info available on ‘rough’ differences between offered F-16IN and UAE block 60?

Also, just for the interested discussion – what would be your personally suggested ‘optimal’, advanced block F-16 loadout, for an alert intercept sortie (say a fictional F-16 block 60+ operator, if you wish)?

Lastly, wiki-p apparently lists UAE block 60 as employing MICA missiles?? What would be the cost and difficulty involved with integrating a MICA-IR into Block 60’s (or block 50/52+ for that matter) interface?

Thanks in advance..

Hi,

I’m curious about Tejas’s latest status and info? Is development still a robust priority? What engine is India selecting? Could it be navalized… those sort of questions and whatever else you might have, thanks. Respects –

I guess one could speculate that block II code is written, which is sufficient for IOC?

But as far as why skeptics/critics are bashing F-35 goes… that is a pretty generalized supposition imho, as there are surely many differing reasons of varying rankings of importance, depending on which critic (or basher) you ask.

Regards, JS..

for a bit more balance
For the F/A-22, development costs are estimated at $28.7 billion which is a 127% increase over the 1986 estimates;
planned development time has risen from 9 years to 19 years
the initial operational capability date has slipped over 9 years from March 1996 to December 2005.
Average unit procurement costs have also increased to $153 million, representing
almost a 122% increase from 1988

I’m going to stick my neck out, as I’ve not yet been around here long enough to test the shark tank waters on this subject 🙂

Re: F-22 ‘Avg UPC increasing to $153m’? Source? That may be the URF or at best UFC avg (in TY dollars?)? FY09 – final years procurement – weapon sys cost FWIW, was about $180m?

As far as the crisis of F-22A achieving IOC 9 yrs late?? No real hysterics necessary as there was something called 700 F-15s and something like 2,000 F-16s in USAF fleet (fairly young flight hrs at that), plus A-10 of course.

Now ponder if USAF can maintain latest air combat strategy deterrence requirements, with F-35A IOC in 2016, follow-on USAF FRP order sizes imminently due for a considerable haircut (there’s not way short of a supplemental JSF Stimulus bill, or Lease acquisition to meet official buy estimates) and block IV achieving IOC who knows when? Now contemplate simultaneously accelerated ‘early-retirement’ of current F-16 force size, as well as F-15C/D size, in order to upgrade the remaining legacy jets ultimately making it to 2020 and beyond (with F-16 force potentially being fully retired by early 20s, short of very expensive major SLEP).

We’re conceivably and indeed realistically talking of a 2020 force structure – ‘staying the course’ – of around: 115 Primary F-22A (including normal attrition and consisting of about 80x block 35 modernized variants), 90-120 FOC, primary F-35A and a flight-restricted and hangar friendly 200-250 combined F-16/F-15C/D structure (assuming no additional future F-15C/D structural issues – and accounting for noted upgrade exchange strat). F-15E fleet could stay mostly intact as currently estimated.

Again, F-35A UPC costs will continue to grow, more than originally estimated vis-a-vis 2007/2008 estimates, especially as the orders are reduced starting probably in FY12 and likely in FY13, continuing there on at considerably reduced annual buys – regardless of whichever Fixed-price contract format is implemented. IMHO.

So yeah, my core position – subject to change – is that I agree to disagree with ‘stay the course’ F-35 ideas and concepts… given the available public info to work off.. Respects.