Realistic, with the facts, BVR missiles still are far for being precise, on excercices the common kill range is 20km with a base kill probability (optimist) of 50%, add it the maneuovres, and ecm..

In real war time, the hit probability is below 20%, that against poor adversaries, numerical superiority, better supporting, etc..

No the air combat is not a video game

BVR combat, stealth and UAVs have such a incredible marketing campaing, that most ppl here will be very disappointed with the facts

Rubbish. The “analysis” that come up with sub-20% PK values are biased and conducted with an agenda in mind.

A recent APA “analysis” came up with 17.1% by ignoring AMRAAM kills unless they happen to fit a pre-conceived notion of “BVR” and ignorning multiple hits on individual aircraft, which has happened more than once.

Play your statistics anyway you like. The facts are:

1. AIM-120 AMRAAM has more BVR kills than any other current generation BVR weapon.

2. The A variants, which is the data used for this so-called analysis did not feature HOJ capability and it featured 80’s level ECCM technology and the rounds were predominantly fired under extremely tight ROE’s because they were utilised during UN missions.

Attempting to extrapolate this performance into likely combat performance for missiles that are multiple generations newer in technology in a high intensity conflict against a peer or near pear enemy is such a long bow as to be entirely irrelevent.

Get a grip? I’m not the one losing the plot here.

Out of the F-22’s features, which gives it the biggest advantage over it’s competitors? It’s speed? Rubbish. Plenty of fighters have it’s speed.

It’s LO? Hello. No other in-service fighter matches it’s signature management capability.

It’s sensor systems? Hello. No other in-service fighter has a radar/ESM capability to match it. SH Block II goes close with it’s APG-79 radar, but falls short on the ESM capability.

… from which angle? Don’t be surprised to find out that from certain angles its RCS might be 2x higher than the one of F-16.

Uh-huh.

Good luck with that idea…

…. you might REALLY want to reconsider that one… 😎

The Su-35 isn’t in-service.

Note that the Tejas no longer has those four metallic brackets around the engine exhaust.

A fan of the Mirage, much? 🙂

I’ll give you this Mr. Simonds – you are passionate about what you think!
You wouldn’t be an officer by chance?
Regards
Pioneer

In another life…

As someone has already stated – when has the F-15 Eagle ever really been up against a really professional and skilled adversary?
I still believe that the true test of the F-15 Eagle would have been a NATO vs. Warsaw Pack war – but that’s only hypothetical!
I’m not knocking the F-15 Eagle per say. (Although I liked the Fairchild Republic ‘FX’ design better – somewhat smaller, lighter and cheaper!)
Its more the case of the U.S military’s BVR kill mentality and want, against the facts of air combat history
How many Aim-7 Sparrow have been produced, and at what cost?
How many kills to launches of Aim-7 Sparrows have there been, and at what cost?
Now compare these to the facts of WVR AAM’s like the Magic, Sidewinder, Atoll and Aphid, and the kills to launches they have achieved.
I would find it’s some what interesting though if you were to ask the USAF and its pilots to chose only one of the two designs of the F-15 or F-16 which design would they select.
Again I use the Israeli Air Force as an example, for I think that they are one of the best, and most battle experienced air forces since WWII.
Why is it, even though the IAF has had the likes of the mighty F-4E Phantom II and F-15 Eagle, equipped with Aim-7 Sparrow BVR AAM’s since the 1973 War, not very often employed this BVR kill capability?
After all, if the BVR kill capability was workable, Israel of all countries, with one of its biggest fear being war of attrition, would surly employ this kill capability from day one of any hostility.
But instead the predominant air-to-air kills caused by the IAF have been WVR!
Why is that?

1. No IFF capability, so targets had to be identified before a launch to prevent fratricide.

2. AIM-7 was always a highly overrated missile. Even in the last operational variants it was an unreliable missile. In any-case it was barely BVR capable by today’s standards.

3. Because of the AIM-7’s poor operational performance, a IR guided WVR missile was the more reliable option. When you had to confirm a target visually anyway, it makes a tad more sense…

The statistics about AMRAAM’s “performance” in particular over the years are very interesting.

What is even more interesting is the way some of those statistics are used. Air Power Australia and their ilk often discard the success AMRAAM has had in the WVR range of kills and other BVR scenarios have seen 2x AMRAAM missiles fired at a target hit the aircraft.

One kill with 2x missile fired works out to be a 50% kill rate. In actuality, BOTH weapons hit the aircraft and would most likely have killed it, even had they been fired individually. This is a good example of statistical anomalies and why it’s dangerous to “analyse” success or otherwise based on statistics alone…

Fair enough, but it assumes you see the incoming round at sufficient distance first in order to be able to move out of its NEZ. DAS is great but it still won’t give you time to move out of a missile’s NEZ if it’s already incoming when it picks it up. By that time you’re pretty much borked no matter what you try and do about it (especially without jamming in the rear sectors and no towed decoys).

]

Ah, yes. Here comes the Eric Palmer inspired idea of putting a towed decoy on a VLO fighter.

And here is L-M doing everything it can to improve EMCON on their VLO fighters.

By all means, let’s have a radio wave emitting decoy dragging along behind the aircraft then…

Front-on it’s much different of course, but SAM shots are hardly guaranteed to be front-on.
Perhaps ‘unimpressive’ was too harsh, but according to LM it’s nothing special:
Which I’d expect. WVR’s a great equaliser really, but the fact remains that the F-35 isn’t going to outperform anyone else in a knife fight, hence why it’s not likely to get 2 kills with the cannon for one loss in addition to four perfect AMRAAM shots.

Once again, a base-line configuration is being assumed to be the ONLY possible configuration.

I’ve said enough on that already.

I was under the impression that missile seekers would disagree with you. The hotter the exhaust, the easier it is to track, and such a very large exhaust plume would presumably be easier to lock on to than two smaller, cooler ones.

Here is what an ASRAAM missile seeker sees:

looking at a QRF-4 target drone (F-4 Phantom derivative).

Compared with something that can carry enough weapons to allow it to use that fuel, i.e. genuinely patrol airspace or perform CAS. As far as I know the SBD is not a CAS weapon, and nor are 2000lb JDAMs.

Since when? In any case, F-35 will be able to carry 500lbs variants of the Paveway and JDAM. These most certainly are CAS weapons and indeed are the only CAS weapons (beside guns) RAAF uses…

Before someone wishes to wax lyrical about the results of air combat exercises, please read this, it should clear up a few misconceptions about “air defence” exercises and attempting to use the results to provide some sort of legitimacy about your “argument”…

Those who are aware of this and still do so, are being disingenuous…

There are some serious misconceptions out there about how air combat training is conducted so I’ve decided to write a post about how it really happens. Everybody seems to want to cite a particular exercise as proof of their point, when in reality, they have no contextual reference for these results they are referencing. Realize that I am writing from a USAF/USN/USMC/NATO perspective. If anyone else can provide some information about how it’s done elsewhere, please chime in.

Air-to-air combat is an extremely complex and dynamic undertaking. The combination of speed and the ability to maneuver in three dimensions creates an environment that is constantly changing and rarely allows any of the participants to see and understand the entire picture at once. In order to be successful in this environment, participants must be highly skilled, (reasonably) intelligent individuals who fight in these types of battles regularly.

Fighter pilots from countries all over the world are expected to use hardware purchased with national treasure to defend their homeland against attackers or attack others as directed by their leaders. In order to effectively accomplish those missions, pilots must regularly train for air combat. Air combat skills are perishable and even the best pilots are not as keen as they might be if they haven’t flown in a while – especially when flying in large force exercises where one decision may be the difference between success and failure.

Definitions: Air Combat Training (ACT) is a term used to describe a battle between similar aircraft. If 2 F-16s are fighting against 2 other F-16s, this would be an ACT war, whereas 2 F-15s fighting 2 F-16s would be termed Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT).

When planning a DACT exercise, planners typically will build an Offensive Counterair (OCA) strike package and Defensive Counterair (DCA) package with appropriate aircraft – this was displayed in the Cope India exercise when a strike package consisting of SU-30s, Mirages, and Jaguars attacked a target defended by F-15s. Besides designating types of aircraft and missions, planners will also draw up objectives for the exercise. These objectives can be very specific or quite broad depending on the situation.

A broad objective may be stated as “building trust between countries� or “familiarize pilots with other air forces.� More specific objectives may be “effectively integrate air forces for lane defense.� In order to accomplish these objectives, rules of engagement (ROE) will also be set.

ROE consist of weapons load, identification criteria, maneuvering limitations, tactics restrictions, and just about anything else you can think of. ROE can be pretty liberal or very restrictive, depending on the objectives, experience level of the pilots, or number and type of aircraft involved. If the objective is to “build trust� between nations, you can bet your ass that the rules are going to be damn restrictive to try to ensure there will be no accidents/dangerous or stupid stunts that would embarrass one side or the other or result in needless loss of life. This is why briefings are conducted, and “pickup games� are not allowed. (This is also the reason why this article about the Typhoons getting bounced by F-15Es is absolute ********.) Regardless of the particular ROE established, somebody needs to be the bad guy.

In most exercises there will be a threat aircraft and weapons designated as the training aid for the other side. In U.S. exercises such as Red Flag, this will be something like a MiG-29 with aa-10s and aa-11s, and will be referred to as “opfor� or “red air.� Red air will usually consist of F-15s or F-16s (or whatever they can get) and will do their best to simulate that threat by limiting their radar modes, lock ranges, tactics, etc. “Blue air� will fly with their normal weapons loadout and will normally not have any restrictions other than operating their systems in a training/peacetime mode. There may be other restrictions imposed based on the objectives. Typically, the threat capabilities will start out low – short range missiles and very benign tactics, then increase as the exercise continues, as long as the blue air players are learning something and they are ready to progress to the next level. If the blue air fighters are getting their butts handed to them, the threat level will remain low, but if they are doing well, the threat capability will increase so the training is useful.

Notice that the red air players are training aids. They are supposed to follow the rules and die like men when blue air is executing well. If, however, the blue air screws something up and they have an opportunity to kick some tail, they are expected to do so. Violating the ROE by using a capability that is restricted, shooting beyond a specified range, or not adhering to an established ID criteria is considered a training rule violation and is dealt with severely. Several pilots have been sent home from exercises and have even been reassigned because they didn’t like to follow the rules.

By now it should becoming clear why one side or the other in these exercises often has a larger kill:loss ratio than the other. Red air is supposed to die – even if there are more capable aircraft on the red side. This is how many of the “surprising� results occur in large exercises – the threat level is tailored to the training needs of the blue air so they can learn from their mistakes in the debrief.

When conducting the debrief, kills must be assessed in order to find out what really happened. In order to do this, pilots must review the recording of the mission so they can evaluate their targeting and weapons employment. Red and blue air will get together, exchange data, and together decide who shot who and when. This is often an inexact science, however, with ACMI monitoring and extensive recording equipment in the aircraft, it is getting better. With results in hand, the blue fighters can then determine what they did wrong, and how to do better next time. This training is very effective for the blue air, but it usually sucks for red. What about exercises with real “threat� aircraft like MiG-29s, MiG-25s, etc? This is obviously the best training there can be, however, there is a problem.

When participating in an international exercise, both sides are probably going to hold some information back. This is not a “you show me yours, I’ll show you mine� game. In many cases, the shot data/weapons performance is classified, and not releasable to those on the other side. This is exactly the case in Cope India 04.

How do you debrief an engagement when neither side wants to say what really happened? Nobody is going to walk into the debrief and say “I shot that guy at this time and this range with this missile,� because they are basically giving away their capabilities. There are a couple of ways to deal with this, one of which is to not relay any of the shot information, but to merely say “that guy is dead at this time.� In that situation, no information (other than the f-pole) is released to the other side. However, astute people on the other side can extrapolate the data and figure out approximately when the shot was fired and can have a pretty good idea as to the performance of the missile. The other thing you can do is to establish a theoretical missile, with a nominal range to be used by both sides. This levels the playing field and rewards the side which executes better, rather than the side with the longer range missiles.

Detailed assessments that would normally take place to validate shots can’t/won’t happen in an exercise like this, therefore the overall results are not really accurate. However, as you say, they most certainly will debrief to get some results regardless of the potential inaccuracies. How valid the results are depends on how the exercise was planned.

As you can see, the results of these exercises (especially those released to the public) are quite likely not accurate. And, for one side or the other to claim victory in one of these exercises is either dishonest or just plain ignorance. Normally, the results are released as a series of politically correct statements such as those we’ve seen by the authorities after Cope India. Both sides are happy, they learned a lot, and can’t wait to do it again.

It should be noted that these types of exercises are planned many months in advance. A key part of the training syllabus is to agree on the types of scenarios to be performed during initial planning.

Most of the learning experience occurs on the ground, not in the air. The evolution from Air Tasking Order to Mission Planning/C3I/Asset Coordination to Aircraft Generation is where air battles are won or lost. The mechanics of flying airplanes and shooting off ordnance is icing on the cake.

I’m certainly not trying to stifle the spirited debate that goes on here. It’s fun reading the arguments for and against various aircraft, however, be careful when you’re quoting the results of some exercise when making your point!

I’m only saying that without details, all of this, “my airplane kicked your airplane’s butt” is entertaining, but silly. One valuable part of the exercise is simply watching how the other side operates, what kind of tactics they use (they may have been “modified” along with the weapons), how they talk on the radio, etc. Obviously, the technology represented by the Su-30s is of great interest to the USAF also.