Chinese J-11B Presages Quiet Military Revolution

By Douglas Barrie
11/05/2006 09:17:03 PM

China is in the midst of a critical period of testing an “indigenous” version of the Russian Su-27 Flanker, known as the J-11B, with propulsion, radar and weapons system integration underway.

The effort is emblematic of Beijing’s efforts to recast its capabilities for the 21st century as its military and associated defense-aerospace sector undergoes its own revolution in military affairs.

The development of the J-11B, if successful, will mark a notable change in capability–not only for key elements of the country’s defense industrial base, but also for the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).

The Chinese military is recalibrating the balance of quantity and quality in favor of the latter, as a guarantor of a decisive military edge and the ability to project power regionally. At the same time, the nature of the relationship between Beijing and Moscow may be subtly changing, reflecting China’s growing confidence in its own capabilities.

Alongside key elements on the J-11B, Chinese industry is beginning to produce a gamut of capable guided weapons, both tactical and strategic, including satellite-guided precision systems. The emergence of unmanned platforms is also gaining the attention of Beijing.

The nationally developed systems now in various stages of the J-11B test program potentially provide performance improvements over the various Su-27 models now in PLAAF service.

Air Show China, held here Oct. 31-Nov. 5, included the first official detail about the Shenyang Tai Hang engine. This turbofan powerplant is being developed for the Flanker, and is also sometimes referred to as the WS-10A. A handful of J-11B airframes are now likely being used for development testing, including at least one J-11B engine-integration aircraft.

Beijing and Moscow first agreed on the Flanker sale in 1991, with a license production contract signed in 1996. The Flanker has given China its most capable fighter aircraft while also providing a vehicle for its industry to gain knowledge of fourth-generation fighter manufacturing. The first kit-built J-11A was completed in 1998. The J-11A still uses Russian engines, radar and weaponry.

Design and development of the Tai Hang has been underway for nearly two decades, says one senior Chinese aero-engine executive. He admits the program has proved challenging: “We hit difficulties in developing the engine.”

Chinese industry executives attending the show remain reticent to discuss the J-11B program. The executive would say only that the Tai Hang has “similar applications to the Al-31 [the present Su-27 engine]. It’s of a similar thrust and is of the same technology generation.” The J-11B program also includes the integration of Chinese-developed planar array pulse-Doppler radar replacing the Russian N-001 cassegrain radar, at least two versions of which are fielded by the PLAAF. An image of a J-11B, still in its primer (see top photo on p. 27), appears to show the aircraft fitted with a different radome to the basic Su-27. Given the available space for a flat-plate antenna, this would offer a performance improvement over the N-0001.

Also associated with the J-11B is the Luoyang PL-12 active radar-guided medium-range air-to-air missile. While the Chinese air force already has the Russian R-77 (AA-12 Adder) in service with the Su-27, the PL-12 offers a big performance increase over the present export standard of the Vympel R-77. Officials from the company were unable to discuss the PL-12 project.

The initial development test-firing program for the overall PL-12 program now appears complete, with the missile at least close to service entry. It was integrated first on the J-8II for the development program. Trials of the PL-12 on the Chengdu J-10 also have been carried out.

The PL-12 does benefit from Russian technology, with the seeker and inertial guidance system provided by Moscow. A variant of the Agat 9B-1103M radar seeker is the most likely candidate for the missile. This seeker was intended initially for an improved version of the R-77, but appears to have been sold to China first.

The PLAAF currently has the capability for two-target engagement using the Su-27, R-77 combination. Successful integration of the PL-12 on the J-11B would likely provide a genuine multitarget capability and give the PLAAF a more capable air superiority aircraft.

The country is also moving to fill gaps in its tactical weapons capability, and to bolster its ability to support combat aircraft export proposals with credible guided-weapons packages. The show included the presentation of several previously unseen air-launched tactical systems. Luoyang showed the LT-2 laser-guided bomb, along with the LS-6 precision-guided glide bomb (middle photo). Rival China Aerospace and Technology Corp. unveiled its FT-1 and FT-3 satellite-guided weapons family. Both are aimed at potential exports of the FC-1 light fighter, including Pakistan, and likely national requirements.

Meanwhile, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. (Casic) showed the C-704 antiship missile (bottom photo), along with the C-802KD air-to-surface version of the C-802 antiship weapon.

The LT-2 has been in service with the Chinese air force “for more than three years,” says a Luoyang executive. The 500-kg.-class (1,100-lb.) weapon resembles the Russian KAB family. The official suggested that the laser-guided bomb has a range of up to 20 km. (12.4 mi.) from high altitude, with an average accuracy of about 2 meters (6.5 ft.).

The LS-6 appears, in effect, a successor system, with a family of weapons planned. The official says “about a dozen” launch tests of the LS-6 precision bomb kit have been carried out using a Shenyang J-8II as the test aircraft. The program was begun in 2003, with testing now complete.

He identifies the JF-17–the Pakistan air force designation for the Chengdu FC-1 now in development–as the next intended aircraft for integration of the weapon. Guidance is provided by an inertial package coupled with satellite navigation. The official says the weapons family will be capable of using three systems–the U.S. GPS, the Russian Glonass and China’s own Beidou system. The architecture for this system eventually foresees using five satellites in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) and up to 30 non-GEO platforms.

The 500-kg. LS-6 has a maximum launch range of 60 km. from medium altitude. A 1,000-kg. kit has also been considered, although this requires a larger wing. A 250-kg. variant is in the pipeline as well. Also under study is the addition of a laser seeker.

The two weapons shown by Casic cover the 250-kg. and 500-kg. class. The FT-1 bears a resemblance to the U.S. Joint Direct Attack Munition. Development began in 2001, according to a company executive. Tests have been carried out from a Xian JH-7. Range of the FT-1 is given as up to 18 km., depending on the release altitude and aircraft speed, with an accuracy of “30 meters, or less.” Casic subsidiary China National Precision Machinery Import & Export Corp. is responsible for the C-704. At least a small batch of the antiship missile has been produced.

The design is strongly reminiscent of the Hongdu JJ/TL-6 antiship missile, although dimensions and performance figures for the two vary slightly. Data provided for the C-704 give the monopulse active-radar-guided missile a maximum engagement range of 35 km.

The company is also offering a further variant of its C-802 antiship missile. The air-launched C-802KD is claimed to be capable of engaging ships in harbor or some fixed land targets. Given that the missile is fitted with a radar seeker only, land targets would need to provide a high radar contrast.

An electro-optically guided medium-size air-launched weapon in a similar class to the C-802 is under development in China. This program almost certainly corresponds to the KD-88 designation.

The first indications of a measured shift in Sino-Russian relations could be detected in the outcome of the ongoing “push and shove” between Beijing and Moscow over the provision of a Russian engine for the FC-1 light fighter. The aircraft is a joint development between China and Pakistan.

Chinese and Russian aerospace executives are maintaining China’s FC-1 light fighter will be provided to Pakistan with a Russian engine, though this is still pending political approval from Moscow. The Russian government has yet to approve the release, with suggestions that Moscow might nix a deal to avoid jeopardizing sales to India.

There is no point in beating the chest and saying ‘we told u so’.
Only time would reveal whether it was a pressure tactic from russians (they have left themselves plenty of room to manuever by linking any deal with russian export laws) or otherwsie. But this clearly sends out the signal that in modern world only strategic interests matter. People who are so upbeat about past russian-Indian relations tend to overlook some very important facts;
-China as a fast growing economic and military power has gained increasing prominence in Russian policies. In spite of Russian reservations regarding China’s intentions, they cant ignore the fact that China is a neihbour with whom Russia needs excellent relations to develop her own economy and clout especially in 21st century world
-with India attemtping to divesify its arms sources Russia has every right to look for alternative markets something which to the effect has been stated by Russian officials in the past
-neither chinese nor pakistanis are stupid enough (as was implied on numerous occassions) to have overlooked such a fundamental component for a fighter during its development

Alexander Vatagin stated very eloquently If we don’t sell [Pakistan the RD-93 engines] then someone else will. It’s just a reality. Russians know that any refusal would only delay the project not terminate it. Both Pakistan and China haven’t poured in hundreds of millions into this project to terminate it at this stage. Even if Russia refuses to sell, more than one country would be more than willing to sell-in light of American F-16 sale to to Pakistan. So Y shouldn’t Russia make some money while it can. Only way i can see Russia refusing to sell is if India gives them firm assurances for enough business to recover their finacial and strategic (it would have some impact on Russia-China relation thought probably not significant) losses. OTOH, Chinese strategic relations with Pak would suffer to a greater extent, and China having received firm assurances from Russia in past regarding this deal would want to recover their own losses from Russia.

Lets see what this new Janes article has to say.

Means deal void,China incurred losses…..

Hardly logical.
$267 million for 100 engines
$500 odd million for overall R&D
Numerous working hours
Reputation on line

Dont think so.

Whereas USAF might be paying 120 million or so for a Raptor airframe, how much would a foreign customer would have to pay? Im sure they would want to recover some of their R&D costs.

That they (read russian) didnt even bother about the few a/c you shot down (and an own kill, stroke of genius!) during the Afghan conflict, only goes to show that they didnt care much for your lot

Nick…did u really mean what u wrote down here, or was it to just get one up? :rolleyes:

Nick 76

Just out of interest, when did HAL start upgrading Mig-21s to Bisons?

my uncle’s brother’s barber’s cousin’s teacher who knows a Qatar AF pilot was saying the Qatar deal fell thru not because of price (cover story) but because Unkil intervened to block the sale then…maybe in a fit of love for the munna.

with Indo-Unkil relations gradually sliding down the toilet…no surprise the deal
is back on the table via dassault upg.

Your uncle’s brother’s barber’s cousin’s teacher who knows a Qatar AF pilot may be right. 😉
http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/Jul162005/national195252005715.asp