WilkWhat are the covert sensors that ID and track the target?
Did you even read the example that you quoted? Why would you even be asking this question if you did?!
ESM/Passive acoustic?…they’ll give you a signature covertly sure, but, not at great resolution so no tracking and neither are invulnerable to deception or simple signature masking. So not 100% reliable to track/ID by themselves and are utilised to cue a platform with greater sensor resolution for that reason.
No form of ESM or passive acoustic sensors can provide tracking information? No further comment on that as “it’s not worthy of my ridicule.”
Prairie Masker has pros and cons, one of the biggest cons being that the resulting acoustics are a red-flag indicating the presence of a military vessel.
Surface wave radar is about the best bet for reliable range/resolution – its good for about 400km range top end and about a 4km by 2-3 degrees of arc accuracy. Not hard to track in on surface wave and its emitters are not really so mobile…first target on the list for a saturation TLAM strike in support of theatre entry you might think? You seem to be hellishly fired up about the defenders variance from peacetime to war state…you do seem to have overlooked that the same applies the other way too.
TLAM wasn’t in service in 1982. At least you’ve finally acknowledged the difference between peacetime and wartime, and the threat from OTH sensors. That’s something I suppose.
Anyway bottom line is that you cant, no matter how much you’d like to pretend otherwise, shorten or bypass the kill-chain. Your ‘events’ are meaningless as it doesnt matter what percentage of ‘Force A’ deploys…what matters is whether they know what they are deploying out to meet. You are still making the same mistake of assuming that your ‘Force B’ knows its flying out to a carrier because you know that it IS a carrier.
In reality, with no track or ID, Force B doesnt know that until that information is developed.
The fact that you just confused Force A with Force B twice indicates to me that you didn’t even properly read the example.
Force A does not need to id a carrier in order to fly out to it. Force A only needs to detect a contact. At that point if the detecting sensor is unable to do so, other sensors/platforms are employed to ID, and if necessary, engage the contact.
You are contending that covert sensors can deliver that data but you also highlight the only platform that can actually manage the task….
You clearly did not read, or understand, the example. At all.
That, or you are trying to pretend that it is something that it isn’t because it dismisses your silly “maskirovka is impossible without 100% id of carrier” claim. Which is what the example was for in the first place.
Peacetime or wartime submarines, like any ship, have to refit and repair and, at start of war, there will be units unavailable. Thats just a fact of life…expediting hulls to sea would happen, but, then so would losses and combat damage.
So again, wartime is different than peacetime, and depending on the nature of the crisis/conflict/threat the number of platforms deployed can vary significantly.
You would note that I said 35-40 hulls at sea earlier…which isnt 40% of 60 is it? I was already including hulls on transit and accelerating through workups, that may have combat capability, without being on-station as to discount them would be an inaccuracy.
You had said “40% at sea on station” as if those were the only ones that mattered, hence my reply referring to 40%.
Its still, in PacFlt 82 terms, not a huge number of effective boats spread across that fleets rather large OpArea…
Why would they have to be spread out across the entire Pacific and Indian Oceans? The problem is that you have not defined what the nature of the conflict is (there was none.) Hence, making statements about the size of the “operational area” is meaningless. Deployments would differ dramatically in the event of say, a Korean-war crisis versus regular peacetime activities.
Point 1 Dont be ignorant…I’ve already explained that by saying ‘against the best’ I meant against the most comprehensive capability that has deployed against a carrier.
That capability was never deployed. And you’re calling me ignorant!
Point 2 I’ve answered it several times to you and Leon. You just dont understand the answer. The important part in the kill-chain doesnt depend on a peacetime or war time footing. In fact the value of the detect-ID-track part of the kill-chain is as valuable in peacetime as it is in wartime as it allows for the efficient management of your maritime environment and lowers dependence on costly to run, and numbers-limited, patrol vessels.
No, you haven’t answered it and certainly not several times. If you had a viable answer to it, you would easily be able to counter my list of points which I’ve posted repeatedly. Yet you haven’t. Instead, you’ve now descended to basically claiming that this was the equivalent of a wartime test because the Soviets wanted “to lower dependence on costly to run patrol vessels.” As far as I’m concerned, that topic is finished as I’ve no desire to even quote any more of that sort of nonsense.
Hit another ship that wasnt decoying you mean…after RN soft-kill had defeated the inbound missile in the first place?
“Defeated”? If the missile was properly defeated it would not have continued on to sink another ship.
RN soft-kill that was anticipated to be successful in defeating MM38/AM39 as we had MM38 in the fleet, as GWS50, and had stalwart assistance from the Aeronavale on transit?.
Funny that you didn’t say anything about that when you were singing the praises of the soft-kill measures, which happened to be one line prior to you lecturing me about failing “to take onboard the rather large advantage” of having your enemies’ weapons. What a HYPOCRITE.
In your rush to be very clever and score points there Wilk you do seem to have argued yourself in a circle!.
YOU posted one of the most blatant examples of double standards I’ve ever seen on this forum. You even managed to do it in two consecutive sentences. The fact that I pointed it out is “scoring points” and being “clever” to you? Whatever.
WilkYour points distill down to just one thing though
Really? Really?
“…the article, and your accompanying claims are full of assumptions and omissions, including, but not limited to:
– assuming that a peacetime response is equivalent to a wartime response.
– assuming that the Soviets were utterly stupid and revealed their complete sensor picture to their adversary when they had absolutely no reason to do so.
– assuming that the Soviets were completely incapable of maskirovka.
– assuming that mirror strikes provoke the same response as direct strikes.
– assuming that Soviet forces that did respond were using their equipment to its fullest, instead of peacetime modes.
– assuming that the Soviet forces that did respond were fully networked, instead of being required to operate on their own in order to test the individual units’ capabilities.
– assuming that forces which made a detection, such as submarines, were ordered to reveal or transmit the detection instead of performing a mock attack and retiring.
– omitting or ignoring the presence of subsurface sensors, over-the horizon sensors, etc.
– pretending that the alleged absence of a certain type of sensor is evidence of non-detection.
– assuming that their own sensors were infallible by claiming to know with certainty whether certain Soviet assets were present or not.
– and so on. I’m not going to waste a whole page on this.”
You say that they only boil down to one thing for you because you have zero effective counters to any of them. Hence, you’ve latched onto one of these points – maskirovka – because you (wrongly) believe that you’ve got me on that one point.
To play the deception you credit them with they had to know what the Midway was and be tracking it. Otherwise how do they know what it is to not challenge…you are making the classic mistake of getting the pieces fit the story as you know it to be after the fact and to fit your personal agenda.
Event 1:
It is peacetime. Force A detects (using oth radar, fixed seabed arrays, aircraft, submarines, whatever) Force B approaching.
As it is peacetime and the danger is minimal, force A sends out only 50% of it’s overt platforms to meet Force B, and these overt platforms id and perform mock attacks on only 50% of Force B. Force A’s covert sensors id 0-100% of Force B (insert whatever number you fancy).
Force B believes that it has been “tested against the best” Force A had to offer and that only 50% of its forces were found.
Event 2:
It is wartime. Based on their success during Event 1 in peacetime, Force B approaches again. This time however, Force A utilizes 100% of their assets and consequently 100% of Force B is attacked and destroyed.
The survivors of Force B are bewildered. They cannot believe Force A to be capable of such a fiendishly clever plot. They had been told maskirovka was impossible unless everything was ID’d 100% by an overt platform.
Now down from ‘hundreds’ to ‘about 60’ and importantly remembering that 60 would be, on any given day, roughly 40% at sea on station.
I said the “Soviets operated literally hundreds of subs.” I also said they had hundreds of subsurface platforms when you were talking about passive sonar in general. I didn’t say that they were all based in one area (why would they be?!). Of course if there was a desire to do so many more subs could be deployed to the area; the RN didn’t have half a dozen subs operating around the Falklands in 1981 did they… Even if we are considering “only” sixty, I hope your carrier crew are saying their Hail Mary’s because their probability of not encountering one of sixty subs (potentially being cued by OTH radar or other sensors) is not good at all.
And 40% eh? Are we talking peacetime or wartime? Oh that’s right, you completely ignore that distinction.
First hand account from a trained ISTAR professional?. Verbal first hand accounts from an RN Wasp pilot and the same kind of first hand account from a retired CPOWEA who recounted a tail of tripping over one of the pieces of intel recovered!.
– no credible sources from the Soviet side, who are the ones who would know what they detected, whether they were using their all their resources at their full capacity as they would be in wartime, and that those resources were the best they had, etc. Claims of non-detection from the side who isn’t doing the detecting are untrustworthy at best, and have proven to be false in the past.
– “verbal evidence” in a web forum is utterly meaningless as anyone can pretend to have some. I happen to have authentic “verbal evidence” myself (though sadly not for this particular event) but I only utilize it as a resource to assist me in my arguments.
– The “professional” made a number of glaring assumptions and omissions as I’ve pointed out repeatedly.
– Most importantly, it does not support your claim that they were “tested against the best the Soviets had”, which is what this argument began with in the first place. THAT is the important point. Whether the midway was id’d or not is moot: The question, which I have asked repeatedly and you have repeatedly failed to answer, is how a peacetime response is the equivalent of a wartime test “against the best.”
Oh and the Sheffield and Coventry sinkings…you forgot that Glasgow was alert and decoyed successfully and that no ship, in the task force, that employed expendable countermeasures was struck by an antiship missile.
Yeah, save for that little problem of those missiles simply striking another ship… and the fact that not all ships had a chance to deploy decoys before being hit meaning that they weren’t some sort of panacea for the asm problem.
You also failed to take onboard the rather large advantage it is having your enemies area AAW radar/missile combination to practice against in your own fleet.
Certainly having your opponents’ weapon system is an advantage… Hey wait a second, didn’t you just say:
no ship, in the task force, that employed expendable countermeasures was struck by an antiship missile.
an antiship missile
Oh what missile might that have been? Could it have been… no… it couldn’t have… could it? The Exocet? And what was one of the types of missiles the task force was equipped with? Oh that’s right, the Exocet!
facepalm.gif
You didn’t think this one through at all did you? Or did you hope that no one would point out your obvious double standards?
Hmm let’s see what’s more difficult… sinking an escorted guided missile destroyer with dumb bombs using subsonic aircraft that aren’t even equipped with countermeasures because you might have practiced against one in your fleet (although not against the escort)… or tailoring and testing your countermeasures to defeat the radar-guided ASM both you and your opponent are using while likely being provided detailed information from the manufacturer of those missiles.
Tough one there!
WilkAs for land based strike, in the 60+ years of the jet age the USN has managed about a 3:1 kill ratio in air combat, so presumably for an opponent to defeat a standard (not reinforced with more aircraft) CVW would require the acceptance of the loss of about 100 high end aircraft. I don’t know about what it takes to sink an AGEIS destroyer but the HMS Coventry shot down 3 aircraft before it was sunk so presumably to sink the escorts another 10 or more aircraft would be lost. Now since on 4 air forces in the world have more than 500 combat aircraft: Israel, India, China, Russia I don’t think many could afford to lose the 110 fast jets needed to sink a USN CSG.
The Coventry was sunk by UNGUIDED BOMBS. In 1982. Let me repeat that so that it sinks in: an anti-air guided missile destroyer was sunk by a handful of subsonic aircraft using UNGUIDED BOMBS. So it managed to shoot a few down. What an accomplishment! And an accomplishment it only managed to achieve because those aircraft happened to be equipped with weapons suitable for ww2. Her sister ship wasn’t so lucky as she was attacked by a weapon actually appropriate for the era, and, surprise, surprise, that ship was sunk without managing to shoot anything down.
WilkYour argument re the Midway episode seems to be that the Soviets may have known the Midway battle group was there, but chose to appear not to know, so as to deceive the Americans as to their capabilities. Really?
Nope. The Soviets were utterly stupid and always revealed their full capabilities despite having absolutely no reason to do so, and always sent out all their aircraft, despite again, having no reason to do so. So proclaimed Jonesy and now John K; therefore, it must be true.
Back to reality…
NATO frequently had exercises well within range of Soviet land-based air, such as in the Norwegian sea. The Soviets’ response to these exercises varied. Sometimes they showed up with MPAs. Sometimes they observed from a distance with frigates. Sometimes the task forces were emitting and the Soviets didn’t overfly them. In at least one instance a Soviet sub surfaced in the middle of the exercise, but strangely enough the Soviets didn’t fly out with swarms of backfires to sink them!
Yet in this thread we’ve actually got posters claiming that since the Soviets didn’t send out aircraft to greet every carrier in peacetime in international waters, that is “proof” that those “carriers were tested against the best the Soviets had”!
Consider the history of incursions into Soviet airspace over the years. Korean Airlines flight KAL007 was shot down with all its passengers, merely for encroaching on Soviet airspace. I recall a Swedish Dakota was shot down over international waters in the Baltic with the loss of all on board. Over the years of the Cold War several US intelligence gathering flights were shot down, some in Soviet airspace, some not, again, with the loss of all on board. In short, the Soviets were not at all cool about incursions into or even encroachments upon their air or sea space, and showed the will to deal with such events using lethal force.
So the Soviets shot down some aircraft that were inside their airspace and failed to respond, and “neutral” Swedish aircraft (thirty years earlier too). The US Navy also on occasion shot down aircraft such as Libyan fighters or an Iranian airliner that they deemed a threat. Oddly enough here though they weren’t shooting at the Soviet aircraft that were sent out, and the Soviets weren’t shooting at the US ships and aircraft… I wonder why…
I am not suggesting that they would have attacked the Midway battle group in international waters
So then, what are you suggesting?
Wilk…and semantics again. The meaning, in context, is very obvious…they werent challenged. He stated the element you’re whining about…stop playing word games Wilk.
Obvious where, in your fantasy definition where “weren’t challenged” equates to “not detected”!? He stated not detected multiple times. Now you are trying to spin that as not meaning what it means in plain English.
You said that they may have held back from overt confrontation of the Midway for reasons of deception
That is one of many reasons I have listed, which I’m not going to quote yet again. And those reasons individually and more importantly as a whole refute your ludicrous “they were tested against the best the Soviets had” claim. You still haven’t even responded to most of my points, let alone attempted to counter them as a whole. Instead you attempt to pick away at a point here and there, whilst making the occasional comment of “well there’s a question mark of a sub being there.” It’s as if you’re pretending that 90% of my points do not exist. Perhaps I’ll just start responding to only 10% of your post too.
Unless they knew that ship WAS the Midway how do they know to do this?
Look up the definition of maskirovka. Then, try again.
You’re building this fantastic theoretical model of what could have happened here and how this could have been accomplished to shoot holes in the piece Wilk. You cant get past the fact that you are making it up as you go along and, ultimately, all you’ve got is this question mark of whether a submarine might or might not have been present and undetectable.
As opposed to your claim, which, if I were to use your style of argumentation, boils down to proclaiming that the carriers were undetectable and “tested against the best” because the Soviets did not overfly them in peacetime 24/7.
Take issue with my writing style all you like, but, the fact is that you are trying to obfuscate and misdirect to cover the basic lack of anything to support your supposition. I’d recommend you try to find some supporting evidence though…
Unbelievable that you are the one demanding further evidence when you still haven’t supplied a shred of your own. YOU are the one making an extraordinary claim about undetectability and “tests”, and we’re still waiting for you to supply evidence to support it:
During which RN-Soviet exercises were these tests conducted? Were both sides completely transparent and revealed the full extent of what they did detect? And can you provide statements from the Soviets involved that confirm that they used “the best they had?” and that they agree that they could not do “anything about and the escapades of the Midway” had a shooting war started?
You’re looking for records from the 2nd Red Banner Submarine Flotilla out of Kamchatka Rybachiy…most probably their 45th Submarine division as, at the time, they had 6 or 7 671RTM’s plus a couple of earlier -1’s which would make them the most likely source of your threat from the local side. Backing them up were about a dozen, evenly split, Charlie-1 and Echo-II SSGN’s belonging to 10th Division.
There were about a dozen Echo-II’s and a few vintage Novembers at Pavolvsk Bay and Rakushka as part of the 4th Flotilla at the time which may have had anticarrier tasking. I’d try them too.
Wait, you actually think that what you just listed supports your argument? You are also missing a few (sadly the source I suspect you are using is slightly incomplete and is noted as such). My sources show 20 SSGNs (majority 675 but with a half dozen 670s), 23 SSNs (mostly 671, nine others are 627s and 659s), 19 SSKs (mostly 641s and 651s).
That’s over sixty subs based in the local area!
Yes 100km wakehomers…the ones that you thought long ranged if they were being launched at 25km…or am I misquoting you?. Maybe you need to look at the collection of subs in theatre…and their numbers…before getting too carried away with that one.
I just did and the numbers do not support your position in the least.
WilkI made no such explicit claim and neither did the article cited
LOL what?
Despite launch of helicopters and active search methods by several ships in the successful SAR, including clear voice UHF transmissions, the force is not detected
In NORPAC 82 these mirror image strikes within range of Petroplavask and the SSBN bastion in the Sea of O are conducted for 4 days without being detected by the opposition
A strategic strike capable force operated with complete impunity for 4 days within range of strategic assets without being detected
In Pico’s illustration he provides the basis for his position that they werent detected
:rolleyes:
Here though we have the firsthand description of an officer, experienced in all aspects of naval deceptive manoeuvre, detailing observed Soviet responses to his groups moves. These responses include an attempt to search for his ship but no detection via active means. We have definitely, in this theatre at this time, indications of skywave and surface wave radar coverage both of which being cueing assets (though its possible the skywave system at this time was generating poor results). Potentially there MAY have been some fixed passive sonar in theatre…also a cueing asset if it was operational. If either system, radar or passive sonar, got a hit it didnt cue anything to target on the surface or above. This is known fact from the article.
Sadly it looks like I was right about having to quote myself. Here we go again:
…the article, and your accompanying claims are full of assumptions and omissions, including, but not limited to:
– assuming that a peacetime response is equivalent to a wartime response.
– assuming that the Soviets were utterly stupid and revealed their complete sensor picture to their adversary when they had absolutely no reason to do so.
– assuming that the Soviets were completely incapable of maskirovka.
– assuming that mirror strikes provoke the same response as direct strikes.
– assuming that Soviet forces that did respond were using their equipment to its fullest, instead of peacetime modes.
– assuming that the Soviet forces that did respond were fully networked, instead of being required to operate on their own in order to test the individual units’ capabilities.
– assuming that forces which made a detection, such as submarines, were ordered to reveal or transmit the detection instead of performing a mock attack and retiring.
– omitting or ignoring the presence of subsurface sensors, over-the horizon sensors, etc.
– pretending that the alleged absence of a certain type of sensor is evidence of non-detection.
– assuming that their own sensors were infallible by claiming to know with certainty whether certain Soviet assets were present or not.
– and so on. I’m not going to waste a whole page on this.
You insinuate that the opposition could have been clever and been showing the US only what they wanted them to see. You are missing the point that, to have decided to employ maskirovka in the first place, the Soviets would have had to KNOW what the contact they held, from those cueing assets, was!. How did they get the ID?.
No, they would NOT have to know what the contact was. What a bizarre and nonsensical statement to make.
What you are left with, after all your protests, is a huge whine at the tone of the article and my piece which boils down to no more than a petulant ‘well…there could have been a submarine there!’.
Jonesy I have started writing a lexicon to help me try to understand you. Here are a few of my entries thus far:
disputing an article or post = “a huge whine”
basic military strategy = “a fiendishly clever plot”
subsurface sensors and platforms = “omnipotent Soviet submarine fleet”:diablo:
I’ve got plenty of space, so keep them coming!!
On the other hand…if there really was no submarine there…or the carrier zig-zagged…or, like Midway, plugged in a sprint every now and again then what?.
Ooooh a zig-zag, and a sprint every now and then… yeah that’ll keep you nice and safe from 100 km ranged wakehomers or ASMs…
Just a friendly reminder: the year was 1982, not 1942.
Submarines have their limitations too and ones, qualitatively better than anything the Soviets had in 82, had no easy time against a carrier group in blue water that same year.
Well seeing as how those “qualitatively better than anything the Soviets had” submarines were still using ww2-vintage unguided torpedoes as their main armament, then yeah I could see how you might think they did not have an easy time.
Interesting. To echo the earlier response to this though…all of the BRIC states are carrier operators and all have expressed interest in developing that aspect of their naval forces.
And yet they continue to acquire numerous other types of warships and land-based airpower whilst leaving carriers as a low priority with limited numbers expected to be operated. India and China’s carrier programs look like they will both result in three 40-60k tons carriers operational each. Compare that to their increasingly powerful airforces and these carriers will only carry a minute fraction of their nation’s air power. We’ve been hearing from various Russian sources about a new carrier for a long time but instead they’re spending their money on new generation land-based fighters and bombers and building SSGNs at prices they could be building carriers at. I expect they’ll build at least one eventually though just to display that they’re still in the carrier club. Brazil? Has decided to build SSNs… In summary the BRIC carriers account for a miniscule proportion of their airpower, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.
WilkOK so, bottom line, you dont believe the article despite the fact you have no proof or indication that the submarines, hydrophones, surface/sky-wave radar and whatever else you believe ‘should’ have been tracking the carrier were actually present and doing so?. In fact you are quite indignant that it shouldnt be just ‘accepted’ that they were there and knew everything that was going on?.
Straw man. I have not made any claims as to what the Soviets detected. Because I don’t know. On the other hand, you, and the article you cite, have claimed to know with certainty as to what they did detect (until you finally admitted that you “couldn’t 100% guarantee it”). However the article, and your accompanying claims are full of assumptions and omissions, including, but not limited to:
– assuming that a peacetime response is equivalent to a wartime response.
– assuming that the Soviets were utterly stupid and revealed their complete sensor picture to their adversary when they had absolutely no reason to do so.
– assuming that the Soviets were completely incapable of maskirovka.
– assuming that mirror strikes provoke the same response as direct strikes.
– assuming that Soviet forces that did respond were using their equipment to its fullest, instead of peacetime modes.
– assuming that the Soviet forces that did respond were fully networked, instead of being required to operate on their own in order to test the individual units’ capabilities.
– assuming that forces which made a detection, such as submarines, were ordered to reveal or transmit the detection instead of performing a mock attack and retiring.
– omitting or ignoring the presence of subsurface sensors, over-the horizon sensors, etc.
– pretending that the alleged absence of a certain type of sensor is evidence of non-detection.
– assuming that their own sensors were infallible by claiming to know with certainty whether certain Soviet assets were present or not.
– and so on. I’m not going to waste a whole page on this.
Now that was just the detection/response angle. You then somehow managed to extrapolate your claim as proof that they were “tested against the best the Soviets had,” as if it somehow tested the capabilities of the staggering array of missiles, torpedoes, jammers, active/passive defenses, decoys/countermeasures, etc. that both sides would have employed in a real test/wartime.
And after all that, you’re surprised that other posters don’t believe you?
..and now you are quite simply being dishonest. The claim for undetectability of a carrier 20 miles off someones coast I’ve never made. Similarly I’ve never said that, when a service advertises its carriers transit through a chokepoint on the internet, it will be undetectable. The former was the case with the Iranian UAV and the latter with the Fencer overflight.
My point has nothing to do with detectability in a choke point. You have used claims made by navy servicemen or spokesmen that they were not tracked as “proof” of non-detection. In the case of the Iranian UAV overflight there was initially a denial of the overflight. So why should anyone treat these claims seriously, as you seem to do.
Would you care, Wilk, to offer an opinion on the topic of the thread or are you more of the stance that sea power is a fallacy and only land-based air is worth consideration?.
I don’t have much to say on the topic because I see the USN as simply staying the course for as long as they can hold it, so to me the future is Nimitz/Ford. The USN likes their supercarriers and won’t settle for smaller carriers even if they were better dollar-for-dollar (and I don’t believe they are). As budgets increasingly tighten and options become limited I expect the USN will prefer to lower the number of active CVNs rather than attempt to adopt smaller platforms, despite all the dangers (political, budgetary, and strategic) of doing so. In their place there would be some further reliance on SSGNs and land based air. The access denial fears are blown way out of proportion as the USN is extremely unlikely to enter combat with anyone with that sort of capability.
On the topic of land-based air vs “sea power” (which I’m going to take as carrier based airpower) I certainly see land-based airpower replacing carrier-based to some extent. Mostly for the following reasons:
1) Decline of the USA + rise of the BRICS. The BRICS have lesser global ambitions and consequently lower global power projection needs. They tend to be more concerned with their own “back yards” which are generally in range of their land based air, and if not then perhaps soon they will be as a consequence of:
2) Increasing range of land-based aircraft. Obviously that one doesn’t require an explanation.
WilkApart from the point that they did divulge detection info….mock strikes against Enterprise?. Immediate reaction when Midways aircraft were observed?.
Divulging SOME detection info does not in any way equal divulging ALL detection info. How you cannot grasp such a simple concept is beyond me.
My apologies I thought it plainly obvious I wasnt talking about the Soviets using American sonar. I was referring to a type of theatre passive sonar deployment. i.e if no fixed array was in place then a mobile one would be required. You didnt state the hydrophones needed to be fixed but, in absence of a SURTASS-type platform, it does beg the question of what deployment platform you are considering for the long-range passive sonar capability you describe.
I didn’t “describe” any long range passive sonar. I mentioned hydrophones, since the original undetectability claim conveniently ignored any subsurface component. If we ignore fixed arrays (which remain classified but we know the Russians have them, and they’ve revealed the existence of some, including off Kamtchatka), then you still had hundreds of mobile platforms equipped with cylindrical, flank, etc. arrays, and a small but increasing number with low frequency towed arrays.
Wilk, to follow your analogy, do you think the home side would’ve allowed the ‘unannounced practice’ on their pitch in the first place?. Demonstrably they didnt when the other ‘half’ of the team turned on the floodlights and ran their practice blatantly in full view. Your suggestion is that they were happy to reveal their gameplan on one hand and allow the other side to continue their practice unhampered on the other?. Remarkably generous.
Why would the home side not allow it when it provides them the opportunity to fully observe the opponent on their home turf? It continues to be really amusing that you think the home side were the ones who revealed more of their “game plan.”
I dont think it. They did tip their hand several times and it gave us, I’m told, valuable insights. I’m sure you’ll spin it to state that these were all intentional efforts of misdirection and counter-intel as you are well aware that disproving such a comment would be near impossible. All I will say then is that tangible, significant, intelligence benefits were derived by NATO operations that, where I in the Soviet position, I would not have allowed if I could have at all stopped it. That they didnt stop those actions from happening, had they known they were in progress, would be a display of fantastic stupidity. I dont believe they were that stupid.
There’s a lot spin here indeed – all coming from you. You conclude this paragraph by indicating that you believe that the Soviets were not stupid yet the entire piece implies that they were stupid enough not to engage in any misdirection. You are on the wrong side of logic, reason, and evidence here, and you know it, so you’ve descended to making unclear, unprovable claims about “valuable insights,” whilst preemptively accusing me of making unprovable claims.
You do have a habit of trying to put words ‘in my mouth’ and telling me they are wrong!. I never said they ‘were never detected’ though. I have no idea why the USN released that statement
Putting words in your mouth? You have repeatedly made references to these claims about undetectability. Some of those claims have been proven to be false.
I make no contention that carriers are invulnerable everywhere on the planet.
No, they’re just invulnerable in some places, right…?:rolleyes:
Again for that to be the case you have to turn a blind eye to the reaction of the forces involved during the operation. Or you have to ascribe the actions to some overarching and incredibly subtle strategic deception plan on the Soviets part. I’ll look forward to seeing you provide evidence that Pico was wrong in his, reasoned and experienced assessment, with your equally reasoned and experienced counter position.
Oh, now *I’m* supposed to provide evidence against *your* unproven, illogical claims. You have made the claims of undetectability and “tests against the best the Soviet Union had”. You are the one who needs to back up that claim. I asked you to provide proof to support your claim in my first post. Here it is again, in case you’ve forgotten:
During which RN-Soviet exercises were these tests conducted? Were both sides completely transparent and revealed the full extent of what they did detect? And can you provide statements from the Soviets involved that confirm that they used “the best they had?” and that they agree that they could not do “anything about and the escapades of the Midway” had a shooting war started?
Here was your response to it:
The proof of the one-sidedness, certainly in one case I recall, was quite tangible, irrefutable and wont be expanded upon here.
And after that you’ve got the audacity to demand “proof” from me? You cannot possibly be serious.
I also demonstrated why Pico’s undetectability claim was nonsense in my first post too, I’ll refrain from quoting that though as I expect soon most of my responses will be best answered by quoting my previous replies.
Could it all have been a fiendishly clever plot to deceive NATO as to the Soviet ability to localise, detect and track marine targets. Its impossible to 100% guarantee it wasnt.
So according to you, not revealing all of your detection info to a potential opponent in peacetime is “a fiendishly clever plot.” :rolleyes: At least you’ve finally admitted that you don’t have any proof. You could have just said that earlier though, and not wasted everyone’s time.
It does prove the response to a detected carrier, in that theatre at that time, at least.
No, it absolutely does not prove the actual response to a detected carrier in a real, kinetic war situation. Peacetime DOES NOT EQUAL wartime even more so considering this was not a friendly, transparent exercise.
WilkWanshan,
I’m not sure what your question is… but I suspect that it’s not at all related to the topic and so should probably be taken to pm’s.
WilkIn the rush to discredit you are missing a few key points though. Midway was operating in the face of OTH radar in that exercise serial. Fixed passive hydrophone lines are best deployed on favourable marine topography, if you dont have those convenient topographical features then its SURTASS…if you dont have SURTASS then what is your platform for the passive sonar?.
If I’m “missing a few key points” then you certainly haven’t pointed them out. Claiming undetectability whilst operating in the face of OTH radar, in peacetime, against a force that has no reason to divulge detection info, is stupid. The surtass statement makes no sense. Why would the Soviets be using a US sonar, and where did I state that the hydrophones need be fixed?
RN side it was on operations. The proof of the one-sidedness, certainly in one case I recall, was quite tangible, irrefutable and wont be expanded upon here.
This is not even worthy of my ridicule.
All you are saying though, effectively, is prove that the carrier group wasnt detected and that all this isnt false assumption. In the RN case the ships involved eventually were discovered but not in time to prevent the actions we needed to take to achieve our goals. In Pico’s illustration he provides the basis for his position that they werent detected during that 4 day window…..so you are arguing a moot point.
So to make an analogy, your team decided to show up for an unannounced practice at the opposing team’s pitch. The other team wasn’t there, so you made up some rules, played against an imaginary opponent, scored a few empty netters, and left, declaring that you would do that well against him if it was the championship game. Meanwhile, the other team watched you play using the microphones and cameras that you pretended weren’t there.
..what even the parts where he said Enterprise operated plainly and was subject to a number of Soviet mock attacks?. Maybe you liked the part where he acknowleged luck can play a part…you can always run over a submarine thats inconveniently located and gives the game away….by extrapolation you can say the same thing about an AGI if it somehow manages to go unnoticed long enough…thats happened too. That it is not guaranteed to work 100% of the time does nothing whatsoever to degrade the core principle, and proven efficacy, of deceptive manoevre outlined though.
You have the luck part backwards. In the real world, the Soviets operated literally hundreds of subs. It would be the carrier which would have to have luck not to encounter one. And no, it did not need to “run over a sub” as those subs had the capacity to detect the carrier, and employ accurate, guided torpedoes and missiles against it at tens, and in some cases, hundreds of kilometers distance.
Its easy to make claims with conviction when you know some of the operational history. If the Soviets were deliberately letting NATO navies take the actions we did, in order to fool us into the mistaken belief that we could act with some license, (as you imply) then they paid a high price in gifted intel for their ‘victory’.
See the above analogy. It is hilarious that you actually think the Soviets were the ones who paid the high price in intel.
Falling back on Iranian UAV’s or Fencer overflights to try to disprove the carrier advantage, when in both cases the carrier position was localised before the fact, is more than slightly disingenous…its no different in fact to the mock attacks Pico mentions himself from 82.
No one disputes that aircraft can overfly ships when they know where to find them. The dispute is whether they can reliably find them quickly enough for it to make a difference. I’d expect you would have a problem proving that one.
Funny how the story changes. First, “we were never detected,” then, when the other side decides to present irrefutable evidence of detection, it changes to “it was localized before.” Rather like your attempt to steer this discussion on a different course; the dispute is about your absurd claim of carriers being “definitely tested against the best the Soviets had.” Slightly disingenuous indeed. Minus the “slightly” part.
WilkWhat gives you that idea?. NATO carriers were definitely tested and tested against the best the Soviet Union had….and in their own back yard. I know of some things that the RN got away with that the Soviets just would not have allowed had they been able to do anything about and the escapades of the Midway (note – medium carrier) off the Kamchatka back in the day are legendary.
During which RN-Soviet exercises were these tests conducted? Were both sides completely transparent and revealed the full extent of what they did detect? And can you provide statements from the Soviets involved that confirm that they used “the best they had?” and that they agree that they could not do “anything about and the escapades of the Midway” had a shooting war started?
The quite affable Andy Pico, at the time a Hawkeye operator, described the process and history more than adequately here for anyone who’s not familiar: http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-031.htm
The article is full of this sort of nonsense:
the force is not detected because no Soviet asset was above the radar horizon. No overhead system was cued.
Interesting how in this writer’s seemingly alternate universe, a cvbg can only be detected by an asset above the radar horizon. Apparently it cannot be detected by passive hydrophones, OTH radar, periscopes, “fishing” trawlers, etc.. It is also appears to be omniscient and is completely aware of whether it has, or has not been detected, even if the opponent is utilizing silent, passive means of detection. It also happens to know with certainly, whether there is, or is not, a “Soviet asset above the radar horizon.”
Obviously if you wish to delude yourself into believing that, then that’s your prerogative. Luckily, as stated earlier in this thread, there has not been a real test (aka a shooting war) so it’s easy to make extravagant claims. And hopefully, the other guy won’t release a video of your carrier from his UAV, which you claimed wasn’t there 😀
WilkWilk – is R-33 really LOAL capable?
Yes since its seeker is incapable of detecting most targets at the missile’s max range it has to be. LOAL is not really that special even R-23 was actually LOAL.
WilkNo, when you fire SARH missile you need to hard-lock the target before the launch.
No you don’t. That is a bit of a myth. For missiles which are LOAL and possess a datalink/inertial guidance, you only need it in the final phase. Before that, inertial/datalink guidance can be provided from TWS or similar mode, full illumination is not necessary. This also means that even if you momentarily lose track during midcourse guidance, you can regain it and still guide the missile in (although possibly at great cost to PK depending on target maneuvers during the time tracking was lost).
THIS gives the warning signal to opponent’s RWR.
Yes, it’s a warning signal, but NOT an indicator. It’s the same if your RWR is showing an intermittent scan by a bandit (of course with sufficient signal strength that he can probably detect you). That too is a warning that there could be a missile inbound.
No guarantee, but at least you know who is aiming at you.
But that’s not what you were saying before:
the Tomcat will be aware that the missiles has been fired (SARH guidance), but Foxbat can only guess.
In your previous post you claimed that the F-14 “will be aware” of the launch. That’s what I disagreed with.
Anyway, in the case of MiG-31, this is actually not true since the 31 is capable of effectively “locking” several targets simultaneously (thereby giving it true multiple simultaneous attack capability with SARH missiles). So it may not, in fact, be “aiming” at you (for the moment…)
Of course the AWG-9 has to emit, but you’re just scanning, you don’t have to reveal your intentions that you want to attack that particular MiG by hard locking him and switching radar to STT mode.
I agree. But in a 1-on-1 scenario, this is meaningless (and 1-on-1 scenario was the whole basis of this discussion). In other scenarios with many aircraft pilots should always assume that if they are being painted by the enemy then there may be a missile inbound, even if the signal is intermittent.
Ok, so even if the first Phoenix misses its target and the MiG gets closer lets say 60km then the Tomcat pilot should realize that the Phoenix missed. Next step – turn again, 50km distance – fire another phoenix, guide the missile for some time and if the MiG fires his missile, turn away from him, dive and outrun the missile in low and dense portions of the atmosphere.
Couple of problems here. First, the F-14 can only be certain that the AIM-54 missed if he still detects Zaslon emissions. If the MiG-31 has switched to passive IRST tracking (against which the now afterburning, receding F-14 would be an optimal target), then the F-14 may believe a hit occurred when it did not. Second, if the F-14 turns (and obviously he must turn very quickly) he will reduce airspeed rapidly and quickly re-enter R-33 Rmax or Rtr or even NEZ, so the MiG-31 will launch again (thereby launching first, and from a much higher energy state, too). Once the F-14 has turned he still has to find the MiG, track and launch. All of this takes time, during which there is a rapidly approaching R-33 and the F-14 is now in a relatively low energy state, which will limit evasive potential.
All I’m saying here is that IMO the “run away” strategy is possibly the worst one the F-14 could chose in this scenario.
But I think we can talk forever about such unrealistic 1on1 situations and ‘invent’ new counter-counter-counter tactics…
Agreed. But it makes for entertaining discussion…
WilkNo. When you launch SARH missile you have to illuminate the target for the missile. Firing ARH missile gives you no warning untill last few seconds before the impact.
Unless you’re using a datalink or passive tracking, you need to scan and track the target for both SARH and ARH missiles. Consequently, the target has a warning that a missile *may* be inbound. For SARH you require continuous illumination during the terminal stage. For ARH the missile seeker handles that. In either case, the opponent’s RWR will pick up your fighter’s emissions and can expect that a missile may be on the way.
So when you are illuminated you can expect that the missile has been fired or can be fired anytime now.
Yes, there may or may not be a missile fired at you… No guarantee either way.
Firing ARH missile gives you no warning untill last few seconds before the impact.
False, unless you are using a datalink or passive tracking (or you’ve “mad dogged” the missile). This is a 1-on-1 scenario so no datalinks and F-14A had no IRST, so AWG-9 has to emit in order to track the target.
It’s exactly the opposite way. ARH missile gives you warning few seconds before impact. SARH missile needs illumination and illuminating your target sends a clear warning to his RWR.
See above. Unless you’ve got a passive sensor, you have to scan the target, which presents a clear warning on his RWR… The only difference with illumination is that if you are being illuminated you are effectively a magnet for missiles…
Sure, but the Tomcat can turn 180* away from the target after firing his missiles.
And without midcourse guidance VS a very fast target PK of AIM-54 will drop to zero… and the F-14 has turned away from an opponent who can (given equal starting conditions) easily catch-up to it. Not a very good position to be in.
Second thing is that even when both fighters fire at the same time only Tomcat will have a clear warning(illumination for missile guidance).
False. Both fighters need to track each other and consequently have equal warning (I’m assuming MiG-31 isn’t using its IRST here…) Again, there is no magical warning when an SARH or ARH missile is fired!
Another thing is that the Phoenix probably has speed/energy advantage over the R-33.
This has already been debated in this thread. One thing is certain though is that due to higher altitude and speed, MiG-31 is able to give a bigger “boost” to its missiles.
So in 1on1 scenario Tomcat has one clear advantage – firing AIM-54 doesn’t send any warning.
Not an advantage because firing R-33 doesn’t send any warning either.
If the MiG want’s to fire R-33 he has to illuminate his target.
No, all he has to do is track the target and provide continuous illumination in the terminal phase. Which is… much like the F-14 tracking the MiG-31! The difference being that the MiG-31 does the terminal illumination itself whereas F-14A has AIM-54 do it. With that said, MiG-31 might as well perform continuous illumination throughout the engagement as that decreases probability of losing track of the target and also does not provide any indication of number of missiles or range of the missiles which have been fired (or if they’ve been fired at all!).
So the Tomcat can wait with firing his own missiles until being illuminated.
Very, very bad idea. Since continuous illumination need only occur during the terminal phase, if he waits until he is illuminated that may mean an R-33 is merely seconds away from impact!
Then, when both missiles are fired the Tomcat can turn away and run (shrinking R-33 effective range significantly).
Already commented on this a couple of times. Turning away from an opponent with an energy advantage over you is not wise.
Main advantage is that the Zaslon is a PESA radar, so it can scan large amount of space much faster and this is a huge advantage over MSA radars, however detection ranges seem to be similar.
Detection ranges were sacrificed in favor of larger volume scanned which was deemed more important (and for the MiG-31’s intended mission this was probably the correct decision).
WilkEven if both fighter fire at the same range – the Tomcat will be aware that the missiles has been fired (SARH guidance), but Foxbat can only guess.
This statement makes no sense (and if it’s possible, even less sense in the context of MiG-31 radar capabilities and IRST). The terminal guidance method of an incoming missile is not some magic indicator of a missile launch. There is no way of knowing for certain that missiles have been fired unless you visually spot a smoke trail or you’ve got an IR warning system. Active homing missiles are actually disadvantaged in terms of detection because the target becomes aware of the missile seeker going active and can attempt last-ditch evasive actions. Against missiles with SARH terminal guidance you’ve no such obvious warning.
High and fast flying MiG can’t do much turning after the pilot realizes that Phoenix got active
Assuming you’re talking about a 1-on-1 fight no competent 31 pilot will blast straight at an F-14A that’s tracking him. He will instead launch, turn away to his max tracking angle (+-70) and accelerate. At high speed this angle this will result in the AIM-54 being forced to bleed excessive energy in order to match the maneuver, ultimately resulting in a much slower endgame which may be insufficient to match any final maneuver by the MiG, or even to catch it. Of course the 14 can also attempt such a tactic but due to lower speed and smaller tracking angle it would be not be as potent.
The 14’s best chance is to quickly close the range where it gains the advantage. This may not be easy to do, as due to the speed and range advantage of the 31 the latter should be able to dictate the terms of the fight.
The MiG-31 might win a few miles missile range by flying faster and higher, but the F-14 could escape the engagement zone.
This “tactic” keeps appearing in this thread and I keep shaking my head whenever it comes up. Turning away from an adversary who has a major speed and range advantage over you is an extremely poor idea.
Both Zaslon and AWG-9 have similar capabilities
This statement which has been repeatedly made in one form or another sums up everything that is wrong with this thread. It shows that people have either no understanding of Zaslon’s capabilities or are deliberately making false claims. Zaslon and AWG-9 DO NOT have similar capabilities. Zaslon due to its very nature has a number of (at that time) unique capabilities that the AWG-9 had no analog to (no pun intended). Some functions of Zaslon, like scan time and volume, exceeded those of AWG-9 by literally, an order of a magnitude or more and they’ve been pointed out; but, unsurprisingly, they’ve been ignored. Obviously, those capabilities came at a cost in weight but that’s not being denied by anyone.
MiG-31’s biggest advantage is it’s speed and range
I disagree. Zaslon in combination with speed and range are its biggest advantage. It is, in effect, an extremely fast mini-AWACS with a long range missile system. Consequently, it can monitor huge areas of airspace far, far better than any other cold war fighter and thanks to its speed and range it is generally able to engage and disengage at will, making it highly survivable.
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