That is quite insignificant. Because if one accepts this logic, then he will be rewarded by more reduced unit price in the next lots which will contain less support cost, in return. In the end you pay the same, so don’t hold your breath.

Quite on the contrary. It was announced that the Brazilian Gripen deal will be up $5.4 billion for 36 jets (incl. equipment, support cost, ToT, and most importantly licensed production and reexport). I have not seen a single Gripen fan who would not humbly accept the fact that if you want to make your own NG Gripens and even have the right to export them, then get prepared for total acquisition unit price approaching $150 million. So where is the bloody murder screamin?

Msphere, your reasoning of aircraft costs on total value of the contract is flawed:

1. Yes, the Brazil deal is 5.4 billion for 36 aircraft (dozen locally produced) as well as ToT. Do you have the details as to what is included for those aircraft? How much is the value of spares in the contract? Maintenance training? Are there sims included?
so you want to go with total acquisition price of 150 million, OK

2. Let’s look at S. Korea’s 7.1 billion dollar F-35 deal. It includes: two simulators, spares, some ToT, offsets such as satellite launches, technical aid for S. Korea’s F-X program, and forty F-35’s. That averages out to 177.5 million
Does that mean that the F-35 is 27 million dollars more expensive than the Gripen E/F?

Nope, let’s look at other contracts:
Israel’s first deal for 19 F-35’s is 2.75 Billion, which works out to 144 million each.

Do you think it will cost S. Korea 7.1 Billion in then year dollars to buy 40 more F-35’s in the 2020’s during FRP? Or it Brazil decides to contract for 36 more Gripens to be built in Sweden for some unforeseen reason that those aircraft would cost 150 million per?

Bottom line is you cannot calculate total acquisition unit price from contracts.

This analogy is erroneous for several reasons:

1. there are no LRIP contracts which would include only 100 widgets.

Sigh, the entire focus of what is in dispute about the defense-aerospace article has been lost.

Nowhere, was I disputing any sustainment costs, nor concurrency. The author included parts of sustainment and support costs in the LRIP contracts in an attempt to show an increase in unit cost, that was the issue.

Gotta love how the discussion spirals to the point where posters are making arguments far beyond what was in dispute.

Horse manure. You don’t have a factual point.

No, I do, your just out there shooting blanks. Again, go back to the article. Disregard the number of aircraft ordering in each lot, look at what is included in each contract. LIRP 5 & 6 include different program support, different mission equipment, RCS radar testing mods in one contract, more simulators in the other. The author adds all these contracts up to compare the unit cost between lots 5 & 6.

Surely you are not dense enough to think this an accurate way to ascertain what the customer pays for the airframe.

Moreover, do you think FRP F-35 contracts will include simulators and support equipment to set up pilot training centers? Get off it, your rebuttals are silly and ignorant.

P.S.- nice after the fact edit of your post. Now we are changing your argument? I never said the MMRCA contract was comparable, I was pointing out flawed methodology so you can drop it.

Also, you really think that the costs of setting up training centers in various nations shows what one nation pays for the LRIP aircraft? (shovel- hole getting deeper)

A widget by it’s very nature doesn’t require service and support or spare parts. Improving it makes it become a different widget.
So an apples to oranges comparison.

The F35 on the other hand is very far from being a widget.
Attempting to dismiss valid observation by comparing LRIP contracts for non operational airframes to widget contracts merely demonstrates the lack of fact you have on your side.

Your (and the authors’) inability to differentiate unit costs of the F-35 from total procurement costs are not my fault. I was using a simple example with the widgets to point out where the author went wrong.

Your rebuttal just shows your lack of objectivity- refer to Tony’s response above, see what happens when one tries to figure out how much an aircraft costs by looking at a contract? Yours and Tony’s reaction prove my point

Come on LO, you really think that including the cost of simulators are related to Unit cost?

He clearly included non-recurring costs. Do you think the purchase of simulators or upgrading the RCS testing at Hill reflect the price the USAF or others pay for the airframe? Are those costs going to be the same in future lots? I think not.

-BTW, you’re focusing Rafale comment which I was illustrating that the Methodology that Briganti used to determine Unit cost by adding up all training, parts, etc. would be akin to assessing the unit cost of the Rafale by dividing the MMRCA deal by number of aircraft….. Flawed methodology.

FBW – Describing something as “even more of a laugh” is a little empty when you don’t advance any facts in support of that statement.

The author added up the total contracts including for: non-recurring sustainment and logistics support, special tooling and test equipment, ALIS equipment, spares, ancillary support equipment, training equipment and on and on, then divided by the number of aircraft in the lots.

Using the same logic, the 20+ billion dollar contract for the Rafale works out to 175 million per fighter. Obviously, there is more to pricing unit cost than dividing the total contracts by the number of aircraft, no?

The previous couple of comments have highlighted the range requirement for strategic assets.

For me it is absolutely clear that LO and VLO platforms are at their most effecient when they have the range and autonomy to penetrate opposition airspace silently without requiring supporting assets.

Supporting assets are required, even the B-2 with it’s phenomenal range needs tankers (due to the difficulty with forward basing that delicate money pit). Current U.S. doctrine for penetrating contested airspace include jamming aircraft, ISR assets such as the RQ-180, Global Hawk. Tankers and AWACS will always be part of the equation, though I doubt future AWACS will look anything like today’s airliner based solution.

There is no guaranteed way to fly “silently” through contested airspace without breaking the kill chain. LO is one arrow in the quiver, something that has be recognized and addressed.

The F35 has neither the range nor the all aspect VLO characteristics to achieve that.
It is a tactical strike fighter mascarading as a strategic asset. To the detriment of true strategic requirements.

Two issues, the USAF would argue with your assessment of all aspect VLO (certainly RCS would be bigger from certain angles, but that is the case with most LO designs). Second, the F-35 has never been considered a strategic asset, it is a tactical strike fighter as you’ve stated. The Strategic strike requirements are met by the B-2 and the future LRS-B.