FBWUK/German GDPs are widely inflated and has nothing to do with reality. for example in Kingdom of Saudi Gasoline prices are 1/10 of UK/Germany. Education even overseas is free. and arms procurement in billions. heavy twin engine airforce with all AESA radars. trillions in soverign wealth fund and private accounts. No debt. No need for Chinese working for them. decisive command on world reserve currencies. picture tell everything.
http://online.wsj.com/articles/john-kerry-meets-with-saudi-king-abdullah-1403888673.
Confusing GDP with PPP.
FBWTrying to predict availability of an aircraft that has not even achieved IOC is a bit like trying to guess keno numbers based on previous lotteries.
I’d love to hear you make that argument as you’re trying to sell a new airliner to Emirates. Combat aircraft are a bit different, but essentially not that different. Every component can be and should be designed, bench-tested and validated in flight to achieve a specified lifetime and probability of failure, and every maintenance action can be simulated in the design stage and validated on the flightline.
Indeed, if you really don’t expect to be able to predict availability before IOC, your program should be scrapped and you should probably be facing five-to-ten in the federal slammer for fraud.
Airliners don’t stay in service for 30 years. Their engines don’t have a core that runs at the temp fighters do. Second, USAF availability rates tend to suffer based on budget whims and deferred maintainence. Historically, USAF availability rates have increased during combat ops, at least in the short term:
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR468.pdf
The f-22 has improved every year, though it has yet to achieve it’s goal.
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663196.pdf
The saga of the b-1 shows how availability is a moving target. The aircraft suffered from poor availability thoughout it’s early years as the unloved stepchild of SAC. Once the B-1 became an important asset in the conventional arsenal, it’s availability improved significantly until age and operational tempo wore the fleet down.
http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20080408/NEWS/804080326/B-1B-readiness-drops-4-years-row
The f-35 will probably suffer from the typical teething troubles the U.S. Fighter fleets experience when being introduced. Once lessons are learned by operational use, they SHOULD improve. The supers are about the only fighter in the US fleet that came out of the gate strong.
FBWHe brings up an issue that should be part of every debate actually: sortie rate, availability.
As of now, F-35 availability is 50%, meaning if you need 25 fighters for an air force, you need to buy 50.
Time will tell how much this will improve, compared to others, this may indicate a 75% availability at its peak
Availability rates fluctuate over the aircraft’s service life. Trying to predict availability of an aircraft that has not even achieved IOC is a bit like trying to guess keno numbers based on previous lotteries.
FBWA bad aircraft that does fly is far better than a good aircraft that doesn’t… and not only is the F-35 inadequate for anything other than bombing static targets, but it will also be a chore to keep in the air.
Absurd points, and that’s about the only reply a post like that deserves.
FBWa question.
Its more than likely that F16-IQ will never be delivered to Iraq.
Would the US give us a refund or will they take the money and run?
We really could use that money just about now to buy ACTUAL USEFUL WARPLANES that we could ACTUALLY USE.
My guess is AMARG, U.S. couldn’t take them without paying, but probably will “wait” on delivery until things stabilize.
FBWMost of the issues you mention above are explainable.
Turning at sea level is lift-limited, not drag-limited. F-16s can make up for high wing-loading with better high AoA capability.
F-15 is a funny one because a lot of fundamentally incorrect empty weights have circulated. Wiki are using F-15C empty weight for F-15E.
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104501/f-15-eagle.aspx
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104499/f-15e-strike-eagle.aspxVS
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-15_Eagle
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_F-15E_Strike_EagleIf you use the correct figures it makes sense. There’s also the issue of the semi-permanent centre pylon. Take that off and figures change remarkably, it makes a pretty big difference.
A clean MiG-29 actually has one of the best TWRs at 1.09 and has variable ramps explaining why it beats the F-16 supersonic.
The MiG-29’s climb figure seems to be based on a misinterpretation:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mig-29#Specifications_.28MiG-29.29
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikoyan_MiG-29#cite_note-176
http://web.archive.org/web/20080620004748/http://www.flug-revue.rotor.com/frtypen/FRMiG-29.htmThe only source states 55s to 6000m. Now realistically I take that to mean from brakes-off, since it’s too slow to just include the climb. Looking at the F-16 graphs, 55s would be realistic for acceleration to Mach 1 follow by a climb to 20,000ft.
However some tardsman on wiki has mistook 6000m for 60,000ft and divided it by 55 and times’d it by 60 to get the 65,000ft/min referenced in wikipedia, after which the link is stated as a source.:stupid: Now everyone copies that figure from wikipedia, like the dumb unthinking rats they are.
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/mig29/
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/mig35/
@Lukos, one of the reasons Andraxxus is coming up with different numbers than you is because your trying to extrapolate data from Wikipedia listings and he IS READING THE FREAKIN FLIGHT MANUALS. They are readily available, crap I’ve got links to the F-15 A/C/E and F-16 block 50, F-4E, F-18 C/E, etc. Also, both the F-16 and Mig-29 have nominally high wing loading but excellent turn performance because both were amongst the first blended wing and body designs. Simple wing area does not give wing loading. By some estimates, nearly 30% of the F-16’s lift was provided by the fuselage.
FBWhttp://news.usni.org/2014/06/23/breaking-fire-breaks-f-35-eglin-air-force-base-pilot-safe
Pilot safe, good deal. I’m guessing there are a lot of smug bloggers on the usual “haters” sites, and quite a few circumspect ones on the f-16. net type forums that were rejoicing the T-50 fire incident. Hey, these things happen.
FBWI disagree on all points, firstly those criticizing Sprey are those who are stuck in the early 50’s,
thinking that cruising subsonic in hostile environment is perfectly OK for as long as it is possible to accelerate from mach 0.6 to 0.95,
somehow and for some reason that is hidden from me, this is coupled with fantasies of plinking down fighters 100 km away,
“over the shoulder” and what-not,
tho i suspect the slogan ‘first look/shot/kill’ may be behind the misconception
along with misinterpretation on stated missile range, lacking parameters.
F-22 got it right on all points except sortie rate, cost, and operational cost, Sprey foresaw this before F-22 was even conceived.
The one parameter where radar are more accurate than passive sensors is range,
and btw ‘BVR’ constitute distances of ~5 nm, depending how big the fighter is,
the missile seeker itself can pick up at this distance.
When you say you disagree on all points, it would be nice if you broke down point by point what exactly you disagree with. What “passive sensors” are you referring to? At the time Sprey was making his case, passive sensors were pretty much limited to first generation IRST (that were used primarily to train the radar toward the target, not the quality target imaging of today’s IRST ), RWR that were nothing like today’s DAS, and the eyeball.
“The one parameter where radar are more accurate than passive sensors is range”
another vague comment not backed up by any details. Using passive Geo-location should provide very accurate targeting, provided you have three platforms networked together. Second, not once did anyone mention 100 km BVR kills. With the range of modern IR missiles, and improved close in capability of modern radar guided missiles, 0-10 km is a very dangerous place to be. I cannot stress enough that you should look back to the links I’ve posted previously about the evolution of WVR combat since the 1980’s(http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?128845-What-metrics-of-Agility-and-Maneuverability-matter&highlight= ) . The type of aircraft that he was envisioning, and your postulating would be at a huge disadvantage in the very area your assuming it would dominate. As far as fighters operating at .6 to .9 mach, there is good reason for this. Even the F-22 was expected to fly the majority of it’s mission at those speeds. It’s really going to take a breakthrough in engine technology (AETD?) to make supercruise practical over an entire mission profile.
As stated by Hopsalot, Sprey HATES the F-22 and it’s nothing to do with cost. You can believe what you want, but the evidence does not back up your assumptions. This is the F-35 thread and I’m not wasting any more time on Sprey.
FBW@Tu-22M- Overall I agree with your points, what is overlooked is whether the aircraft fits the defense doctrine of the nation making the purchase. I don’t think many, outside of Dassault, would argue that Brazil made a wise choice. The Gripen is a good fit for a nation that: a) has few (if any) regional threats that would outclass the Gripen b) does not have a tradition of spending, nor supporting a large defense establishment since the 1920’s battleship race. c) has not engaged in any expeditionary engagements, overseas deployments, or defense commitments. The Swiss had a similar choice to make and chose poorly by not pursuing the Gripen purchase. Where I disagree is that purchasing three times as many cheaper aircraft is actually a cost savings. I doubt training, spares, fuel, maintenance, on a large number of less sophisticated fighters would be any more affordable.
Then you are mis-reading him altogether,
he advocate surprise attacks, that is what supercruise is for, that is what passive sensors are for,
and by that, it is clear that missiles is the primary weapon, at as close as possible range,
so that long reaction time & evasive maneuvering will be denied.
Small size also reduces notification, not to mention his ideal fighter can be bought and operated in at least 3 times the quantity
of a larger less maneuverable and thus more vulnerable fighter to return fire
@ Obligatory- I don’t think anyone who is criticizing Sprey is misinterpreting his message. The issue is that his ideas, when postulated in the late 60’s were already becoming obsolete. First, there were no passive sensors in the 60’s or 70’s that would have provided the type of target data for BVR missiles needed. IRST were useful for secondary targeting and surveillance, but this was before HMS, integrated avionics, and multifunction displays that would have provided the pilot with the tactical picture needed. Using Geo-location for targeting was not feasible with RWR technology at that time. His ideal fighter would have been largely limited to daytime WVR engagements at a time when the pulse doppler radar, IFF, and all aspect IR missiles were being introduced. He failed to realize that his dream fighter would have been inferior in providing the critical information for shortening the OODA loop as situational awareness was becoming more important. I think you are trying to apply his ideas from the 1970’s using todays technology because it fits YOUR paradigm of what a fighter should be. The F-16 Sprey envisioned would not have been a success, it was the intervention of the air force that led to the inclusion of a radar, strengthened airframe, and growth potential that has allowed the F-16 to be successful as a multirole fighter. Each successive block has grown heavier (with a degradation of the agility of the original) and yet become more capable as a fighter. Again, Sprey was an opponent of the AMRAAM program whether you want to accept that or not. His vision of a fighter would not have even been able to take full advantage of an AMRAAM class weapon due to the need for mid course guidance. Look up the RAF experience with integrating the AMRAAM on the Tornado F.3, without the mid course guidance, it was deemed to be less effective than the Skyflash SARH missiles.
FBWSuperhornet production is basically over for USN, therefore most of the contracted 590 or so superhornets must already be in service with USN. Around 500ish, alongside f18g?
Yet there seems to be over 400 more legacy hornets in service for a total of some 900 or so f18a-f (without g models). That is for 10 to 11 carriers. Out of which no more than 8 or so would ever really get deployed at once. So basically 112 fighters per carrier. Even if we take some 75% availability figures for the planes, that’s still 84 ready to deploy fighters per deployed carrier. Are all these numbers more or less correct or is the number of active hornets/superhornets smaller? Almost 80% more fighters ready per ready carrier than each carrier would realistically carry?
Does USN plan to rotate the planes from/to carriers during deployments so they always have freshly maintained planes? Even so, there’s way too many planes left. Does USN worry it might lose a third of its fighter fleet in combat ops? Or does USN plan to regularly use its planes from ground bases as well, redeployed near the areas that need them?
VFA squadrons equipped with f-18c/d are down to 10 aircraft per squadron in many cases. Some issues with the available numbers you listed: 1. Only roughly 60% of aircraft are assigned PAI ( in active squadrons), the rest are in training squadrons, weapons squadrons, attrition airframes, etc. 2. The number of f-18c/d might be too high. I saw 400 in service as of 2008/9. In reality, there are less than 500 aircraft in VFA squadrons in current carrier air wings. Each carrier not in RCOH has a wing assigned deployed or not. Here is a link with a description of the planned carrier air wing composition:
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_CarrierAi…
FBWHe stated the facts: short range weapons are more lethal, effective, and cost less,
but he still wanted a long range aam for certain applications.
quote me where he lobby against AMRAAM
Read the airforce mag link. The reformers including Sprey, Burton, opposed most every pentagon program of the 1980’s. A bit of background on this was that the Amraam experienced cost overruns that raised unit cost to nearly 1 million per. He and the rest pushed Sen. Hart and others for cancellation of M-1 abrams, Amraam, etc. as overly complex and costly. There are several books on the reformers including “pentagon wars”. Google “reformers and amraam ” and you can read some excerpts of these. Again, i am out out of town and typing from a phone, so no, i can’t cut and paste parts of articles for you. Btw, here is another article from a newspaper in the 80’s quoting Sprey and Burton:
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-10-04/news/8703160051_1_amraam-air-to-air-mcdonnell-douglas/2
FBWFBWGive the man some slack, the technology was lacking but what he envisioned was for all practical purposes an AMRAAM,
(fire and forget, without the need of continuously illuminate the target, and without the need of keeping a steady course,
with a stealthy (arent continuously signaling to the world its location) supercruising platform, but an affordable one, unlike F-22
It would be easier to “cut him slack” if he wasn’t a self-righteous crusader with a skewed agenda. His ideas, when formulated in the late 1960’s, were justified considering the usaf focus on tactical fighters that were more geared for nuclear strike and interdiction than countering the red airforce over centag. The problem is, technology advanced, but his ideas did not keep pace. I posted the aceval/aimval papers in the fighter maneuverability thread a bit ago. There is a great analysis in one of exactly where the “reformers” went wrong. In essence, they viewed the results as a validation of the lightweight austere fighter. In reality, it was a validation of the concept that situational awareness trumps all. Turn rate and agility are not decisive in a many v. many furball. The reason why, situational awareness goes out the window. The pilot gets “tunnel vision” and can be killed by bandit entering fight unseen. The usaf learned that the F-15 & 14 superior situational awareness were more often the deciding factors to achieving kills before the merge. Lastly, he lobbied hard for the cancellation of the amraam so i’m not sure where you got that information.
FBWTop speed has nothing to do with weight. Lighter aircraft should only accelerate quicker to that speed.
And he is talking acceleration, not top speed. How is the removal of radar et all, not going to affect C.G., trim drag?Not to mention the aircraft was “clean”.
FBWA Su-27 can go ~M1.7 with 4xR-73 and 6xR-27s and full fuel load. Also such payload allows Su-27 CG switch to negative stability above ~M1.3 which is not the case for a clean Su-27s. How fast a Typhoon can go with a)10 A-A missiles? b)10 A-A missiles and sufficient fuel to chase a Su-27?
Point haavarla making is; Su-27 is already too draggy and have too much thrust to be affected by the drag of R-27. Same is not the case for Typhoon.
Without EFTs, Typhoon won’t have enough fuel -by a long shot- to chase/outrun a Su-27; supercruise or not. To quote Gerry Gallop, a topgun instructor who flew Su-27;
According to this, Su-27 can maintain supersonic flight for 50+ minutes at M1.3, makes 1300 km. For how long a Typhoon can supercruise with full internal fuel?
I believe that if you look up that article, that was a civilian su-27 (demilitarized). Im not sure what the weight differential was, but probably significant.
Edit. 3000 pounds less according to flightglobal article.
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