F-22 was the first airplane designed to exploit the lessons of ACEVAL/AIMVAL. See and shoot the enemy before the enemy sees and shoots you.

This requires stealth and sensor techniques to positively identify potential targets at BVR ranges. You cannot predict the combat effectiveness of Gen 5 jets by interpolation of Gen 3 & 4 combat data.

Not sure why you are making this assertion, there is no attempt to predict combat effectiveness. Secondly, yes fifth gen aircraft employ different tactics, but: the weapons they employ are the same as other fighters, and the physics are the same for fourth or fifth gen aircraft, they can only turn/pitch/roll so much within load factors. Make no mistake, the sensor fusion and data fusion has a huge impact on combat effectiveness. (one the first articles up top dealt with sensor agility)

@TU-22M

“Has this been posted?
http://www.aviation.org.uk/docs/flig…-FTM108/c6.pdf
Has pretty much all formulas on the relation of bank angle/turning, aerodynamic lift/thrust lift etc. Even covers missile agility.

Got it didn’t post it, thanks for posting it. Good reference for explaining maneuverability

BVR- part I (WVR part 1 here:http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?128845-What-metrics-of-Agility-and-Maneuverability-matter&p=2113513#post2113513)
The first problem is what constitutes BVR engagements: a fighter like the f-16 may not be visible beyond about 5 miles, the F-15 or Su-27 will be visible much further. Second issue is systems like IRST, DAS extend the “visuals” of a target. Lastly, newer IR missiles can reach out ranges previously reserved for the traditional radar guided BVR missile.
So to what degree does maneuverability matter in modern BVR combat? And has BVR missile engagements become a mature technology that impacts fighter design?

First- Ault report (vietnam)- Report of the Air to Air Missile System Capability Review: July to November 1968 (this is a pdf- copy paste in google to grab original)
_
Synopsis:
It took 5.2 seconds to fire a sparrow missile, pilots were forced into a “heads down” position with radar scope to fire
failure rate was increased by turning sparrow into an “ejector missile” from a rail missile
pilots were not completely versed in the engagement parameters of the missiles
handling of the missiles impacted their performance (particularly sparrows)
pilots had not actually fired the missiles in training
topgun came out of the need for more realistic training

My note: this paper is one of the holy grails of those bashing the idea of BVR combat. In essence, the real lesson is that Vietnam was an anomaly. We’ve spent many years learning the wrong lessons from Vietnam (low level penetration, gun kills, ACM in close quarters), the Gulf war gave a glimpse that these lessons were wrong, or at least mis-interpreted

Next-Promise and Reality: Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Air-To-Air Combat:Lt Col Patrick Higby, USAF
http://pogoarchives.org/labyrinth/11/09.pdf

yeah POGO

Synopsis:
58% of missile kills in until 1982 were heat seekers, 14% were radar guided missiles
majority of radar missile kills were WVR
Gulf War I showed as many as 16 BVR kills (or as few as 5)
59% of kills in Gulf war I were radar guided missiles (sparrow), gun kills 5%
Post Desert Storm amraam kill ranges were possibly WVR
F-16 had dismal performance with aim-9 despite WVR petigree

My note: This study does not take into account mission kills, many launches from Aim-7 were outside of launch parameters and the pilots knew it. The book “Crusade-The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War: Rick Atkinson” discusses many of the air to air engagements of the war, including one of the more famous Mig-25 examples. The navy has a saying “a stern chase is a long chase”, that is true of BVR missile engagements too.
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/98-210.pdf

Short synopsis- BVR engagements are dictated by ROE, future stealth engagements may not allow this.

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/24445455/BVR-Missiles

Synopsis- breakdown how BVR missiles work

http://www.ipcsit.com/vol16/24-ICICM2011M054.pdf
Maneuver Strategy in Beyond-Visual-Range Air Combat: Liang Xiao, Jun Huan

synopsis:
Based on the experience of an air combat expert, following 9 maneuvering intensions can be found: (1) Head-on approaching;(2)Left vertical escaping; (3)Side flanking; (4) Same direction escaping; (5)Right vertical escaping; (6)Front side approaching; (7)Front side escaping; (8)Lateral flanking; (9)Rear side flanking.

Supremacy Function

Decision making needs to evaluate the supremacy and then find out respective benefits of each type of the maneuver strategies. The aircraft supremacy state membership function is obtained by defining the relative state variables: Td is the distance supremacy, TΦ is the azimuth supremacy, Tq is the impact angle supremacy, and TE is the energy supremacy.

Distance Supremacy
The killing probability of a missile to its target is larger when the missile is at a medium launching distance, and when it is near to the nearest or the farthest launching distance, the killing probability is smaller and changes rapidly. When launching within the unescapable area, no matter how the target tries to avoid the attack it can not escape. A distance supremacy function can be derived based on this
azimuth performance-When the missile is launched for attacking and it has a significant supremacy to the target, the aircraft has to keep a certain azimuth with the target in order to minimize the threat from the target. Meanwhile, the aircraft has to keep the guidance to the missile to ensure the target is within the detective area. The attacking condition is retained to perform the attack when necessary

Impact Angle Supremacy

The effect of the impact angle to the supremacy function is reflected in its effect on the missile killing probability. The simulation results show that when the target is moving a rectilinear motion, the value of the killing probability is symmetrically distributed within the attacking area.

Energy Supremacy

In order to obtain a larger initial kinetic energy to extend the missile’s launching distance, the carrier should increase its speed hence its kinetic energy before launching. To maximize the supremacy the carrier can normally achieves the velocity of sound before launching of the missile.

My take: Here is where the air-superiority fighters have a distinct advantage. Greater radar range and kinematic performance rules.

That’d greatly depend on how you envisage the mechanics of the next major air war.

A few questions to ponder….

-The attacking mindset-
Will radar guided BVR truly come of age?
Will HOBS IR AAMs mean anything within a 5 mile sphere of an aircraft with HMS is dead?
Will LPI radar actually mean you can use a radar with impunity, seeking out and destroying hapless targets with long reach AAMs?
Will IRSTs allow passive detection and engagement of unwitting aircraft using LOAL after launch weapons guided to an IP via datalink?

-The defensive mindset-
Will continual improvements in DIRCM mean the IR AAM loses effectiveness drastically?
Will LO and VLO aircraft mean radar missile seekers lose the low return signature in the clutter of counter measures?
Will AESA sets be capable of jamming radar guided seeker heads?
Will DEW be capable of frying radar guided seeker heads?

Obviously the maneuver priorities of the former 4 differ from the latter 4….

Great questions:
I focused the first two posts of links mostly on WVR considerations, there is no doubt that the goalposts have changed. That is one reason I started to compile various studies. Boyd and the E-M theories he postulated were based on the need to achieve a 6 o’clock firing solution. Obviously, that is not the case anymore. Most of what I’ve deduced from this are that transient agility metrics are displacing some of the traditional measures of how a fighter will perform in a merge. The technology of sensors and weapons is advancing far faster than the physics that govern aerodynamic performance of a platform. F-4 phantoms based on 1950’s aerodynamics still provide a viable air defense for some nations based on avionics and weapons upgrades. It may not achieve a favorable kill loss ratio, but flying an airframe for 50+ years shows that the advancements gained in aerodynamics, propulsion, and agility have slowed compared to the microprocessor. (Imagine a spitfire providing air policing in 1990)

I’m going to post some BVR links next-looking at some traditional maneuverability

Part II- Operational Impact

ACEVAL/AIMVAL-
http://combatace.com/blog/5/entry-33-acevalaimval-lessons-learned/
http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/141240.pdf
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2008/February%202008/0208reformers.aspx

Differing conclusions can be drawn-
First, requirement for visual id limited effectiveness of BVR shots, F-14 had TCS, F-15 pilots taped hunting scopes next to HUD to cheat. (In the age of IFF, AWACS, IRST, the lessons learned about visual ID to avoid blue on blue engagement may have changed significantly- I think)

Second, the large air-superiority fighters had a distinct advantage in 2 v 2 engagements and the like. The many v. many scenarios see kill ratios drop significantly. This has been codified as “in a dogfight everyone dies at the same rate”

Third, the pioneering use of HMS and off-bore sight missiles in the study showed that 90% of aim-9 kills were by that method.

Lastly, the experience of F-15’s and F-14’s showed that the larger, more powerful fighters did have an advantage, but a fighter with better weapon system/radar has a greater advantage by avoiding the merge altogether ( development of the amraam)

The “Reformers” used this as an attack on the concept of BVR, one that persists to this day using flawed data from ACEVAL/AIMVAL and sparrow Pk from Vietnam.

F-18 VS X-31 VALUATION OF PROPOSED AGILITY METRICS USING X-31 VS. F/A-18 FLIGHT DATA: Julieta E. Booz

This study looked at the use of nose pointing vs standard maneuverability, the conclusions are basically that the x-31 with inferior T/W ratio and wingloading was able to exploit TVC to win engagements through superior nose pointing.
Unfortunately, I was unable to find a similar study I once had that included the F-16. Interestingly, the F-18 with it’s superior AOA ability was able to dominate a one circle engagement. In a two circle fight, the F-16’s superior energy management led to the F-16 winning.

http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public/PubFulltext/RTO/MP/RTO-MP-035/MP-035-29.pdf
Design tools for Performance assessment of fighter aircraft incorporating new technologies

This study again looks at the effects of new agility metrics over traditional maneuvering i.e. sustained turns, and the impact of weight and thrust on both. Somewhat counterintuitively, the study stresses that increased thrust is an advantage in BVR engagements and less so in WVR. You need a major increase in thrust to impact WVR performance.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/73440311/Investigation-Into-the-Impact-of-Agility-in-Conceptual-Fighter-Design

Interesting paper describes the conflicting requirements for an Air superiority fighter vs a
fighter/attack aircraft. It gives good insight into the design drivers for what became the JSF program, at least from Boeing’s perspective

My take on this:
The focus on sustained turn rates are not predictive of a dominant WVR fighter aircraft.
If you find yourself in a knife fight, the aircraft with the better transient agility metrics has the initial advantage, yet with HOBS and HMS within visual range combat is as much about the systems (faster OODA loop= kill)
With modern ir missiles there are not going to be many two circle (or more) fights, this is going to be quick draw not fencing.
BTW, most of the research is from the 90’s, but that’s when most fighters currently in service were designed, also if anyone has papers from Russian, Indian, French, etc. I would love translated synopsis posted here.
Part III will be BVR combat

note- obligatory, I think you are missing the point, you cannot separate maneuverability from sensor agility, BOTH matter and in modern combat having one without the other is useless.