Their point is that the cost of maintenance/training etc is outweighed by the cost of complexity due to cramming too many functions into one airframe.
I understood the point, I am saying the examples they are using are false. Modern fighters have operating costs far in excess of a 1970’s fighter. This is a null hypothesis, what are the drivers of cost on fighters? In the seventies, airframes and engines. Now, the avionics suite and software needed to run it are the usual reasons for delays and cost over-runs. F-22 is the best example. It is a specialized platform. Total program cost: 67 billion. That does not include the cost of bringing the Raptors up to 3.2b, there’s 12 billion more. I think the F-22 is an exceptional aircraft. It is also one that ate the USAF budget for the better part of a decade. There is no way there will be a “sixth gen” aircraft that does not have dual utility for the USAF and Navy.
USAF budget could not support cost to: design, build, and maintain specialized airframes for: interdiction, CAS, air superiority, strike. RAND is saying that they are correct and every air-force around the world that is trying to cram as many functions into a single airframe as they can are wrong. France will soon be down to one (Rafale), UK two, U.S. is looking at 4″ish” by 2030.(f-22, F-35, F-18 E/F, , F-15E)
Did RAND just make comparisons for the F-111, F-14, and A-10 being a “Joint” program? Yes, they did. F-111B was a failed program that the F-14 was to replace. The A-10 came out of the A-X program that had, if any parallel, the decision to purchase the A-7D, not the F-111. Since when did any of the F-35 variants get cancelled and replaced by a totally new program as the F-111B did? The F-111 program in scope and scale is probably the best analogue to the F-35 program, but RAND comparing the commonality of the F-111, to the F-14, and A-10 is myopic. Equally disingenuous is the F-16/F-18 comparison as coming out of the LWF (ACF) competition. The navy was not even part of the original competition, how is that “Joint”? There is plenty to criticize about how the initial JSF program was handled. The non-comparisons in this study don’t add to the knocks against the JSF, it is another Knock against the reputation of RAND, IMO.
RAND makes a point here:
In addition, having a variety of fighter platform types
across service inventories provides a hedge against design
flaws and maintenance and safety issues that could potentially
cause fleet-wide stand-downs. Having a variety of
fighter platform types also increases the options available to
meet unanticipated enemy capabilities.
But then, if the purpose of the paper is to point out how joint programs don’t save money, what about having to set up: separate training, depot and maintenance, spare parts, different hardware and software upgrades for a variety of fighter platform types? With the exception of India, (and possibly China) every single airforce has been trying to consolidate their fleets into a fewer platforms. I assume they have a monetary reason for doing so.
Interesting quote from the Australian parliamentary hearings that I’ve been looking for regarding the end of life engine numbers used for range, acceleration, etc. (Credit to user from F-16.net, spazsinbad, who actually found the quote in the hearings). I had heard this many times, and could never find the direct quote:
Mr Burbage: We have 16 key performance parameters on this airplane. Half are logistics and sustainment-related, half are aero performance-related and one or two are in classified areas. We have an oversight body called the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC, that looks at those requirements every year and makes decisions on them — ‘Are we going to meet them, are we not going to meet them? If we are not going to meet them, what is the impact of that?’ We have one this year which was the range of the Air Force airplane which had a specific set of ground rules associated with how that range is calculated which is not similar to either of the other two airplanes. The airplane flies a large part of its mission at a non-optimised altitude in the original calculation. The JROC agreed to change the ground rules to fly that airplane as the other two were flown and, when that happened, the airplane had excess margin to the range requirement. For any performance-related requirements, we artificially penalise the engine by five per cent fuel flow and two per cent thrust. Those margins are given back as we mature the design and get more and more solid on exactly what it is going to do. They are there for conservative estimation up front. We have not taken back any of those margins yet so, when those margins are taken back, the airplane will continue to be well in excess of its basic requirement. The airplane is meeting all of the other requirements today
2% thrust degradation is 560 lbf in mil, 860 lbf in max. Not a huge impact on performance. The 5% fuel flow has a significant effect on range. The last range estimates of 584 nm, +10% fuel reserve + 5% reduction in fuel flow. Granted, that is with a change of mission profile.
Well, in the case of the NSM (Anti-Ship) is should do well in the export market. (including the US) As it is very Stealthy and fits easily in the F-35 internal weapons bays. The AGM-154 in unpowered and I believe it has a range of ~ 60 Miles. The NSM is something over 100 Miles if memory serves me………Nonetheless, I am sure both weapons will likely see extensive service with US F-35’s. Just depends the mission profile…
AGM-154-ER has a range of over 100 miles (200-300 miles), and is in competition with the AGM-158 LRASM for anti-shipping role of the Navy. AGM-158 won’t fit in the F-35 weapons bay, however.
Unfortunately NSM has very limited utility in US usage.
The US’ preferred weapon is AGM-154 ER which is network enabled, SAASM equipped, low observable and has a BROACH warhead, making it capable of destroying hardened targets.
SOM is also a very capable weapon, but I don’t believe it has been fitted to the F-35 weapon bay.
The JSM version of the kongsberg missile will fit. The missile received the modifications needed, not sure if Norway is paying for internal integration. JSOW fits, apparently the JSOW-ER has the same dimensions from information I could gather. The JSM is a bit more sophisticated than the JSOW-ER for anti shipping missions anyway (Sea- Skimming, terminal maneuver, IR seeker, etc). Anyway, I agree there is no way the DoD would pay for a weapon with a duplicate mission to the JSOW.
EDIT: They have done internal fit on F-35
http://www.kongsberg.com/en/kds/products/missilesystems/jointstrikemissile/
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2013/06/10/Kongsberg-Lockheed-fit-test-F-35-missile-test-successful/UPI-40951370875501/
http://www.businessinsider.com.au/how-anti-ship-missiles-are-tested-2014-1
Is it possible that for once the U.S. Congress will get over the “not designed here” philosophy and buy some of these. I hope so. NSM is shaping up to be a winner, and a land attack version rumored to be on the way could make for an excellent addition to the F-35’s quill.
The PAKFA uses a very smart set of solutions, why? S ducts are aerodynamically not the best for pressure recovery, due to aerodynamic distortions of the flow, straight ducts reduce boundary layer accumulation and therefore volume too and drag.
The grid is in the subsonic section of the inlet duct, if you remember, F-117 has a grid too for RCS reduction on the intake lips, at supersonic speeds the need for air supersonic shocks does not allow for a fixed intake, thus setting the grid deep inside the inlet duct is a very smart solution.
Remember F117 was a subsonic airplane with fixed intake.
Another advantage is the PAKFA can fly with weapons bays with camber, it will generate lift and reduce volume, this makes the jet basically a Su-27 but its cross section is very small, looking at the PAKFA from the front you see a small forebody, in F-22 or J-20 you see huge forebodies specially in J-20 the bumps for the DSI increase the frontal cross section, same problem has the F-35, this in F-35 increases drag and it is know F-35 is a fat aircraft in terms of air drag.
PAKFA will be faster, in fact what the Russians wanted is not go far stray from the Su-27 proven aerodyamics.
Thanks for the reply, squares with what I was thinking. In essence, all three possibilities that I mentioned. The blocker does not appear to be a grid, more like the Super Hornet’s if anything. There was also the post from aviation week 2010 where it was described as an adjustable series of vanes if Sweetman’s analysis was correct. ( I know it’s old, but in light of the recent patent information, was he on to something?)
http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post:c3f1c693-d1d6-4f37-b3fd-e7f16e087b2e
PAKFA is far more advanced in aerodynamics, and if the composites and intake grid work as advertised, it is indeed the most advanced 5th generation out there since it allows for better aerodynamics with higher stealth than F-22
Bold statement, aerodynamics you could make a case for based on evidence and design philosophy presented in the patents. The higher level of stealth? That is conjecture, computer modeling can only go so far as to Russian figures given for the F-22 RCS.
Anyone know when the Italians got the AMX into service?
first production version produced in may 1989, entered service in november of same year.
http://www.fighter-planes.com/info/amx.htm
ActionJackson
look at these NATO test results of fan blade tests?”
When Jo was dictating to everyone that the T-50 was to only use stealthy fan blades and partial duct shaping he provided a link to a documented RCS test of a test stand containing a fan with 45 degree angled blades (significantly more canted than his own images of T-50 blades). Unfortunately it only showed how badly fan blades scatter.
That is interesting. With the partial bend of the duct, part of the engine will be exposed necessitating the blocker. I am curious as to the driver of this design aspect: keeping sufficient volume between engines for the weapons bays, concerns over frontal cross-section, Better airflow to the engine? ( which has a larger effect on efficiency blocker vs. serpentine bend )
I had tried to point out the fan blade issue to him. That curved blisks would be a problem for RCS if exposed. Also that Rolls Royce and others had investigated PMC blades (and made no claims about radar absorption).
What if we renamed the thread:
“Is stealth really that cost-effective”.
Nic
Is losing aircraft to SAM cost effective for an airforce? Package Q, as mentioned above, shows what can happen when the enemy knows your coming, and you are unable to suppress his defenses. I do think that the USAF has moved past the idea that “Stealth” aircraft can penetrate advanced air defenses with impunity. The investments in EW with the NJG and Growler, MALD-J show this. The LO aircraft can at least shrink the engagement envelope, a legacy aircraft laden with bombs and external tanks not nearly as survivable in triple-digit SAM environs.
Is your argument is that Rafale and Spectra offer a more cost-effective approach? I would disagree, on the grounds that the cost between the newest LO strike aircraft (F-35) is projected to be competitive with the fourth + generation (whether it gets to that price point is another argument). Integrated defensive avionics are becoming standard, there is nothing to suggest that Spectra is unique (though it is sophisticated, and importantly, regularly updated). The newest ones allow the aircraft to fly a profile to best avoid detection, cue anti-radiation missiles, etc.
http://www.armada.ch/aircraft-self-protection-sophistication/
On a side note, I find Package Q interesting because there is the growing internet fallacy that GW1 was a cakewalk because the Iraqis were completely inept, old Soviet weapons, etc. The Iraq IAD system was built by the French, command bunkers by the Germans, air defenses were Soviet and Western. It completely discounts the exceptional planning, proficiency, and sophistication of the coalition airforces. They were expecting to lose fifty aircraft in those first attacks. Package Q shows what could have been.
Ajai Shukla, the author of the article has a popular defense blog on the web (broadsword). He is an advocate, or at least interested in the idea of India pursuing the F-35. He has always been a bit skeptical about India’s involvement in the Pak-fa program. From reading some of the Indian defense blogs, there seems to be a widening divide between those who support closer ties with western nations and defense purchases, and those who want continued strong ties with Russia. With the continued foot dragging on the Rafale contract, the MOD may find itself in a position of having to choose between the two. It will be interesting to see which way India leans for future defense contracts, and that may be influenced by how the Rafale deal and FGFA deals turn out or don’t.
if Jo Asakura is not welcome on this forum then hopefully Mr. Asakura would repost many of his findings at http://www.russiadefence.net/ (English language forum on Russian military)
And that would be sad, I would be sorry to see him go. The best part of this forum is the multi-national aspect of it. However, his last few posts were highly offensive. If reading only what agrees with your outlook is your cup of tea, then I’m sure a Russian only forum would suit that. I, for one, enjoy reading others point of view and enjoy good natured banter. The deletion of the last thread is a shame, but correct me if i’m wrong, a correct action under UK law of libel.
If you are detected, you can be destroyed. It will make no difference if it reaches and destroys its target, if it does not return, it was a total failure.
Since when does stealth become a war of attrition.
stealth what, IR emissions? RADAR? EMCON? This is not the 1980’s when radar sig was the key defining feature of “stealth” there is a reason why the an/alr-94, BAE barracuda, and spectra are among the most classified systems on modern fighters. The days of the f-117 relying on just radar sig are over. The USAF and others realized this a long time ago. Newer fighter rely on ir reduction, secure transmissions “MADL”, passive detection, and avoidance of x band targeting radar through far better RWR than previous systems. It’s not a one trick pony, it’s a philosophy of design that crosses a spectrum of ID, communication, and control that give a first look first, shoot advantage. It’s not going away, just evolving into the norm. The degree of integration of sensors, materials , and software are going to get better…. and so are the counter measures. I would not say it’s a war of attrition, more a war (to steal from the brits), a war of boffins.
There were quite a few Air National Guard units equiped with the A-7D in 89.
no doubt, A-7 squadrons were primarily guard units by 1989. FI, and Janes were usually a year or two behind actual strength of CFE reporting (1990-91). ANG lists 14 squadrons of A-7, though those numbers seem high as last listing in air international is of 337 as of 1987.
Flight international gives the totals as:
337 A-7 for the air force (270 active)
220+ for the navy
These numbers include aircraft holdings i.e. davis-monthan storage. Numbers in active units were far less by 1989