FBWIn 1989, you could be flying an F-15C with AMRAAM provided you were flying F-15C’s out of Eglin. No guarantees they would work very well (don’t think the missile passed all live fire tests till end of year).
FBWFBWAside from sparing the ISIS militants, the coalition warplanes have also been hampering the Russian Air Force’s operation in support of the Syrian military, the ministry claimed, noting that in accordance with the prior agreement the coalition aircraft should not have been flying in the area.
One last attempt to inject some reason in this:
1. BOTH the SDF and Syrian Gov have made deals to move IS out of populated areas to spare the civilians. They’ve given free passage to other areas within IS lines. Again, BOTH have done this, and it has nothing to do with helping IS.
2. There are good reasons that the deconfliction lines exist.
3. If you were a Kurd on the eastern side of Euphrates near Suwaydan Jazira, you would be appealing to the US to keep Russian airstrikes off the front lines too. There is no direct communication between the ground forces pushing in from the east and the Russian airforce. It’s not like the Su-25’s are using SDB or JDAM directed by JTAC embedded with the Kurds.
The media narrative and comments from some Russian officials and officers are trying to paint a picture of the US actively inhibiting Russia from destroying IS. They downplay the existing protocol and cooperation between the two. It isn’t hard to understand why the US does not want Russian airstrikes near SDF when the US has personnel embedded with Kurd forces.
Don’t get me started on Erdogan. He is happy to accuse the US of being complicit with IS to cover his own actions of supplying and coordinating with IS to counter the Kurds. Duplicitous doesn’t even begin to describe his role in the Syrian conflict.
FBWRegarding the alleged F-22 incident:
CENTCOM CJTF OIR PAO
There is no truth to this allegation. According to our flight logs for Nov 23, 2017, this alleged incident did not take place, nor has there been any instance where a Coalition aircraft crossed the river without first deconflicting with the Russians via the deconfliction phone line set up for this purpose. Of note, on Nov 23, 2017, there were approximately nine instances where Russian fighter aircraft crossed to the east side of the Euphrates River into Coalition airspace without first using the deconfliction phone. This random and unprofessional activity placed Coalition and Russian aircrew at risk, as well as jeopardizing Coalition ability to support partner ground forces in the area.
Any claims that the Coalition would protect Daesh, or hinder, a strike against Daesh are completely false. We strike them hard wherever they are found. What we can tell you is that we actively deconflict the airspace in Syria with the Russians to ensure the enduring defeat of Daesh in the region. We will continue to work with our SDF partners, just as we will continue to deconflict with the Russians for future Coalition strikes against Daesh targets in Syria
FBWK, about the response I expected from you.
Go about your business on this thread of the usual narratives “US is protecting IS, Russia is there legally & there is no deal on protected airspace above the Kurds (who have done more to defeat IS than Syrian Gov,US, Russia, and Iraq combined),” and whatever other the US is evil narratives popular amongst some Russians and their supporters.
FBWMy my..
https://www.rt.com/deconfliction/412590-russia-us-syria-air-force/
Please, you have US claiming that Russian aircraft violated deconfliction airspace causing US to abort sorties against IS. Bottom line, tough to operate two airforces in close proximity with minimal communication.
The rhetoric isn’t helping and if an incident happens it endangers everyone. Russia needs to stop claiming the US is protecting IS, as that is patently false, and US needs to lay off with theats to shoot down Russian aircraft when the fly over Kurdish held zones.
But I’m sure you swallow the RT story as accurate.
FBWIn the 80’s yes, Israel did not have countermeasures on their A-4’s or F-4s at the start of 1973 war. They developed their own as well. Most Israeli aircraft probably had their own fitted by the 80’s
Soviet exports had chaff/flare dispensers cause the US ended up testing them in the 4477th TES. Egyptian F-16’s had them as well- AN/ALE-40V. Quite a few of the F-4E’s to Turkey were Ex-USAF birds, going to guess they had them as well.
FBWWelcome in the wonderful world of stealth planes!
part.
Nothing to do with “stealth” and everything to do with small production run, decision to box up production line (the lose and mislabel tooling), and the USAF demand for F-22’s that cannot be met except by repairing aircraft that would have been written off or stored for parts. Damaged bulkhead and longerons would usually result in one of the latter. The USAF is also restoring an EMD bird to flight status as well, it highlights the folly of a 194 airframe production run. A lot of those early Raptors weren’t supposed to be part of the combat coded, or training fleet. In essence, only 150 of the 187 production F-22’s would have been used as PAI, TAI, the rest would have been maintenance trainers, weapons and test aircraft. There were supposed to be roughly 150 more built in following blocks.
FBWI just checked it, you have to copy the above link and paste it into google search, hyperlink not working.
FBWSix years. Going to have to look up class A mishaps and report to see the extent of damage, but that seems like a long time for what was essentially a “wheels up” landing. Two things to ponder: if the fleet wasn’t so small, would it have been repaired at all, and if the the F-22 line wasn’t defunct would they’ve been able to replace the damaged parts and get the aircraft back in service faster.
Edit- addition, F-22A 07-4142 which was involved in the landing gear retraction mishap at Hickam has been spotted as active (still at Hickam, with AK base code, Elmsdorf)
Well, here is the accident report for 02-4037 (from a chinese site, interesting):https://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/…-/name/02-4037+F-22A+AIB+31-05-2012.pdf (you may have to copy paste in google to be able to download)
Short version pertinent points:
he MA sustained an estimated $35 million in damage (Tab P-9). The damaged
areas include the main weapons bay doors, the nose landing gear (NLG) doors, the outboard
F-22A, T/N 02-4037, 31 May 2012
2
main landing gear (MLG) doors and internal components, the lower missile launch detector
(MLD) assembly, and the forward and aft edges of the horizontal stabilizers (see Figure 2) (Tab
P-3 to P-9).
You can see the pictures of the damage in report- pretty extensive inside weapons bay.
FBWThanks BIO. This just seems like a nightmare from a logistics standpoint- three stand alone programs. Just don’t get why the pods themselves wouldn’t share a similar configuration with different contractors competing for swap out modules and arrays for each band.
Edit- the original incremental roadmap would have allowed the swap-out of mid and high band arrays (for whatever reason increment 2 was always separate from what I’m reading on 2014 NAVAIR briefing ppt). That article below does not explicitly state no comonality, but the L-M EW division manager seems to hint that.
But here it is stated again:
https://www.c4isrnet.com/electronic-warfare/2017/11/30/navys-next-gen-jammer-theyre-not-increments-theyre-bands/
While the Navy first set out awarding each phase under increments 1, 2 and 3, it has moved away from this designation because “it assumes you’re building on the last” version, Rick Diamond, senior manager, electronic warfare business development at Lockheed Martin, told reporters during the Association of Old Crows Symposium in Washington, D.C. “Each pod is separate.
FBWA few months back, people were asking how Aggressor aircraft like the F-16 and A-4 (or F-15E in some recent exercises) can replicate the threat aircraft (Su-27 and the like). Most of these arguments focused on kinematics.
Recent posts on “The Aviationist” site show what the services are more interested in replicating (RF, emissions, adversaries using IRST, ECM).
https://theaviationist.com/2017/12/05/two-edwards-based-f-16s-spotted-in-star-wars-canyon-with-mysterious-new-pod/#disqus_thread
Those F-16’s are intended to broadly replicate different adversaries in the electronic spectrum. The “mystery pod” in question on that F-16, is a threat simulation pod (comments section say AN/AST-4(V), could be AN/AST-9(V), could even be the new 5th gen threat emitter mentioned in 2005 ATSO powerpoint). These pods can replicate the radar emissions of aircraft, even missiles. One reason why ELINT sniffing of potential adversaries radar is so important.
This navy presentation gives an overview of threat simulation:
https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2009/test/VanSplinter.pdf
Brief overview of AN/AST-4 pod: https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/equip/an-ast-4.htm
FBWWe know today that the Growler will fly in three different configurations (each one with one pod dedicated to one single band).
We don’t, that’s what I’m asking B-I-O. The high band jammer still AoA study (may or may not be an addition to mid-band pod)
FBWorthrop officials confirmed during a media tour of its facility here on Dec. 5 that the firm fully intends to compete for follow-on contracts to develop the future Increment 2 (low band) and Increment 3 (high band) mission systems.
B-I-O, can you clarify some points on this for me?
1. The AN/ALQ-99 was modular- with the transmitter modules for high, mid, and low band swapped out for different configurations (usually mid and high modules band fitted together and separate low band modules on different pod)
2. The current AN/ALQ-99 don’t support high band jamming channels anymore (or am I mistaken, I recall the AN/ALQ-99 received new low band transmitter modules recently). Most of the time the Growlers carry two mid-band configured pods and one low band.
The root of my question is this, NGJ program could possibly field three different jamming pods? The mid-band pod from Raytheon, the increment 2 low band pod for which Northrup and Raytheon are competing, and a future high band pod. That seems absurdly redundant to develop three distinct pods possibly from different manufacturers. Or am I misinterpreting this and the NGJ pod will be modular with jamming modules and antenna (possibly from different manufacturers) sharing a common pod architecture?
FBWAnnnd for at least the fourth time I wrote GAO instead of DOT&E.
B-I-O clears it up, thanks.
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