FBWDon’t hesitate and provide us with those “real” numbers, please.. TIA.
There is hardly any difference in SFC between the F110-GE-129 and F100-PW-229..
Who are those mysterious MiG-29 users who have decided to replace their Fulcrums with F-16s? :confused:
F100-220 (SFC .73 lbs/hr/lbs st)= 10,650 lbs JP8 per hour in intermediate thrust
F110-129 (SFC .68 lbs/hr/lbs st)= 11,617 lbs JP8 her hour in intermediate thrust
RD-33 (SFC .77kg/kgfh, other source lists .74 lbs/hr/lbs st)= 8,310 lbs of fuel per hour using the lower SFC listed
Now, let’s think. The F-16 has one engine, the Mig-29 has two. How exactly does the F-16 use more fuel?
(edit- corrected -229 to -129 typo)
FBWAddendum- it is not a knock on soviet era weapons that they were designed with a shorter service life. It was doctrine. The Soviet era maintenance was done by conscripts, with the understanding that numerical superiority was more desirable than a long service life. They were probably right given a high intensity conflict. No one envisioned that air superiority fighters, or strike fighters designed in the 70’s would still be front line fighters some 30+ years later.
FBWNo doubt TR1, read the bottom of my post….. was still typing.
FBWSome of these guys just invest too much in their opinion early on and then they have to stick with it just to save face
Or know actual numbers over opinions.
FBWNot sure why this paper is considered important. Every modern engine has monitoring. Martinez brought this argument into F-16.net (I know, but look up TEG’s response) and got refuted piece by piece. I’m not a “west is the best” poster but the AL-31 and RD-33 have a service history. You can sell it on this forum, users say otherwise.
Soviet designs traded thrust for longevity, as they didn’t plan on the same serviceability as NATO. They were probably right in that scenario. Different doctrines. Things have changed, and while I’ve no doubt that the engines have been modified for more hours, the legacy remains.
FBWMarcellogo, what exactly is a randomly guided bomb?
Have you actually looked at the types of munitions used in CAS missions lately? Would you consider the SDB-II random? What about laser guided SDB or GBU-54b? This is a failure to understand that the types of munitions have changed the nature of close air support. You seem to be under the impression that guided munitions need mission planning, that just isn’t the case when looking at the recent expenditures in Syria or Iraq.
No offense, but your lacking in understanding on how close air support has been prosecuted by western air forces in recent campaigns. It isn’t the platform, it’s the timely intelligence and munitions. The B-1 has been the superstar, with the F-15E as a second, drones third, and F-16’s and A-10’s filling in on expeditionary air wings when the first two are rotated out. (In the case of the USAF).
FBWIn military thrust, the F-16 consumes around 10k PPH, in afterburner it goes as far as ~49k PPH. JP8 weighs in at 6.65lbs/gal, that’s anywhere between 1,500 and 7,500 gal/h or 0.4-2.0 gal/sec. JP8 cost is $2.95/gal, total cost between $4,500 and $22,000/hour. $17k per hour is easily doable, depending how much afterburner is used.
How much data does one need to provide in order to bloody make you finally admit you are wrong ?!
Use real numbers please:
Look up which F-16 engine you are using. Btw, this whole arguement is based on one operator. I don’t need to tell you how flawed that is, especially when users of the Mig-29 have stated how expensive it is to operate and have looked to replace it via the f-16. Confirmation bias in effect:
Look up the SFC of the F-16 engines-
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1596.pdf
FBWSo you say the USN can deploy 2 carriers at one time, versus 10 total. Sounds very low. All the more that the carriers are designed to carry much more than 44 planes.
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No, I said 2-3 are deployed, 2 more usually in various stages of working up. While there are technically 10 Carriers commissioned, one is in RCOH therefore 9 are on the 36 month maintence-workup-deployment cycle. (even when CVN-78 is commissioned there will still be only 10 carriers available).
Those working up could be deployed within 30 days. Last year saw four CVN deployed at the same time (but that was a temporary peak caused by stretched deployments due to Syria).
The carriers do embark more than 44 aircraft, when you count the Growlers, E-2D and rotary wing assets. The four VFA squadrons typically are 12 (usually Supers), or 10 (Legacy) Hornets. Even IF all four squadrons were authorized at the standard 12 aircraft, that would only be 48. The future CVW will stay at 44 even with the addition of the F-35C. As of now those will be 10 aircraft squadrons. The planned future carrier air wing will be about the same size as current ones, 79 aircraft.
While the availability of the Navy’s strike fighters is certainly troubling, it isn’t like even a 70% availability would mean larger air wings or more wings deployed. It does result in the loss of training hours, increased wear and tear on serviceable aircraft.
FBWFrom what I’ve heard Trump wants to focus on readiness as much as possible for now.
The situation with China is risky. The Chinese know that the USN carriers are low on functional aircraft. I don’t understand that this kind of report is not kept secret, as it could give ideas to potential enemies. If I were Trump, I wouldn’t do anything that could provoke the Chinese until readiness has recovered.
The deployed CVW aren’t. There is a considerable workup period for each air wing prior to deployment. Currently there is:
CVN-77 (with CVW-8), CVN-70 (CVW-2) deployed. CVN-68 is working up for deployment. With only 10 carriers currently in service, it would be difficult for the USN to have more than three (likely 2 as now) deployed, 2 working up. Not sure they would even be able to surge more carrier air wings forward due to the current CVN shortage.
The current VFA squadrons are short 1-2 Hornets, most of the carrier air wings have 44 or fewer strike fighters. The readiness issues aren’t with the deployed wings, it impacts the ability to deploy a carrier and CVW on short notice in event of a conflict. In some cases, cannibalizing spares from non-deployed wings to support the deployed strike fighters.
This isn’t even a new issue- It was reported nearly a year ago (but fell on deaf ears):
https://news.usni.org/2016/05/26/navy-lays-bare-fa-18-readiness-gaps-take-year-surge-air-wing
FBWReally? Adding lonf lead items procured in 2015 and engines ordered separately (in july i think)?
Which LRIP lot are you referring to? The Lot 9 contract wasn’t finalized until November, Lockheed was funding some of the long lead items.
Or are you referring to that Defense-Aerospace.com butcher piece courtesy of de Briganti and Winslow Wheeler? (Actually originally War is Boring, another stellar publication)
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/5/179781/the-latest-official-f_35-prices-are-bogus.html
Lot 9 contracts: https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/976507
https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/606863
FBWGoodbye another 300-ish F-35s. Not that I did not foresee that, it’s actually a good thing..
Doubtful, the USAF may go through with the “dog and pony show” CAS comparative tests in 2018. That does not mean that the A-10 will be found competitive considering the range of missions and scenarios that could be considered “Close Air Support”.
If I were to do a “Crystal ball” analysis of what the findings will be: Neither the A-10, or the F-35 were suitable for all CAS missions. The F-35 was superior in any sort of contested environment, the A-10 had superior persistence. The future close air support mission will be distributed across a variety of manned/unmanned platforms and the continued development of miniaturized munitions.
And itt is likely that the CAS mission will be split between the F-35, drones, the B-1, B-21 (in the near future). As one of the Generals stated ““CAS is a mission, not an airplane”. More to the point, the evidence from the last 16 years of conflict suggests that the A-10 isn’t even the most valuable close air support platform (though it is the cheapest on a CPFH basis). Again, the Chief of Staff had a good point, “longer we have this discussion [about] the A-10 and don’t connect it to how the A-10 fits into a family of systems, the more we’re [stuck] having a 20th century dialogue about close-air support,”.
What the article does not state is that the USAF is continuing to divest itself of A-10’s right up until 2021. The active squadrons will continue to drop as planned (the only difference is that it will be drawn out beyond the planned 2018 date).
The F-35A numbers are not expected to change:
The Air Force’s top uniformed leader also indicated that the F-35 review ordered by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis was unlikely to result in a smaller number of Lockheed Martin’s F-35As being bought by the Air Force
FBWhttps://www.navytimes.com/articles/letter-time-to-rethink-the-f-35-program
So what do people think about this proposal?
Unlikely, the Marines aren’t keen (and never were) on the Super. They are being forced (by the realities of being excluded from CVW) to buy some F-35C to ensure thier presence on the “big deck” carriers.
The cost differential between the F-35B and the Super isn’t substatial enough for the Marines to abandon their Aviation plan (340 F-35B). They are committed to 14 active squadrons of F-35B to meet the needs of the MAGTF(s). I doubt they want to abandon their plans for Distributed Aviation Operations, which they see as key to their Pacific strategy.
Considering the small (planned 80) F-35C buy, switching off to the Super would have marginal impact on the Marines’ aviation budget. The impact on the F-35C and future force mix of the CVW would be uniformly negative.
FBWYou are referring to what the MiG-31 are actually doing for decades? And hundreds of km apart, not just miles.
Check date of post… I doubt you are going to get a response. I believe lukos was banned a few months ago.
FBWYes there were Growlers at RF 17-1:
Yeah there were, overlooked the non-USAF participating units.
Considering the F-35’s mission set, the access U.S. has had to early S-300 systems, I wouldn’t say it is unreasonable that the F-35 performed well against simulated threats.
FBWMethinks they got help from the growlers or the threat was not representative.
Based on the intent and purpose of RF, it more likely that the simulated threat was more sophisticated that what the F-35 will face in the majority of potential combat theaters.
No Growlers at RF 17-1.
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