I’ve just read Deighton’s “Fighter” over the summer break. God knows why I’d never read it before but there you go. The forward is by the very intriguing AJP Taylor and, from what I can tell, the book seems to be generally ackowledged as a well researched account of the BoB. But for me the book raises as many questions as it answers. Make no mistake, I learnt a lot (assuming it’s on the money) but there are some aspects of it I find remarkable and I will test them on this forum. The first is the discussion, in the chapter on ACM Sir Hugh Dowding, about the war cabinet meeting of 15 May 1940.
Deighton notes that on 10 May the great blitzkreig of 1940 began – panzer columns crossed the French borders and headed for the Meuse and; “The French asked the British to employ their heavy bomber force against the German columns”. At the meeting of the War Cabinet on 15 May it was agreed that RAF Bomber Command be authorised to attack and on the same night “the RAF mounted the largest air bombardment the world had yet to see”. But it was directed at various targets in the Ruhr, not the advancing German forces.
He goes on to note that the French argued desperately that air attacks upon the Ruhr would have no effect upon Guderian’s armoured invasion of France. They were right, in fact the attacks had little or no effect at all. Deighton says that the RAF official history admits that the bombers achieved none of their objectives. Industrial damage was negligible. He also says the official history goes on to explain that the greatest benefit expected from this opening shot of the strategic bombing of Germany was [apparently quoting the official history] ‘an informal invitation to the Luftwaffe to bomb London.’ and thereby indirectly support by the French by drawing away some Luftwaffe strength.
Well I’ll be amazed. I know it was war, but it was early days and the UK largely untouched and things were still fairly, shall we say, chivalrous. An invitation by the War cabinet to bomb its own citizens? Any students of RAF Bomber Command and/or the strategic bombing campaign care to discuss?
By: adrian_gray - 23rd February 2005 at 16:03
There are various references in arcitles from around 1940ish about structural weakness in 109 wings, so the story was clearly around then. BG’s comments were something to the effect that “this was a time when people could still believe that the wings of a Bf109 would come off in a dive” which makes his views on the matter clear.
Paul
I recently bought a copy of Pierre Clostermann’s “The Big Show” and I am fairly certain that in there he intercepts a ‘109 at high altitude and in the ensuing dive to escape the ‘109 pilot pulls the wings off. This is, however, referring to a VERY high altitude photo reconnaisance version so the speeds concerned are probably considerably higher than under more normal conditions.
Adrian
By: Andy in Beds - 23rd February 2005 at 15:16
Recently I was re-reading some of the Air in the War series. Some of you will remember this was a magazine published a few years ago (well rather more than I care to think actually) containing reprints from Flight and Aeroplane from 1939 onwards. At the end of each magazine was a commentary from Bill Gunston looking at the articles form a modern perspective.
There are various references in arcitles from around 1940ish about structural weakness in 109 wings, so the story was clearly around then. BG’s comments were something to the effect that “this was a time when people could still believe that the wings of a Bf109 would come off in a dive” which makes his views on the matter clear.
Paul
VB
I think there were considerable reservations about many of the features of the 109 within the Luftwaffe. The Kosin book goes into great detail about the shortcomings of the 109. As I’ve said above, the Nazi hierachy wasn’t one where free speech and questioning decisions tended to benefit a persons career.
Cheers
Andy
By: vildebeest - 23rd February 2005 at 14:26
Recently I was re-reading some of the Air in the War series. Some of you will remember this was a magazine published a few years ago (well rather more than I care to think actually) containing reprints from Flight and Aeroplane from 1939 onwards. At the end of each magazine was a commentary from Bill Gunston looking at the articles form a modern perspective.
There are various references in arcitles from around 1940ish about structural weakness in 109 wings, so the story was clearly around then. BG’s comments were something to the effect that “this was a time when people could still believe that the wings of a Bf109 would come off in a dive” which makes his views on the matter clear.
Paul
By: Andy in Beds - 23rd February 2005 at 13:07
“That’s why I wrote it…”
🙂 🙂 🙂 🙂
By: VoyTech - 23rd February 2005 at 12:46
Voytech
thank you.
From you I’ll take that as a sizeable compliment.
“That’s why I wrote it…”
By: John C - 22nd February 2005 at 18:03
Ok Andy that makes sense! As Steve says, the aircraft tries to rotate around the propshaft, and with no lift the wing will be pushed down. I didn’t get as far as diagrams and tried to work it out in my head – never a good plan!
JC
By: Arabella-Cox - 22nd February 2005 at 17:52
However wouldn’t the engine torque force the port wing down? Any thoughts anyone.
Yes. As I recall it, this was also one of the primary reasons for the crash of Spitfire PV202 on my birthday in 2000 (hence the reason why it sticks in my mind). The engine was given too much power at a low altitude and low speed, and the resultant torque sent PV202’s wing down with insufficient height / time to recover.
Much the same would happen with any high powered piston warbird; as the engine power increases, the prop has inertia which resists the power increase. The resistance has to go somewhere, so the torque tries to rotate the airframe the opposite way around the propshaft. In smaller, less powerful aircraft, this is barely noticable as the power isn’t really sufficient to rotate the airframe against the air, but with a big piston beast I’m told you have to be very careful.
Great critique by the way, provided a very welcome break from ‘spreadsheet hell’ earlier this afternoon… 🙂
Steve
By: Andy in Beds - 22nd February 2005 at 17:34
Nice critique Andy – very impressive.
Initial thought on the wing drop question – assuming that the prop is turning anticlockwise from the cockpit, it would be trying to drag the airframe in the same direction with the lift from the wings countering this. If both wings stalled at the same time, then the inertia from the engine and prop would force the port wing down.
If the prop turns the other way, I’ve run out of ideas – or it’s torque reaction.
JC
Crackpot theorist
John
thank you also.
From my notes I actually spent a happy lunch hour drawing little diagrams taken from pictures of 109’s showing the rotation of propellors.
From the cockpit side view the rotation is clock-wise (anti-clockwise head on) so therefore opposite to what you thought (?) However wouldn’t the engine torque force the port wing down? Any thoughts anyone.
Oh, and you can add this. The Buchon that was fitted with the Hispano engine. Did it stall right wing first as the prop rotated the other way?
Anyone?
Cheers
Andy
By: John C - 22nd February 2005 at 16:53
Nice critique Andy – very impressive.
Initial thought on the wing drop question – assuming that the prop is turning anticlockwise from the cockpit, it would be trying to drag the airframe in the same direction with the lift from the wings countering this. If both wings stalled at the same time, then the inertia from the engine and prop would force the port wing down.
If the prop turns the other way, I’ve run out of ideas – or it’s torque reaction.
JC
Crackpot theorist
By: Andy in Beds - 22nd February 2005 at 16:49
Isn’t it simply a question of misunderstanding? From the German viewpoint “Stukas” were widely used in Spain, because “Stuka” is simply an abbreviation for a dive bomber.
I wil certainly be pleased to read more of Andy in books.
Voytech
thank you.
From you I’ll take that as a sizeable compliment.
I do as you say suspect that the story started because Stuka is a generic term.
However, Len Deighton is JU87 specific.
Not a big criticism–really. 🙂 🙂
Cheers
Andy
PS Love the Spitfire book.
By: VoyTech - 22nd February 2005 at 14:41
Deighton perpetuates the story that the JU87 was particularly effective in Spain. This is a myth; there were no squadrons of Ju87’s causing havoc in Spain.
I can’t say I really blame Deighton for this as I think the Stuka stories go all the way back to the civil war itself.
More recent research would suggest that at any one time there were never more than five JU87’s in Spain and their use was very limited. The bulk of close support operations in Spain carried out by the Condor Legion were by Heinkel He 51’s and Henschel Hs123’s. The Hs123 was a dive-bomber but the He 51 was originally designed as a fighter.
Isn’t it simply a question of misunderstanding? From the German viewpoint “Stukas” were widely used in Spain, because “Stuka” is simply an abbreviation for a dive bomber.
I wil certainly be pleased to read more of Andy in books.
By: Andy in Beds - 21st February 2005 at 11:23
Thank you for the gracious words Gentlemen.
I really enjoyed the process–it makes a change to really read a book again, as opposed to just skimming through them.
I’ve just started part 1 (The Pioneer Years) of the massive five volume history of British aviation by Harald Penrose. My plan is to work through all five volumes by the end of the year (some hope!).
If anyone’s interested in my thoughts as I go–sing out.
Cheers
Andy
By: JDK - 21st February 2005 at 11:16
Thanks Andy.
Good man. A lesson to those of us unable to question our assumptions.
My hat’s off.
By: Smith - 20th February 2005 at 20:10
Many thanks Andy. A great job well done! 🙂 Now where are our resident 109 experten? :rolleyes:
By: Andy in Beds - 20th February 2005 at 14:54
Fighter by Len Deighton.
Hi all
A few weeks ago on this very thread I was challenged about my comments and asked to elaborate about some of the things I had to say about the book ‘Fighter’ by Len Deighton.
So keen were some of our little congregation that I should eat my own words that one person (thanks Damien) even lent me a copy so that I could re-read it.
As those of you who’ve been following this saga know I’ve already admitted that I was wrong and the book is good, very good actually and well worth reading and below I’ll try to explain why I think it’s worth a read or even a re-read if you haven’t visited the book for a while.
I think I now realise that when I first read this book over twenty years ago, much of what it contained was ‘flying in the face’ of what was then the conventional wisdom on the Battle, much of which had been produced during the war or shortly after.
Deighton must have been one of the first authors to challenge that wisdom and much of the very good research carried out since then has tended to confirm rather than deny what he had to say and in that respect the book hasn’t aged too badly and much of what we now accept about the history of that time is really being expressed in this book which was written back in 1977.
As I said above, I first read this book back in 1982 so I suppose that in the intervening twenty-three years my knowledge, tastes and understanding of historical events may have altered so while reading I did check what Deighton had to say against other sources and although they weren’t primary sources themselves they are generally considered reliable.
I ended up with half a school exercise book filled with notes and there were a couple of occasions when I thought ‘I’ve got you now Mr D’ but on checking I found him to be very accurate.
One instance of this was an incident that occurred on 18th August 1940 at Croydon.
Deighton relates how a 615 Sqn. Hurricane crash landed at Croydon Airport after a raid elsewhere. The aircraft (L1592 coded KW-Z) was flown by Pilot Officer D.J. Looker who was amazed to be the subject of a complaint by airport officials for using the field as an emergency landing ground (Page 214).
I must say I found this story a bit unlikely especially as Croydon airport had been quite badly bombed three days earlier on 15th Aug by elements of Erprobungs Gruppe 210, which I had supposed might have blown away much of pre-war petty officialdom and it’s attitudes but on checking in ‘Battle of Britain, Then and Now Mk V’ (After the Battle Publications 1989 page 56) this story was confirmed and it also confirmed that Pilot Officer Looker’s Hurricane is now preserved in the Imperial war Museum in Lambeth.
There were only two relatively minor points where I found other sources disagreed with Deighton and neither of them was really crucial to the story of the events of 1940.
The first was the part the Junkers Ju87 played in The Spanish Civil War and the other was some aspects of the design of the Messerschmitt Bf109.
The Spanish Civil War matter can be quickly cleared up.
Deighton perpetuates the story that the JU87 was particularly effective in Spain. This is a myth; there were no squadrons of Ju87’s causing havoc in Spain.
I can’t say I really blame Deighton for this as I think the Stuka stories go all the way back to the civil war itself.
More recent research would suggest that at any one time there were never more than five JU87’s in Spain and their use was very limited. The bulk of close support operations in Spain carried out by the Condor Legion were by Heinkel He 51’s and Henschel Hs123’s. The Hs123 was a dive-bomber but the He 51 was originally designed as a fighter. The Germans did however use the experience gained in Spain using these two types to develop tactics and these were perfected by the time of the invasion of Poland in 1939. A good reference for the use of German types in Spain is ‘Aircraft of the Spanish Civil War’ by Gerald Howson (Putnams 1990) and I used this more recent publication to check up on Ju87 deployment in Spain.
What Deighton has to say about the Messerschmitt Bf109 is more involved and to his credit he goes to great lengths in the book to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of all three of the main fighter types, again much of which is very well written and accurate.
Deighton makes the point several times that the Messerschmitt Bf 109E had fundamental shortcomings in it’s design, most especially in the area of it’s wing and of course in it’s range and I found the section in the book about the development of the 109 particularly interesting.
While I agree with Mr Deighton that the Bf.109 had a number of deficiencies I cannot find anywhere else a report of structural weakness in the wings.
This is not to say Mr Deighton is incorrect, I haven’t got a great amount of reference material available on the 109.
I did resort to two references that I have on the shelf, one is old and I’m not sure how accurate and is ‘The Messerschmitt 109. A Famous German Fighter’ by Heinz J. Nowarra. (Harleyford 1963) and the other is ‘The German Fighter Since 1915’ by Rudiger Kosin (Putnams 1988) This was originally a German language publication and Kosin was himself an aeronautical engineer and I suspect his version of events has some validity. The Bf109 had some very difficult handling characteristics near the ground, which I suspect were never really resolved, and Kosin discusses them in depth.
He discusses the fact that the original German test pilots at the Reichlin Test Centre were unhappy with the 109 and it’s handling near the ground and especially with it’s stall (always apparently left wing first—caused by slightly different airflow over the port wing by the propeller or propeller torque?) and goes on to say that at least one test pilot had the slats wired shut because he felt the handling of the 109 was more benign without them.
He goes onto say that in the prevailing political climate of Nazi Germany that the unfavourable reports were quietly shelved and production proceeded with the consequence that the 109 had throughout it’s life a shockingly bad accident rate. What is also seemingly certain is that German fighter pilots in 1940 were reluctant to pull the 109 into as tight a turns as they might have wanted as they were concerned either with the structural strength of the airframe or the way the aircraft might behave in very tight turns and this set them at something of a disadvantage at times when flying against Spitfires and Hurricanes.
One last point I’d like to make about the Messerschmitt 109 is that the later ‘F’ model did suffer from structural weaknesses in the wing and this was recognised and airframe modifications were put in place to cure this.
In conclusion a very good book, not only did I enjoy reading it again for pleasure but I did enjoy looking into it at a deeper level for this review and I’ve certainly enjoyed discussing my thoughts with Gnome (Don) by E-mail while I’ve been putting the pieces together.
Recommended!
Oh, and if anyone else among our little congregation would like to chose another book to discuss I’ll be happy to read their thoughts.
I’ve just read ‘Fighter Boys’ by Patrick Bishop (for the second time) and I’d be happy to look at that in detail if anyone’s interested.
Cheers
Andy
PS Do any of the pilots, engineers and mechanics who frequent this site have an explanation of why the 109always stalled port wing first?
By: Dave Homewood - 27th January 2005 at 01:41
Who would have won the Second Battle of Britain?
No doubt the New Zealanders again 🙂
Damien, I read once that very near the top of that list of people the German’s were intending to execute once they got to Britain was the radio comedian Tommy Handley, because Hitler was so outraged that he’d sung “Who Is That Man Who Looks Like Charlie Chaplin”!
That’s a true story.
By: Charley - 26th January 2005 at 22:44
Whirligig
Sooooo…….
I’ve been thinking.
What if Adolf had left the USSR alone and had another go at dear old Blighty in 1941? Still no overt US support and the full might of the Third Reich facing us.
Who would have won the Second Battle of Britain?
Over to you…
JC
The Westland Whirlwind would have been able to show it’s true potential as a destroyer of Axis vehicles and landing craft. 🙂
By: Andy in Beds - 26th January 2005 at 21:53
Many thanks Andy
My comment re. bias not at al personal, I’ve never met the man. I did write to him once and got a fairly short (both meanings of the word) response – probably the millionth similar question 😉 My observation is more about the perspective he takes which is very supportive of the various decisions taken by Portal, Harris et al – supportive in that he accepts them without seriously critiquing them (in the manner I might have expected a historical author to do). Perhaps on reflection the bias is mine! I may do a spot on navel gazing on that one.
I agree re. the emotional connection and devotion to the task – empathy is perhaps the right term. I very much respect that. And IMHO there is a positive to his non-critiquing narrative style, it results in a simple lay out of the events from which the reader can draw his/her own conclusions.
All the best, Don
Don
one last thought about Martin Middlebrook which has nothing to do with aviation. He does a talk on Commonwealth War Graves and cemeteries which lasts about 30 minutes. He gives details of the layouts, the headstone designs and the inscriptions on them. Until you’ve heard him deliver it in a field cemetry, somewhere like High Wood or Serre Road–well all the books he’s ever written don’t come close to that half hour.
More on aviation soon.
Andy
By: Smith - 26th January 2005 at 21:51
Hmmm … pros
– by then the U-boats were doing a pretty good job
– only other front – Africa
cons …
– UK’s fighter defence well prepared
– still no decent strategic weaponry/aircraft in (Hitler’s) arsenal
– still loss of pilots problem fighting over enemy territory
I think it was 1940 (ie. catch them semi-unprepared) or not bother.
Option may have been to make UK sorties punitive (in terms of losses etc.) and therefore end up stalemating. Think however UK/Churchill would’ve succeeded in gaining US support in due course. Certainly political support which might have pressured Hitler to (maybe) ease back borders. Would be interesting if it had stalemated – what then? When would the bear have growled?
By: John C - 26th January 2005 at 21:27
Sooooo…….
I’ve been thinking.
What if Adolf had left the USSR alone and had another go at dear old Blighty in 1941? Still no overt US support and the full might of the Third Reich facing us.
Who would have won the Second Battle of Britain?
Over to you…
JC
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January 15, 2005 at 9:08 am