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matt

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Viewing 15 posts - 976 through 990 (of 3,292 total)
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  • matt
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    I do not understand why the LCS is supposed to be such a bad design?

    Surely the power to weight ratio is a bonus.

    What are the main concerns?

    Also I can appreciate the cost of the first two ships being high but this is always the case with development. Once they know what they want the rest of the 50+ ships will be a lot cheaper.

    Which means the USN can carry on having a large number of boats.

    I appreciate these are a lot bigger but they remind me of the WW2 era PT boats but with a lot more punch and capability. I am sure the IN would have loved to have these in the 1970’s.

    Surely fast moving 1 or 2 boats with long range and a lot of missiles could cause mayhem not only for shore based enemy combatants but also enemy groups.

    in reply to: Taiwan's growing fighter gap with China #2397413
    matt
    Participant

    Cant taiwan just buy some F-2’s or Gripens or even a Su-30MKI or something?

    Does it have to be a US aircraft?

    in reply to: Boeing proposes new F/A XX – the NGAD #2397447
    matt
    Participant

    I cannot see the US nationalising defence contractors. That’s a cultural (and ingrained cultural) thing rather than anything pragmatic.

    The mantras of private = good, public = bad and private = bad, public = good both have their own flaws.

    Private companies make a profit (that is their raison d’tre).

    Making a profit means selling what you make for more than it cost you to make it (no great insight I’ll confess)

    $Sell = $Make + $Profit

    Exponents of private companies therefore claim that this means that they have to be efficient, otherwise they cannot sell for more than they spend. Thus they would claim that such companies cannot afford to carry incompetents or excess stock or unecessary capabilities.

    They would further argue that all of the useful things ever were invented by tightly focused entrepenerial (sp) private companies and individuals and that all of the bloaty rubbish was created in government labs and by state owned companies.

    Public owned or state business proponents say that by not needing to pay an owner or shareholders on the stock exchange they can charge less

    $Sell = $Make

    And that they can afford to have reserve stocks and reserve capability
    And that they can afford to indulge in white space thinking

    Al

    As much as there are issues with the US defence industry they have not yet reached the level of incompetence that they need to be nationalised.

    And it is evident from other countries that nationalised defence just seems to create a bolted defence industry too comfortable and not hungry to pursue the next technology.

    Its a simple case of the air force and navy asking for less exotic tech and keeping things simple where it feels it can.

    sitting on this side of the pond cant see why the US would need major re-structuring apart from a knee jerk reaction to please tax payers (which is not always a good thing).

    in reply to: Indian Air Force – News & Discussion # 13 #2397455
    matt
    Participant

    NEW DELHI: It needed drastic surgery but only first-aid has been rendered. Or, so it seems from the government’s half-hearted steps to revamp Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), whose projects continue to be plagued by huge time and cost overruns.

    Defence minister A K Antony on Thursday approved a series of measures which — it was grandiosely proclaimed — will “transform and revitalize” DRDO in both “form and substance”. The measures range from creation of a Defence Technology Commission (DTC) headed by Antony and de-centralization of DRDO’s management to hiving off some of its labs and setting up a commercial arm with seed capital of Rs 2 crore.

    The other steps include development of Mark-II versions of the long-delayed Arjun main-battle tanks and Akash surface-to-air missile systems as well as consultation by an “eminent human resource expert” to restructure DRDO and selection of industry partners by evolving “a suitable mechanism”.

    But there is scepticism whether all this will actually transform DRDO into a lean and mean organisation capable of delivering cutting-edge weapon systems to the armed forces.

    For one, MoD will decentralise DRDO management through creation of seven “technology domain based centres” or clusters of labs — missile systems, aeronautics, armament & combat engineering, electronics & communication, material sciences, naval systems and life sciences.

    But there are fears all this will make DRDO even more bureaucratic and top-heavy, especially since each such cluster will be headed by a director-general and his associated paraphernalia.
    DRDO, with its 51 labs, currently has one director-general at the helm. After being redesignated as chairman, he will head the DRDO management council consisting of seven DGs, four chief controllers (R&D) and an additional financial advisor at the HQ.

    For another, MoD has decided to hive off only three of its 51 labs, two to CSIR and one to ICAR, instead of the dozen or so recommended by the Rama Rao Committee report.The Rama Rao report had stressed DRDO should concentrate only on 8 to 10 ‘critical technologies’ of ‘strategic importance’ instead of also venturing into making juices, mosquito repellents, titanium dental implants and the like.

    The creation of DTC is being done to allow DRDO to have a greater say in defence procurements from abroad. Armed forces, however, already feel DRDO often derails armament deals by pledging to develop the systems concerned but does not make good its promises. Defence scientists, on their part, contend the services are often against indigenisation, with foreign arms lobbies always ready to play ball in deriding DRDO.

    There is, of course, no getting away from the fact that India needs to develop a robust industrial-military infrastructure, importing as it still does around 70% of its military hardware and software. Incidentally, India has inked defence deals worth a staggering $50 billion since the 1999 Kargil conflict, the overwhelming majority of them with foreign armament firms.
    /////

    hmmmm … not suprising..

    in reply to: Boeing proposes new F/A XX – the NGAD #2399722
    matt
    Participant

    I think this discussion isn’t just about the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, compared to some of the other less well to do adversaries the USN would face in the future the Taliban and Sadams are relatively lower technology.

    Imagine something like a C-8 or whatever being fired from the Iranian shore to hit a DDG – 1000 , how much damage would it do? Compare that damage repair to the cost of the missile fired by the Iranians. Does it make sense?

    Would the USN be able to replace the DDG 1000 quickly? Could it even afford to?

    The question is can the USN afford to put higher cost high technology as they can fit in a lower number of vehicles against enemies that are looking at cheaper ways to take out those ships?

    Similarly for the MV-22 it would be inconceivable looking in from the outside for anyone to be able to claim that the tilt rotor project has been a success and anything more than a white elephant.

    in reply to: Boeing proposes new F/A XX – the NGAD #2399728
    matt
    Participant

    From Ares Blog :

    Gates Says Navy Needs to Ask Itself Hard Questions
    Posted by Paul McLeary at 5/4/2010 7:00 AM CDT
    blog post photo
    SecDef Robert Gates (Pic: USAF)

    Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made a roomful of Navy officers and Naval industry types choke on their lunch yesterday afternoon at the Air Sea Space convention when he flat out told them that the Navy budget is going to remain flat in the near-term, and that the service has to ask itself “whether the nation can really afford a Navy that relies on $3 [billion] to $6 billion destroyers, $7 billion submarines and $11 billion carriers.”

    It was the kind of real talk that Gates has become known for in his tenure as SecDef—and the kind of thing you get the sense that he really enjoys. The Secretary began his talk innocently enough, but when his early remarks are taken in the context of the whole, it was quite the opposite. In summoning the memories of American military innovators like Lt. Gen Victor Krulak, Adm. Chester Nimitz and others, Gates noted that “they had the vision and the insight to see that the world and technology were changing. They understood the implications of these shifts and then pressed ahead in the face of often fierce institutional resistance.”

    In other words, the Navy leaders need to put more work into finding ways to keep the force relevant, and at a lower cost. “Mark my words,” Gates said later in the speech, “the Navy and Marine Corps must be willing to reexamine and question basic assumptions in light of evolving technologies, new threats and budget realities.”

    The new threats are in part defined by the irregular challenges even potential near-peer enemies would present in a conflict with American naval power. “Our Navy has to be designed for new challenges, new technologies, and new missions,” Gates said, because “potential adversaries are investing in weapons designed to neutralize U.S. advantages – to deny our military freedom of action while potentially threatening America’s primary means of projecting power: our bases, sea and air assets, and the networks that support them.”

    Interesting was Gates’ continuing references to the work of theorist Andrew Krepinevich and his work in his book 7 Deadly Scenarios and elsewhere in which he outlines how irregular threats presented by actors from the low end to the high end of the threat spectrum can overcome American precision weapons and big deck naval power.

    “The virtual monopoly the U.S. has enjoyed with precision guided weapons is eroding – especially with long-range, accurate anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially strike from over the horizon,” Gates warned. “This is a particular concern with aircraft carriers and other large, multi-billion-dollar blue-water surface combatants, where, for example, a Ford-class carrier plus its full complement of the latest aircraft would represent potentially a $15 to $20 billion set of hardware at risk.”

    Finally, the SecDef criticized the Navy for its failure to think critically about this threat, and instead offering solutions that consist of “either more of what we already have or modernized versions of pre-existing capabilities. This approach ignores the fact that we face diverse adversaries with finite resources that consequently force them to come at the U.S. in unconventional and innovative ways. The more relevant gap we risk creating is one between the capabilities we are pursuing and those that are actually needed in the real world of tomorrow.”

    And just to ensure that the industry representatives in the audience choked on their lunch of beef and fish, he added that “we simply cannot afford to perpetuate a status quo that heaps more and more expensive technologies onto fewer and fewer platforms — thereby risking a situation where some of our greatest capital expenditures go toward weapons and ships that could potentially become wasting assets.”

    Gates promised that he will have more to say in a speech he is giving this Saturday. I can’t wait.

    http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a7194c24e-048b-4279-a448-e981feebb110&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest

    in reply to: Boeing proposes new F/A XX – the NGAD #2400117
    matt
    Participant

    Part of it from cutting the F-35C – if they were smart. There is always development money in the pipeline though. Gates is trying to wean the Admirals and Generals from spec’ing the most complex and expensive solutions – a good fight imo. Look at the USAF: F-22’s at all costs and to the detriment of other programs. The Marines: the MV-22 – hugely expensive and difficult to maintain. F-35B: not going to be cheap. Don’t get me started on the EFV – 22mil each – more than an M1 tank. And it can’t handle EFP/IED’s. The Navy: lCS, a small combatant: 500mil +…. DDG 1000….

    I agree with the above and the prices do seem to be excessive in some cases but I cant square Robert gates statement to mean the NAVY can go in for another expensive project.

    F-22 is an Airforce only project isnt it? I thought the NAVY opted for the F/A-18 E/F and JSF combo instead?

    in reply to: Boeing proposes new F/A XX – the NGAD #2400140
    matt
    Participant

    Where will the money come from, for this though?

    I thought Robert Gates was going around the NAVY circuit telling them to cut down on the high budget items that are not relevant considering some of the asymmetric systems put up by navies with lower budgets

    in reply to: MMRCA News and Discussion IV #2400179
    matt
    Participant

    No that will be for the Super hornet or the F-16.. we have to pay the FMS route a lot of money so that they can give free weapon systems and the like to our neighbours in the west.

    in reply to: PAK-FA Saga Episode 13 #2400915
    matt
    Participant

    Is there any news on the PAK FA itself ?

    in reply to: Indian Air Force – News & Discussion # 13 #2400916
    matt
    Participant

    Has anyone got any lists of major successes by DRDO that have met either the budget or time lines or even both?

    in reply to: Boeing proposes new F/A XX – the NGAD #2401210
    matt
    Participant

    The Navy and Industry have just been told the budget is not going to be increased and that the need to look at reducing some of the costs, not sure how this squares up with that recent blunt announcement.

    in reply to: MMRCA News and Discussion IV #2401401
    matt
    Participant

    Shouldnt they atleast try to stop the neartime shortage of aircraft?

    in reply to: PAK-FA complement ? #2402072
    matt
    Participant

    You have to ask what the low of the hi low mix with the PAK FA should be used for?

    Its not going to be sent into a heavily protected area with lots of air defence systems.. The PAK FA would be sent in first to sweep the area and reduce threat levels as much as possible before the low of the hi lo mix goes in.

    With this in mind and the fact that Russia will not be going around the globe bombing countries thousands of miles away does it really need anything more than the Mig-35?

    in reply to: Indian Air Force – News & Discussion # 13 #2402187
    matt
    Participant

    Delayed Projects of DRDO

    (Source: Press Information Bureau India; issued May 5, 2010)

    Some of the major delayed projects of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) with original and revised cost, and Probable Date of Completion (PDC) are given below:

    — Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Full Scale Engineering Development (FSED) Programme – Phase II:
    Date of sanction – 20 November 2001
    Original PDC – 31 December 2008
    Revised PDC – 31 December 2012
    Original Cost – Rs. 3301.78 cr
    Revised Cost – Rs. 5777.56 cr

    — Full Scale Engineering Development (FSED) Programme of Naval Light Combat Aircraft (LCA-Navy):
    Date of sanction – 28 March 2003
    Original PDC – 27 March 2010
    Revised PDC – 27 December 2014
    Original Cost – Rs. 948.90 cr
    Revised Cost – Rs. 1714.98 cr

    — Interception, Monitoring, Direction Finding and Analysis system (IMDFAS) – Divyadrishti:
    Date of sanction – 27 August 2002
    Original PDC – 26 February 2008
    Revised PDC – 26 August 2010
    Original Cost – Rs. 560.00 cr
    Revised Cost – Rs. 670.60 cr

    — Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP):
    Date of sanction – 26 July 1983
    Original PDC – 30 July 1995
    Revised PDC – 31 December 2010 (Projects for development of Prithvi, Agni, Dhanush, Akash and Trishul missiles have been completed, whereas PDC for only Nag missile has been extended upto to December 2010)
    Original Cost – Rs. 388.83 cr
    Revised Cost – Rs. 1771.43 cr

    — Kaveri Engine for LCA:
    Date of sanction – 30 March 1989
    Original PDC – 31 December 1996
    Revised PDC – 31 December 2010
    Original Cost – Rs. 383.81 cr
    Revised Cost – Rs. 2839.00 cr

    The reasons for delay in completion of the above projects and their cost escalation are due to technical / technological complexities; Sanctions imposed by technologically advanced countries and various control regimes; increase in scope of work in terms of creation of more infrastructure, test facilities and their maintenance; change / enhancement in user requirements during development; deviations/failures during testing; extended and long-drawn user trials; etc.

    Following efforts have been made to complete these projects without any further delay:

    — Consortium approach has been used for design, development and fabrication of critical components.

    — Three-tier project monitoring approach is being followed in the major projects / programmes.

    — Project Monitoring Review committee (PMRC); and Project Appraisal and Review Committee (PARC) meeting are held regularly to monitor the progress of the ongoing projects.

    — Concurrent engineering approach has been adopted in technology intensive projects to minimize time-lag between development and productionisation of the systems, and Information Technology and modern management techniques have been applied.

    — Encouraging joint funding by Services to ensure their commitment towards early completion.

    — Promoting synergy and better coordination among user Services, DRDO and production agencies through cluster meetings.

    This information was given by Defence Minister Shri AK Antony in written reply to Shri Kalraj Mishra in Rajya Sabha today.

    -ends-

Viewing 15 posts - 976 through 990 (of 3,292 total)