my advice is for the two to buy a hovercraft next time. :rolleyes:

crobato :rolleyes: you are wrong Sens as I have read 10,220 Kgs empty weight for the Su-15, but you are right normal take of weight for the Flagon is little bit heavier but Max take off of both fighters is around 17,000kg , when we compare the fighters you need to see that the J-8II carries usually Pl-9 and PL-8 plus fuel tanks and the SU-15 carried Aa-3 Anab and AA-8 Aphid but by no means the J-8II is lighter as you say to put it in simplier wordsThe J-8II as the SU-15 have a Thrust to weight ratio of 0.92 both fighers have the same thrust to weight ratio and the kunlun still keeps it as in the Su-15MT

not taking sides (cos i dont really know who is right on the empty weight of the Su15), but last time i checked, a plane with the same max take-off weight as another much heavier plane will usually be the one better off in WVR combat.

think about it, the empty weight is just the weight of the plane itself, while the max take-off weight represents the thrust limite of the engine (usually). so what does that say about TWR of the two? with the same amount of gas and weapons load, who will have the better TWR?

also, if the plane (empty weight) is lighter, but max take-off weight is similar, then what does that say? the lighter plane can carry up more gas and/or weapons, translating into greater combat endurace.

IMHO, it is pointless to say, ‘look, these two planes have the same max weight and similar TWR at that state, so their performance must be similar’. just as planes dont ever fight when they are at empty weight, neither do they ever fight at max take-off weight.

if i were you, i’d be focusing more on getting some links and other concrete evidence to show what the empty weight of the Su15 is.

You wouldnt find SSN’s operating within the Chinese 12 mile territorial limit thats for certain.

IF the PLAN is only strong inside of its territorial waters though that does give rather a free hand for SSN ops against the two major shipping lanes just to the east of the Paracel’s and west of the Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea – the waters there being a minimum of 200m depth. Cutting those neatly severs China’s oil lifeline to the Persian Gulf.

The same could be said for the East China Sea off Shanghai. The bathymetry of the waters there is extreme to say the least but, while there are areas as shallow as 50m which would be virtually impassable to an SSN wishing to remain covert, there are also areas extending down past 3km deep, just perfect for a lurking sub, inside of the Ryukyu island chain.

Shallow water restricts movement, allows for mine fields, reduces sonar performance and brings the danger of visual detection from the air.

Shallow water also creates flow noise that degrades passive sonar and presents the advantage to the vessel with the better DSP’s in their sonar. Visual detection of a submerged sub requires something to luckily overfly the boat and be looking down at the right time. Visual detection is a very short-range solution and relies on the sub being near-enough periscope depth as makes no deifference. Minefields aren’t too popular in shipping lanes!.

Active sonar and convoy tactics would be used to reduce SSN’s chances too.

Medium and high frequency active sonar, such as those fitted to PLAN ASW escorts suffer very badly from topography reflections in shallow water. Low frequency active sonar is the way round that but the PLAN arent there yet.

i really doubt anyone would be willing to blockade chinese shipping, not unless WWIII breaks out. china is simply too great a part of the international economy.

Like Indian said this just shooting the sh1t and I could not conceive of the geopolitical situation that would place RN SSNs in the kind of role we’re talking about. As a strictly academic exercise though, if a selective blockade were to be pursued, interrupting the circa 2 billion barrels per day oil imported by China, would be a feasible proposition for the RN sub fleet

any likely sea conflict will focus exclusively on military targets, with the RN’s subs tasked primarily to deny the PLAN the use of the sea. cant do that hiding in the deep.

Not necessarily. Such a blockade would seek to serve a political objective and targetting Chinese-flag tankers, for example, to impact on China’s military operations could be a viable course of action in a limited scenario. The defintion of Sea Denial is the prevention of an advesary’s free use of the sea for its own advantage after all!. Just potting warships doesnt necessarily do that!.

…and convoy tactics would be used to reduce SSN’s chances too.

Convoy tactics really depend on the quality of the escorts you have to form the convoy with. This is not the 1940’s in Western Approaches anymore and the attacking boats are not likely to come steaming in on the surface to be picked off. Convoy’s can be useful against attacking SSK’s by use of co-ordinated manoevering – zig-zagging and the suchlike – against an SSN with far superior manoverability and advanced HWT’s though a convoy without heavy organic chopper support is a nice compact concentration of targets.

as i already said, the PLAN is not yet a true blue water navy, so whats the point in reinforcing that?

also, even if the RN were to try to blockade chinese oil lines, the task is far from as clear cut as you would make it seem. remember that china does produce the majority of the oil it needs domestically and also has oil and nature gas pipelines to russia and other former soviet states with yet more pipelines in the pipes, as it were.

as such, even if the RN were to successfully cut off china’s sea based oil lines, it will not cripple the chinese economy in the short or even medium term. even after that the effects will be felt in declining chinese exports first and foremost before key military and common day needs are jepordised in china. so go into any supermarket and check how many of the goods on sale their have ‘made in china’ on the back, and you well see that depriving the world of chinese goods will carry a cost higher then any government, any country will be willing to pay for only a limited conflict.

there is also the matter of possible chinese responses to widening the conflict beyond merely military targets. just an example off the top off my head would be chinese reprisal attacks on british assets, of which the north sea drilling rigs spring to mind. such fixed targets could be hit be sub-launched crusie missiles from considerable distances, making the task of trying to find the attacker almost impossible unless luck would place an RN sub close to the chinese SSN launching the attack (which, based on the number of the RN sub force and the ‘fact’ that most if not all of them will be off in the far east hunting chinese oil-liners, is far from likely).

the UK would no doubt be forced to recall subs to try to ensure the safety of the oilrigs and other maritine assets, which would make the job of blockading chinese oil lines much harder for the remaining subs, especially since they would have to close to within visual range to ID every liner that passes through (which is alot, as all of SE asia gets its oil through these waters).

there are many more ways in which china can take action to counter a blockade, but i feel that we are already slipping away from the original topic with all these far flung scenarios about oil blockades and reprisals. the original issue being discussed was whether the RN could have the same effect in denying the use of sea to the PLAN in a possible future, non-total-war situation as it did in the falklands, the answer to which is a very clear NO.

PLAN ships would have almost unchallenged use of the sea to at least the 12 mile EEZ, and most likely well beyound that depending on what time frame this future conflict is set in. meaning that the RN would have only neglageble impact on the PLAN’s movements unless china tries to, i dont know, take the falklands from the british for example.

all you say is true, thats why i put extra emphysis on the fact that the PLAN is not on the same level as the likes of the RN in terms of true blue water operating ability.

however, if we are talking about a conflict near or in chinese waters, then even the RN’s sub force will find it extremely difficult to have anywhere near the effect it had during the falklands.

the PLAN might not yet have the ability to effectively locate, track and attack ultra-quiet RN subs, but the main stumbling block the PLAN is faced with is location. once a target has been found, it would not be that difficult to track and attack it, especially if it was near the chinese mainland. and there lies the problem for the RN.

sure, its SSNs could probably slip in and out without much risk of being discovered, but as soon as they decide to attack something, then they’ll find themselves in all sorts of bother.

even then the exchange rate will most likely be substantaully in the RN’s favour, however, the RN does have one major drawback in that as advanced as their subs are, they dont have that many of them.

im a little disappointed with all the zombee films. surely we can come up with more challenging oppents. 🙁

other than the USN, none of the other western navies (even including their SSNs) are safe when operating within Flanker range of the india/china/russia shores.

The british & french carriers can be matched by shore based flanker, migs, aew so that advantage is neutralized. shore based LRMP a/c and ship based helos can make life rough for a SSN esp as torpedoes arent really long ranged weapons..

That leaves the surface ships to clean up, which as noted above
isnt very difficult…using stuff like subs armed with klubs.

The “West” looks strong onlee because of the vast USN presence. if due to a economic decline or political changes
the US CVN fleet were to drop down, the “West” will cease
to control the worlds oceans the way it does now. This will
signal the end of a particular phase in world history – expeditionary ops against powerful enemies far away.

Imo In around 2 decades, india & china will be strong enough
to beat back massed US CVN + SSN attacks even if the
US spending continues at its present super-high levels.

well its not very ‘sporting’ to put your oppenent in his most disadvantagous position and put your forces at their strongest position and compaire the two.

the true test of sea power is not whether you can hold out in your home base (cos with land based long range modern fighters like the newest flankers, would you really need surface ships to keep an oppent with limited carries at arm’s length?), but rather if your navy can hold out against another on their own.

in that sense, neither the PLAN or IN can match the likes of the RN and french navy. the IN might be in a better position then the PLAN by having carriers, but i wouldnt put money on them being able to match the french carriers simply because the rafale is just a generation ahead of the sea harriers and Mig29s, thats also leaving out the sizeable underwater advantage the likes of the RN and french navy have.

similarly, while the PLAN has an advanatge over the IN in terms of its underwater fleet, the chinese subs are still some way behind their western counterparts. in terms of air defence, even with the new 170/171 and 168/169 DDGs, i dont think the PLAN can really do that much against rafales.