Is that orders, commitments or options?

Kinda hard to keep track of all the legalese used these days.

Dispersed operations work well for a few sorties when you eventually run out of jet fuel and munitions

Yes, because using a road as a runway means your very far from transport links to resupply…

oh, wait a minute.

or until the enemy puts a PGM into your makeshift runway.

In which case, you taxi around it and use the rest of the motorway… or turn around and go the other way.

Sweden (for instance) has over 1700 km of motorway. Good luck cratering all of that without shipping massive losses. Oh, and we’ll not mention the amount of regional roads which it was actually built to operate from.

I too, am interested in the source of this claim. Gripen E will also have more composite material, thus a relative reduction of weight.

Ha. I definitely wouldn’t make the assumption that composite == lighter.

Indeed, as far as many PSEs go, the reverse is true! [But it does enable you to do other things metallics cannot.]

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/28/new-u-s-stealth-jet-can-t-hide-from-russian-radar.html

Holy Hell…

News for you – the USAF happily admit “there’s nothing invisible in the radar frequency range below 2 GHz”.

Hmmmm.

Been pondering the thread again when waiting for NASGRO to do its stuff…

There are a number of aspects we need to consider in greater depth I think.

1. Is the primary aim to provide a means of indirect fire to front-line troops engaged with enemy combatants in relatively close proximity? i.e. very tactical support, on a platoon/company level?

2. Is the primary aim to provide a means of increasing the effective range of the overall fire solutions available to the unit commander in the field? Wider tactical support, on a divisional/corps level?

3. Is the primary aim to provide a means of deep interdiction, removing targets that are more toward the infrastructure of the enemy’s fighting machine rather than the machine itself? Which would be support on a theatre level… if not quite strategic.

For (1) I’m thinking hovermast (as mentioned by lukos) which can be used by the troops to paint a target, then either rocket launched LGB or guided mortar rounds.

For (2) your looking at something a bit more A-10 than UAV, but probably with network integration with the ground troops to spread information both in the air and on the ground.

For (3), your going to have to penetrate AD belts. For which I think you’d need a pukka strike aircraft.

I have 6 gbu-39s or 3 AMRAAMs ( 1 amraam = 2 GBU-39s )…and 2 AIM9Xs and 2 x 27 mm cannons. Also one GBU 31 fits when all AMRAAM are away…or 2 x AMRAAM and 1 GBU 32.

Combat range about 1000 km.

Ceiling 30 300 meters and mach 3 there ( getaway car ). Maybe 600 kts at low. You have to reload quickly to get same effect as you kite does.

So…

1. 5x AAM (1 less than F-22 and 1 more than F-35)… which must be stored internally to control RCS.
2. Mach 3 capable (which means afterburning engine(s), structure capable of dealing with the heat soak and variable geometry air intakes).
3. Combat range of around 1000 km, for comparison, the combat range of the F-22 is about 800km, the F/A-18 E/F about 700 km, the F-16 about 600 km. Your gonna need a fuel fraction in around ~0.35 to achieve that.
4. Use of the radar guided AMRAAM means you need fire control radar.
5. To remain low observable means you need advanced RWR, FLIR, IRST and ECM.

And you propose to do this for around 360/12.5 = $30 million per aircraft?

Might I respectfully suggest you don’t have a clue what you are talking about. You’d do well to pay heed to what your being told in the thread.

though I disagree that Afghanistan has much to teach us about naval aviation. Land wars in Central Asia simply aren’t the place for naval aviation and the Navy should not be designing aircraft around that mission

If the US expect its carriers, to be more precise, the aviation wing of its carriers, to be their primary means of (gunboat) diplomacy, then they need to be able to operate effectively anywhere around the world. If that includes being able to effectively control airspace and perform air support/interdiction missions hundreds of km inland, then so be it.

Furthermore, if the US expect its carriers to be able to operate in high threat environments (see Norwegian sea, Barents sea or South China sea), then the CVBG air defence bubble needs to be larger than it is currently.

If they don’t want to be able to perform either of the above, then the E/F Hornet is fine. But it is a regression compared to what a carrier group used to be able to do.