How did Rolls Royce manage to get around the export ban?

UK suppliers who chose to do so could dodge the export ban in one of two ways.

Some of them could work up some verbage (with Foreign Ministry concurrence) to the effect that they were only supplying “defensive” items. This was true during the mid-1990s for example, when the UK bid on the supply of AWACS to China (a tendor which they did loose, but nonetheless competed for).

The supply of Spey engines, on the other hand, fell into the category of “honoring existing agreements”. Since the original deal to supply Spey engines was inked long before any blanket export restrictions existed, Rolls Royce could continue to supply engines and jet engine parts indefinitely, because it was covered by a previous agreement.

Only EF/Rafale/Gripen/F-22 are new fighters from TVC era with F-22 already have it. and there was simply no TVC develpment available for EF/Rafale/Gripen and developing it will add alot of money to R&D. just look at slow development of AESA for those fighters.

All I can say is, “read the article.” The Typhoon is the product of a development effort that also led to the joint US-German X-31 test program. As originally envisioned, it was expected to incorporate thrust vectoring as a core technology to its design. A decision was made during the mid-1990s, however, to shelve thrust vectoring, because it was expensive, and just wasn’t as important as other elements of the program.

US use F-16C/F-15E as Strike fighters and F-15C is too old for this.

The US incorporated thrust vectoring concepts into the F-15, F-16 and F-18 during flight test. The nozzle designs used under both the F-15 and F-16 were nearly production-ready – yet the decision was made NOT to retrofit the US fleet with these nozzles.

The decision not to incorporate TVC into all of these aircraft was a choice – right or wrong – based on the perceived cost and merit of the technology.

Well Worth the Read

I picked up my new copy of AFM today and it had a very cutting report about the worth of Thrust Vectoring.

Basically the conclusion was it wasn’t worth it, I personally tend to agree with the thrust of the argument especially in the respect of energy management in Knife edge Dog fight.

I would urge anyone who has not already done so to read this article (Air Forces Monthly, March 2008). It’s one of those rare additions to the aviation literature that will likely be referred back to time and again.

Drawing on flight test reports from the X-31 and F-16 MATV programs, the article explores both the benefits and shortcomings of thrust vector technology. In simple terms, the original objective of this technology – from an air combat perspective rather than from an air show perspective – was to expand the lethal envelope of the fighter’s weapons envelope.

The idea of “supermaneuverability” was to allow an airplane to briefly enter post-stall flight so that it could obtain a firing solution, and then return to normal flight. As the article underlines, however, this technology has virtually no impact on traditional agility metrics, such as turn rate.

Which gets to the crux of why this technology was not deployed more widely:

The potential advantages of thrust vectoring are still there. They just haven’t been attractive enough to warrant the cost associated with implementing them when other alternatives offered equal or greater promise.

In sum, this issue of Air Forces Monthly probably offers the most complete review of this technology that we have yet seen. Well worth the read.

Three Fundamental Sources

I see that the debate surrouding the size, weight and role of the J-10 is alive and well. It warms my heart to know that some things never change.

I am aware of only three published sources that most, if not all of the internet estimates projecting the size and weight of the J-10 can be traced back to:
– Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft
– An article in Combat Aircraft published in Nov 2006
– An article in Air Forces Monthly published in Feb 2007
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These three sources are widely divergent in their projections, reflecting just how little has been officially acknowledged regarding this airplane. The reasons for these differences, can be traced back to the different assumptions, and information available to each of the three publications.

The J-10 dimensions provided by Jane’s were copied directly from the Lavi, a much smaller airplane. For some reason, Jane’s has never attempted to update these values.

The weight projections provided by Jane’s, however, are a different matter. I have seen no explanation for where these weight estimates came from. In reviewing various articles from Jane’s Defence Weekly however, it has become apparent that Jane’s has received a number of status updates surrounding the J-10 over the past decade, supplied by Russian contractors who visited the Chengdu facility. It is possible that this was the source of their weight information.

The article that appeared in Combat Aircraft in Nov 2006 (Vol 7, No 9), was a dedicated review of the J-10. The dimensions were derived from photo analyses of images that had been leaked to the West, and the weight estimates were derived from an engineering projection based on the dimensions of the airplane.

An underlying assumption behind these weight estimates, however, was that the J-10 was a product of China’s “awakening” to the role of airpower in modern warfare, that occurred as a result of the 1991 Iraq War. In this conflict, it was the tactical air-to-ground capabilities of the US-led alliance, and not their air-to-air capabilities, that had a decisive impact on the outcome of the ground war. This conflict is widely credited with a renewed willingness on the part of the PLA to fund new aircraft and weapons for the PLA. Seen in this light, the J-10’s empty weight is projected to be in the neighborhood of 9730 kg.

The Air Forces Monthly article on the other hand (Feb 2007), was not dedicated to reviewing the J-10 at all, but was a survey of fighter procurement trends worldwide. No explanation was given for the size and weight estimates printed in this article, although some quarters who would prefer to see the J-10 as a purely air-to-air weapon have seized upon this publication to justify a much lower empty weight estimate of 8300 kg.

In the end, none of the available sources constitute an acknowledged, official value for the size and weight of this airplane. The truth surrounding the capabilities of the J-10 will likely not be revealed until the type enters the export market, and deliveries commence to buyers such as Pakistan.

Still has a Role to Fill

Getting back to the original question of this thread, I would have to say that the J-8II – while it is no match for the performance of such alternatives as the J-11 – will likely still be seen in China’s skies for sometime to come.

Despite its relative age, it does have one redeeming quality: the range necessary to patrol China’s long borders, something that it is better suited for than the J-6 and J-7 variants that are being phased out as rapidly as China can afford to replace them. I would agree with some of the earlier comparisons, suggesting that the J-8II can be readily compared to some of the later versions of the F-4. While it may not be the frontline fighter of China’s future, it still has a valuable role to play as part of the second tier of China’s defense. It would expect to see these airplanes continue to fly for another decade or more.

The real problem with LCA was India’s insistence that the entire program – airframe, engine, and avionics – be home-grown. This is antiquated thinking. Only a handful of nations have both the experience and the financial resources to do a program like this on their own. Virtually every major fighter program of the past twenty years has required extensive international involvement.

The Indian Air Force would have killed the LCA long ago if given the chance. They know they need real solutions, not aerospace social programs. At this point, India either needs some foreign partners, or a new program.