fltgshdwConsider which combat aircraft have actually implemented an over-wing inlet in the past forty years: F-117, B-2, Bird of Prey, X-45, X-47, nEUROn, Taranis. These are all dedicated strike/bomber type aircraft that adopted an over-wing inlet purely for low observable reasons.
Any fighter – any aircraft that is expected to see severe maneuvers and high angles of attack – will avoid an over-wing inlet like the plague.
fltgshdwNot a chance. The entire “Wild Weasel” Viper program was a way to suplement and then to replace the F-4G fleet “on the cheap”. In that particular competition three diferent aircrafts were evaluated, a version of the Tornado (sponsored by Northrop), a F-15 WWeasel Twin Seater (based on the “Strike”) that was rumoured to be the USAF favorite and the Viper, this last one won on costs, the chances of the USAF implementing an entire new platform for a very specific mission right after the fall of the Berlin Wall (peace dividends et al) was zero.
That’s the thing with what-if scenarios: no one can ever prove or disprove anything.
With regard to cost, however, I am at an advantage in that I’ve actually read the book. The U.S. General Accounting Office placed the unit fly-away cost for the Lavi at $17.8 million in 1985 dollars, on a 300 aircraft purchase. The cost for an F-16 with an equivalent avionics suite was placed at $16.9 million. For considerably more range and payload compared to the F-16 models of that day a Grumman-built Lavi would have been very cost competitive.
Again, it’s a what-if scenario. No one will ever know. We can both can state whatever opinion we want, but neither of us can ever prove anything.
That doesn’t preclude a US veto. If the State Department decrees that US-built weapon or component X may not be sold to country Y (the matter being discussed here) then it isn’t sold.
You’re right, it doesn’t preclude a U.S. veto. But it means that the Israelis would not have been shut down from competing directly against U.S. manufacturers, as has been the case for proposals to supply Israeli-developed radar systems for the Gripen:
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2009/07/13/Israel-bows-to-US-pressure-on-Gripen/48991247493191/
Moreover, having access to compete for sales to the U.S. Air Force would have been worth far more than a dozen airplanes sold to a small, overseas customer.
fltgshdwExcept that Israel couldn’t have sold the US-made engines or the other US-made, US-developed or US-financed parts without US permission. Indeed, Israel isn’t even able to sell entirely Israeli-developed & Israeli-made major weapons if the USA objects, because of its dependence on US money & technology. There are several cases of Israeli weapons sales being cancelled because of US vetoes.
The Israelis had a strategy for dealing with the U.S. veto threat, the same strategy that has seen over a thousand of Rafael’s LITENING targeting pods produced for delivery worldwide: they had a U.S. partner. Export orders for the Lavi would have been fulfilled by a U.S.-based assembly line to be set up by Grumman Corp.
Grumman produced the composite wings and vertical tail for the Lavi, and had no jet fighter of its own in this same size class. The contract between IAI and Grumman, calling for a parallel U.S. assembly line was signed only months before the program was cancelled.
Forget about export orders to smaller air forces around the world. A Grumman/IAI Lavi would have been a threat to F-16 sales to the U.S. Air Force. The Lavi was intended from the beginning for the strike role. The F-16 was not. It would have made far more sense for the U.S. Air Force to procure a U.S.-made Lavi for the Wild Weasel role than to develop the F-16CJ.
fltgshdw[ATTACH=CONFIG]249365[/ATTACH]
Again, the differences are negligible, with only small advantage for F-14D. It is obvious, that even if the numbers are the same, the Super Tomcat was in another league in comparison to the legacy model, as the F110 allowed much more care-free handling than the stall-prone TF30 (although I think that these E-M diagrams to some extent debunks the myth of sluggish F-14A). But can anyone explain, how can the E-M diagrams be practically not influenced by the 34% increase in static thrust?
You’ve had a few examples from other aircraft provided in other posts already, but I would add this nuance to the interpretation:
In other words, a pilot with a higher-thrust F110-powered F-14D would seek to use his advantage in acceleration at low g-loadings to give him an edge over an F-14A powered by the TF30. The F-14A pilot, in contrast, would seek to lure the F-14D into a low-speed, tight, turning engagement where the F-14A would have the advantage. It’s commonly called “dissimilar air combat” (although here there are many more similarities in this example than in most comparisons).
Welcome to the forum, Lolek.
fltgshdwI am waiting the book beeing delivered too.
I am doubting the max take-of weight figure of 19,280 kg.
Originally it was supposed to be 7260 kg, but the reinforcements enable loadout of 9340 kg, at least these are the numbers by Mr. Golan. Extremely impressive if true.
I also happen to own the book, which makes the explanation for the Lavi’s extraordinary range and payload pretty plain. To quote from the book (page 255):
[INDENT]The Lavi ultimately out-performed its contemporary “counterparts” as an attack jet because it was an attack jet first, and not as an afterthought. . . The Lavi demonstrated what could be accomplished if the attack mission was set out as a priority in fighter-bomber development, rather than added on after the airplane entered service.
[/INDENT]
But if anyone wants to know more they could always just email the author. He appears to respond to questions from his blog, and there’s a contact form on the right-hand side:
http://john-golan.blogspot.com/search/label/Lavi
fltgshdwThank you Fltgshdw. The 2 central semi-confomal hardpoints that are in between 2 landing gear bays seem to be not in line with the forward and the rear ones.
It looks like someone else posted the same question on the author’s blog. You can find his answer below.
http://john-golan.blogspot.com/2016/10/lavi-armament-stores-and-weapons.html
fltgshdwThank you for sharing Fltgshdw.
I read that Lavi had 7 semi-conformal hardpoints under fusalage. Do you have pictures show how their positions are?
See slide 6 of the earlier slide-pack:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-PAxPH8yY9bb28yVklvOG16czA/view
The Lavi had one centerline hardpoint (which was used in the prototypes to loft telemetry), and three tandem hard points arranged on either side of the fuselage (as shown in the illustration on slide 6).
fltgshdwInteresting reading (the links). Does this book include anything on the China/J-10 angle?
There’s a small section discussing the J-10 – about two and a half pages worth.
fltgshdwThe author has added an historical survey, drawn from the material in the book, as a supplement to the technological survey released previously. It was added as a web blog:
http://john-golan.blogspot.com/2016/09/lavi-retrospective-journey.html
And as a slide show and video:
http://john-golan.blogspot.com/2016/09/lavi-retrospective-journey-video-and-pdf.html
fltgshdwLavi Book – Supplemental Material
The book’s author recently released a technological survey for the program, as both a web blog:
http://john-golan.blogspot.com/2016/05/lavi-engineers-perspective.html
And as a slide and video:
http://john-golan.blogspot.com/2016/05/lavi-engineers-perspective-video-and-pdf.html
Looks like a good supplement to the book, with a number of illustrations that never made it into the printed version.
fltgshdwThe engines are the only technology that the Chinese will likely farm from the Su-35 (assuming that deliveries take place). The Chinese have already outgrown their reliance on Russian technology in every other respect.
fltgshdwCSBA Rebuttal
I stumbled across a rebuttal to the CSBA report that’s probably worth saving as a reference:
http://john-golan.blogspot.com/2015/07/review-of-csba-study-on-future-air.html?m=1
To summarize the author’s arguments:
My own conclusion is that jet fighters, as we know them today, evolved out of decades of experience. They will not be so easily discarded by some think-tank projections.
fltgshdwHello all,
I understand that an article was published in the Jerusalem Post Magazine this past September, on the subject of the cancelled Lavi fighter program. Unfortunately, my local magazine source doesn’t carry the Jerusalem Post.
If anyone happens to have a copy of the article I would much appreciate an electronic scan if they could point me in the right direction.
Many thanks.
fltgshdwNo. The IDFAF has never emphasized the BVR intercept. You can see it in the statistics from the 1982 Lebanon War, in contrast to the USAF and USN statistics from the 1991 Gulf War.
Operation Desert Storm was the first (and so far only) large scale conflict in which BVR interceptions accounted for a significant fraction of the air-to-air kills (nearly 40%). Please note, however, that due to the rigid rules of engagement only the USAF’s F-15’s were cleared for BVR interceptions. None of the USN fighters (including the F-14), nor the F-16 had the proper hostile-IFF equipment to ensure that they could avoid the possibility of fratricide. That was also why the F-15C’s were responsible for the vast majority of US and allied kills in 1991: they were the only ones fully dedicated to the air-to-air mission.
In sharp contrast Israeli operations over Lebanon in 1982 were dominated by visual range interceptions, and Israel’s F-15 and F-16 fighters participated equally. You also have to keep in mind the relatively small scale of the aerial battlefield involved. For the Israelis, a BVR intercept would likely have meant targeting Syrian fighters flying over Syria – something that was likely to be too much of a provocation for the Soviets to tolerate. The Israelis waited instead for the Syrian aircraft to cross into Lebanon before engaging them – within visual range.
fltgshdwfltgshdw, is that normal PPP or military PPP ? might I request the source as well ?
thanks.
The most comprehensive resource for Israeli budget data is Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics. Budget data is available from 1950 onwards.
http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/?MIval=cw_usr_view_SHTML&ID=449
http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/?MIval=cw_usr_view_SHTML&ID=447
Estimates for purchasing power parity (PPP) have been assembled by a number of sources, to provide a more consistent means for comparing economic wealth and buying power than is necessarily reflected by the official exchange rates. These measures work by tracking a basket of goods and services which they can then compare against the cost for those same goods and services elsewhere in the world. I have yet to see a version of PPP that is specific to the military. However, labor rates – including those for skilled labor – are consistently lower in a nation like Israel than they are in the United States or many western European nations. The same economic forces that led Microsoft and Intel to open up research and development sites in Israel also make it cheaper for the Israelis to produce missiles and UAV’s.
Many sources utilize the PPP values provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a recognized, international standard.
http://www.oecd.org/findDocument/0,3354,en_2649_34357_1_119656_1_1_1,00.html
The OECD only began tracking the Israeli economy in 1995, however. If you want a more complete, historic picture you have to go to a resource like the Penn Tables, produced by the University of Pennsylvania.
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php
The use of resources such as these is particularly significant from a historical perspective, since Israel’s official exchange rate was set by their government until only a handful of years ago. The New Israeli Shekel (NIS) didn’t become a freely convertible currency until 2003, and NIS derivative trading was not available until 2006. Estimates from the above two PPP conversion sources fundamentally agree, however: US military grants to Israel dropped below 15% of Israel’s total defense spending in 2006 – part of a longer-term and continuing trend.
Based on official Israeli government sources, Israel’s 2008 domestic military budget stood at NIS 51.53 billion. That translates into $ 14.37 billion if you use the official exchange rates, or $ 14.36 billion using the PPP values provided by the OECD (the two happen to be fairly close for that year – something that is more likely to be the case for freely traded currencies). This compares to total US military aid grants of $ 2.38 billion in that year – or 14.2% of Israel’s total defense expenditure.
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