PLAWell that i salso a missile with some estimated data on FAS… And we all know how good FAS is.
M18
Configuration Two Stage
Length [meters]
Diameter [meters]
Mass [kilograms]
Propellant Solid
Guidance Inertial
First Flight 19??
IOC ??
Deployment mobile
Range (km) 1,000-1,200
Re-entry Vehicle Mass (kg) 400-500
Warhead Yield conventional
Lethal Radius
[soft target] 10 meters [crater]
60 meters [unitary]
250 meters [submunition]
CEP (meters) 200
PLAI am very sorry I cannot post hindustani post or another Indian newspaper but I think this is enough evidence for our Indian friends. Where are they btw?
Cheers.
PLAThe wish of the Soviets to catch at least one of Pakistani F-16s was perhaps influenced by several Iraqi claims, that their MiG-23MLs have shot down Iranian Phantoms, Tomcats and Tigers. The Soviets certainly wanted to show their capabilities and were eager to engage. A good illustration of this was the case when on 26 September 1988, Maj. Vladimir Astahov and Capt. Boris Gavrilov intercepted two Iranian AH-1Js some 75 kilometres south-east of Shindand, and shot both down, supposedly using R-24 missiles. However, this was also to be the last engagement of Soviet interceptors during the War in Afghanistan. By this time, the Soviets troops were already pulled back from most of Afghanistan, and the DRAAF was now alone to fight against Mujaheddin, which took one city after the other. Under such circumstances, the government in Kabul was rather careful not to provoke the Pakistanis even more. Nonetheless, on 3 November 1988, two F-16s of the 14 Squadron, flown by Sqn.Ldr. Ehtsham Zakaria and Sqn.Ldr. Khalid Mahmood (on F-16A 85-717), were on a CAP over the Kohat area, the GCI informed them of six contacts closing towards the border, three of which subsequently entered the Pakistani airspace, while three – probably escorting MiG-21s – remained over Afghanistan. Both F-16s were swift to engage, closing upon the enemy, when their contacts suddenly executed a 180° turn and flew back towards Afghanistan, apparently after being warned by their GCI. Closing to a range of eleven kilometres, Zakaria acquired the target visually and recognized it as a Su-22, flying at a level of almost 6.000 meters. While both F-16s were still in a climb, the Sukhois were already underway to the west, but then, one of Afghanis turned back into the threat at the same time when Zakaria experienced some difficulties with his Sidewinders. The Su-22 corrected his route towards the leading F-16, but Mahmood was quick in countering this move and firing one AIM-9L from a range of approximately five kilometres in a head-on-pass. The missile impacted, blowing several pieces off the Sukhoi, but the aircraft continued to fly. While Zakaria manoeuvred for a gun-attack, Mahmood fired another Sidewinder, this time from a 150 – 160° aspect angle. The second hit broke the Su-22 in two and the wreck fell some 18 kilometres inside Pakistan. The pilot. Capt. Abdul Hashim, ejected and was captured by Pakistani Army.
PLAThe Broken Wing
On the late afternoon of 4 August 1988, a section of Su-24s was underway to attack an Afghan refugee camp near Miranshah. Half an hour before sunset however, they were detected by Pakistani radars, and two F-16As of the 14th Squadron, flown by Sqn.Ldr. Ather Bokhari (on F-16A 85-725) and Sqn.Ldr. Taufeeq Raja, were scrambled to intercept. Reaching a position over Hangu the Pakistani pilots were advised that the enemy turned back towards Afghanistan. Thus, the F-16s slowed down and started what seemed to be another several-hours-long CAP during the early evening. Sqn.Ldr. Bokhari then continued the story. „I was vectored on a heading of 300 degrees, and the controller reported the target 30 degree left, 15 NM. I turned left and called contact. The GCI controller clearly told me to go ahead and shoot the target. I achieved a head-on IR lock on one aircraft at 7 NM flying high. He started to turn right at 6.5 NM, putting me on at 3.5 NM. I engaged burners and closed to less than 2.5 NM from the target before the desired launch zone (DLZ) started to flash. As all parameters were met, I fired the missile and saw it go towards the target in the TD box on the HUD. I next saw a ball of fire in the TD box. I broke left to 120 degrees, descended to 5,000 feet, and dispensed chaff and flares. On looking back at the 8 o’clock position, I saw flares at about 3-4 NM and mistook them initially for missiles. It all but stopped my heartbeat but my controller reassured me that there were not other aircraft in the vicinity. I then took a safe passage home.“
A V-VS Su-25 “Grach” seen armed with bombs and unguided rockets while rolling at Baghram AB. The type proved highly successful during the operations over Afghanistan, but started suffering losses to Stingers and Pakistani interceptors in the time between 1986 and 1988. Despite many reports on the contrary, no Su-25s were ever delivered to the Afghani Air Force. (Avijatsija & Vremja)
According to Russian sources, upon being attacked by an F-16s, the leader of the Su-25-formation, Col. Alexander Rutskoy initiated a hard, 6.5G turn into the threat. Nonetheless, it seems Rutskoy subsequently lost the sight of the opponent which pulled an even harder turn behind him in the darkness and was shot down by an AIM-9L. Upon impact the Su-25 broke in two, and the wreckage was found the following morning, but the cockpit was empty. Thus, the Pakistanis organized a search operation, and the next evening Rutskoy was caught by local people, which handed him over to the authorities. Interestingly, the Russian pilot subsequently explained, that he was surely hit by a radar-guided missile, fired from the forward hemisphere, and declined to believe, that Bokhari used only one AIM-9L, fired from the rear hemisphere. However, it remains unclear why the Soviet formation continued their attack after being intercepted by F-16s: the target was not worth the danger they faced, and their RWRs should actually have warned them of the threat. But, considering the fact, that remaining three members of Rutskoy’s formation were far closer to the Afghani border, it seems possible, that the Colonel tried to defend them by engaging the F-16 and thus buying some precious time. The loss of Rutskoy and his Su-25s, however, was not the only bad news for Soviets in that month: hardly four days later, another Afghani pilot defected with his MiG-21 to Parachinar, in Pakistan. Equally, the tactic – or better said, the almost complete lack of any defensive manoeuvring – displayed by Rutskoy’s formation remains unclear as well, especially in the light of the next engagement between Soviet and Pakistani aircraft, which followed hardly one month later.
PLAPAF pilot
PLApicture of the Su25 wing
PLAhttp://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/airforce/index.html
April 8th, 1988, Squadron Leader Athar Bokhari
Almost 16 months elapsed beofre the next ‘kill’ was achieved near Miranshah. Squadron Leader Athar Bokhari’s success of August 4th 1988 was unique in that it was the only one involving a Su-25 and a Soviet pilot. The mission began with a ‘hot’ scramble in F-16A 85-725 from Kamra at about 1900 hours, Athar being instructed by GCI to intercept four unidentified radar contacts. By the time he reached the area, however, all four had returned to the safe side of the border, so he began ‘CAPing’. At arounf 1950 hours, GCI reported the presence of four more ‘bogies’, although it is conceivable that this was the original group returning to the scene of the earlier acitivity. GCI also advised Ather that the contacts were gone 23 nm away, still 5 miles on the side of the border but that they were heading in easterly direction, which seemed to indicate that an incursion was imminent. Ather’s initial GCI vector was 300 degrees as he moved to cut off the threat. At a range of 18 nm he obtained a radar lock on one aircraft which was heading almost directly towards him. he also noted that there were about 4-6 miles of lateral separation between the pairs of enemy aircraft. The range continued to diminish and at 7 nm Athar began hearing the familiar growling sound as the infra-red seeker head of a sidewinder started tracking its target. Thus far, though, DLZ criteria were not satisfied. It was at this range that his adversary started a rapid turn to the right, which was certainly tactically unsound and was eventually to be his downfall. In Athar’s own words, “He just came and turned in front of me…” Athar was then told by GCI to ‘go for it’, since his target was now about 7nm inside Pakistan with the other three members of the formation about 2-3 nm inside. At 5 nm, Athar was abeam the Su-25 and closing fast. He pulled into a left-hand turn which brought him to a heading of about 250260 degrees and allowed him to take up the almost classic six o’clock position at a range of about 3 nm. In just a few moments, DLZ criteria were met, but Athar allowed the HUD circle to flash three or four times before firing his starboard AIM-9L at a range of 2.5 nm. (Earlier he experienced some difficulty with the port AIM-9L, which would normally be fired first – this resulted in a decision to switch to a starboard weapon.)
At that moment, the target was at 26,000 ft and flying at a speed of about 290-300 kt; Athar was slightly below at 21,000 ft but with a high overtake at 510-520 kt in afterburner as he climbed towards the bandit. Athar was clearly confident in the capability of the sidewinder, for he fired just once and then waited for a few seconds to observe the fireball before breaking left and dropping to low level. As he egressed the area on a heading of 120 degrees, he looked back and observed what he at first thought to be a number of missiles that had been fired at him. Notifying GCI that he believed himself to be under threat of attack, Athar popped a number of infra-red flares as he departed. It was only later that he reached the conclusion the ‘missiles’ he had seen were actually infra-red flares launched by other aircraft in the enemy formation. Within seconds of being hit by Athar’s sidewinder, the Su-25 pilot ejected. He was subsequently captured and interrogated, when it was learned that he was Colonel Alexandrov of the Soviet Armed Forces. Eventually, he was released into the care of the Soviet authorities but not before divulging that his initial thought on being hit was that he had a technical problem. Only later did the pilot realise that he had been shot down, but he remained adamant in his belief that he had been hit by a radar-guided missile (eiether an AIM-7 or an AIM-120) fired from a head-on pass and refused to accept that it was actually an AIM-9L fired from behind that brought about his downfall. he was however, relieved to be taken into custody by the Pakistan Army rather than Afghan Mujahideen forces and probably had good reason to feel that way. A section of wing taken from the wreckage has been placed on display close to the base commander’s office at Kamra.
PLAApril 1988 Sqn. Ldr. Athar Bokhari
No. 14 Squadron, PAF F-16A Fighting Falcon
(S. No. 85-725)
PAF Minhas (Kamra) 1 Soviet Su-25
Col. Ruskoi Alexander Valadimirovich, Soviet Air Force (ejected) 1 PAF F-16 Vs. 4 Soviet Su-25s. Night interception over Parachinar, Pakistan. AIM-9L Sidewinder Kill. Remaining 3 Su-25s bugged out. Soviet Su-25 pilot, Col. Ruskoi Alexander Valadimirovich, (later Vice-President of Russia) was taken prisoner by Pakistani authorities.
PLA1983 January 14 – 40 General Dynamics F-16 “Fighting Falcon”
aircraft inducted. Based at 38th Tactical
Wing, Sargodha Air Base.
1983 February 13 – Chinese A-5 ground-attack aircraft
inducted
1983 March 6 – Air Headquarters moved to the capital,
Islamabad; elements temporarily remaining
at Peshawar, redesignated as Rear Air
Headquarters.
1983 July 10 – PAF Book Club established.
1983 November 20 – An Afghan pilot defects and lands his
Su-7 at Dalbandin Airfield.
1984 – No.22 Squardon (Mirage OCU) Commisioned.
1984 February 12 – PAF Base Minhas established
1984 March 27 – Institute of Flight Safety (IFS)
established.
1984 April 2 – PAF Base Pasni commissioned.
1984 April 31 – Independent Electronics Branch (IEB)
established.
1984 September 22 – Defecting Afghan pilots land their
An-26s at Miranshah Airfield.
1984 November 8 – Flight Cadet (Under Officer) H.M. Saleem
wins the “Best Pilot Trophy” at the PAF
Academy, twenty-seven years after his
father Air Commodore S.M. Saleem.
1985 January 22 – PAF Bases Mirpur Khas and Vehari
commissioned.
1985 March 6 – Air Marshal Jamal A. Khan takes over as
Chief of the Air Staff.
1985 July 13 – Two defecting Afghan Mi-24 “Hind”
gunship helicopters land at Miranshah
Airfield.
1986 May 17 – PAF F-16 shoots down an Su-22 of the
Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Pakistan
becomes the second country after Israel to
put F-16s into military action.
1986 September 1 – PAF Staff College renamed as ‘Air War
College, PAF’.
1986 October 12` – A defecting Afghan pilot lands his Mig-21
at Kohat airfield.
1987 – Boeing 707 aircraft inducted for VIP
flight.
1987 February 11 – PAF Base Rajanpur commissioned.
1987 March 30 – PAF F-16 shoots down an intruding Afghan
An-26 near Miranshah area.
1987 April 16 – PAF F-16 shoots down an intruding Afghan
Su-22 near Tull area.
1987 October 15 – Blue uniforms introduced to replace khaki.
1987 October 21 – Warrant Officer Jansher Khan wins World
Open Squash Championship.
1987 December 31 – A third son of Squadron Leader Zaheer
Ahmed becomes a PAF pilot.
1988 – Martin B-57 bombers retired from PAF
service.
1988 March 9 – Air Chief Marshal Hakimullah takes over
as Chief of the Air Staff.
1988 May 17 – PAF F-16s shoot down two Russian Su-22s
over Parachinar area during Afghan war.
1988 August 4 – PAF F-16 shoots down Russian Su-25 in
Miranshah area during Afghan war.
1988 September 12 – PAF F-16s shoot down two intruder Russian
Mig-23s during Afghan war.
1988 November 1 – PAF F-16 shoots down an intruder Russian
Su-22 over Tull area during Afghan war.
PLA
PLAhere some more info…
The Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicle displayed in March 2000 appeared to be similar to the Russian MAZ-547V TEL used with the SS-20 ‘Saber’ missile in the early 1980s. The SS-20 missiles were destroyed following the 1987 INF treaty, but the vehicles could have been retained for other uses. The wheeled TEL has six axles and is believed to have a length of 16.5 m. The missile is raised vertically for launch, with the TEL vehicle stabilised by four or six hydraulic jacks. A launch could be expected within 10 minutes of arrival at a pre-surveyed site. Also displayed in March 2000 was a missile reloading vehicle, which appeared similar to the TEL but with a strengthened rear chassis and a crane. It is expected that both vehicles will have a road speed of around 65 km/h, and a radius of action of around 500 km.
Operational status
The Shaheen 2 missile development programme probably started around 1996, and has followed closely behind that for Shaheen 1. There has been one flight test for the Shaheen 1 missile, made in April 1999 over a range of 450 km. Shaheen 2 was first displayed in March 2000, and has not yet been flight tested. It is possible that a limited production of 5 to 10 missiles has already started, although with the close relationship between the two Shaheen missiles the precise numbers may be difficult to establish.
Specifications
Shaheen 2
Length
17 m
Body diameter
1.1 m
Launch weight
14,500 kg
Payload
1,000 kg
Warhead
750 kg nuclear 15 to 35 kT, HE, chemical or submunitions
Guidance
Inertial
Propulsion
Two-stage solid propellant
Range
2,500 km
Accuracy
500 to 750 m CEP
Contractors
The prime contractor is believed to be the Pakistan National Development Complex, with assistance from SUPARCO and the Atomic Energy Commission.
PLAWell… I have to agree with that. Media knows not that much about weapons these days and are allways political instruments. Objective in the media is something that is not that important anymore. There allways two sides and the truth is never nice. And one of the things that keeps returning is that wars are never nice. Some have to end as dead bodies and others have to decide how. I doubt that it is done allways correct. If we can talk about killing in the correct way…
We know how CNN was used and they seem to have unlimited can of experts.
PLAI hope that is enough… 😀
PLAAllow me again…
Description
There have been no official specifications issued for either Shaheen 1 or Shaheen 2, except for the payload and maximum range, and the following details are estimates from the available evidence. It is believed that the Shaheen 2 missile has a length of 17.0 m, a body diameter of 1.1 m, and a launch weight of 14,500 kg. The first stage length is 4.0 m, with a body diameter of 1.1 m, and a weight of 5,500 kg. This first stage is a modified Shaheen 1 motor assembly, carrying around 4,800 kg of solid propellant. There are four clipped delta wings at the rear of the first stage. The second stage has a length of 5.8 m, a body diameter of 1.1 m, and a weight of 8,000 kg. it is believed that this stage is an unmodified Shaheen 1 motor assembly with 7,000 kg of solid propellant. There are four clipped delta wings at the rear of this stage, similar to those on the first stage.
The payload assembly separates from the second stage after second stage burn-out or before re-entry, has a length of 7.2 m and a base diameter of 1.1 m. There are four small delta control fins at the base of the payload assembly, believed to be used to align the warhead at the start of re-entry to improve the accuracy.
The payload assembly has a total weight of 1,000 kg with a 750 kg warhead, believed to be nuclear with a yield of between 15 and 35 kT. There are reports that alternative HE, chemical and submunition warheads have been developed. Guidance is inertial and there may be some form of terminal guidance although this is thought to be unlikely at present. An accuracy of 500 to 750 m CEP has been suggested. The minimum range is probably around 500 km, and the maximum range is stated to be 2,500 km.
PLAFor God sake… It was a war and wars are never correct or nice.
Sign In
