Possibly the most in-depth article on the Kargil conflict, its beginnings and the IAF’s involvement and the lessons learnt from it, that I’ve come across.

Written by Benjamin Lambeth, it makes for a very interesting and absorbing read. A must read for those interested in how the shape of future warfare along India’s northern borders with China and Pakistan may shape up to be.

Carnegie Endowment – Airpower at 18,000 ft- IAF in Kargil War

After several early firefights with the entrenched Pakistanis that occasioned numerous Indian fatalities in an unsuccessful bid to recapture the closest of the occupied positions, the Indian Army approached the IAF on May 11 and asked it to help turn the tide through a commitment of armed helicopters to support the embattled ground troops.26 Conflicting views persist to this day regarding what happened over the ensuing two weeks after that initial army entreaty with respect to when and how the IAF should become involved in the conduct of India’s looming counteroffensive.

One view maintains that the IAF initiated combat operations over Kargil only “reluctantly” and sought “to avoid involvement in the conflict altogether, claiming inexperience in mountain warfare and unfamiliarity with the terrain, as well as the risk associated with the heightened SAM [surface-to-air-missile] threat in the mountains.” That view holds that the IAF committed itself to the fight only after an insistent demand for such involvement from the Indian Army leadership.27 This interpretation drew much of its claim to veracity from an assessment by an Indian civilian defense writer that appeared shortly after the war ended. The writer alleged that once the extent of the Pakistani intrusions was discovered, the IAF at first “sidestepped requests by the army to attack the infiltrators” and agreed to lend its support to the ongoing fighting only after its leadership “was presented with a fait accompli and pressed [presumably by higher government authority] into making attacks on May 26.”28

This particular para may illustrate just why the IA is insistent on the helicopter gunships being completely under their control as opposed to the current situation where they are manned by IAF pilots and under IAF control while being tasked to support IA objectives.

the IA has now ordered ALH Rudra gunships and 114 LCH gunships (of which the IAF will get a separate 64) and has plans to have an aviation brigade with 2 heli gunship squadrons plus 2 squadrons of tactical lift/recon helos in each of its Strike corps

Indian air force to buy French fighters

utter rubbish. The MiG-21 is deeply unpopular with the media who have termed it ‘Flying coffin’ and ‘widow maker’. We’ve never heard of a single incident where any IAF pilot has refused to fly a MiG-21, unlike even F-22s in the USAF when they were having their hypoxia related issues.

Agni IV IRBM launched successfully in another test. Displayed accuracy of <100 m over a flight range of 4000 km.

Agni III user trial test to be carried out soon by the Strategic Force Command.

India on Wednesday successfully test-fired nuclear weapons capable Agni-IV for its full range of 4,000 km from the Wheeler Island, off the Odisha coast.

The missile lifted off from a road mobile launcher at 11.48 a.m. and after zooming to an altitude of over 800 km, it re-entered the atmosphere and impacted near the pre-designated target in the Indian Ocean with remarkable degree of accuracy following a 20-minute flight.

Carrying a payload of explosives weighing a tonne, the missile re-entered the atmosphere and withstood searing temperatures of more than 3,000°C.

The developmental trial of the long range ballistic weapon system was conducted by missile technologists of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which designed and developed it.

Talking The Hindu from Wheeler Island, Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister V.K. Saraswat said “ we had an excellent launch”. He said the two-stage solid-propelled missile performed as per the normal parameters right from the lift-off till the terminal event when it impacted the target point with a “two-digit” accuracy. He said the data showed that the missile followed pre-determined path with an accuracy of less than 100m. Two naval ships located down range recorded the trajectory of the missile and the terminal phase and transmitted the data in real time. He said the success of the mission reinforced the robustness of the design and various subsystems.

Dr. Saraswat said Agni-IV would be inducted into the services next year after undertaking one more developmental trial. He said, “The mission confirms reliability and robustness of the missile. It demonstrates India’s missile technology has become highly mature and we can now design any missile for any mission, depending on the threat profile. Technologically, today we are at par with the best in the world. We have complete industrial infrastructure which helped us to realise Agni-IV”.

He said the series of successful missions — Agni-V, followed by Agni-I, Agni-II, Prithvi-II and Agni-IV now showed that these missiles could be launched on demand in a very short time.

Avinash Chander, Chief Controller (Missiles and Strategic Systems), DRDO said Agni-IV was tested in its full operational scenario and the missile fully proved itself in all respects. He said the deliverable road mobile launcher configuration was also validated in this mission. Observing that it was one of the lightest long-range missiles of its class, he said it would be a potent addition to the strategic forces.

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Meanwhile, the Strategic Force Command personnel will launch nuclear weapons capable Agni-III surface-to-surface ballistic missile on September 21, 2012 as part user training.

Video of the launch is here

Agni IV launch video

Could one of our French friends translate the details on the Snecma collaboration with GTRE as given on this page from Air & Cosmos?

There are two types of asbestos – definitely cancerogenic amphibolous asbestos, which has been banned and chrysotilic asbestos which is soluble and therefore much less dangerous as it doesn’t accumulate in the lungs. The second type is not banned by the Rotterdam convention and is used in US, China and Russia. India nevertheless requested “no asbestos whatever”.

Vik still is capable to make 23 knots under 5 boilers which was the reason to continue the flight tests and repair the boilers later.
The designer of the boilers has stated that the warranty period was only 10 months (:confused:) and the designer and the actual producer of the boilers Baltiysky Zavod are disputing who is responsible and will have to pay for repairs and delay fine, if any. This has nothing to do with Sevmash shipyard or India.

Thanks Snake65. The bold part is the one I have a question about. Does it imply that the boilers were under warranty and hence the Indian side will not have to pay for the repairs or replacement of the boilers?

Though in insurgency warfare every base is technically a FAB.

The LTTE engaged in terrorist activities far from the front as well as more conventional fighting.

If so, then even conventional aircraft would be based there, not just STOVL aircraft like the F-35B.

Besides, where could they have based their aircraft if not at Katunayeke air base? The post I quoted implied that the LTTE attacked an FAB, which was clearly not the case.

ask the Russians

those aren’t really LERXs on the PAK-FA- they’re movable LEVCONs. And the leading edge of the LEVCON has the same sweepback angle as that of the wing itself. Not so on the AMCA configuration whose CFD image was posted.