Ah yes, sorry english is not my first language.
Perspective:
Kh-25MA with Fazotron NIIR MMW seaker head.
Kh-25MS with the PSN-2001 GLONASS/GPS receiver
And suppose the Venezueleans are the best pilots in the world….
We don’t have the best pilots in the world. We have pretty good pilots (between the best in the F-16 comunity worldwide) with maybe the best safety record due to operational circunstances in the world for more than 10 years (we have never lost a single F-16 due to mechanical problems, but two bird-strikes and one low altitude maneuver)…we have asisted twice to Red Flag along NATO and USAF, and do it wonderful there…most of our participations on every south american exercise have been remarcable. So we’re not lybians.
There is no air launched anti-ship missile that could sink an CVN.
So what you have to said about 200Kt nuke-capable Kh-22N/NA?…would they reach the carrier isn’t my problem, they would destroy it and anything around a nice radius. So your argument is not correct.
Some people simply can’t understand that R 37 does not exist an an operational weapon…
Status of some programs in Russia is not known. Some are true lemons, some are far more advanced that most believe, and there are lots of programs whose existance is not known in the west.
Number of aircraft: 24 says most sources (I think it was mentioned by Chavez himself, I’m sorry was seeing the Footbal match, didn’t pay attention).
Two Su-30 demostrators will come here for Independence Day parade (July 5), they will depart from Russia, 27 June. Backseater will have Venezuelan pilots.
Chavez himself said there is the possibility to buy Su-35 in the future. This is obvious. Su-35’s production start in 2009 (at least the exports start that date).
Supposedly first deliveries will be December this year…but nobody serious here believes that if new aircraft are bought…so go and figure.
The A-50 fleet is located at Ivanovo, not at rat-tag god forbidden Berezovka base (some time ago, it was based on Pechora).
AFAIK, first command datalinks on Soviet Union were of the Lazur kind, operating with the Vozdukh-1 system in 1958, IIRC on Su-9 (or was it 11?).
This is broadly comparable to the kind of equipment that worked with SAGE on the american aircraft of the period.
Later there was Lazur-M, Biryuza, SPK-68, SAZO-SPK-75 and some others more…
IFDL datalinks were of the APD-518 (MiG-31) and TKS-2 (Su-27, MiG-29M, and so)…
Really? Except for the Eritrean- Etiopian confilct there is no recoreded kill by a Russian BVR missile. In fact 99% of all BVR kill were by US missiles: Sparrow, Phoenix, AMRAAM.
Iran-Iraq
Recorded use of BVR weapons by:
MiG-25P/PDS
MiG-23ML
MiG-29
Ok boys, I have read in the JMR snippet of May 10 that PRC bought up to 1500 RVV-AE missiles plus a batch of 100 very recently, now, there is any info on IAF queries and purchases of this weapon system?
Now if you think “where are the russian’s of Vympel getting money for new toys”, you have an answer…don’t think you sell 1500 advanced MRAAM every day at a single buyer!.
ALMOST ALL RUSSAIN SAM SYSTEMS ARE FITTED WITH A TV CAMERA AND AN ASSISTED TRACK ENGAGEMENT MODE, SO THERE IS A VERY GOOD CHANCE THAT THE F117 THAT WAS SHOT DOWN WAS DONE SO WITH A CAMERA AND THE NAKED EYE 😉
The author of the shot-down denied the use of the Karat EO-device.
Arthur can you comment more on the USAF pre-positioned stocks of weapons on Europe back then?, were them based solely on Germany?, near the airfields?, don’t you think they would be suit for a nice reception of KAB-500/1500L by Su-24M once the Air Operation begins?.
Thanks!
MFI have nothing to do with Su-27M/T-10M program.
MFI was OKB A.I Mikoyan’s proposal for Istrebitel-90 fighter program. MFI was a nickname for MiG 1.42.
T-10M program (Su-27M inside VVS) was an interim program between the TPFI program of the 70s and the Istrebitel-90 program “anti-ATF”.
Here it’s information on NVA weapon’s stocks and “how much of what did they have”…
It’s absolutely impressive about the air stocks…more than 17 thousand air-to-air missiles, I’m sure the numbers of R-23, R-24 and R-60 would be rather pretty pretty low…but damn, those numbers are impressive.
As much as the stocks of air-to-surface guided missiles, more than 700 missiles for a fighter-bomber force of just two types (MiG-23BN and Su-22M4/UM3) in two regiments of no more than 70 aircrafts is something to take note…well to be sure, they were lots of Kh-23M, would like to know through, how much Kh-58E and Kh-25ML/MP were on those stocks…
http://www.bits.de/public/bicc95.htm#stocks
Funny info no matters!
These number-comparisons are way, way off. Each and every time when a match is made, Soviet units from the western MDs in the USSR are taken into account, whereas deployable USAF assets are left out. This is utter nonsense, especially if you consider that certain CONUS based units actually were assigned to USAFEUR even though they were based in the US. Examples being the F-15s from Holloman and the A-10s from Myrtle Beach, and although i’m not sure i think the same holds true for the Cannon 111s and Moody’s F-16s. These units were deployable on very short notice to their colocated operating bases in NW Europe. If you take those into account, NATO numbers are at least 3-400 aircraft short, and more if you take the other NATO-deployable units (plenty of ANG and AFRes squadrons) into account.
They’re a lot more be sure of that, the question is:
a) How much time would take for them to deploy along its logistical train supply…this is not like the 1st TFW deployment to Gulf Peninsula 48 hours after Saddam invaded Kuwait…if you even deploy them without the logistical train (spares, weapons, manpower and so)…what difference would they made?.
b) Political implications that such a massive USAF ReforGer would have in the political situation prior to war?…if you’re in the NATO side and you’re in the constrain of war (the buildup period) you would be wanting to, or gain time for negotiations or gain time for influencing the COF (Correlation of Forces) so the deployment of forces in-situ…when the USAF deploys 300-400 aircraft to Europe (how much time it would take?, 4-5-6 days?…after how much time of deliberation and political talks?) for the Soviets to re-shift the COF deploying the forces on Baltic, Bielorrusian and Carpathian MDs slatted for reinforcing Europe?…
c) Would all the countries involved in such reinforcements be in accord with the decission?…how much pressure would the soviet politic machine exert on Belgium, Netherlands or Denmark to delay this?…
Another thing almost always going wrong is that PVO-Strany units are included in the WarPac tables. Those would not be deployed in an offensive fashion (take note that the bulk of the fighter regiments in the Murmansk-Karelia area were PVO, and hence defensive) bar a few possible exceptions.
They would not be offensive at all, nor it would be a disadvtage why it should be?, in the Doctrine it’s slatted some units would move forward, that means for local air defense tasks on Poland, Czechoslovaquia or East Germany, even if not, NATO deep penetrations and deep interdiction against Polish and western Soviet territory on Bielorrusian MD would have have to deal with this…
Frontal Aviation’s business was to deal with NATO’s frontal forces, A-PVO would take care of the SAC and deep penetration TAC and allied components…so they count.
Of course, twisting the figures a bit to your disadvantage was a perfect way to make sure less Western tax-money was wasted on education or healthcare, and more spent wisely on filling bomber- missile- or other gaps. Too bad some people still take those numbers seriously.
Another is to build myths like equalling soviet and warsaw pact forces to those of Iraq and Mid-east…there is no similitude in neither position.
For the rest, i stick with Steve: there are so much flaws in the opening statement of this thread, that it’s hard to stay serious. Were those F-5E’s in CENTAG actually the Dutch NF-5s?
Dutch NF-5s lived on 2 ATAF, so they would support NORTHAG…damn, would be dumb to have Dutch Freedom Fighters to support NATO where there are not Dutch Forces at all 😀 (Dutch I Korps NE was in the northern side of Northag, close to AFNORTH/Schwelling-Holstein German/Danish combined forces)
Most of what was in service in Iraq in 1991 was in service with NATO in 1987
Not exactly so, per example, LANTIRN system, F-15E, F-16C Block 40, F/A-18C/D…we can count on…not to talk about J-STAR…
Check per example some interesting critical areas in NATO. ARM capable aircraft in the NATO in Central Europe were just a few aicraft of the big total were equipped for the task. In the USAFE, only the F-4G at Spanghdalem (24 aircraft, 81st TFS of the 52th TFW) used them. Even if the SEAD equipment of the F-4G was the most absolutely capable equipment of its kind, 24 aircraft wich how many would be any time in service (80-85%?) and how much atrittion they would endure by all means (from accidents on take-off and landings, to destruction on the ground by air attack, to shot-downs in sorties, to commando attacks to the airfield and so)…limited numbers of spectacular quality aircraft just show you how much vulnerable they’re…
I’m pretty aware, they were other F-4G units on CONUS (3 more in fact with different contingencies plans) how much would they be deployed to Central Front (to Central Europe, or Norway, or Turkey/Greece/Italy, having to save contingences for possible Mid East and Korea deployments)….the situation isn’t that good…
Aside of those aircraft, only the F-16C Block 30 were rated for Shrike use, but AFAIK were never deployed nor trained to do that…it was just a capability never exploded in the operational sense. Only Block 50 F-16s used to use that…post Desert Storm.
What about NATO?, it looks worst for NATO’s air forces in the SEAD area. EPAF air forces (Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark) used F-16A Block 10-15 as their core…those aircrafts lacks any kind of SEAD capabilities…much of them even didn’t have any kind of PGM at all (I have heard RNAF’s F-16A used to carry Paveway with British Bucanner lasing them…did you know about this?)…Bunderluftwaffe lacked anything of the kind…French AdlA deployment is doubt and not very clear for me…they used the ARMAT, a good derivative of the old Martel…it was a sound weapon for offensive deployment, some 100km, M 0.9…I don’t have any information on numbers or deployable aicraft but I would suppose, some Jaguar would handle them.
RAF is a sort of mistery, because I know that only shortly after the begining of desert storm did ALARM entered in service, in pretty few numbers…what did they have earlier, I don’t know, I know RAF used Shrike on limited numbers in the Falkland/Malvinas war in 1982 with the Vulcan, I don’t know if by 1987/1989 they have the on inventory, nor I think that the remaining Martel for ARM duties would be there at that time…
So if you look carefully, only a pretty pretty limited number of airframes were allowed for SEAD active ARM use, yes, in Spanghdalem there was some 2 adittional F-16C squadrons that would support the F-4G in team tactics…I guess they would have too much damn things to do…they have to fight against the most comprehensive air defense network ever deployed by any ground forces (GSVG’s SV-PVO), plus three different air defense networks (LSK/LV in East Germany, and Czechoslovakian and Polish Air Defense Networks) if they want to “strike in the depth”, be it deep penetration or interdiction sorties…if they want to attack the “front” a much more powerful even Air Defense Network (that of the Soviet, East German, Czech and Polish Armies advancing), that would not be retreating nor acting without air support, nor politically constrained, nor taken off initiative, nor overwhelmed by numbers…central front is not Iraq, nor Yom Kippur, nor anything previoulsy fought…
Just for some numbers, in the GSVG they were 19 ground divisions, each with an Air Defense Regiment and 4 air defense batallions.
From those 19 Divisions, 8 Divisions used OSA-AKM (SA-8B Gecko) and 11 used advanced Kub-M3 (SA-6 Gainful of last model, don’t know the ASCC code). Each SA-6 regiment have 4 batteries with 8 fire-channels, each batery with 6 launchers plus reloads and so. Each Kub-M3 regiment could attack at the same time 4 targets with 8 missiles. The OSA-AKM regiments have 5 batteries of 4 TELAR, each TELAR could attack at the same time one target, so a Regiment could handle at short range, 20 different targets with 40 missiles in the air…
Each Air Defense Batallion working at Regimental level (they were 4 regiments in each of the 19 division so you can figure it up), have 2 bateries of 4 ZSU-23/4 Shilka SPAAG and 4 Strela-10M2 (SA-13 Gopher) SHORAD SAM systems, plus some MANPADs. They were also lots of AD batallions that from 1985 replaced the Shilka by the Tunguska system (4 SPAAG plus the 4 Strela-10M2)…
MANPADs at Divisional levels were at Batallion level, I forgot the TO&E, but you could believe me…they were a lot of them…
At Army level, they were 5 Air Defense Rocket Brigades, equipped with the Buk-M1. Each Brigade deployes up to 48 fire chanels for engaging up to 48 targets with 2 missiles a piece.
Army level SAM defenses were interconected to Division level and Front level Air Defense assets (both SAMs and Interceptor assets)…
At Front level, they were 2 S-200VD Air Defense Brigades, 1 S-300V Brigade and 2 S-125M Brigades…
The single S-300V Brigade based at Magdeburg had anti-SRBM and SRAM task, plus off course Air Defense against air-breathing targets. The Brigade could handle up to 72 targets at the same time, with up to 144 fire channels for 144 missiles.
This complex ADGE was interconnected to LSK/LV and TLA NVA’s Air Defense Networks and via then to Warsaw Pac ADGE command center in Minsk…
This is not Iraq.
Rokosowsky could you comment on your sources for logistical stocks of Warsaw Pact?.
MrDetonator should answer better but I remind, MiG-29 from the 80s was cleared for 2000 hours before a life extension overhaul, that get you a total of 4000 hours of airframe life.
Current build MiG-29s (MiG-33 and MiG-35, that means MiG-29K and MiG-29M2) get 6000 hours of airframe life, but I don’t if this could be extended via overhaul.