RE: Airspeed Oxford

Hi,

Wrecks and Relics, 18th Edition lists the third Oxford (may be AT601)as stored off site but belonging to the Midland Warplane Museum.

Regards
Ross

RE: Air Historical Branch

[updated:LAST EDITED ON 17-01-03 AT 08:44 AM (GMT)]Hi Merlin,

The AHB holds all the records yet to be transferred to the PRO. These range from modern to 100 year retained documents. They also have the cross indexed casualty information.

Since these are classified documents a serving officer/civil servant will examine the records on your behalf and (at the discretion of the MOD) reply with an edited version of the record.

Generally I have found if you show you have researched your question then you are more likely to have a reply. However as they may have released all the info to the PRO as Kev35 discovered they may not be able to tell you more on you question.

Large multi question requests are less likely to get a positive reply.

From the (MOD)RAF Web site:

“Air Historical Branch (RAF)
The Air Historical Branch (RAF) is a small working department of the UK Ministry of Defence. It seeks to maintain and preserve the historical memory of the RAF and to develop and encourage an informed understanding of RAF and air power history by providing accurate and timely advice to Ministers, the RAF, other government departments and the general public. The Branch is not a public record depository, but maintains a substantial archive of classified policy and operational documents, which are normally declassified after thirty years and transferred to the Public Record Office. The Branch also holds an index of RAF casualties from 1939 onwards, aircraft accident record cards dating from the inter-war years, and a photographic archive.

Air Historical Branch (RAF), Building 266, RAF Bentley Priory, Stanmore, Middlesex, HA7 3HH”

There is a similar section for Naval Historical Branch (RN) which deals with FAA but again the PRO and FAAM have copies of most of their documents.

Regards
Ross

RE: RAF Squadron Markings.

Hi Kev,

No. 22 Sqn crest contains the Greek symbol for Pi.

This came from the Great War where the bulk of their patrols were over the trenches of the 7th Brigade.

22 over 7, 22/7 = Pi

Regards
Ross

RE: Info on French pilots flying for the R.A.F.

Hi,

Try the following book:

Aviateurs de la liberte, Memorial des Forces Aeriennes Francaises Libres.

Colonel (H) Henry Lafont of Service Historique de l’Armee de l’Air

It lists most of the FAFL aircrew with photos and biographical details.

Which airmen were you interested in? I’ll look them up and say if they are covered.

Regards
Ross

RE: RAF Lossiemouth in WW2

Hi,

All the PRU with the exception of No.140 Sqn were put under the control of Coastal Command. This was due to the bulk of early recce work being done on the German Capital ships in French and later Norwegian ports. No.540 operated a detachment at Lossiemouth in 1944 to 1945 to report on shipping movements for the strike wings further north.

No.21 Sqn was Fighter Command but was attached to Coastal Command to cover the areas of Norway that the Anson units could not reach. This was needed until more Hudsons reached the Northern units. 24/06/40 to 29/10/40. Later detachments were 27/05/41 to 14/06/41. 07/09/41 to 21/09/41.

No.82 Sqn was a similar unit and was used to replace the Coastal Units suffering from heavy losses during shipping strikes. 18/04/41 to 03/05/41.

If you check the dates in 1941 you will find that they are all associated with the movement of the Capital Ships.

Regards
Ross

RE: Mystery Jet Provost

Hi,

I was speaking to one of the flight instructors and he said that the JP was used by the Technical Training School for engine ground run practice. He also said that it had not run for quite some time.

Regards
Ross

RE: What WW2 story ?

[updated:LAST EDITED ON 24-02-02 AT 00:04 AM (GMT)]How about this on the 3rd Dec 1942, Wellington DV819 1474 Flight:

Special duty flight.
Operation took place across the N. coast of France to an area near to Frankfurt. The aircraft was engaged on the 18th sortie on a particular investigation, which necessitated the aircraft being intercepted by an enemy nightfighter and up to this sortie, all efforts to get such an interception had failed.

At 04:31 hrs, the aircraft was in position 4954N 0739E and set course for position 5030N 0737E. The Special Operator, P/O Jordan, had been reporting that he had been receiving signals on his special wireless equipment which he thought were the ones requiring to be investigated. He warned the crew to expect a fighter attack. On this Northerly leg the signals grew stronger and Jordan repeated his warning. A code had previously been arranged, so that if the signals were picked up, the frequency would immediately be sent back to base, it being absolutely vital that this information should reach base at all costs.

Position 5030N 0737E was reached at 04:42 and the aircraft set course for the homeward leg. The Special Operator passed the coded message to the Wireless Operator for transmission to base, giving in the message the required frequency and that this frequency was very probably the correct one. Jordan warned the crew that his receiver was being saturated and to expect an attack at any moment. Almost simultaneously the aircraft was hit by a burst of cannon fire. The rear gunner gave a fighter control commentary during the attack and identified the enemy as a JU88. Violent corkscrew turns were used as evasive action. Jordan was hit in the arm on this first attack and realising that now there was no doubt at all about the signal being the correct one, he changed the coded message, a change that would tell base that the frequency given was absolutely correct and that it applied without a doubt to the signal being investigated. Although hit in the arm, he still continued to work his sets and to note further characteristics of the signal. The Rear Gunner fired about 1,000 rounds on this attack, but his turret was hit and made completely unserviceable and he was wounded in the shoulder. On the second attack, Jordan was hit in the jaw, but he still continued to work his sets and note the results and told the captain and crew from which side to expect the next attack.

On the third attack, the front turret was hit and the Front Gunner wounded in the leg. The Wireless Operator went forward to let him out of the turret but he was hit in both legs by an exploding shell and had to return to his seat. P/O Barry, Navigator, then went forward and let Grant out for the turret. Jordan was hit once more, this time in the eye, and although he continued operating his equipment and noting further details of the signal, he realised that he could not continue with the investigation much longer, owing to his condition and seeing that his inter-comm had also been shot away, he went forward and brought back the Navigator and tried to explain to him how to continue operating the equipment and so bring back some more valuable information. By this time he was almost blind but although he tried hard to show Barry what to do, he realised that it was an impossible task and in the end gave up the attempt.

F/Sgt Vachon had by this time come out of the rear turret and had taken up position in the Astro Hatch, from where he continued to give evasive control but he was hit again in the hand and Barry went back and took over from him in the Astro Dome. During this period the aircraft had lost height from about 14,000 feet down to 500 feet above the ground, violent evasive action still being taken by the captain. After 10 or 12 attacks the enemy aircraft broke off his engagement and disappeared.

Hits had been scored on the Wellington in 5 or 6 of the attacks, resulting in the following damage:- 1. Starboard Throttle Control shot away (starboard engine stuck at +3 boost all the way home). 2. Port Throttle jammed. 3. Front and rear turrets unserviceable. 4. Starboard Ailerons unserviceable and trimming tabs having no effect at all. 5. Air Speed Indicator reading zero in both positions owing to the pitot head or pipes being holed. 6. Starboard petrol tank holed. 7. Fabric shot and torn away on starboard side of fuselage. 8. Hydraulics unserviceable, 9. Both engines running irregularly. The Wireless Operator Sgt Bigoray, in spite of his injuries, transmitted the coded message back to base but receiving no “R” for it continued to send it in the hopes that it would be picked up. It was received at 05:05 hours.

The Captain kept the aircraft on the course for home and managed to climb up to 5,000 feet, at which height he came back. At 06:45 hours the aircraft crossed the coast at about 10 miles N.E. of Dunkirk, where searchlights tried to pick it out but these were dodged by evasive action and coming down low over the sea. When they were switched off, the Pilot again managed to gain height. The Wireless Operator put the I.F.F. on to Stud 3 and sent out an S.O.S. and a message to the effect that they had been attacked by an enemy aircraft. He again transmitted the coded message in case it had not been received the first time. At approximately 07:20 hours the English coast was reached. The Pilot tested the landing light to see if he could ditch using it, but decided it was impossible. He decided to wait for daylight before ditching and asked the crew if anyone preferred to bail out rather than ditch. The Wireless Operator stated that he preferred to jump, as one of his legs had stiffened up to such an extent that he thought he would not be able to climb out of the aircraft in the water. He made his way to the escape hatch in the rear of the fuselage, from where he intended to jump, but having reached that position he remembered that he had not clamped down the transmitting key and in spite of his injury he returned to his set, clamped the key down, and warned the crew not to touch it. He jumped out over Ramsgate and made a safe landing.

The pilot ditched the aircraft at approximately 08:24 hours about 200 yards off the coast at Deal. The dinghy inflated but had been holed by cannon fire. The Special Operator tried to make it airtight by holding some of the holes but it was impossible and the crew got out of the dinghy and climbed onto the aircraft, About 5 minutes later a small rowing boat appeared, took them off and rowed ashore.

The following signal has been received from the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal, G.C.B, D.S.O., M.C., for P/O Jordan, P/O Paulton, P/O Barry, F/Sgt Bigoray, F/Sgt Grant, F/Sgt Vachon:-
“I have just read report of your investigation flight carried out on Thursday, 3rd. December and should like to congratulate you all on a splendid performance.”
AIR27/1156