Probably not until they figure out what the problem is.

Doh! Very true.

Anybody?

Have you see this: DELIVERING DEFENCE TODAY AND TOMORROW: THE MARITIME CONTRIBUTION?

A Speech by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope at the International Institute for Strategic Studies on 24 February 2010. To quote some of his later comments:

A key issue, as I have already mentioned, will be our understanding of how Defence can contribute to conflict prevention as part of its role in a wider Security construct.

In this, I would say that the key questions we will be facing as a consequence, both within each of the Services and from a collegiate perspective, are likely to reflect three issues:

Firstly, what do you want to defend and what are the Standing Commitments for Defence?

This is the fundamental strategic policy issue for Government. Clearly, those ambitions and commitments will dictate not only the capabilities that Defence will require, but also the scale and readiness at which those capabilities will be held.

Secondly, we need to have a clear idea about what we as a country would aspire to do on our own.

We should not assume that our interests will always be synchronous with the interests of others, even allies of long standing. There may be occasions where we have no choice but to act alone, particularly where the threat is to exclusively UK interests. The answer to that question will dictate the breadth of the military capabilities we should have, or which we should be able to access.

Third, where the UK is operating as a coalition member, how do we want to influence our partners?

Should we rely on the mass of forces we can offer to support a mission or Campaign? Or can we influence outcomes and the planning or conduct of an operation in more effective ways? For example, through the provision of niche or high-skill military capabilities? And do we aspire to lead coalitions in the future?

The issues, as you can appreciate, involve more than simply making a choice between land forces or carrier-based air power. It’s not about tanks versus jet fighters. It is about deciding where the balance of investment should lie, judged against this country’s vital national interests, and the ambition this nation sets, both for itself, and for Defence.

Less newsworthy, but no less fundamental, is the need to improve efficiencies in how Defence does its business. If we are to maintain the operational capabilities so necessary for success – and I am convinced that is where we need to focus – we have to look again at the structure, processes and manning of the support mechanisms, the teeth to tail ratio.

This is not easy to do, but it seems to me essential that those areas highlighted in the Green Paper are fully scrutinised in any future Defence Review.

For example, key reforms in how we plan for and procure the equipment required to deliver the capabilities we will need must be a given, as the Bernard Gray Report has already made clear.

The Defence Review, when it comes, must stay focussed on maintaining and developing military capabilities – and I am equally clear that we must seek to maintain a balance of capabilities across our forces. In the challenging resource climate we face, this balance and the dilemmas therein, highlighted by the Green Paper, deserve and will receive close scrutiny, I am sure.

From the maritime perspective, the ability to defend our nation and interests across the globe relies on a force structure that can provide the essential framework through which our range of capabilities can be delivered and supported. Expeditionary operations, as I have illustrated, are facilitated by our ability to flexibly deliver air power, tailored to the mission, from the sea.

But we also need to deliver effect onto the land in other ways, if we are to reserve to ourselves real choice in the means and methods of responding to situations affecting our security and interests – amphibious forces, submarine-launched Land Attack Cruise Missiles and the enablers that ensure the conditions for success on operations; submarines, frigates, destroyers, support shipping and mine counter measures vessels. When not involved in conflict, these forces are kept very busy across the world, protecting and promoting the UK’s interests on a daily basis.

Regardless of where or how we fight, our focus must inevitably always be the same: defence of the realm, security of our people and the protection of the national interest. In the final analysis, we need to be prepared for whatever the future might throw at us. The Navy is prepared, and is delivering, every day. I believe that maritime forces also have a vital role to play in delivering this country’s defence and security into the future, in delivering choices for the Government, as much as in delivering firepower when required.

As I said a moment ago, I don’t have all the answers. The Green Paper outlines a number of questions that have moved forward the debate about Defence and which will prompt further analysis and work. I look forward to continuing to work closely with my fellow Service Chiefs in addressing those issues. Thank you.

BTW, did anyone see the Newsnight special earlier this week?

If only we hadn’t scapped the Sea Harrier* before CVF (and aircraft) are ready to take over. As discussed on the Sea Jet and Future Carrier PPRuNe threads. Not that Argentina has the means to mount an invasion 1982 style….

* A few are still in RN/MOD hands, and either stored or used for shore based ground based training purposes, and in theory could be regenerated.

Is headbutting the wall/desk/whatever allowed?

Brown goes into battle with billions for defence – from The Times

Just a second, this is commiting to things we are already commited to, surely? Perhaps it is trying to get one up on the Tories, who are not ring fencing defence expenditure?

Also, Sir Malcom Rifkind is suggesting greater co-operation with France.

He also comments that:

If we wish to have global influence we must be prepared to pay the price. It is an expensive price, at present running at £35 billion a year. The public finances are in a poor state. In a democracy such a decision cannot just be for politicians and Parliament. It must be for the nation as a whole to decide and the quicker the debate begins the better.

I believe the price is worth paying, and it has to be a price sufficient to enable us to fight and win conventional high-intensity conflicts and not just counter-insurgency such as in Afghanistan.

To say that we do not know what kind of wars we may need to fight in future is not just a statement of the obvious. It is also a reminder of how diverse recent wars have been.

We could not have won in the Falklands without the strength of the Royal Navy and its aircraft carriers, in particular. The Gulf War, to liberate Kuwait, required tanks; Kosovo depended entirely on the air power of the United States and of Britain’s Royal Air Force. In Afghanistan it is helicopters and armoured vehicles, as well as infantry, that have been the most pressing need. That is what makes defence so expensive.

As I said earlier, we DO live in interesting times.

What suprises will we get this decade? Where? With what sort of equipment? In the nineties we had the suprise invasion of Kuwait and subequent conflict, and the conflicts in the Balkans. Then this last decade we had the the terrible events of 9/11, and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

What now?

Will the stand off with Iran over the alleged nuclear weapon programme lead to any sort of conflict? Will North Korea push the international community too far with the next nuclear test, no doubt with more sabre rattling? Will Chavez’s Venezuela seek a war to distract the population from the economic woes – and against who? Colombia? What about the Netherlands Antilles?

Is the campaign against terror spreading to Somalia and Yemen? Can the political system in Pakistan survive?

Is the future land centric counter insurgency, or have we been led down a blind alley? Will terrorists acting as proxies for certain Governments been supplied with sophisticated weapons?