In a dispute, it is not a requirement that both parties must make concessions, and it is absurd to suggest this, where one party is found to be in the right, then the party in the wrong very often loses their case. If you sue someone, but lose the case, then you receive no compensation, and will, as a matter of course, be required to pay the other side’s expenses. If Argentina feels it has a case, then it could take legal action, and allow the international courts decide. If Argentina won the legal argument, then a settlement to transfer sovereignty would be agreed to. If Argentina lost the argument, it would be required to drop its claims. Since it does not appear to be willing to actually take the legal route, this does suggest that their legal advisors do not believe that they have a probability of winning. Put simply, if Argentina felt it had a reasonable chance of winning, it would not resort to political point scoring, it would put its faith in the international legal framework.
In international law, it is not as simple as claiming that someone else’s land automatically belongs to you, simply because it was once under your control. There are literally hundreds of examples, such as the French island off Canada mentioned previously, or Moroccan claims on the Spanish enclaves in Northern Morocco. The land belongs to those who maintain ownership, over time – prior ownership does lapse by a mechanism known as prescription. Prescription basically says that if a previous owner does not contest ownership within a reasonable time, then ownership passes to the new occupier. Since Argentina had well over a century in which to challenge this ownership – not by recourse to arms, but to the law – and did not do so, the lands become sovereign property of the UK. This is not mere supposition, or British propaganda, it is the cold hard truth of how international law works.
Self determination doesn’t just apply to aboriginal populations, it applies to any indigenous population, which the Falkland Islanders most certainly are. They have a distinct identity, and have lived on the islands for most if not all of their lives. With regard to the issue of ownership, the Argentine claims are very weak legally. Since they only occupied the islands for a matter of mere months in the last century, and a matter of only a couple of years at most in the entire history of the islands, their claim is incredibly weak. In contrast, the British islanders have occupied the islands consistently for well over a century, now approaching two centuries. Even if this is ignored, the islands would have become British by prescription alone, because of the duration of inhabitation. Furthermore, the wishes of the islanders are very relevant, especially in light of the way they have been treated by the Argentines, with the invasion and occupation in ’82, and frequent threats and provocation from the Argentine government. If you lived on the islands, would you honestly want to switch to being governed from Buenos Aires?
I do feel the best bet for an arsenal ship type concept is to simply make either C-1 or C-2 (or preferably both) a stretched Type 45, with more VLS cells. The design would be stretched to allow a longer VLS fore, and possibly add a VLS amidships. The forward VLS would take advantage of the built-in space for the sixteen strike length cells, taking it to 64 cells; this would then be stretched by around 50% in length, taking it to 96 cells. This does look possible from the overhead views of the T45, but that is just guesswork. This would give 96 cells, to be filled with a mix of Aster 30, Tomahawk/Scalp and CAMM; e.g. 40 Aster 30, 40 Tomahawk/Scalp and 64 CAMM in total.
If you want to opt for a true arsenal ship, to be a simply VLS hauler, on a simple hull, yet keep up with the Type 45, then the solution would be a catamaran, e.g. the JHSV. These have the advantage of a lot of physical deckspace, lots of speed, and relatively simple design. The 7m length of the proposed Sylver A70 wouldn’t be too much of a problem, it would be about the height of the hangar plus one deck below. As such, you could build a JHSV type hull, packed with VLS cells, equipped with a basic but sufficient defensive fitout, along the lines of what we would fit to the C-3. There would be deckspace for over 100 cells, yet on a small hull. Since it is using standoff weapons, it doesn’t need to get too close to danger anyway, but even if it does, it could close at 40 knots, launch and return quickly.
If the UK is to get any true SSGN capability, then it pretty much all depends on what the Vanguard replacement looks like. If the costs can be kept down (yes, you can laugh at that the very idea!), then buying a couple more to serve as SSGNs might work. This would mean something like six hulls, with a modular launch tube, to allow either cruise missiles or Trident. We would then keep three or four full sets of Trident, and three or four sets of cruise missile launchers. This would always guarantee the deterrent, yet allow us to put to sea plenty of conventional firepower whenever necessary.
unless brasil buys second hand carriers (from the british for example), they’ll need to build some.. and guess what nation can propose them a deal about it (carriers AND aircraft)?
France
If they build a carrier with brasilians, it might be an interesting proposal to put the rafales on it and have the two aircraft air force and navy with many common parts… Swedish AFAIK never have built a carrier (just as they never made a naval aircraft.. so, if such thing goes further, we may just as well be here arguing similarily for the next couple of years… 😀
No, the Swedes haven’t built many aircraft carriers, but the Indians are building carriers, and would be a very attractive option for the Brazilians. The Indian carriers could well end up being adapted for CATOBAR ops, with the attraction of allowing them to use E-2s, Rafales/Super Hornets/Sea Gripens. Even if the Indians themselves don’t need CATOBAR capability, it would certainly make their carriers very attractive to some prospective carrier operators. If Brazil, or even Argentina if they ever have the money to return to carrier ownership, need a new carrier in the next twenty years, then the Indian carriers will be pretty attractive.
I’d hope they get something for those extra 600 lbs.
Well, apart from the ability to hit targets, which is pretty important, the weight difference isn’t all that important. Though Storm Shadow is a bit heavier, it is well within the carrying capacity of pretty much any of the jets likely to carry it. Basically, the Storm Shadow range was deliberately low-balled, as most western sources do with kit. Heck, the Hellfire was originally quoted as something like 3km range in the media, but was actually a lot greater once the true range figures came out.
As for the mention of the JASSM-ER, it does have a lot of potential, but at the same time, a lot to live up to. Given its genesis, I would be concerned about its ability to live up to the promises. I would also mention the Scalp Naval missile, which is a very long range derivative of the Scalp/Storm Shadow, albeit one intended for ship and sub launch. It may well be possible to re-adapt the Scalp Naval for air launch, as a direct equivalent of the JASSM-ER.
How dare you sir, spending 1/3 of the education budget on consultants and advisors at County level and higher makes perfect sense. Likewise a rolling annual programme of refurbishment to executive offices in NHS hospitals and Flag Rank retiring on a pension of full salary. Why on earth would be spend aany of that money on accomodation, personnel or a planned procurement of equipment for front line forces. You are talking rubbish 😉
I humbly apologise sir, and I shall do my penance and community service working as a banker in the city! :diablo:
Utter madness! As we have seen over the last two decades, when you downsize, you will find it especially hard to rebuild numbers. Since the armed forces are already overstretched, with too few personnel and insufficient equipment, making massive cuts is beyond foolish. The fact is that, in order to ringfence spending on hospitals and education (both areas where a fair amount of money could be saved without hurting effectiveness) for electoral purposes, it seems defence is to be gutted. The scary thing is that both main parties seem willing to gut the defence budget, in spite of maintaining a major commitment to Afghanistan, which is draining the already underfunded defence budget.
A lot of the problems have been coming for many years, with projects being years behind schedule, and massively over budget. Often, this has been largely a result of insisting on short-term savings (by not buying now, keeping projects pre-main-gate). What is needed is a rational review of how to fix the procurement nightmares, on a long-term view, not just penny-wise pound-foolish short-term view. Equally, we need to work out the size of force needed to support our commitments, and actually fund the force properly. Cutting force size when we are already at overstretch will simply make the force more broken, not magically fix it!
It would be – if the Afghan’s bought them directly from Kazan Helicopters or Ulan-Ude Helicopters, but they aren’t – they are purchased through US sources – via third parties, arms dealers and shadowy organisations. 😮
I agree that the Mi-17/171 etc is ideal for the job and is relatively cheap – if you cut out the middle men.
Ken
I agree wholeheartedly, it makes no sense to buy them from third parties all the time, much better to just suck it up and buy them direct. A simple order given to Kazan for one hundred Mils would be perfectly reasonable, hell, we use Il-76s and An-124s all the time, why can’t we just buy some helos direct? 🙁
In effect there is just such an option, namely the Mil Mi-17, and it is being used already, especially for resupply operations. Basically, the Mi-17 is big enough to haul a respectable load, can cope with hot and high ops, and is cheap enough to buy in good numbers.
What is really needed is to have a long-term solution for Afghanistan, i.e. a force that can be passed onto the Afghans once we have pulled out (for whatever reason). This means buying a viable fleet for the future, and something like the Mi-17 probably makes the most sense. For fixed wing purposes, you need pretty much the equivalent of the Mi-17, so something like the Embraer ALX or AT-6C would be possibilities, being relatively straightforward to operate. Add in some surveillance aircraft, similar to the King Airs being used under Project Liberty, and you have a reasonably well equipped Afghan Air Force. The major attraction of this type of force is cost – Mi-17s shouldn’t be too expensive, nor should a fleet of ALX or AT-6s, and a HISAR equipped King Air should be pretty reasonable too.
Overall, the strategy for Afghanistan needs to be viable in the longer term, so that we can train up the Afghans to take over once we are gone. If we give them something like F-16s, Blackhawks and the like, then as soon as we leave, they would just end up grounded or sold off. Even buying ~100 each of Mi-17s and ALX/AT-6s shouldn’t be much over $2bn, a relatively modest price for what it represents.
A much more sensible choice would be to order the some ships of the Schelde Enforcer type. A limited LSD could be built very cheaply, along the same lines as the British Bay class LSD(A)s. For a more capable LPD option, the sister ships, like the Dutch Rotterdam/Johan de Witt class, could be built, still for low cost compared with the San Antonio class. I think a large part of the problem for the US Navy amphibious shipping fleet has been the insistence on building the most expensive ships possible. If you look at the new LHA and LPD-17 designs, these just scream of excessive spending. By spending so much, on so few ships, they are being forced to cut numbers, which then hurts capability. This can be seen in more than just the amphibious fleet, the USN seems to be trying to buy impossibly expensive ships.
More modest choices might have been better, such as going for amphibious ships more like the Enforcer series (which would have been able to replace all the old LPDs and LSDs). For replacing the Perry class, a relatively low risk option, along the lines of a frigate-sized Sa’ar 5 type, using the SPY-1F could have been a good choice.
Basically, by going for a relatively conservative approach, but going for a better trade-off between capability and cost, things could have been looking a lot better. It is worth noting that the hey-day of the US Navy power, i.e. ’50s-’70s, they relied on a lot of relatively old, cheap and cheerful ships. They relied on extensively modified Essex class carriers, modernised world war two destroyers, small SSNs and SSKs, etc…
The modern trend of sacrificing numbers in the name of a smaller ‘silver bullet’ force is pretty dangerous. The same can be seen in the USAF, with ever reducing numbers, all in the name of the stealth game, pinning their hopes on quality to offset shortfall in quantity.
I would just increase the size of the forward VLS, from a 6 x 8 arrangement to an 8 x 8 arrangement, yielding 64 Sylver A70 cells. Add in another 64-cell A50 VLS amidships, just forward of the hangar. This gives 64 cells to carry Tomahawk/Scalp Naval and an ABM missile, either a sort of Aster 50+, or even (with a few modifications) the SM-3. The amidships 64-cell then carries Aster 30s and quad-packed CAMMs. Overall, I would figure on a total of 48 Aster 30, 64 CAMM, and 40 Tomahawk/Scalp, plus 8 ABM missiles.
Overall, for a ship like that, a pair of AGS isn’t worth it, but a pair of 155mm L/52s (in the modified Mk8 turret) or Oto 127mm L/64s might be. The key thing, though, is the number of VLS cells, which determines how much punch the ships have. A mere 48 cells limits you to carrying mostly AAW missiles, for defensive reasons; any cells beyond that, and you start adding land attack missile capacity (or other types).
Sadly, this is pretty much the standard cuts-driven planning. I think we should introduce a new medal for the politicians making these cuts: “for acts above and beyond the call of stupidity!” 🙁
The point about certification was actually more about ongoing production standards, i.e. that the charges need to be manufactured to higher standards (to withstand heat, vibration etc…) for ship-board use. The idea is that even a relatively modest increase in manufacturing costs can end up costing an awful lot more, when you are talking about tens of thousands of rounds.
Fed: The problem I have with the L/39 is simply that it doesn’t really too many advantages, compared to its disadvantages. These include having to use a two-stroke loader, storing ammunition completely differently, and reduced rate of fire, without a water-cooled barrel (which makes firing for extended periods more problematic). One thing to remember is that, with newer charges/rounds (notably the South African non-standard volume ones), the L/52 has shown itself capable of firing out to about 60-70km in some tests. This would effectively double the range of the RN’s shipboard guns, from the Mk8 Mod1s firing the new HE ER round out to about ~28km ish, to an L/52 firing out to more than twice that!
The Vulcano round is really the game-changer in my opinion, with the potential to fire accurately out to 100km, and even the potential to introduce IR rounds for anti-shipping use. I do really like the Italian Oto Melara 127mm L/64 though, and if we cannot get the 155mm L/52, then any change of gun should, ideally, be to the Oto turret. The Vulcano fired from the L/64 is expected to be accurate out to 120km, which would give an amazing capability boost. Another possibility might be to ask for a 4.5in version of the Italian Vulcano round, which should be possible, and still yield a reasonable range. Even if it only offered, say, a 60km range, then it would still be a major boost in capability, especially if we can get them fitted fleet-wide!
One important question regarding the 155mm option is the calibre – the L/39 version doesn’t really appeal to me, for it to be worth the effort, it would need to be the L/52 version. The major issue is whether it is actually practical to use the same ammunition and charges on land and at sea. This is actually more about the Army’s side of it than the Navy – is it cost effective for them to use ammunition that has to be certified to shipboard safety standards. This means increasing the costs of the charges in particular, which might not be very popular – in effect, it might reduce costs for the Navy getting new ammunition, but it could easily end up costing a lot more in day to day costs.
Ed personally I think the Artisan is similar to the Thales SMART-S although I don’t think it is as capable as that radar as I get the impression Artisan is a pretty basic 3D radar designed to be a cheap replacement to existing systems. So I don’t think it would compare easily with the Herakles or anything above the SMART-S. That’s just my opinion and I have nothing on paper to back it up so feel free to disagree, maybe somebody knows of better information about the Artisan radar?
As for the C1, C2 and C3 options I’ll stick to my original choices. A derivative of the Type 45 for C1 reusing the hull, propulsion and other systems where possible if within cost parameters. C2 Absalon class derivative swapping out the Thales SMART-S for ARTISAN for commonality reasons and swapping out weapons with UK equivalents for the same reason. I think however that the UK should adopt the Millennium gun system to replace Phalanx and Goalkeeper as it is purported to be an excellent system and could be used on land as well as at sea. The C3 role would be best filled I feel by the purpose designed BMT Venator however the VT C3 proposal would also suffice and is lower risk. The problem is I doubt we will get enough of any of any of the 3 ‘flavours’ of
Thanks, that’s pretty much what I had thought, but I wasn’t sure. It is my understanding that it was basically the ‘cheap but British’ choice, hence was chosen for the T23, Ocean and Albions… The ulterior motive behind my asking about comparisons with Herakles was because I had read a couple of interesting pieces discussing the Singaporean Formidable class. The suggestion was that they are to be able to take the Sylver A50 cells, to use Aster 30, rather than just the A43 cells for Aster 15; this being interesting since they use the Herakles radar.
In essence, I was wondering about how capable the Artisan radar is likely to be, and therefore the possibility of C-1 and C-2 using Artisan, but with Aster 30 (even if they cannot take advantage of its full capabilities without CEC). If we end up basically just taking the Type 45’s hull, adding a little space for a VDS, and use a more basic sensor fit, then this could be sensible. We could potentially leave in the same VLS setup, i.e. 48 Sylver A50 cells, and the theoretical space for sixteen A70 cells for Tomahawk/Scalp Naval. As long as the sensor fit is reasonably good, even if it isn’t in the same league as the T-45, then that would at least allow us to have sufficient AAW-capability fleet-wide, even with the tiny number of proper AAW ships. This would also allow us to, as I would hope will happen, stick to just Aster 30 and CAMM – T-45, C-1 and C-2 would all carry Aster 30 and CAMM, while the rest of the fleet, i.e. C-3, CVF, LPDs and a possible LPH(R) carry just CAMM.
As for the replacement of Phalanx and Goalkeeper, I do like the 35mm Oerlikon with AHEAD/ABM ammunition, but I seem to remember there being some doubt about the effectiveness of the small fragments. If this is not an issue, then it might be sensible, though I would actually look at the possibility of re-adopting a modified version of the GCM AO3 twin 30mm, but using the Mauser Mk30 (firing 30×173 airbursting ammunition) instead of the RARDEN cannon (which fired 30×170). This would be lighter (hopefully), and could be fitted to all the ships in the fleet, rather than the situation now where only some ships get a CIWS, and others just get the DS30 or equivalents.