Sintra2004 figures –
Quoted MTOW = 27216 kg
Empty = 12020 kg (also as 13170 kg)
Internal Fuel = 8165 kg
Payload/[pilot/consumables, etc = 7031 kg (also given as 7250 kg)The max hardpoint load is 9843 kg in any case.
The empty weight of the F-35A went to 13200 kg.
SintraTotoro
The internal fuel of the F-22 has never been officially disclosed, but the numbers for the F-35A/B/C were made public a long time ago.
F-35A – 18480 Lb´s (8,400 ton)
F-35B – 14003 Lb´s (6,365 ton)
F-35C – 20085 Lb´s (9,130 ton)
Now, that´s what i call “a decent fuel fraction”.
Cheers 🙂
SintraI’d love to hear the justification for that one.
ECR CAPTOR – First look
AIM120C5 – First shoot
Better supersonic acceleration – First to “get the hell ou´there”
The RAFALE has a useful range/payload advantage on the ATG arena but the “phoon” has a decent ATA advantage based on a bigger aperture radar and a better all round supersonic performance.
SintraIf the SH is too far outside the capability they’re looking for, than the Gripen would seem to be the logical choice of the three remaining aircraft, although I’d wonder if they perhaps aren’t looking for something more laong the lines of a weaponized and mission-capable T-50?
A weaponized and mission-capable T-50 will be on the same cost class of a SAAB Gripen, so…
SAAB must make a huge “blunder” to loose this one.
Sintra“Binding offer” in my world means “Binding offer”
But it´s not, Lockheed Martin isn´t prepared to sign a fixed price contract. They cant. That was one of the reason´s why Eurofighter GMBH droped of the contest.
When the Norwegian MOD transformed the contest from an RFP based to a RBI one, basically they´ve given “carte blanche” to Lockheed Martin to advertise a unit cost based on a late 2005 “best case scenario”, and those 20 billlion Nkr are exactly that, a highly optimistic prediction that LM wont put in a signed contract. And those 20 billlionNkr/48 Units are less than what the USAF states that it´s going to cost them their F-35A fleet, so we have a problem here…
But dont take my word on it, from Bill Sweetman:
Both countries have also adopted procurement strategies that gloss over a key difference between JSF and the European aircraft: Eurofighter and Gripen are both offering a fixed price, but there is no firm price on JSF, there won’t be one until the first full-rate, multi-year production contract (set for 2013), and if Norway and Denmark stick to their current schedules they’ll be buying some aircraft, at least, from the expensive low-rate initial production (LRIP) batches. Norway has covered up this issue by issuing a “request for binding information” (RBI) rather than a request for proposals, which would normally contain a binding price agreement.
Without a fixed-price requirement, JSF marketeers are able to advertise their current estimated flyaway price (average price over the entire 3,000-plus projected run, without spares or support equipment), which looked like a bargain even before the dollar fell through the floor.
What Tom Burbage has just said to the Norwegian Press is that LM his prepared to “sell” a 13 Ton, F-4E Phantom size, LO strike fighter, with a next generation AESA radar set, equiped with an internal “evolved” SNIPER XR LDP for the same price tag of a naked 8,5 ton “classical” Block 50+ Viper equiped with a mechanical AN/APG-68(V9) !!!
But it didn´t stop here, he was quoted saying that the logistical/cost footprint of the F-35A was “20% smaller than that of the F-16”!
Hell, if that´s true it goes “head to head” with the “old” Gripen C/D, the indisputable champion of the “i´m cheap to run” fighter award until now!
Wait a minute, why my “Bulsh%# Metter” just went “through the roof”?
If Lockheed Martin his prepared to sign a “fixed cost” contract with those number´s on it, double the original requirement and buy 96 of those “Lightning II”.
It´s an historic event, the first time in history that a next generation fighter being bigger, heavier, more advanced, more capable his actually CHEAPER to buy and operate than their predecessor… It never happened before.
This coming from LM, the guy´s responsable for the VH-71 helicopter, the Hercules Juliet, the LCS-1, the Raptor, etc, etc, etc, all projects with an “impecable” cost management.
Right…
SintraSuch things couldn’t happen, even the Victor Blencko MiG-25 was a staged event to make the west “think” USSR was behing in airforce tech, how do you “think” he got by all those SAM’s you realy think he acomplished his adventures with out help from the Soviet Government?
:rolleyes:
Try reading this (“MiG Pilot: The Final Escape of Lieutenant Belenko” by John Barron)…
More here: http://www.google.com/gwt/n?u=http://www.geocities.com/siafdu/viktor.html
SintraAccording to one account, the Swedes preferred American (Raytheon?), but were being blocked from the sort of access & control they thought essential. Raytheon & Northrop were happy to co-operate, but officialdom had other ideas – supposedly under heavy lobbying from Lockheed Martin & the USAF. SAAB wouldn’t have been allowed to know everything they needed to do all the integration themselves, necessitating giving all their software to the US supplier. So the Swedes went with Thales, which they thought second-best but good enough, rather than have their hands tied by US tech transfer restrictions. Well, you know what rumour mills throw up.
Yes, i´ve heard the same.
SintraOne interesting thing is the Thales AESA antenna. I wouldn’t be at all surprised if it’s a modification of the antenna for the RBE.2 AESA. The radar back end is an upgraded PS-05/A with new software.
[Edit]
Ah. It seems I was right. Buried in here.“The demonstrator radar will be a prototype combining the modified back end of the C/D’s PS-05/A with a Thales array, using modules that are already flying on a test-bed as part of the Rafale AESA program”
What caught my atention was that SAAB received offers from Selex, Raytheon, Northrop and Thales to develop the radar/antena set and they eventually chose the French company. I was a bit surprised.
SintraIf you mean that Rafale is subject to a US technology transfer veto as Gripen is, then you’re mistaken. AFAIK there’s nothing American in Rafale – and that is not entirely deliberate
MIDS LVT 😉
SintraApologies, I should have said ‘Matra’ (now MBDA):
http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/jalw/jalw3025.html
http://www.onera.fr/conferences-en/ramjet-scramjet-pde/
🙂
OH
Thanks for the links Otaku 🙂
Sintrasecretive collabarative Ramjet/Scramjet ventures with MBDA
:confused:
WHAT?!
That´s new, never heard it…
SR(A)1239, the RAF RFI that lead to the Meteor program his from June 1995, the contestants were BAE and Raytheon, MBDA was formed only in 2001 from such diferent companies has Matra Aerospatiale, BAE Dynamics, Gec Marconi, Alenia Difesa, the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 and that photo of the ramjet R-77 photo his from 1993…
Care to explain how a company (MBDA) that was formed in 2001 had “secretive Ramjet/Scramjet ventures” with Russia in the early 90`s?!!!
Any source for that claim?
The Warsaw Pact was dissolved in July of 1991, that Russian AAM design was frozen in 1993, that must have been a “speedy gonzalez” venture! 😀
Cheers
SintraHas anybody saw what picture KNAAPO use for their PAC FA section?
http://www.knaapo.ru/eng/index.wbp
I do hope that they are paying a good fee to Josef Gatial 😀
SintraYeah, same here 😀
Me too. 😀
SintraThat depends on what you believe I think. Was it going to be some huge cloud hiding the aircraft from radar all the time? I think not. It is more likely that the system was intended to serve as an active ECM system to defeat tracking radars and active radar weapons. There was a JDW article around the time that the 1.44 was unveiled that talked about the Keldysh device and IIRC there were some British (BA I believe) scientists who validated the concept but couldn’t quite figure out how the Russians made the thing work. The Keldysh system was likely an offshoot of or the same system that was to mask the Meteorit missile system from radar. In theory it is a sound concept, as long as you aren’t expecting the total stealth I described above. RWR detects missile seeker emissions, Keldysh activates to fool the seeker, and pilot executes a high-g maneuver to escape the missile’s FOV to avoid reacquisition. As a reactive system it does make a lot of sense, if they got it to work. At one point they were even offering a related system for export.
Superagility. While the Eurocanards are very agile aircraft, it would appear that the Russians went almost overboard in some of their aircraft with respect to aerodynamic performance. They seemed designed to dominate the WVR arena. The Keldysh system would have forced opponents into the WVR arena after it negated the radar-guided BVR threat. Alternatively an intermittent Keldysh signal could irritate an attacker’s radar long enough for the MFI to get within range for a BVR shot. Then close on the target while it’s busy evading an R-77 salvo and go WVR for the kill.
Hello SOC
The description of the Keldysh system was on the Internet for years in the site of the… KELDYSH RESEARCH CENTER(http://www.kerc.msk.ru/ipg/index_e.shtml) 😀
It was erased somewhere around 2003 (if i remember well, i was stupid enough not copying everything), but the very famous (:diablo: ) Venik copied everything. It was an interview with Anatoliy Koroteyev, the Director of the KELDYSH RESEARCH CENTER and gives a description of the system. Venik also copied the original (1999) Janes News about the system (http://www.aeronautics.ru/plasma04.htm).
You are correct when you say that the system worked with the ECM/RWR of the fighter, it would have projected a plasma cloud in the sectors of the plane that got iluminated by hostile radars.
But they couldn´t make the “thing” work, it was a failure, by late 2002 the work was abandoned.
About the aerial tactics that you describe, did you know that you´ve just described almost to perfection the actual conditions that were simulated by the USAF and that produced the document that was delivered to the Congress in 2003 saying that the F-15 Eagle would lose every encounter with an evolved Flanker?
Just take the Keldysh System out, join the very complete information about the AN/APG-63 capabilities that the pilots who were simulating the Flanker threath had (they were USAF Eagles and Viper drivers) and the R-73/HMS combo, to finish the recipe just use the exact tactics that you describe (long range R-27 fake shots, Eagles manouvering to avoid a “blank shot”, “Flankers” hiding in the pulse doppler “echo” of the AN/APG-63, followed by a WVR fight in wich the R73/HMS was unmatched, the HMCS/9X combo by them wasn´t exatly “common”).
About the Superagility of the Russian prototipes, pick the Eurofighter Typhoon, join an AVEN TVC engine with improved thrusth by something like a ton in post combustion (the 1998 Eurojet EJ230), then what you got his a 40% smaller Mig 1.42. Not more, not less.
I was forgeting, the British Scientists, they were from the Surrey University. That University has been working on some very “exotic” RCS reduction technologies for an awfull lot of years. They have a “few” contracts with BAE and… EADS… Funny 😉
Original 1999 interview with Anatoliy Koroteyev
РОССИЙСКИЕ УЧЕHЫЕ СОЗДАЛИ РЕВОЛЮЦИОHHЫЕ ТЕХHОЛОГИИ ОБЕСПЕЧЕHИЯ МАЛОЗАМЕТHОСТИ ЛЕТАТЕЛЬHЫХ АППАРАТОВ
МОСКВА, 20 янваpя./Коpp.ИТАР-ТАСС Hиколай Hовичков/.
Ученые Исследовательского центpа имени М.В.Келдыша pазpаботали новые технологии обеспечения малозаметности летательных аппаpатов. Они не только пpинципиально отличаются от амеpиканской технологии снижения демаскиpующих пpизнаков типа “стелс” и обеспечивает полную скpытность защищаемого объекта, но и значительно дешевле. Об этом коpp. ИТАР-ТАСС в эксклюзивном интеpвью сегодня сообщил диpектоp Центpа академик РАH Анатолий Коpотеев.
В основу амеpиканской технологии “стелс”, внедpенной на стpатегическом бомбаpдиpовщике В-2, истpебителе-бомбаpдиpовщике Ф-117А и истpебителе 5-го поколения Ф-22 “Рэптоp” , заложены следующие пpинципы. Планеpы этих летательных аппаpатов выполнены таким обpазом, чтобы максимально снизить эффективную повеpхность pассеяния, исключить возможные точки констpукции, котоpые могут служить отpажателями падающей на аппаpат электpомагнитной энеpгии. Для уменьшения величины отpажаемого от объекта pадиолокационного сигнала также используются pадиопоглощающие покpытия или матеpиалы. К основным недостаткам этой технологии относятся чpезвычайно высокая стоимость и отpицательное влияние на летно-технические и маневpенные хаpактеpистики защищаемых летательных аппаpатов, пояснил академик.
Российские ученые пошли по дpугому пути. Они пpедложили создавать вокpуг аппаpата специальное плазменное обpазование, котоpое мешает “видеть” летательный аппаpат. Пpи этом не затpагивается аэpодинамика самого аппаpата. Hе влияя на летно-технические хаpактеpистики защищаемого от обнаpужения самолета окpужающее его облако искусственной плазмы обеспечивает снижение заметности более чем в 100 pаз пpи значительно меньших затpатах.
Физическая суть pоссийской технологии обеспечения малозаметности заключается в следующем. Если объект окpужен облаком плазмы, то пpи взаимодействии с ним электpомагнитных волн сpедств обнаpужения пpотивника, возникает несколько явлений. Во-пеpвых, пpоисходит поглощение энеpгии электpомагнитной волны, так как пpи пpохождении плазменного обpазования она вступает во взаимодействие с заpяженными частицами плазмы, пеpедает им часть своей энеpгии и затухает. Во-втоpых, вследствие pяда физических пpоцессов электpомагнитная волна стpемится обогнуть плазменное обpазование. Оба этих явления пpиводят к pезкому снижению отpаженного сигнала.
Пpоведенные экспеpиментально-теоpетические pаботы на наземных моделиpующих установках и в натуpных условиях доказали эффективность данной технологии. В Центpе были созданы специальные устpойства пеpвого поколения, обеспечивающие создание искусственного плазменного поля вокpуг летательного аппаpата и снижение отpаженного сигнала.
В дальнейшем была установлена возможность создания еще более пpодвинутых систем, ставших системами втоpого поколения. Их пpименение позволило не только ослабить отpаженный сигнал и изменить его длину, но и получить pяд ложных сигналов. Это сильно затpудняет пpавильное опpеделение скоpости летательного аппаpата, места его нахождения и ведет к pазвитию совеpшенно новых подходов к обеспечению малозаметности ЛА, невозможных для тpадиционной технологии “стелс”. Пpичем системы, созданные pоссийскими pазpаботчиками, весят в пpеделах 100 килогpаммов и имеют энеpгопотpебление от единиц до десятков киловатт.
Сейчас в Центpе им.Келдыша идет pазpаботка еще более эффективных систем обеспечения малозаметности тpетьего поколения, основанных на новых физических пpинципах. Как полагает Анатолий Коpотеев, имеющийся в Центpе научно-технический задел в области обеспечения малозаметности позволяет России начать экспоpт имеющихся систем пеpвого и втоpого поколений, котоpые пpошли полный цикл наземных и летных испытаний. В настоящее вpемя pешен вопpос о включении этих систем в список pазpешенных к экспоpту pоссийских изделий обоpонного значения.
SintraThe Keldysh Plasma Stealth was a technological dead end, and i´m trying to figure out what exactly the Mig 1.42 brings to the table that the original Typhoon tranche 2/3 Eurojet 230 (that engine was tested in 1998) equiped didn´t have…
It´s a question of “threath perception”.
If Western Europe had a “Real” Eastern conventional “threath” in wich the ATA factor was some variant of the Mig1.42 or the Berkut, the RAF, Luftwaffe, ADLA would be fielding hundreds of highly improved Eurocanards. Think of AESA, TVC, Meteor, etc, etc, etc. And the likes of MBB “Lampiridae” wouldn´t have been caned, and a prototipe of the BAE Replica would be flying today.
In the end there´s no conventional threat to Western Europe, so…
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