Yup, that’s the plate with the Curtiss Wright build number and (in my case) the USAAC serial number.

Not sure of RAF orders had the RAF serial number stamped there, but it seems likely.

I have a full set from a P-40M…just need the rest now

Unfortunately, this is part of why these things are often hush-hush.

If it were me, I’d keep my mouth shut until it was in a container and at sea…maybe longer

[QUOTE=shepsair;1883323]Richard

Think they are amending the article every now and then. Definitely changed the captions on the wartime photos.

Standard procedure was never to put down the undercarriage in unknown terrain.”

I think it was updated after my read of it. Article is pretty “me too”.

Agreed on the U/C being kept up for such landings as SOP, as I alluded to in an earlier post. That evidence does point to a very specific A/C.

One thing the article does have (likely) right, is the conclusion that it landed with power on.

If my 112 Sqn records are any indication, there could have been 6-12 HS*B marked Kittys.

Interesting that one of the photos shows the (steel) inlet vane of the supercharger and it’s associated shaft lying loose on the ground. You can see melted aluminum on a few of the vanes.

There must have been some amount of fuel and fire present for the magnesium supercharger case to go away enough to let a component that far inside fall away. The melted looking rubble under the cowling seems to support that.

That said, if there was subtantial fuel left in the aircraft, you would think the fire would have progressed further and consumed more.

That might suggest that the pilot landed very low, but not completely out of fuel. If the engine were completely starved, he would (normally) cut the switches and switch off the tank selector. Of course, the switch/throttle positions in the photos could have been monkeyed with several times by the time the photos were taken. Still, that might have helped minimize the fire.

The broken reduction case might suggest that the engine was still running and under some power when the prop struck – many P-40 belly landings didn’t separate that way.

If the terrain was as bad then as it is now, he’d choose to belly in (unless the U/C was locked down – as postulated). Flipping would be the main concern, certainly not saving the a/c.

If a wheel landing was unavoidable because of this, you’d expect the pilot to land under fair power, full flaps and far behind the power curve to try to get the touchdown speed as low as possible.

The evidence seems to support this in some ways – Just speculation, of course.