There is no AESA option with the Mirage 2000.

As for the cost, here the data from Defence Minister AK Antony’s written response to a Parliamentary question:
“The last contracted price for each Mirage-2000 aircraft in the year 2000 was Rs 133 crore. The contract for upgrade was signed in 2011 wherein the cost of upgrading one aircraft was Rs 167 crore…. ”

Rs 167 crore = 1.67bil Rupee = $27.17mil. Is this figure correct?

I believe that’s just the Dassault contract. Another parallel contract was signed with HAL which will locally upgrade the bulk of the aircraft. The total amount was Rs 10,900 crore or about $2.4 billion at the exchange rate in 2011.

I agree that Gripen fits Brazilian needs, but not that it could be sold to Argentina. Too much British content, e.g. much of the radar. The UK can veto Gripen E sales.

Hmm… perhaps with a different radar? NG-SABR or EL/M-2052.

It’s a matter of national priorities. If Brazil’s military spending was running at 2.5% GDP like India then things would be different

Not to take this too far off-topic but India’s defence spending of around $38 billion amounts to 1.8% of its GDP in 2013. However this does not include the costs associated with the nuclear and strategic missile programs. Also I’m not sure if it includes military pensions. In any case, even accounting for that it will still remain under 2% of the GDP.

Its a little harder to get a handle on Brazil’s defence spending. From what I could gather it averages 1.5% of the GDP translating to around $30 billion (though some sources claimed figures under $10 billion), but has decreased hugely after recent budget cuts.

They’re personnel costs must be fairly high (or their defence budget isn’t completely utilized), because there’s not a lot equipment to show for it. Even a small military like Singapore for example, while not supporting a comparably large standing army appears otherwise more suited to fighting a conventional war. Then again, I suppose Brazil’s military has probably been geared over the decades to fight domestic insurgencies rather than foreign invasions.

In either case, given the sheer shortage of fourth generation aircraft in its fleet, the Gripen appears to make better sense assuming an envisioned expansion of the fleet beyond the 36 aircraft in question.

Between the Rafale and Super Hornet, the SH will probably work out to be a lot cheaper. However, unlike the Rafale its going out of production soon and follow-on orders will stop being option after a point. On the other hand, once the F-35 is in production, I wouldn’t totally discount the possibility of ex-USN or ex-RAAF SHs becoming available somewhere down the line.

5G fighter is too big a project that these pods and weopons are very minor things. so you have to assume they are going to develop almost every thing. otherwise Ktrv cannot increase production increase by 5 fold with current weopons.

I don’t have to do anything of the sort.

Russia is too rich for that kind of small money at this point. infact Russia selling fighers at this point is political favor to that country.

I know. Its pitiful how the Americans are scrambling around to sell their F-35s, just to keep their industry afloat.

I’ll go one further…..As many have said forget the 50/50 Development with Russia on the PAK-FA. Instead customize the Indian PAK-FA along the lines of the Su-30MKI. Then cancel the Rafale (MMRCA) and instead purchase the F-35. Which, I believe could also be customized along the lines of the Su-30MKI/PAK-FA. Then India would have two Stealth Fighter from both the EAST and the WEST. (Hi/Low Mix) Which, would be bending over backwards to provide the best possible deal for India. Then after having both in service. India would be in the best position to determined which company it would want to jointly develop a 6th Generation Fighter with in another 10-15 years.

It did in fact cross my mind. The Rafale’s potential induction now well overlaps the arrival of the F-35 on the market. And F-35 does have capabilities that complement the PAK FA; the latter doesn’t offer anything similar to the EOTS-DAS or expect to field a comparably potent mix of munitions, but does have its strengths as an interceptor and air superiority fighter. Also, where the Russians are banking upon the PAKDA to cater to their strike requirements, India may be left with a capability shortfall.

But this again raises the question – what’s the optimal mix of hi-to-low fighters? In the case of the F-15/F-16 we saw a ratio of about 1:4 for both the USAF and IsAF. Originally, the USAF had a similar plan for the F-22/F-35 but actually be operating them in ratio closer to 1:13. In the PLAAF on the other hand, I’d imagine the J-20/J-31 ratio would be a lot less skewed (though this case I’m not sure if the J-20 is an air superiority fighter in the first place).

Point is, this determination as far as the IAF’s requirements are concerned can only made after a professional comparative evaluation of both aircraft.

Vnomad, TR1’s right, in the absence of any firm data on costing- it’s best to wait. However, I’ll try to simplify the above.

The ‘Angry Indian’ provided a number of $200m [144/$30bn], using numbers from the recent AW&ST article claimed an IAF procurement of 200 [200/$30bn] gives $150m per plane. This number is known as the Programme Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC). As a comparison the F-22’s PAUC is $369.5m (for 179 planes). So given the IAF gets an F-22 competitor and a similar quantity to the USAF, then a PAUC of $200m is a *good deal* ($150m for 200 units- even better!).

This may be a reason HAL was prepared to surrender a chunk of its workshare, as it probably felt building and upgrading indigenous production infrastructure and tooling was an unnecessary additional cost. The IAF didn’t see it that way. JMTs.

But this turns around and brings us back to what I was originally saying. I think we can both agree that ‘joint development’ on the PAKFA/FGFA is not going to happen (and was probably never viable in the first place). The PAK FA is going to remain a Russian aircraft to last bolt, minus perhaps some minor customization for foreign customers.

This being the case, India has little to lose (and possibly a lot to gain) by opting for a competitive evaluation against the F-35. Were you in the shoes of the Indian MoD/IAF brass, would you do differently given the facts?

The problem for the Russians is how to persuade the Indians to accept this PAUC, for such little workshare or ToT, let’s see in mid-November their attempts to sweeten the deal. If they bought @ FMS rates it still gonna be well over $100mn per unit even as economies of scale kick in (the F-22’s ‘fly-away’ unit cost is $185.7mn). Either way $200mn PAUC for an F-22 class fighter is not great, but not bad and I don’t see LM’s team dusting down their suitcases to head for Delhi if the Russkies can keep the PAUC at between $150-$200mn- this is why a clamour for Indian withdrawal from the project has not been heard, aside from angry Indians on fora, of course.

*http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31673.pdf

Could you repeat the middle part of your post? Its a little jumbled so not very easy to get a handle on. From what I understood (and please correct me if I’m wrong), the 50-50 involvement by the Indians pertains not to the R&D phase (which is well underway) but the total procurement cost of $60 billion ($20B of which is for R&D), the Indian contribution being $30 billion. But the Russians will have to convince India to settle for ‘little workshare or ToT’.

Even assuming that the conditions were ripe for it, where would you expect to see a clamour for Indian withdrawal? The man on the street’s never heard of the PAKFA and media hasn’t taken it up thanks to opacity surrounding the deal and its ‘still under negotiation’ status.

As for the Indian govt and IAF, why would they have announced (what amounts to a symbolic) cut in the PAKFA acquisition estimates if they were completely satisfied with the direction the talks were taking? Its an aircraft to be delivered post 2020, that is to say, there are no budget savings that be achieved today by downsizing those projected numbers, especially given that the difference can easily be made up by supplementary orders.