VnomadThe most important question to be asked in the Korean theatre is basically to the Japanese and the South Koreans, and that is —–> Are they ready to die to keep America safe.
A second Korean war would be as bloody as the first, if not more. But unlike the first, the second Korean war is likely to bring to the table a real possibility of the bully getting punched in face (read continental US). This is what has unsettled the muricans and the hawks inside murica would love to fight to the last Korean and Japanese to keep continental America safe, but is that what the Japanese and Koreans want? I guess not.
Its a damned outrage that the US got involved in the Korean conflict in the first place. If they hadn’t come in blundering with their neo-imperialistic arrogance, all of Korea might have had an opportunity to experience the joys of living under the guidance of the people’s Dear Leader Kim-il-sung and his equally wise successors.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a genuine workers’ state in which all the people are completely liberated from exploitation and oppression. The workers, peasants, soldiers and intellectuals are the true masters of their destiny and are in a unique position to defend their interests. – http://www.korea-dpr.com/
VnomadI don’t think so. Even with stealth and PGMs around the corner, against WP forces, low level attack would have remained a valid tactic. Unless you think the end of the SU should have been taken in account in the late 60s but that would have made a lot of weapon systems pointless. Not to forget also, if the cold war had continued, the need to replace Tornados would have come up much sooner, i.e. a replacement would be in service right now and Tornado would be obsolete by default.
Sorry, missed your post there.
Well the Tornado was conceived in the 60s but entered service in 1981 and probably achieved FOC around 1984-85. It was pressed into combat, just 6 years later i.e. 1991.
PBS Frontline Oral History – Gen. Chuck Horner
Q: What happened to people who flew low in Vietnam?
Horner: I was on a mission in Vietnam, we went in at low altitude, it was the first SAM strike in history, it was July 26th 1965 – we lost eight airplanes. I learned a lesson that day the hard way .. not only did we lose a bunch of airplanes but we had a bunch of airplanes shot up that came back and the holes, because the airplanes were flying solo, the holes were in the top of the airplane, the bullets going off, shells exploding in the air, punching holes in the top of the airplane. I came away with the conclusion that low level was a non-starter, it just didn’t make any sense, and if you think about it, where are most of the defences, most of the defences are people with guns and there’s a lot of guns on the battlefield – you don’t want to go low altitude, you’re giving everybody a shot. The reason people don’t want to go at high altitude where they’re out of sight of the guy with the gun is they’re worried about the surface to air missile, they’re worried about the enemy interceptor. Well, what you do is you take care of those right off the bat, with electronic counter-measures, support aircraft and fighters, loud weasels and ……… missiles, you have an air campaign that makes sense, then you don’t have to fly in the guns, that’s why I was against low altitude is because you lose airplanes needlessly.Q: You let your guys fly low on the first night.
Horner: What happened is I ordered the Air Force guys that they could not go low level unless they could justify it. Two of the wing commanders came to me and pleaded their case, the 111s and the F15E guys. When you think about it, it’s a two-seat airplane where half the crew is dedicated towards navigating to the target – I think that had something to sway their opinion, they didn’t know it, but they were receiving the word from their crews they had to fly at low altitude. Both of those systems immediately got out of the low altitude environment after they saw all the bullets going past the canopies.Q: After the first night, when it came to low flying with the United States Air Force, what happened?
Horner: After the first night, the airplanes that went in at low altitude learned the lesson very quickly and we saw them for the most part come up out of the low altitude environment .. yeah, they might have flown around at low altitude trying to evade radar, acquisition radars, but when they got near a target or near a defended area, they weren’t at low altitude.Q: Because hitting Iraqi targets at low altitude–just take me through it.
Horner: Okay. When you fly at low altitude, you make yourself available to everybody with a gun and a shoulder fired infrared SAM. If you’re at medium altitude they can’t see you, they can hear you, they can know where you are, but they can’t see you enough to shoot. Also the triple A has to predict where you are by the time of flight, if you’re very close the time of flight of the bullet is very quick so they don’t have to lead you very much, but a high altitude aircraft, when you have a large calibre anti-aircraft gun, it has to figure out where you’re going to be way out in time, the time of flight of the bullet, so if you just continue to move they can’t do it, you defeat the guns.Q: What do you think of the courage of pilots who have to fly down a runway in 30 seconds in a straight line?
Horner: There’s no doubt about it, probably the bravest pilots in the Gulf War were the R.A.F. They had a munition, the JB 233, which had to be delivered at very low altitude and had to be delivered as they flew down the runway. Those airfields were heavily defended targets. I think it showed up in the losses, they took a lot of losses. Now maybe it wasn’t from JB 233s, maybe it wasn’t just from low level, but there’s no doubt about it, their loss rate was like ten times with some of the other systems. They changed all that, Bill Ratton came in and says we’re not going to do this any more, he got ’em up at medium altitude, got Paddy Hine to send some Buccaneers down with the laser guided …laser designated kits, and the Tornados did good work at medium altitude.
Q: How concerned were you about the level of casualties the Brits were taking?
Horner: I was very concerned about all aircraft losses and the fact that the Tornados were experiencing a higher loss rate than anybody else was personally disturbing to both me and Bill Ratton, the RAF commander.Q: Was it fairly clear to you what was causing the loss of them?
Horner: I don’t think there’s any doubt about it, the Tornado losses were in part due to the low altitude tactics.Q: Were you relieved when they stopped flying at low altitude?
Horner: I think one of the things that helped work the problem is that Bill Ratton finally got ’em up out of the low altitude structure and got some capability to drop laser guided bombs from medium altitude and I think that solved the problem, I think they only lost one airplane after that.Q: But, you stopped the United States Air Force flying low after the first night, the Brits carried on for many nights after that, what do you feel about that?
Horner: When the British were taking their losses early in the low altitude, I guess it would have been easy enough for me to say something to somebody about that, because I would have if they’d been United States Air Force, but on the other hand, in order to hold the trust of all the allies, you have to respect the allies, and so it was up to them to fight their forces as they saw fit. All I wanted to do is make sure we were working as a team and so it was really up to Bill Ratton to do what needed to be done and he did it.
PBS Frontline Oral History – Lt. Gen. Sir Peter de la Billiere
Q: That story of the first night, the Tornado pilots and people. Can you tell me the story of what happened from your perspective?
Billiere: Yes. I was deeply concerned that we were losing proportionately far more than anybody else and the first thing I did was to say why? And it was actually fairly obvious why, when you talked to the air crew. When you analysed the flight reports. When you talked to my extremely able and experienced deputy commander, and really responsible for running the air war, British part of the air war.
And that was, we were flying low level. And whatever reasons may have been given after the war, the reason those aircraft crashed was because they were flying low level. For one reason or another. It may have been they flew into the ground, it may have been they were hit by flak. Maybe they were avoiding flak. But they were flying low level.
And so, one said, well is this necessary? Is this a sensible thing to do? And the answer was, no it isn’t necessary, it’s not a sensible thing to do. And I don’t want to go on doing it.
Q: Were you saying this to Bill Wratten? Were you saying to Paddy Hine?
Billiere: Yes, I said it to Bill Wratten. And Paddy Hine came out and visited within 24 hours. And we sat round a table and discussed the matter. I mean, we all agreed that it was not an acceptable way to continue with the war. And that the RAF had got to go medium level and if that meant a deterioration in the accuracy of their bombing, well so be it. The first thing was to stop this loss of aircraft and loss of life.Q: Do you think that the missions itself, the original JBG233 missions were well conceived? Were they against the right targets? These airfields were huge.
Billiere: We were locked into JBG233. It was all we had. Apart from iron bombs dating back to the last world war, pattern bombing. And for a very good reason. That was the philosophy for fighting in Europe and that was where the British taxpayer had been spending their money in defence to fight the European war. And this system had been developed for Europe.It wasn’t right for the Gulf War and it was very quickly apparent that it wasn’t right and it should in my view have been dropped at an earlier stage than it was dropped. But it didn’t mean to say that the system was wrong for Europe, for which it had been developed.
Q: But in the Gulf should it ever have been deployed at all?
Billiere: Yes. Because it wasn’t until we’d used it in its early stages. And remember that the RAF had spent 15 years developing this system, training their pilots. Developing tactics. It would have been equally crazy to have changed that overnight without trying it out. And we did try it out and it didn’t work because the runways were made differently to the way they were made in Europe. And, because actually the Americans had so decimated the Iraqi air defence capability, that it wasn’t necessary to put the runways out of action.Q: Why did it take so long to take the decision to go up to medium altitude and what did you think about it?
Billiere: The reason why it took so long to change the tactics, is because first of all it was a decision of substantial magnitude. It was going to impact on the whole of the RAF’s strategy as developed for Europe and put it into question. And as a result of that there was a great reluctance in the MoD for it to change. And we weren’t allowed to change it.The commanders on the spot were forbidden to change it. And indeed, I saw a letter from a senior Air Force officer in the Ministry of Defence saying in effect, that if we changed it, then my air commander wasn’t doing his job. I’ve never seen such a disgraceful letter in my life.
My air commander was an extremely fine commander, Bill Wratten. He was deeply concerned about his men’s lives and yet he was put in a position really, of whatever decision he took it was going to be wrong. If he went on conducting these operations the way he was, then his job was threatened. If he didn’t go on with it, then people’s lives were being lost. And it was only when Paddy came out and we sat round a table, it was decided Paddy would go back to the Ministry of Defence and sort the thing out of this.
Well, I mean it was obvious they weren’t going to hit things with a degree of accuracy. You see, just let me give you an example of the way things change in defence. And this is a very general statement and I’m sure some technician will pull it to pieces in detail. But in the last war, you required 50 aircraft, 140 odd air crew to do the same destructive pinpoint damage that now requires 1 aircraft with 1 precision guided bomb.
We hadn’t got precision guided bombs at that stage. We’d got old World War II high level techniques for the reasons that we hadn’t developed that particular side of air war. For very good reasons. It wasn’t required in Europe, in our judgement.
And so it was inevitable that when we went up to a high altitude we were going to start missing things. And we were back into pattern bombing – dropping a lot of bombs and hoping that one of them would hit, rather than sending one bomb in knowing it would hit. And it wasn’t until we got a rather out-dated precision system that required another type of aircraft to help us deliver precision bombs, and those other aircraft were sent out. And then we were back in business, again.
Q: When the guys went up to medium altitudes, the higher altitudes, was any remark made to you by either Norman Schwarzkopf or Chuck Horner?
Billiere: No, they were clearly relieved. Chuck Horner did certainly speak to me and he said that he couldn’t see the justification for this low level delivery and he thought it was the cause of some of the casualties that the RAF suffered. And I would agree with him.
VnomadNew thread created –
VnomadYes as the EOTS in its current form is capable of hitting moving targets with an LGB that are, IIRC, moving less than 30-40 mph. However, that existed at 3i so I think bring_it_on is correct in thinking that the “improvement” deals with improved A2G radar modes.
That’s one of the improvements planned but I think it was referring to this –
F-35 drops PGM on a moving target using Block 3F software
The Joint Program Office (JPO) for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) has for the first time dropped a Raytheon GBU-12 Paveway II precision-guided munition (PGM) against a moving target using the aircraft’s Block 3F software.
The inert drop, which was announced on 20 April, took place at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake in California and involved a carrier-variant F-35C from the 461st ‘Deadly Jesters’ Flight Test Squadron (FTS) attacking a remotely controlled pick-up truck.
As noted by the US Air Force’s (USAF’s) 412th Test Wing, this event using the Block 3F (full combat capability) software is significant, as it incorporates new release ‘logic’ to reduce pilot workload and increase effectiveness against moving targets. This logic is called Lead Point Compute, and it evaluates the speed and direction of the target against the altitude and speed of the aircraft to determine the exact release point.
“[The pilot] doesn’t have to think about how fast the target’s going, or what direction,” Collin O’Fallon, an engineer attached to the 461st FTS for the test, was quoted as saying. “By him using this [Block] 3F capability, it’s doing all the weaponeering for him. That’s really the big thing, it’s a single-seat fighter. He’s got to do it all, so we want to do as much for him as we can.”
The 500 lb GBU-12 has now been dropped from every F-35 variant, though previous tests involved earlier aircraft software blocks. “This was really a test of the aircraft targeting system and associated [Block 3F] weaponeering logic, and the results of this test will be used to certify this capability with a GBU-12 on the F-35.” O’Fallon said.
With the F-35 currently fitted with the Block 3i (initial full capability) software, Block 3F is due to be rolled out in May 2018.
Also, GBU-49 capability is expected to be released in the Block 3F schedule.
VnomadOk, last about Tornado.
What is supposed to be the other airplane (or have you forgot the S) that thrived instead? Su-30 maybe?
Certainly not the F-15E that is actually been produced in less than 500 planes until now against the 827 IDS and ECR.
The Su-30 sure but I was obviously thinking about the F-15E.
As for the orders, I suppose that’s one way to look at it. Another might be to see how many were retained and how many retired.
Tornado – 1000 ordered (800 ECR/IDS + 200 ADV). 300 still serving. Retirements started in 2004.
F-15E – 550 ordered. 450 in service. 100 in-production. Scheduled for retirement starting post-2040 (USAF).
One of them is more versatile and will clearly live longer.
And anachronistic is not at all an equivalent of obsolete.
Which explains why I used the term ‘anachronistic’ and not ‘obsolete’.
Actually, also Tornado has been modernized and can be utilized in the same way all modern so called multirole fighters (F-15E included even if I have never considered it to be such) are but with a way better range and sortie generation rate than any of them + can perform tactical recon and in the ECR version, autonomous SEAD missions at a level USAF actually lack (and sorely miss) from the retirement of the specialized RF-4 and F-4G versions of the multirole Phantom.
And i’m sure those capabilities are more widely used even now that the supposed A2A capability has been, actually are and will be used in the future.
The F-15E is the most capable bomb truck in the USAF inventory (not counting dedicated bombers) – great payload, long range (and capable of flying nap-of-the-earth if required, bumpy as it may be). And with the powerful APG-82 and flight performance similar (though not equivalent) to the F-15C, its air-to-air potential is not in doubt. The TEWS’s a little long in the tooth but with the EPAWSS rolling out, should be cutting edge again (or at least close to it). All packed into one single airframe (not in three discrete ones). That’s a multi-role aircraft by any stretch of the imagination.
It matches the Tornado for range with CFTs. As for the latter’s superior sortie generation – first I’m hearing about it.
Vnomad“improved”? It existed?
Yes. With pilot input.
VnomadPackage Q or Sebia did not render the concept obsolete. Deep low level penetration can still be useful (albeit ot for mass effects, i agree).
If you have an adversary with good mid-level/high-level air defences and porous low level defences, then sure. That’s rarely the case however and, where gaps are present and identifiable, its usually safer to exploit them with cruise weapons.
VnomadNow you’re criticizing the mission, not the aircraft. The rest is debatable.
No that was the very crux of the point with respect to Tornado replacement. That the Tornado was rendered an anachronism by PGMs and the danger from low-level air defences. And that the considerations that went into the Tornado don’t apply to its replacement, there being no real ‘Tornado role’.
The EF might suffice (with certain minor upgrades), the F-35 would be ideal. At least from a technical standpoint.
Compared to the F-105? The F-105 is bad. Tornado can probably hold its own at low level against F-4s. But it’s a moot point as the F-4 is not suited well for low level strike. Its range sucks. Before Tornado the Germans used F-104s for that role, outranging the Phantoms easily (an early F-15A vs. F-16A case )
Again, now you’re saying the mission is not required? Well, that’s something completely different than criticizing the aircraft that excels in it. And the mission was important back in the days. Yes, it might not exist anymore today, but that doesn’t make Tornado a bad aircraft.
Never called it a ‘bad aircraft’. That implies poor engineering or design flaws which is certainly not the case.
Sometimes I feel Tornado is a very misunderstood aircraft and concept. Again: It’s main role was low level nuclear strike into WP countries. A role it was designed around and a role it fulfilled very well.
Not misunderstood just rendered obsolete (the concept not the aircraft) very soon while other aircraft (same class, different concept) thrived. Much like the 1957 Sandys Paper, had the ASR drafters known then what is known now, the Tornado would not have come into existence.
VnomadThe F-15E doesnt have the low-level penetration capability of the Tornado. Its low wing loading makes for a rough and bumpy ride at low level. The Tornado, however, excels in that role.
That was important back when you needed a stable platform to employ unguided projectiles with sufficient accuracy. Today.. meh.
VnomadTornado was tasked with shutting down airfields. More than likely any other system would have suffered similar losses. Those were the highest risk missions.
Attack radar sites with HARMs and take down AAA & SRSAMs with PGMs from standoff ranges. The coalition suffered far more from the Tornado missions than any damage the Iraqi fighters operating from those bases could have done.
The F-105 did not engage in A/A missions but defended itself when attacked. Tornado has guns and Sidewinders for the same reason.
Not sure the Tornado’s maneuverability compares but alright. Still leaves the F-4.
The F-15E can’t deliver a tactical nuke several hundred miles into WP territory flying at tree top level, not with the same efficacy. And not before 1990. The F-111 could however.
Doesn’t need to. And wouldn’t want to. The F-111’s been retired for years. Its not missed.
VnomadGuided weapon is a thing PGM as the sole form of air dropped weapon (almost when it came to Nato ) is just another, even in the first gulf war i.e. more than ten years after Tornado introduction all the coalition partners used mainly free fall bombs. Jdams were introduced in 1997 so it was 18 years after that the shift passed from very low range penetration to high quote drop in order to avoid Manpads, AAA and Shorar missiles.
The Tornado was tasked with low level penetration missions less than 10 years after its induction. The outcome was.. not inspiring.
Also for the term Multirole we have to made a distinction there between the nomenclature and the real capabilities, the Vietnam war has seen the use of a whole range of attack aircrafts, starting by the prop engined A-1 to the F-111 passing trough all century series in all the A- USN planes.
And if someone cite the F-105 as the example of a multirole plane then my Granpa can be classified as an helicopter as we use to say there.
Tornado itself is classified as a MRCA multirole combat plane but at difference of the Thud it almost partially delivered it, given that he has taken the role of a whole plethora of different types of Attack planes and/or specialized planes like as an example the RF- versions of the Phantom that were in service in our own airforces at the time (and also in this we did’t fall for it completely as the successive introduction of the AMX would prove).
The F-105 & F-4 engaged in both air combat and strike missions, something the Tornado is incapable of AFAIK.
Putting a label of multirole on a plane doesn’t mean that it can cover all the possible roles with the same efficacy of a specialized plane.
The F-15E can perform all the Tornado’s functions with the same or better efficacy, no problem. And then do plenty more besides. It is however a marginally newer plane, I’ll concede.
VnomadSeemsme that in this case you are screwing up dates : Tornado entered service in 1979 so no PGM there and also about the multirole label maybe just the F-16 (whose A2G capabilities were, almost in the first versions, leagues behind the one the European plane) be considered so at the time .
PGMs had entered use by the middle stage of the Vietnam war (~1968), both laser & TV guided types, and were in wide use by the end (1973).
To the other point, while the ‘multi-role’ nomenclature may be a relatively recent invention, the idea of multirole aircraft long predates the F-16. Notable ‘fighter-bombers’ from the 60s & 70s include the F-105 and the still serving F-4.
In any case, the point wasn’t about what the design requirements of the Tornado should have been, its about what was finally delivered and its relevance to the modern battlefield. The so-called ‘Tornado-role’ hasn’t existed for a very long time. Most mid-to-large sized fighter jets should be able to perform the full gamut of combat operations from air superiority & strike to SEAD & ALCM-delivery.
VnomadUkraine has 80 Mig 29’s. Uzbekistan has 60. Iran has 40. Kzakistan has 40. North Korea 31. Burma 31
There are tons of them out there operating. The theory going around that they are dying on the vine and that there will never be a market for the Mig 35 is just bunk. Most of these air forces will do the practical thing and buy a replacement that all of their infrastructure is built around.
Ukraine, Uzbekistan & Kazakhstan inherited their MiGs from the Soviet Union. The state of Korean aircraft is open to question.
They’re not dying on the vine but buyers haven’t exactly been lining up for more, including the ones who already operate them (like Malaysia & India). Ironically, its prospects on the export market have gouged away by its successful larger cousins (Su-27 & Su-30s). The Su-30 probably has a better claim to being the F-16 of the non-Western world, despite its size.
VnomadWhen people say Tornado replacement, to my mind it suggests the need to replace certain capabilities the Tornado was being used for, rather than replacing a certain number of airframes allocated to the Tornado force.
I see it as a priority replacement of those airframes with perhaps a minor LR-strike consideration.
In some ways, I think the debate is skewed by the nature of the aircraft itself. The Tornado has always been an anachronism. A non-multirole aircraft in a multirole era. A low-level strike optimized design, in the PGM era.
The considerations that went into the Tornado should not apply to its successor. For a fighter expected to be in service for over 40 years, the requirements should beyond whether it can carry a particular missile (not that there’s any problem in equipping the F-35A with the Taurus – should also interest the Koreans & Spanish).
VnomadYes I think its 4500 pounds including fuel. “Also must perform STOVL vertical landing with two 1000# JDAMs and two internal AIM-120s, full expendables, and fuel to fly the STOVL Recovery profile.” (from Dec 16 SAR) That’s about 2700 lbs of weapons – which is less than a single Storm Shadow plus pylon.
AFAIK its 4500 lbs plus fuel. 5000 lbs in total. 2 JDAMs and 2 Aim-120s is the minimum payload required to be recovered, not the maximum load than can actually be recovered.
Also, the SVRL recovery profile allows RAF/RN fighters to recover with an additional 4000 lbs of payload. For a total of 9000 lb of recoverable payload. Two Storm Shadows would weigh 5,800 lbs. Leaving 3,200 lbs for pylons, missiles & fuel.
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