How will the US react to a F-16 user taking on another F-16 user?

Not necessarily an unforeseen possibility. Greece-Turkey. Turkey-Israel. Israel-Egypt.

JSR has a point

A rather effective way of undermining one’s own argument. :dev2:

This variant was (probably) the one that was offered to India by GB to RG in the late 80s for local production, but the PM/Govt politely refused due to the investment needed for setting up yet another (after Jaguar/MiG-27) production line (and also due to the other lobbies against it) and ‘wisely’ endorsed the import option, when needed, as cheaper. This missed opportunity cost dearly when the spares and support started affecting due to the crisis. We Indians do not have the habit of stocking up spares (untill recently) unless the OEM forces it upon us for reasons of business, maintainability and keeping/retaining brand name high.
Russians do not follow this practice (like their US counterparts) and that has been one of the reasons why mostly the brand name gets affected. If they had followed the same strict procedure of making the operator of their a/c buy/order and stock up the spares for the 5-10 year service of the fleet, most of the problem associated with low availability (due to lack of spares) will vanish. This has what affected the MiG-29s in the Indian service as well, particularly in the early 90s. If there was enough (medium-long term) spares already arranged for the fleet for 5-10 years during the initial deal, most of the problems that IAF faced in the early 90s w.r.t MiG-29s could have been avoided.

The IAF’s problems with the MiG-29 went far beyond just lack of spares stocked.

The Indian Air Force MiG-29 Experience:

The Comptroller and Auditor General of India published on 31 March 1993 the results of an in depth study on the operational performance and reliability of the MiG-29 aircraft. This study was first reported in Aviation Week & Space Technology during 25July1994 (pg.49), and has been obtained by author from Mr. Pushpindar Singh, of the Society of Aerospace Studies, New Delhi.

65 x MiG-29 single-seat and 5 x dual-seat trainers with 48 x spare engines (sparing factor of 0.7/aircraft) were delivered between 1986 and 1990 at a total program cost of approximately $600 million that included initial spares and support. These aircraft were the first MiG-29’s to ever leave the Soviet Union and were not up to the weapons system standard of those that went later to the Warsaw Pact allies. The aircraft were sent disassembled by sea, and re-assembled, and test flown in India. By 1990 three squadrons were operational. Two Flight Data Ground Processing Units were included to help pilots debrief their utilization of flight controls and systems. Expectations were that single-seat aircraft would fly 15 hours per month (180 hrs/yr) and dual-seat aircraft 20 hours per month (240 hrs/yr).

There were extensive problems encountered in operational and maintenance due to the large number of pre-mature failures of engines, components, and systems. Of the total of 189 engines in service, 139 engines (74%) failed pre-maturely and had been withdraw from service by July 1992, thus effectively shutting down operations. 62 of these engines had not even accomplished 50% of their 300 hours first overhaul point. Thus the desired serviceability showed a steadily decreasing trend.

Engineering reports mainly attribute RD-33 failures to design/material deficiencies causing discolored engine oil (8), cracks in the nozzle guide vanes (31), and surprisingly, foreign object damage (FOD). The eight material deficient engines (discolored oil) were repaired by the contractor under warrantee provisions, but the engines had to be recycled to the manufacturer. The thirty-one engines with cracks in their nozzle guide vanes were fixed in the field by contractor teams and adjustments were made to the entire engine fleet. But even though the incidents reduced the occurrences of the cracks, they continued. But the FOD situation is the most interesting, especially after the inlet FOD doors received world press coverage, but there were other concerns about production quality control that led to problems.

Since the Indian Air Force received early model Fulcrum A’s, some just after the 200th production article, there were quality control deficiencies that resulted in numerous pieces of FOD (foreign object damage) and tools being left behind after final construction inside of the aircraft. Remember that the Fulcrum skeleton is made first and then the skin is riveted over top, in the way aircraft were made in the fifties and sixties in the West. Nuts, bolts, tools, etc. all made their way to the engine bays and inlet ducts and when they were loosened up after accelerations they damaged engines and equipment.

On top of all this, it was discovered that the unique FOD doors on the MiG-29’s inlets were not stopping material from getting into the engine ducts. Since the doors retracted “up” into the inlet, debris that was kicked up by the nose wheel lodged on or at the bottom of the door seal and then was ingested into the engine when the door opened during the nose gear lifted off the ground during takeoff.

This problem was known from the earliest days. After the first four MiG-29 prototypes were evaluated, the nose gear was moved further back, but nose wheel “mud-flaps” or guards were still required to protect the engine from flying debris. It took until 1988 before all delivered aircraft were so equipped, therefore the initial batch of IAF aircraft had to be locally retro-fitted with mud guards and that activity was not completed until June 1992. All costs were supposed to be re-imbursed by the contractor but Mikoyan reneged and left the IAF with $300,000 in liabilities. In subsequent MiG-29K/M models the FOD doors were replaced by screens that closed “down”, forcing any debris out of the louvers repositioned to the lower side of the inlet duct..

The Indian Air Force procurement contract was concluded in September 1986, and the first engine was expected to go into overhaul in 1989. However, four engines prematurely came up for overhaul and no repair facility had been prepared. As time went on, 115 of the 122 engines (94%) prematurely failed and had to be re-cycled through engine depots in Russia at great cost. Backlogs were created and only 79 (65%) engines returned on schedule. Even when a regional Indian repair facility was completed in August 1994, the high failure rates continued and the majority of broken engines had to be sent back to Russian depots. Self-sufficiency was achieved in 1994, only after the operations tempo was significantly reduced on a permanent basis. In the process of refurbishing failed engines, the total technical life of most of the engine fleet was effectively reduced from 800 hours / 8 years to 400 hours / 4 years, at a minimum.

Non-availability of radar and weapon system components also resulted in the grounding of seven aircraft for a period of six to twenty months. Two may have been damaged for life due to cannibalization. Besides this, a large number of subsystems and computers experienced unpredicted failures in the last four years which adversely effected the operational readiness of the squadrons. Some of the computers were field-repaired by specialists from the manufacturers, others were replaced. These repair costs were all in excess to the initial contract costs. It was noted that the 10 additional computers, which were imported, cost the IAF around $806,000. Two Flight Data Ground Processing Units quickly became unserviceable during their warranty period and have been lying un-utilized and un-repaired for over two years.

The IAF Headquarters also noted in March 1991 report that a severe shortage of product support equipment had resulted in the decline of fleet availability by 15-20%, which in turn, took negative effect on operational readiness and mission requirements.

So in general, lessons learned from this first out-of-country operation of a Russian front line fighter were:

1. The MiG-29 had intensive problems in operation and maintenance since its induction due to premature failure of engines, components, and systems. 74% of the engines failed within five years, were out of supply pipeline for three years, and reduced aircraft availability by 15, to 20%. This led to a decision to restrict flying efforts and therefore compromised operational and training commitments.

2. There were significant shortfalls in the performance of the MiG-29 fleet resulting in operational and training inadequacies. The shortfall ranged from 20 to 65% in respect to combat aircraft availability and 58 to 84% in trainers between 1987 – 1991.

3. There was a mismatch between induction of the aircraft (1987) and the establishment of its repair facilities (end of 1994). Until that time engines had to be continually sent to manufacturers abroad at great monetary cost, reduction of one-half total life, and a significant stretch of schedule.

4. Non-availability of critical radar components and spares resulted in the grounding of significant numbers of aircraft. Five aircraft were out of action for over six months while two were in the hanger for over two years. Unserviceability of computers and the inability to fix them cost excessive amounts of money to rectify.

5. The pilot debrief Ground Data Processing Unit, imported at high cost, was left lying around unserviceable and unused since its reception in August 1990.

6. The lack of nose wheel mud guards had to be solved by importing upgrade kits and expensive local re-design after material deficiencies could not be overcome.

With a regional support capability in place (regardless of how tenuous it was) and having one of the few respectable MiG-29 operating legacies, the Indian aerospace companies, especially Hindistan Aeronautical Ltd. (HAL), and the IAF became natural partners for MAPO in consummating the sale of MiG-29’s to Malaysia. They were offered the opportunity to get involved with providing training and logistics support for the new Malaysian MiG-29 program. India, of course, gives greater credibility to MAPO in convincing customers that the MiG-29 is a viable fighter candidate for Pacific Rim nations. It remains to be seen, however, what solutions the new joint venture brings to the Indian Air Force problems.

The USAF is keeping its eagle and strike eagle fleet till 2040 so there is no reason to believe that the UK’s Typhoons that haven’t gone through as many deployment cycles will last even longer.

That’s what one would have ordinarily assumed. Trouble is, the Eurofighter, particularly the T1, due a combination of issues doesn’t appear to have anywhere near the Eagle’s shelf life.

The EF has a nominal airframe life of just 6000 hrs (though its makers say it’ll go past 8000 hrs under lighter usage). Then there are the recently discovered manufacturing defects could end up halving the airframe life of older aircraft and quite likely be a major impediment to life extension efforts. Plus the T1 software architecture also makes upgrading to T3 standards inordinately expensive (only the T2s are being upgraded AFAIK).

To top it all the RAF has been flogging its T1 hard. Really hard.

The UK has accumulated by far the highest number of flying hours with the Eurofighter, compared with partner nations Germany, Italy and Spain. Although the RAF has the largest fleet, it is also achieving a utilisation rate around double that of the other air forces.

“We are looking at about 30h per month on average for each of our airframes at the frontline, whereas the other nations fly at a maximum of about 15h per month per aircraft,” says Bushell.

– Link

That’s over 300 hrs annually!
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Given their size and economic profiles, it would be quite reasonable to expect the UK’s ideal fighter strength to be near identical to France i.e. ~225 fighter jets/Rafales (as per the latest White Paper). Ordinarily that would mean 160 Eurofighters + 65 F-35Bs. That’s about enough F-35s to fully equip both CVs (4 full squadrons at 75% availability).

The problem is with the 53 T1s in service. Initially they were expected to be retired by 2018. Right now the MoD is looking to push that further. Maybe till 2025. But beyond that its a very iffy proposition which leaves the RAF with a 50 aircraft deficit. Originally they expected all 138 F-35s to be of the ‘Bee’ model but given the disparity in costs, the F-35A is likely to be a more cost effective option while still enjoying extensive compatibility with the Bees.

Although these are MLU machines, they probably carry APG-66 v2, unlike PAF’s updated machines which have APG-68v9. Most of these already have 5-6k hours and if PAF wants to keep them in service for long, they’d need comprehensive SLEP type updating and modern avionics. PAF still has an option to go for 14 or so MLU kits including the latter radar, but taking into account the 13 ex-RJAF machines they recently purchased they may opt for two variants…at a greater operating cost.

You aren’t going to be able to flog a Blk 15/20 machine past 8000 hrs without significant compromises on safety. That said, the aircraft still have 2000 hrs of residual airframe life which expended at a moderate 150 hr/yr average would comfortably take the fleet to 2030 at which point they can be the first ones out to be replaced by the J-31.

Their radars are obsolescent but that issue can be mitigated by paired them up with (data-linked) APG-68 equipped fighters. Also if I’m not mistaken they’re also capable of employing the Sniper & JHMCS, so all in all they don’t require too much work. Most importantly it’ll allow the PAF’s to conserve airframe life of its more capable aircraft.

As more becomes known about the software, it seems that the F-35 might not be fully operationally ready until Block 4 is implemented. This Block may also see some key hardware changes, such as bringing the Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) up to a suitable standard. Block 4 should be ready early next decade. Buying F-35s before then might mean expensive upgrades before they even enter delivery flight-test. Unfortunately for the F-35, buying later is always cheaper and always brings a better standard aircraft.
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The choice between these two options is not easy but indicates the F-35/Super Hornet issue is more complex than it seems at first. Which is more sensible? More pragmatic? Some deep thinking is required.

Read more: http://navalinstitute.com.au/a-mixed-fighter-fleet-for-canada/

Total BS. The F-35 Blk 3 is superior in every way to the SH while coming in at a comparable if not substantially lower cost for an aircraft delivered in 2020.

The only reason this ‘mixed fleet’ is being considered is that the Liberal govt wants to weasel its way out of its pledge to hold a competition which would inevitably leave it with egg on its face.

This echoes what I have myself been thinking — short-term the F-35 is definitely meeting the requirements (however so will the SH) however longer-term the F-35 may struggle (as will the SH).

Is the F-35 out of synch with the rest of the world?

An overkill today (had it been fully operational) and inadequate 15-20 years from now, shortly after being fully introduced?

How are any of its competitors (including the SH) better positioned, in the present or in the future? What’s the rest of the world rolling out that will nullify the F-35’s advantages over the field?

The system they are talking about is Nebo-M , They are not part of S-400 package as S-400 has its own separate long range MFCR Radar and a different FC Radar but Nebo-M can also be integrated with S-400 system to provide Band Agility and Very Long Range Tracking ( 1500 km plus ) and off board guidance http://www.sdelanounas.ru/blogs/8384

Will run into basic physical limitations. Line of sight for an airborne target at 35,000 ft will be around 500 km. It’ll be able to provide early warning against conventional stealth aircraft within that range but beyond that it’ll serve primarily in an ABM role.