dark light

Vnomad

Forum Replies Created

Viewing 15 posts - 541 through 555 (of 2,429 total)
  • Author
    Posts
  • in reply to: Indian Air Force Thread 20 #2160918
    Vnomad
    Participant

    Yet again, missing the essentials. Modi did NOT choose Dassault. As Austin says, it was chosen before he was elected, through the ludicrously drawn-out process put in place years before his election. He failed to reject Dassault, which is not the same thing.

    It was NOT chosen for the deal in question. Nowhere in the RFP issued to the vendors was there any mention of a fall back off-the-shelf Plan B. And with the Rafale’s L1 status being suspect, there is no convincing evidence that EF couldn’t have made a better offer. Under this new ‘direct purchase’ model, the ASH & F-35 were/are also valid options.

    Sanctioning a gap-filler Rafale purchase was an entirely discretionary decision made by Modi, bypassing the MoD. And if a contract does end up being signed, the credit or blame (depending on how one views it) lies primarily with the PM.

    Yes, they’re failing to agree a price, but again, you’re still missing the point. The fact that they got to the point where Dassault was selected as the preferred supplier, supposedly with price being one of the factors, but agreement still couldn’t be reached & the original process was scrapped & replaced by an ad-hoc deal ordered from on high proves what I’m saying. You’re pretending that the only thing being discussed here is Modi’s Rafale deal. I can’t believe you really think that. The only reason that is even being negotiated is because the procurement system had already failed – & that’s consistently been the main topic of discussion here.

    I don’t who else you’ve been having a conversation with on what issue, but the discussion here was about the ongoing negotiations i.e. Modi’s Rafale deal.

    Please refer to Post #3819 & #3820.

    If you want to discuss the procurement process and have some actual ideas how to ought to be reformed, or can offer a critical analysis of the reforms introduced by Parrikar so far, we can certainly (and separately) discuss that.

    “No deal is better than a bad deal” applies when the deal is unimportant. If you need to eat, it’s better to overpay, or get food you’d not choose normally, rather than starve. If your national security is at stake, the same applies. Second best is infinitely better than nothing. It’s not the difference between a large profit & a slightly smaller profit. You’re making a category error.

    If you want to buy a large number of first line combat aircraft from anyone you can dictate terms, up to a point – unless you buy from the USA via FMS, in which case you have to accept FMS terms. . Doh! The flaw in that logic is obvious.

    First of all, I don’t think a squadron of Su-30MKIs annually is ‘nothing’. Same for a similar number of Tejas from 2018.

    Second, the assumption in this argument is that the other investments being made (incl. SAMs, radars, artillery, AFVs, transports etc) are relatively unimportant or at least a lot less important.

    The FMS’ utility lies in its transparency and procedural efficiency both of which lend itself to (on average) faster acquisitions. The process itself does not make US weapons & equipment more competitive on price. That would be a result of smaller Europeans budgets split over multiple overlapping programs often producing only niche quantities. (Airbus being a notable exception.)

    Both the Rafale and Eurofighter offer relatively poor value-for-money and if delaying the procurement another two years results in a better deal (for an aircraft that will be in service well past 2050) its worth it.

    1.You seem to be suggesting that India should buy all its military imports from the USA via FMS

    2. You seem to be saying that failure doesn’t matter, no need to address problems, all will be well. Not sensible.

    3. It looks to me as if you’re saying “We can buy when discipline is imposed on us by the seller, so there’s nothing wrong with our procurement system”

    4. And while arguing that there’s nothing wrong with the Indian procurement system…

    I believe all of the above would come under the category of “creative writing”. If you’ve decided to argue both sides of a debate, go right ahead but please don’t use me as a placeholder.

    in reply to: Indian Air Force Thread 20 #2161186
    Vnomad
    Participant

    Rafale was the winner of MMRCA contest which the IAF chose on merits among all the contender , The BJP came and then trimmed the deal to 36 because they figured out they cannot afford to buy the 126 type , The MMRCA selection itself was a very long drawn and the Government kept delaying it for some reason to sign the deal.

    The field trials established that the Rafale was technically superior to the F-16E/F, SH Blk II & MiG-35 (the Gripen E was rejected mostly on basis of its immaturity). Hardly a big revelation.

    And it was scrapped for two reasons. One, the Rafale’s L1 status was dubious (I’d be happy to post the links again if you want). Two, cost estimates were upwards of $25 bn, a crippling figure.

    So Modi did not choose Dassult it was already a winner when he came into the picture , He just reduced the number to suite his budget ……To say Modi had some how went for Dassult and MOD or IAF are some separate entity is a fallacy , They are part of GOI that Modi leads hence any decision of cabinet is collective responsibility.

    ‘Winner’ of what exactly? A technical evaluation that was 5 years out of date? Or an deeply flawed bidding process that has little relation to the costs of an off-the-shelf purchase? The decision to buy these aircraft was made by Modi not by the MoD or IAF, both of which are separate entities from the PMO.

    MOD has been stating that they might look to purchase additional 126 fighter of another type beyond the 36 Rafale , that could be Rafale or some other type

    The Rafale deal like many other Defence Procurement in India just shows how badly managed Indian Defence Procurement system is , Virtually all the deal gets delayed and some like Agusta are now caught in corruption.

    Except that the Rafale deal (the current one) wasn’t conceived by the procurement system, it was a political purchase. Which is also why EF Gmbh wasn’t asked to offer up a competing proposal.

    in reply to: Indian Air Force Thread 20 #2161198
    Vnomad
    Participant
    in reply to: Indian Air Force Thread 20 #2161201
    Vnomad
    Participant

    Not at all. You’re not paying attention. That’s a minor detail.

    What I’m saying is that taking 15 years to fail to buy aircraft can’t be due to the vendors. If Dassault refused to be reasonable, it should have been thrown out four years ago. But think about that date. It was selected in January 2012, after a process that had lasted ten years at that point. The fact that it had taken so long to get that far is a condemnation of the system. And the fact that there was still so much latitude in the terms that agreement could not be reached is another condemnation.

    The MMRCA deal was terminated last year. The MoU for this entirely different deal was signed by Modi in April 2015 i.e 13 months ago. And its NOT stuck in bureaucratic red tape, its (apparently) stuck because they can’t agree on a mutually acceptable price.

    If it was all the fault of Dassault or France, then it should never have reached that point. Why is this so hard to understand? Sellers were queuing up. Who chose Dassault? If there were conditions that Dassault refused to accept & which were non-negotiable, how did it get that far? Would other vendors have accepted them? If not, clearly the terms were wrong. If others would accept them but not Dassault, how did the system allow Rafale to be selected? Big fail!

    Who chose Dassault? Modi chose Dassault. And yes it was a mistake, he should have left the entire business to his defence minister to manage.

    FMS from the USA is pretty much a take it or leave it system, in very many respects. If India is happy to buy on terms similar to FMS (as close as is possible without the US structures which support it), it can simply require bidders to offer such terms from the start. If they don’t sign up, the bids can be rejected immediately. And note that India has failed to buy aircraft it wanted from the USA, through FMS, entirely because of Indian administrative failures.

    India has bought roughly $14 billion dollars of military equipment from the US so far, most of it through the FMS channel. While European states can offer govt-to-govt deals these are entirely through ad hoc procedures none of which offer a comparable level of transparency (not least because most defence contractors are partially state owned).

    The basic point here is that as long as it meets the minimum technical requirements, then anything is better than nothing – & so far the IAF has nothing.

    Its not exactly rainwater harvesting. All of these acquisitions are being paid for with hard cash. And if a deal hasn’t been signed the money doesn’t evaporate. And there’s no shortage of avenues to productively invest it in (even within the defence sector). Signing a bad deal is NOT better than signing nothing.

    And (just my opinion) buying a Rafale at F-35 prices is most definitely a bad deal.

    in reply to: Indian Air Force Thread 20 #2161434
    Vnomad
    Participant

    Rafales have been sold to other countries. They managed to agree on prices. Why is India unable to settle on prices & terms?

    Note that I blame politicians as well as bureaucrats – but politicians sometimes rely on advice from officials. And you cannot deny that India does have a serious problem with military procurement. The C-17 fiasco is a particularly egregious example, but it’s far from the only one.

    Basically you’re asking why India isn’t willing to pay what Qatar or Egypt did? Well.. maybe if it were an oil rich sheikhdom or run by a military junta things would be different. However, it is what it is and India appears to have a certain perception of what the aircraft is worth that is at odds with that.

    Equally one could ask why the Rafale hasn’t seen any success outside the Middle East. Why aren’t EU states buying it? Why did UAE issue this statement:

    Thanks to President (Nicolas) Sarkozy, France could not have done more diplomatically or politically to secure the Rafale deal. His personal intervention in this process has sustained Dassault at the forefront of our considerations. Regrettably, Dassault seems unaware that all the diplomatic and political will in the world cannot overcome uncompetitive and unworkable commercial terms.

    Crown Prince Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed

    India can buy other types, but why should negotiations for them go more easily? The vendors all find it possible to reach terms with other countries in a reasonable time, but India struggles to reach terms with anyone. It’s obvious where the problem is.

    Again, the deal isn’t stuck in bureaucracy, its stuck on terms. I imagine if other vendors offer better prices, negotiations will go more easily. In the US’ case there is also the advantage of the streamlined FMS system. (Under which they managed to sign the P-8I & C-130J contracts within 12 months.)

    Dropping Rafale after a 15 year process means starting again. How long will that take?

    Only if they follow the same format. And all indications from the MoD suggest that they’re not looking to restart the whole RFI-RFP-L1/L2 process.

    in reply to: Indian Air Force Thread 20 #2161603
    Vnomad
    Participant

    The problem is that India struggles to make any deals for combat aircraft these days, apart from tacking more on to existing contracts. It’s not a new problem. Think how long it took to order the Hawk.

    Walk away from this deal – & what? That’s it, no more Western aircraft, just what Russia is willing to sell, on Russian terms?

    Assuming a third type is necessary, fact is the Rafale’s hardly the only western aircraft available to the IAF. There’s the F-35 & SH via FMS, as well as the Gripen E. (The EF will probably be no cheaper unless they throw in an assembly line and/or some T1s).

    What India needs is decimation of the people involved in procurement, with a promise to repeat it regularly if the survivors don’t start doing their jobs properly. The problem is India’s bureaucracy & politicians, not the vendors. Giving up on deals because India can’t negotiate them is a recipe for disaster.

    Except that the deal in this case isn’t stymied by bureaucracy or politicians. Simply put, there doesn’t appear to be any meeting ground on cost. Period.

    Personally, I find that encouraging. I fully expected the MoD to sign an uncompetitive deal under pressure from the PMO. (Though that’s still a possibility, since the deal isn’t dead yet.)

    The political factor is ironically the only thing keeping the negotiations going – since the deal originated with the PM rather than with the MoD or IAF.

    in reply to: What will be the next country to order the F-35? #2161643
    Vnomad
    Participant

    So are the Chinese planes…

    Not necessarily. The main difference being the huge disparity in resources IMO. The J-20 entered limited series production last year.

    in reply to: What will be the next country to order the F-35? #2161724
    Vnomad
    Participant

    Thats why there´s this thing called the FGFA.

    The FGFA is years away. At least a decade or so I’d say, as they get the new engine operational, create the production infrastructure, fix inevitable hardware problems & software bugs, streamline maintenance processes & supply chains, and set up a personnel training pipeline, i.e. everything the F-35 program has been doing over the last five years.

    in reply to: Indian Air Force Thread 20 #2161751
    Vnomad
    Participant

    It appears India was willing to pay only €7.35 bn, while France asked for €10.5 bn. Now they’ve made a last and best offer for €7.89 bn, achieved by stripping off a huge chunk of the support package. The ball’s back in the Indian MoD’s court.

    I suspect the MoD, which never wanted to pursue this deal, has been hoping all along that Dassault/French govt would just call it a day and walk away. They’ve been negotiating for 13 months now since Modi signed the MoU in Paris, and they say it’ll still take another few months. They should really just let it go before it becomes more rancorous than it already is.

    in reply to: Indian Air Force Thread 20 #2161759
    Vnomad
    Participant

    Rafale deal: France rejects bank guarantee, awaits India’s reply

    The initial French offer for the 36 fighters made by Dassault Aviation was for around Euro 10.5 billion, following which the Indian side asked for a 30 per cent cut.

    http://images.indianexpress.com/2015/04/raf1.jpg
    The first aircraft is scheduled to be supplied within 36 months of the signing of the deal while the last aircraft will reach India in seven years.

    INDIA IS yet to respond, either verbally or in writing, to a letter sent to Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar on April 1 by his French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian, who made what is said to be the “best offer” his country can make in a government-to-government deal for 36 Rafale fighter jets, sources told The Indian Express.

    The initial French offer for the 36 fighters made by Dassault Aviation was for around Euro 10.5 billion, following which the Indian side asked for a 30 per cent cut. The latest offer, made in the French minister’s letter, is of around Euro 7.8 billion, said sources.

    Days before the letter was sent, the French side had rejected an Indian request for a sovereign guarantee or a bank guarantee for the deal, and instead offered to provide a “comfort letter” from their prime minister.

    As reported by The Indian Express on March 14, the law ministry had raised objections over France’s refusal to provide any bank guarantees. Asked about Le Drian’s letter, the defence ministry said it does not comment on ongoing negotiations between two governments.

    Sources said there was “a significant difference” between the two offers. The original offer included a ten-year product support period, which has been brought down to five years, they said. The latest figure also does not include the cost of setting up infrastructure at two airbases for two Rafale squadrons, said sources.

    It’s learnt that one of the bases is proposed to be established in the east, to tackle the Chinese threat, and the other in the north.

    India will have to make a payment of 15 per cent of the total cost at the time of signing the deal, said sources. The first aircraft is scheduled to be supplied within 36 months of the signing of the deal while the last aircraft will reach India in seven years.

    ”Even though the Indian configuration is different from what the French air force flies, calculations show that the French government has agreed to provide a discount of around 7-8 per cent over its buying price. It will have to compensate Dassault for it in some way,” said sources.

    The IAF has demanded a fighter configuration different from the one flown by the French air force, including an Israeli helmet-mounted camera and a third-party weapons system.

    Price negotiations for the jets have been complicated by deals signed by France for selling the fighter to Egypt and Qatar. Sources said it would not be possible for France to go too far below those prices. Unlike India, Egypt and Qatar have opted for the same configuration as Dassault supplies to the French air force.

    Sources also said that there was a small window available for the two sides to close the deal. French Ambassador François Richier, who has been closely involved with the deal, is ending his Delhi stint in June. It would take a few months for his replacement to present his credentials and understand the intricacies of the deal, they said.

    The French establishment is also expected to go into election mode later this year with presidential polls scheduled next year.

    India had announced its decision to buy the 36 fighters from France during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Paris last April. This followed the selection of the French fighter in a decade-long competitive bid for India’s next Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). The 126-aircraft MMRCA tender was withdrawn by the NDA government soon after the announcement of the 36 fighter deal in Paris.

    Technical negotiations were completed earlier this year and the deal was expected to be signed in January when French President Francois Hollande was the chief guest at the Republic Day celebrations. But both sides were unable to conclude negotiations over price by then.

    in reply to: F-35 News and discussion (2016) take III #2163187
    Vnomad
    Participant

    It’s good that you simply said ‘Eurovision’ and didn’t add ‘Song Contest’, because it’s surely anything but a song contest. It’s a political point scoring event with singing in between.

    ‘Political point scoring event’ where Russia came in third and UK & Germany finished at the bottom of the pile… :confused:

    in reply to: How can Argentina stop the F-35B? #2164965
    Vnomad
    Participant

    Easy. The 2012 population of the islands was just under 3000. I go to my government and tell them to offer every one of those 3000 people a sum of £3mn to effectively pack themselves up and disappear within a 3 month period. All it needs to be a success is enough islanders to go for it that the remaining community isnt large enough to be viable. I tell my government to play the long game and go back after a year with a new offer of £3.5mn to each remaining islander to get lost…or accept a lesser amount and stay within the new more vibrant and viable planned Argentine community.

    Cost £9-10bn. No need to buy an additional bullet let alone spend those billions in rebuilding my military infrastructure that, once I’ve taken the Falklands back and have UK aquiesence, I have no use for….save to make some of my neighbours nervous!.

    UK get to declare that the wishes of the locals have been upheld at every turn and are free to negotiate constructive mineral exploitation contracts with Argentine companies…which the Argentine Govt has been offering as a sweetner all along….and cut out a big chunk of expenditure from their defence budget. Argentina gambles the spend against finding the mineral wealth to make the whole exercise worthwhile whilst wrapping herself in the flag. Google start changing names on maps!.

    +1

    As things stand, all three sides are losers. The Argentinians can’t exploit the Falklands resources because it flies the Union Jack. The Falklanders can’t efficiently exploit them because the only close market is Argentina. And the British are spending hundreds of millions of pounds to militarily secure the islands with little economic benefit.

    Anything that allows them to break the status quo while still being able to sell it as a win to their electorate, should be pursued.

    Personally, I thought the dual nationality proposal was a solid idea. Like a more ambitious evolution of the Anglo-Irish agreement. Should be cheaper to implement as well – say.. £1 mil lumpsum to fly two flags out front instead of just one, with an overall improvement in local economic conditions. Sounds like a good deal to me.

    in reply to: F-35 News and discussion (2016) take III #2165231
    Vnomad
    Participant

    You clearly have no rudamentry understanding of economics as well.. What I tried to paint is that the allready scandalous over budged $400billions and counting is going to increase more.. much more with upgrade Package that is overdue to the scandalous delayed timeframe of the F-35 program.

    $400bn for 2,450 aircraft is equivalent to a unit procurement cost of about $160 mil. Not cheap but far from scandalous. The 4 year rightward ‘reset’ of the timeline too, while a PR nightmare for the program is hardly a ‘scandal’, especially relative to other fighter programs around the world. Similar case for the development cost (its over budget by 30%).

    in reply to: F-35 News and discussion (2016) take III #2165233
    Vnomad
    Participant

    Oh no, that is not how politicians handle things :p What good it does for a politician struggling with BY2022 to consider what happens 10 years in the future? No, they whip out the cheese slicer and cut little bit right away – like they have done elsewhere in same situation, and what they indeed already have done with F-35…

    I have no idea what you’re talking about. The current plan of ramping up production is not threatened by any politician. If anything they’ve rejected the minor cuts proposed by the US DoD.

    in reply to: F-35 News and discussion (2016) take III #2165239
    Vnomad
    Participant

    :facepalm:

    Apparently the idiocy of letting the three services pursue their own independent iterations of F-35 (every variant is expected to have a common avionics & software build), is lost on the US Senate.

    Senate committee votes to disband F-35 JPO

    17 MAY, 2016 BY STEPHEN TRIMBLE

    Three weeks after a prominent member called the size of the F-35 joint programme office (JPO) “disturbing”, the Senate Armed Services Committee has proposed to disband the organisation just as an $8 billion follow-on modernisation programme is taking shape.

    The committee’s version of the National Defense Authorisation Act for Fiscal 2017 approved on 16 May would eliminate the JPO after the Lockheed Martin fighter transitions to full rate production two years later. Management responsibilities would be divided by variant, with the US Air Force taking over procurement and modernisation of the F-35A and the US Navy gaining the same powers over the F-35C and the Marine Corps’ F-35B.

    If adopted by the full Senate and the House of Representatives and signed into law by President Barack Obama, the provision would mark the single-largest change in the management of the programme since it was formed in the late-1990s to manage the fly-off between the Lockheed X-35 and Boeing X-32. It would also raise questions about the status of international partners under the new management structure.

    The Senate committee wants the programme to be managed directly by the services that operate the aircraft, rather than under a joint office that reports directly to the offices of the Secretary of Defense.

    “Despite aspirations for a joint aircraft, the F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C are essentially three distinct aircraft, with significantly different missions and capability requirements. Devolving this programme to the services will help ensure the proper alignment of responsibility and accountability the F-35 program needs and has too often lacked,” the committee wrote in a summary of the bill.

    The passage echoes criticisms raised during a 26 April committee hearing focused on the F-35 programme, when Arizona Senator John McCain called on Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan to describe the staff and budget under his command. McCain disagreed with Bogdan’s reply that the office comprised 2,590 workers with a $70 million annual budget, saying he understood the office employed nearly 3,000 with a $300 million budget. But he called even the $70 million yearly budget for a single acquisition office “disturbing”.

    The F-35 is entering a critical transition period from a development phase with low-rate production to operational status with full-rate production. The USMC has already activated its first F-35B squadron in Yuma, Arizona, with limited capabilities. The USAF plans to follow suit with the first F-35A squadron reaching initial operational capability (IOC) in August, although Bogdan admits a critical back-end system for managing spare parts and logistics will not be ready until October.

    At the same time, the JPO has started planning a controversial follow-on modernization programme, aiming to convert the F-35’s software-based avionics applications to open architecture standards and to upgrade the aircraft’s sensors and weapons with technology developed since the aircraft’s design was frozen in 2004. McCain has opposed the Pentagon’s plan to have the JPO manage the so-called Block 4 upgrade as an extension of the existing programme. Instead, he prefers that the estimated $8 billion upgrade package be managed as a separate programme, with a competitive acquisition and a fixed-price development contract.

Viewing 15 posts - 541 through 555 (of 2,429 total)